COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio DAN MICA, Florida MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland WILLIAM H. GRAY III, Pennsylvania TONY P. HALL, Ohio HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS LESTER L. WOLFF, New York, Chairman TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington DAN MICA, Florida TONY P. HALL, Ohio CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York EDWARD J. PALMER, Subcommittee Staff Director CHRISTOPHER D. W. NELSON, Subcommittee Staff Associate (II) PREFACE On December 15, 1978, President Carter completed the work of 7 years, and of two of his predecessors, by announcing the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, to be effective January 1, 1979. As was clear at the time, the United States undertook these steps with mixed emotions, for in order to recognize the People's Republic of China as the government of the mainland, we had to sever formal ties with our longtime friend and ally, the Republic of China, on Taiwan. The following hearings were conducted by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in February to supplement and parallel those held simultaneously by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Both sets of hearings detailed the concerns dominating the many issues surrounding normalization, which the Congress was being asked to ratify, in effect, through the vehicle of the Taiwan Relations Act.1 CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS Thus, while the many strategic issues inherent in the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China were discussed in detail in the following hearings, as well as in the committee hearings, and in the Congress as a whole, the central debate was over two areas relating to Taiwan in the administration's proposed legislation. These were, first, concern over the security question in the wake of notification of the ending of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei, and second, how the future economic and social well-being of the people on Taiwan would be promoted under the new, unofficial relationship. All witnesses agreed that as a general proposition, normalization between the United States and the People's Republic of China was a positive step, a logical, inevitable one, which, if properly carried out, could serve to enhance our long-term interests in the world, including the prospects for peace and stability in Asia. ADMINISTRATION BILL SHORTCOMINGS However, the nonadministration witnesses agreed that the original proposals outlined by the administration failed to address the security concern, or the needs of the people on Taiwan, or of the private, commercial interests which were to form the bedrock of the new, unofficial United States-Taiwanese relationship. In the early months of the normalization debate, primary focus was placed on finding an adequate, though unofficial, substitute for the Mutual Defense Treaty. A recent lower court decision has cast possible doubt on the immediate future of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which, technically, remains in effect until January 1, 1980.2 1 See app. 5 for text of the Taiwan legislation adopted by the Congress and signed into law by President Carter on Apr. 10, 1979. 2 See app. 4 for complete text of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Whatever the outcome of this legal situation, which involves serious constitutional and parliamentary issues, in February, a compromise was worked out by the House and Senate with the administration, along the lines of the legislation introduced by Senators Kennedy and Cranston, and in the House by myself, as chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. The details of this legislation are fully covered in the first of the following hearings, with statements from Senators Cranston and Kennedy, and in dialog between subcommittee members and administration witnesses. 3 BACKGROUND TO COMPROMISE As a result of the normalization agreement between the United States and China, the United States met Peking's longstanding "three conditions," the "derecognition" of Taipei, the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. In return, the United States retained the right to continue to sell Taiwan defensive arms and to carry out the full range of nonofficial relations. In particular, the United States was assured by Chinese officials including Deng Xiaoping that it could follow the so-called Japanese Formula for continued economic and social relations with Taiwan. These public assurances dovetailed with those enunciated privately when the subcommittee visited Peking in July 1978. At that time, Vice Premier Deng indicated that China was prepared to do what it could to foster peaceful conditions of settlement between Peking and Taipei. However, the Vice Premier then, and in his subsequent journey to Washington this January, repeatedly refused to rule out the use of force, if ultimately necessary, to reunite Taiwan and the mainland. While there was thus some give and take between Washington and Peking, in which the subcommittee played some part, problems immediately arose following the President's announcement due to China's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. This, coupled with the agreement by the administration to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty, made Congress aware of the need to reassure the private and business communities-in addition to the people on Taiwan-that the Taiwan legislation would help safeguard the island's security without the "umbrella" of security implied by the defense treaty. An additional problem-one wholly unnecessary, in my view-was the issue of prior consultation, during the final stages of the negotiations. This issue has been fully aired, and there is no need to repeat the many points raised during the debate, and in the following hearings. For the future, however, the concern remains that Presidents will continue to present the Congress with foreign policy "faits. accompli," in which we have a choice of either appearing to obstruct or serving as a rubber stamp. 5 3 See paper by Jonathan B. Eddison, Georgetown University Law Center, "The Separation of Powers and the Termination of Treaties" (p. 35 of the hearings), statement by Hon. Barry M. Goldwater, U.S. Senator from Arizona "Analysis of Presidential Treaty "Terminations' Argued in State Department Memorandum" (p. 122). 4"A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, Aug. 3-13, 1978", by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 5 See app. 2, letter to President Carter from Chairman Clement J. Zablocki and Hon. Lester L. Wolff, dated Dec. 19, 1978. |