whose intentions were evidently inimical. They openly at length refused to pay taxes, or to acknow leage the viceroy's authority; they seized his person in a progress he was making through the island, and released him only on condition he should recall the troops he had sta tioned in the interior parts. The malcontents continued their intrigues, and completely succeeded in filling the public with complaints and dissatisfaction. Apprised of their designs, the viceroy perceiving the impracticability of obviating them, intimated the intention of leaving the island, and embarking with the English garrison. In consequence of this intimation, a body of French and Corsicans sailed from Leghorn, and landed on the eighteenth of October in Corsica, where multitudes having joined them, they proceeded to Bastia, the capital, and summoned the English garrison to surrender; but it effected its embarkation on board the ships in the harbour with inconsiderable loss, and withdrew to Porto Ferraio, in the island of Elbe, of which the English had taken possession at the time that Leghorn was seized by the French, in order to prevent them from making a seizure of this island in the same manner.

The evacuation of Corsica by the English, and its return to the government of France, was an event peculiarly acceptable to the directory, which did not fail to Speak of it in terms of the greatest satisfaction, and to magnify it as of the highest importance to the republic, and detriment to the English interest in the Mediterranean. The fact was, that the retention of it would manifestly have cost much more than its worth. The disposi

tion of the inhabitants was so little to be relied upon, and they had been so thoroughly prejudiced against the British government, that it appeared totally useless to eudea-' vour to reclaim them by reasonings, which they would have disregarded, or to coerce them by severities, which would have produced civil contentions and bloodshed, that must have filled the island with wretchedness and calamity, without answering any other purpose than perpetuating mutual enmity, and rendering the possession of it a source of endless perplexity. In this light, the determination taken to abandon it, was a measure of timely prudence.

These various successes of the French, and of their partisans, accelerated the treaties of peace into which the princes of Italy bad engaged to enter with the republic. The king of Naples and the duke of Parma had, conformably to the terms of the armistice granted to them, deputed commissioners to Paris, to settle the conditions. It was an auspicious circumstance for both, that Spain was at this time on friendly terms with France. Under the mediation of the Spanish minister at Paris, these two princes were treated by the directory with more moderation than they could have otherwise expected, considering the inveteracy they bad manifested against the republic; much the same conditions were granted to them, as to the other powers with which France had already concluded pacifications. Naples however was required to pay the sum of eight millions, either in money or in naval stores. The Batavian republic was formally included in this treaty, which was

ber.

The conduct of the court of Rome was marked, on this occasion, with a temerity that was by numbers attributed to imbecility, and the grossest degree of bigotry. Notwithstanding the repeated defeats of the Imperialists, such was the confidence in the prowess of the Germans, after Buonaparte had been forced to raise the siege of Mantua; and in that fatality which had formerly attended the French in their invasions of Italy, that it was firmly believed at Rome they would be expelled, as they had been before, with equal loss and ignominy; and that the fortune of the house of Austria would certainly preponderate.

Full of these ideas, those who influenced the papal councils were constantly averse to the concessions demanded by the directory, as repugnant to the long established maxims of the Roman see, and inimical to the Catholic religion. It was explicitly required of the pope, that he should revoke all those publications that had been issued in virtue of his spiritual authority, and that related to the affairs of France.

This was a blow so directly striking at his religious principles, that no surprise was excited at the abhorrence he expressed of such a requisition. Herein be was seconded by all the zealous adherents to bis tenets. Had no other means been used to combat the demands of the French, than reasoning and argument, no blame could have been imputed to their antagonists: but the spirit of bigotry and superstition rose up against them in a manner that reminded the world of

perstition that were recorded of former ages.

The immediate intervention of heaven was resorted to, and miracles positively asserted to have been performed in many of the churches of Rome, in vindication, as it was construed, of the truth and dignity of the catholic religion, outraged by the iniquitous conduct of the French, and their wicked attempts to establish infidelity on the ruins of theChristian belief. The streets of Rome were filled with processions, and the credulity of the people converted into the means of inflaming them against the French, as the enemies of the Divinity, and of all that was sacred among men.

The court of Rome did not seem to reflect, that, by lending it self to such base and scandalous attempts to impose upon the multitude, they forfeited the consider. ation of all the reasonable part even of their own society. For though the propensity of the Roman ca. tholics to give credit to miraculous events is well known, yet the more judicious and discerning among them are very far from giving countenance to the absur dities that pass current among the generality.

Such however was either the real or pretended belief in the impostures daily propagated, that the zeal of all classes and conditions was roused; the populace was kindled to the utmost rage against all who expressed a doubt of these wonders, and testified the most violent ardour to enlist in the ser vice of the church and state. The phrenzy of the monks, and of the weaker ecclesiastics, came in aid of that which appeared in the commonalty

monalty, and even some persons, not devoid of understanding, were induced to think, that the fury and indignation, excited by the persuasion of celestial assistance, being at band, against the French, might supply the want of discipline, and animate the multitude to the most vigorous and effectual exertions. The French resident, at Rome, endeavoured to make the adminis tration sensible of the dangers to which it exposed the state, by these rash proceedings; but his advice was rejected, and preparations of war occupied the attention of all men: not however without moving the compassion of those who foresaw the calamities, or the humiliations, that would result from these senseless measures, and the derision of those who secretly ridicaled the idea of transforming a nation of bigots into an army of heroes. This, however, did not, perhaps, appear to the court of Rome, what indeed it was not, impossible; and, as to the number of those who derided fanatical and superstitious notions, was probably believed to be far less than it really was.

Whether the pope himself was prompted by his own credulity, or that of others, he completely threw off the mask of piety and resignation which he had formerly assumed, as above related, and acted, through out the whole of this business, as if he considered the cause of the Roman see as entitled to superna tural interposition. So deep rooted was his attachment to the rules and prescriptions of former times, that he listened to no advice but that of ecclesiastics, and employed no other persons to negociate with the French, though he well knew how odious such persons were to them, and how likely to mar all

negociations on that very account. He behaved, in short, as if he had lived in those ages when the ignorance of mankind, and the implicit respect arising from it for the pontifical character, subdued the dictates of good sense in all transactions with the church of Rome; and enabled it to domineer over nations with an authority that silenced every argument, and commanded their obedience to him, on the despotic principle of his being the vicegerent of heaven upon earth.

And yet had he turned his attention to what was passing around him, and even among his own people, he must have seen the fatal impropriety of trusting to the disposition of men in religious or political matters, at the present æra, as might have been done heretofore.

So impressive had been the example of the French in affairs of religion and politics, in every part of Italy, that avowed approvers of them had arisen in every province and sovereignty of that country. Republican principles especially, were maintained by those who still faithfully adhered to the tenets of Christianity, which, indeed, they explicitly asserted, was totally unconnected with any form of government, and inculcated no more than obedience to the established laws, and fidelity to the government itself, whatever its form might be. As these maxims, however sound and reasonable in themselves, militated gainst the systems prevailing in Italy, the ruling powers felt, of course, an invincible repugnance to them. Hence their abhorrence of the French, and their readiness, at the same time, to enter into agree. ments with them, before their prin. ciples had gained sufficient latitude among their own subjects to incite [13]

them

them to throw off the yoke, and adopt the system of the French,who might easily be prevailed upon, in such case, to give them effectual

Countenance.

This was fully verified in the instance of the duchy of Modena: its sovereign, when he fled to Venice, had established a regency, which, contrarily to the intent of the armistice concluded with the French, as they complained, set about repairing the fortifications of the city of that name. This afforded them a plausible pretext to take it into their own possession; they dismissed the ducal regency, and substituted a government on their own plan, and which was to rule in their name.. This change was effected on the eighth of October.

The city of Reggio, the next in importance in that duchy, had already cast off its obedience, and settled a republican government, in complete imitation of that in France. This happened towards the close of August. The cities of Bologna and Ferrara, which had submitted to the French about two months before, were now so completely revolutionized in their principles, that they sent a deputation to congratulate the people of Reggio upon what they had done, and to offer them assistance against all opposers. After the French had seized Modena, an union of that city and those of Reggio, Bologna, Ferrara, and of their respective districts, into one commonwealth, under the protection of France, was immediately projected. The French forms and institutions were adopted in every respect; but care was taken, at the same time, to prevent, by the strictest regulations, all tumultuous proceedings, on account of differences in opinion, and to secure the property,

2

of all those who behaved peaceably Herein the conduct of Buonaparte was remarkably impartial: be threatened the severest punishment to those who violated the tranquillity of the public on pretext of avenging the state on the enemies to liberty.

The spirit that animated the people of this new republic, and which was generally diffused every. where, was highly unacceptable to the aristocratical governments in Italy.

At Genoa, the mass of the inhabitants was evidently inclined to the French system, but the nobles still continued inveterate to democratical principles.

In the districts situated along the mountainous country, bordering upon the territories of Genoa, numbers of banditti infested the roads, and were privately encouraged by the Austrian emissaries at Genoa; whose residence in that city was strongly suspected to be connived at by some principal persons in the Genoese government. These suspicions, and the repugnance of the nobles to favour popular notions, prevented a cordial correspondence from subsisting between this state and the French republic.

In the duchy of Milan, the re publican spirit prevailed, with hardly any other opposition than of those interested for the Austrians, by the employments they had held in their service. The administration of affairs, in this country, was now vested in the representative assembly,chosen by the people, which exercised the powers of government under the protection of France.

The members of this administration were men of conspicuous firmness and determination in the cause they had embraced: they exerted all their abilities and influence over

their

their countrymen, in order to preserve that spirit of liberty among them, on which, they were conscious, depended the favour of the French, without which their condition would not be better than under the Austrian domination. This indeed was held in particular detestation by the persons eminent for their literary talents, for whom it expressed a marked aversion, on account of the freedom they frequently took in their writings and conversations, when treating of religious or political subjects.

The return of this odious domination was extremely dreaded by the Milanese. Those, in whom the change of affairs had placed the supreme authority, well knew, that, were the Austrians to regain possession of this country, its inhabitants would suffer severely, on account of the preference they had manifested for the French; and that they themselves had no other prospect than of capital punishment for the part they had acted.

Swayed by these motives, they used every means, and employed every argument, to inspire their Countrymen with the resolution to oppose, to the last extremity, the re-establishment of the Austrian power. They published admonitions and addresses to the public, several of which were strikingly eloquent and pathetic: they warmly exhorted their countrymen, and, through them, the people of all Italy, to improve the opportunity, arisen from the entrance of the French, and their readiness to emancipate the subjects of the despotic princes, who had so long oppressed the country, to throw off the yoke, and to establish free constitutions. They enforced this advice with every reason that could be adduced,

but especially the facility they would find, in conjunction with the French, to bring about every alteration necessary for their welfare. Never might so auspicious an occasion recur, to substitute the governments, founded on liberty, to the tyrannical systems from which every man among them, that dared to speak his mind, openly expressed his wish to be delivered.

In pursuance of these sentiments, which were almost universally dif fused through all classes, the administration publicly offered a prize for the best treatise that should be produced on the important question, which was the free government best calculated to promote the happiness of Italy? The subject was handled, accordingly, with all the freedom it merited the pens of some of the most eminent writers were employ. ed on this occasion, and though, by venturing to utter their thoughts, they might eventually expose themselves to the greatest danger, their zeal and courage raised them above all apprehensions.

The publications of this kind, that frequently appeared at this period, made so effectual an impression upon those for whom they were intended, that a general inclination to take an active part against the Austrians was every where visible. They were, in fact, considered by most of the Italians as the common enemy of their country, long before the French expedition. The only difference between these and the Germans, was, that the latter had possession, and the former was striving to gain a footing. But then, the views of both were professedly opposite; the one meaning to retain his possessions, the other to set them free from their present holders, and to erect them into independent states. [14]

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