case if a passenger should carry merchandise by way of baggage, and thus make the carrier of passengers a carrier of goods without knowing it and without being paid for it.

Generally, a common carrier of passengers, by stage, packet, steamer, or cars, carries the moderate and reasonable baggage of a passenger, without being paid specifically for it. But the law considers a payment for this so far included in the payment of the fare, as to form a sufficient ground for the carrier's liability to the extent above stated.

The carrier is only liable for the goods or baggage delivered to him and placed under his care. Hence, if a sender of goods send his own servant with them, and intrust them to him and hot to the carrier, the carrier is not responsible. So, if a passenger keeps his baggage, or any part of it, on his person, or in his own hands, or within his own sight and immediate control, instead of delivering it to the carrier or his servants, the carrier is not liable, as carrier, for any loss or injury which may happen to it; that is, not without actual default in the matter. Thus, in an action brought in New York to charge a railroad company, as common carriers, for the loss of an overcoat belonging to a passenger, it appeared that the coat was not delivered to the defendants, but that the passenger having placed it on the seat of the car in which he sat, forgot to take it with him when he left, and it was afterwards stolen; and it was held that the defendants were not liable. But if the baggage of a passenger is delivered to a common carrier, or his servant, he is liable for it in the same way, and to the same extent, as he is for goods which he carries.

In this country the rules of evidence permit the traveler to maintain his action against the carrier by proving, by his own testimony, the contents of a lost trunk or valise, and their value. And the testimony of the wife of the owner is similarly admissible. But the carrier's liability is always limited to such thingsin quantity, quality, kind, and value-as might reasonably be supposed to be carried in such a trunk or valise. The rule, with this limitation, seems reasonable and safe, and is quite generally adopted. In Massachusetts it was distinctly denied by the Supreme Court, but was afterwards established by statute.

A sleeping-car company is not liable as a common carrier, or as an inn-holder, but only for negligence. It is its duty to use

reasonable care to guard the passengers from theft, and if through want of such care the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen, the company is liable.

The common carrier of goods or of passengers is liable to third parties for any injury done to them by the negligence or default of the carrier, or of his servants. And it would seem that he is liable even for the wilful wrong-doing of his servants if it was committed while in his employ, and in the management of the conveyance under his control, although the wrong was done in direct opposition to his express commands. So he is for injury to property by the wayside, caused by his fault. But the negligence of the party suffering the injury, if it was material and contributed to the injury, is a good defense for the carrier unless malice on the carrier's part can be shown.

Where the party injured is in fault, the common carrier has been held liable, if that fault was made possible and injurious through the fault of the carrier. If passengers are carried gratuitously—that is, without pay-the common carrier is still liable for injury caused by his negligence.

The liability of railroads for injury or death of third persons as well as of passengers has been greatly modified by statute. In some States contributory negligence on the part of the person injured is no longer a valid defense.

Whether a railroad company is responsible for fire set to buildings or property along the road, without negligence on its part, has been much considered in this country. In some of our States they are made so liable by statute provision. And this fact, together with the general principles of liability for injury done, would seem to lead to the conclusion that they are not liable, unless in fault, or unless made so by statute.

CHAPTER XXII.

HOTEL KEEPERS, INNKEEPERS, AND BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPERS. HOTEL KEEPERS and innkeepers are, in law, the same. An inn has been judicially defined as a house where the traveler is provided with everything which he has occasion for while on his way. There need not be a sign to make it an inn. A coffeehouse or eating-room is not an inn, nor is a boarding-house.

An innkeeper has a lien upon all the goods of a guest, for the price of his entertainment, or that of his servants and horses. This lien covers the goods brought to him by a guest, though they belong to another person. Thus he has a lien on a stolen horse which the thief brings to him. But he has no lien on the clothes or goods which a guest actually has upon his person.

He must receive every guest who offers, unless his house is full, or there is good reason to believe that the guest will be disorderly. A guest has a right to reasonable accommodations, but not to choose his apartment, or use it for other purposes than those for which it was designated. Public policy imposes upon an innkeeper a severe liability. In strict law, he is an insurer of the property committed to his care, against everything but the act of God, the public enemy, or the fraud or neglect of the guest. But there seems to be of late some disposition in the courts to hold him thus liable only where there has been some kind or measure of negligence on his part.

A boarder at a boarding-house cannot hold the keeper of the house to this liability, nor does the common law give the keeper a lien on the boarder's goods, but such a lien is given by statute in many of the States. It is sometimes difficult to say whether a person in the house is a guest at an inn, or a boarder. From all the cases we infer this distinction: A boarder is one who makes a bargain for a certain time. A guest comes and goes when he likes, paying only for what he receives. Though he stays a long time at an inn or hotel, without any bargain on time, he is still a guest; holding the keeper of the inn to his liability, and having his goods under a lien to the keeper. But if he makes a bargain on time, he becomes a boarder, and the liability and lien of the keeper cease.

It is a good defense by an innkeeper against a guest's claim for a loss, that it was caused by a servant of the owner, or by one who came with him as his companion, or by the owner's own fault. It is also a good defense if the owner retained, personally and exclusively, the custody and care of the goods; but it is not enough to make this defense sufficient, that the owner exercised some choice as to where his goods should be placed, nor that the key of the room was given him. But an innkeeper may require of his guest to place his goods in a particular place, under lock and key; or to give notice to guests that he will not be responsible for money, or especially valuable goods, unless placed in the innkeeper's safe. If such precautions are reasonable, and the guest neglects them, the innkeeper is not liable. Some articles of this kind a guest needs to have within his immediate reach; and such things he need not deposit in the safe, and the innkeeper would be liable if they were lost without the guest's own fault.

The innkeeper is liable for the loss of the goods while fairly in his custody, though not specially delivered to him; as if lost while the innkeeper's servant was carrying them to the inn, or from the inn to the cars, or in a hack in which the innkeeper undertook to carry the guest "free" from a station to his inn.

Some cases hold that the innkeeper is liable for the loss of goods placed in, an inn although the owner does not himself lodge or eat there. But other cases, and we think with better reason, hold that the innkeeper is liable only for the goods when the owner comes and stays with them. He is not liable permanently for goods left by a guest who has gone away. He would, however, still be held liable for them for a reasonable time, which, in one case, was said to extend over "some days.” For a guest may leave for a reasonable time-which must not be long-with the purpose of return; and while he is absent his goods are under the same responsibility of the innkeeper as if the owner were in the house.

If a horse or carriage is put into a distant barn, or a horse into a pasture, by the innkeeper, without the knowledge or consent of the owner, the innkeeper is liable for their loss.

A boarding-house keeper is liable for loss caused by the negligence of his or her servants, as he or she is for his or her own; but not, like an innkeeper, for a loss without negligence.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LIMITATIONS.

SECTION I.

THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.

ALL of our States have what are called Statutes of Limitations. They are not the same everywhere; but they provide different periods of time within which the actions specified in the statutes must be brought. These periods vary from twenty years to one. Generally, they are longer for real actions, or for actions on judgments or on contracts under seal, and shorter for simple contracts of various kinds. An abstract of these statutory provisions in all the States is given at the close of this chapter.

In most of the States there is a statute which provides, in substance, that, if a debt or promise be once barred by the Statute of Limitations, no acknowledgment of the debt or new promise shall renew the debt, and take away the effect of the statute, unless the new promise is in writing, and is signed by the party who makes the promise. But this statute expressly permits a part-payment either of principal or interest of the old debt to have the same effect as a new promise. And this statute also provides, that if there be joint contractors or debtors, and a plaintiff is barred by the statute against both, but the bar of the statute is removed as to one by a new promise or otherwise, the plaintiff may have judgment against this one, but not against the other.

SECTION II.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE.

FOR the law of limitation there is a twofold foundation; in the first place, the actual probability that a debt which has not been claimed for a long time was paid, and that this is the reason of the silence of the creditor. But, besides this reason, there is the inexpediency and injustice of permitting a stale