when an employee is injured in the street from a cause to which all other persons using the street are likewise exposed, the injury cannot be said to arise out of the employment.

But on the one hand, it has been held that where a solicitor and collector for a life insurance company was injured by a street car while he was running to board another car, in the course of his employment, such injury arose out of the employment, Moran's Case, Mass. (1920), 125 N. E. 591, 5 W. C. L. J. 400, while on the other hand, it has been held that an employee whose duties took him into the streets, and who was injured by slipping on an ice-covered sidewalk while going to board a street car, was not injured by an accident arising out of his employment. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 150 N. W. 325, L. R. A. 1916A, 310, 10 N. C. C. A. 345. See similar holding in Donahue's Case, 226 Mass. 595, 116 N. E. 226, L. R. A. 1918A 215, 14 N. C. C. A. 491.

In another case it appeared that an employee's duties required him to write letters and mail them at a street box, and that while returning to his place of employment, after mailing a letter, he was struck and injured by an automobile. It was held that the injury arose out of his employment, because "the accident was a natural accident of his work resulting from the exposure occasioned by the necessity of his going upon the street while performing such work." Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 36 Cal. App. 280, 171 Pac. 1088, 2 W. C. L. J. 31, 16 N. C. C. A. 907.

Of these cases it is suggested that the Michigan case is entirely wrong, the Massachusetts case partly wrong, and that in the California case the Court has taken the correct view. When the place of work of an employee is the public streets, then the dangers incident to the use of such streets become dangers that are incident to his employment; and the fact that the traveling public generally are equally exposed to such dangers cannot have any bearing upon the question. Those dangers are incident to the employment as matter of fact, and this fact is not changed by dragging into the question extraneous and immaterial facts for the purpose of spinning nice theories. The employee is subjected to the dangers of the street in exactly the same manner in which a factory worker is subjected to the dangers of the factory while in the course of his employment. Nor does it make any difference that the employee is subjected to greater risks of injury bcause they are more constant than those that are incidental to the occasional and casual use of the streets by persons who use them in the ordinary way. It makes no difference whether the risks he is exposed to are more or less than those to which the public generally are exposed. They are dangers peculiar to the place of the employment, and it is of no consequence where that place is. "The causative danger was peculiar to the work, in that, had he not been on the street in the course of his duty, he would not have been injured." Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 36 Cal. App. 280, 171 Pac. 1088, 2 W. C. L. J. 31, 16 N. C. C. A. 907.

However, in order that dangers of this character may be said to be incident to the employment, the work of the employee must take him into the streets; and when he incurs the dangers

of the streets for purposes of his own, entirely unconnected with his employment, he cannot recover compensation for injuries resulting therefrom. Balboa Amusement Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, Cal. App., 171 Pac. 108, 1 W. C. L. J. 747, 16 N. C. C. A. 906.

An employee cannot recover compensation for injuries by being struck by an automobile while riding his bicycle home to lunch during noon hour. Taylor v. Binswanger & Co., Va., 107 S. E. 649.

Other cases in point are, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., Cal. App., 178 Pac. 542; Consumers' Co. v. Ceislik, Ind. App., 121 N. E. 832; Rogers v. Rogers, Ind. App., 122 N. E. 778; Keaney's Case, Mass., 122 N. E. 739; Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co., Pa., 106 Atl. 196.

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

THE RECENT MEETING OF THE WISCON SIN STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

The annual meeting of the Wisconsin State Bar Association was held at Chippewa Falls, with headquarters at the new Hotel Northern, June 23d, 24th and 25th. The meetings were held in the Elks' club rooms, which occupy the entire fifth floor of the hotel. The Chippewa County Bar Association spared no effort to show their hospitality and royally entertained the visiting members of the State Association, special entertainment being provided for the visiting ladies. The meeting is generally conceded to have been one of the most enjoyable and profitable the Association has ever held.

The meeting opened on the morning of June 23rd, with an address of welcome by Hon. James O'Neill, Mayor of Chippewa Falls. This was responded to briefly by President Thompson, who then proceeded to deliver his annual address, the subject of which was "Extension of the Powers of the Bar." This was followed by reports of committees and business.

In the afternoon the following question was presented for discussion:

Is the present method of litigating questions of law and fact before commissions such a departure from the common law theory of trial in open court that it should be either discarded or radically changed; and is such method especially objectionable in connection with existing provisions of appeal?

The discussion of this question was opened for the affirmative by Mr. J. G. Hardgrove of Milwaukee, and Mr. C. T. Bundy of Eau Claire, while Mr. C. D. Jackson of the Railroad Commission, led the discussion on the negative side. Mr. John B. Sanborn of Madison, and

Mr. Henry J. Killillea of Milwaukee, also took part in the discussion.

The afternoon session was followed by an automobile ride to Wissota Dam and through Chippewa's wonderful natural park comprising some 300 acres. Upon the return to the hotel at six o'clock, the members, with their wives and friends, were served with a buffet luncheon at the Elks' club rooms, followed by dancing.

The evening session was held at the Court House, where Dr. F. L. Paxson, Director of the Department of History of the University of Wisconsin, delivered an interesting address on "The Frontier's Influence on the Development of American Law."

On the following day, Ex-Congressman James W. Good, formerly of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, but now practicing law in Chicago, addressed the convention on the subject of "National Finance."

The sessions were brought fittingly to a close by a sumptuous banquet served at the Hotel Northern, attended by about 150 members and their wives. The principal address of the evening was delivered by Hon. Charles S. Cutting of Chicago, upon the "Duty of Bar Associations Toward an Elective Judiciary,” in which he set forth in an interesting way the recent situation in Chicago with regard to the election of judges and their control by political factions, and how the bar association there met this difficult situation. Other speakers of the evening were Judge Doerfler of the Wisconsin Supreme Bench, and Mr. B. R. Goggins of Wisconsin Rapids.

Hon. John M. Whitehead, of Janesville, was elected president for the ensuing year, and Gilson G. Glasier, Madison, secretary and treasurer.

ships, food and clothing for the Army and Navy, it shall be unlawful to sell for beverage purposes any distilled spirits."

Barnes' United States Statutes Supplement, Section 8350a, p. 358.

Did not the orders of President Wilson, demobolizing the army, supply the place of a proclamation? The statute does not say in what form the President shall make his proclamation.

I put these questions to you because I am very reliably informed that a proclamation that "The War is Ended" will no doubt be issued; that the delay has been due to deciding upon the form of the proclamation.

My suggestion is, that the only form required is a simple statement declaring the War ended. Whatever legal effect said proclamation may have will depend upon the terms of the legis lation upon which it will operate, and that effect will be decided, not by the terms of the proclamation, but by the simple fact that the proclamation has been made, be its language what it may. It will be for the Courts to decide what the legal effect is of the proclamation of the single fact that the "War is ended." Yours truly,

Mobile, Ala.

FREDERICK G. BROMBERG.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

"You admit, then," said an Alabama judge, "that you stole the hog?"

"Ah sure has to, judge," said the colored prisoner.

"Well, nigger, there's been a lot of hog stealing going on around here lately, and I'm just going to make an example of you or none of us will be safe."

Rose, the garrulous domestic, can give you facts of history-international, dramatic, scandalous-right off the bat without a moment's hesitation.

"How do you manage to remember all these things, Rose?" inquired her employer the other day.

Then Rose came back with the infallible rule for memory training.

"I'll tell ye, ma'am," says she. "All me life never a lie I've told. And when ye don't have to be taxin' yer memory to be rememberin' what ye told this one or that one, or how ye explained this or that, ye don't overwork it and it lasts ye, good as new, forever."-New York Sun.

1. Animals Cancellation of Registry. Where, when one became a member of a stockbreeding association, there was a by-law as to tests for advanced registry and canceling certificates of advanced registry, such by-law was part of his contract of membership, and he became bound by it.-Cabana v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n of America, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 277.

2. Trespassing Stock.-A mere agent in control of the cattle, horses, and mules belonging to his principal is not liable for damages done by such animals in trespassing upon the crops of another, under the principle that an agent is liable to no one except his principal for damages resulting from an omission or neglect of duty in respect to the business of the agency.-Minor v. Dockery, Miss., 88 So. 321.

3. Attorney and Client

Constructive Contract. Where an insurance company refused to avail itself of the services of an attorney in exposing malfeasance by its president, whereupon the attorney presented the matter to the state superintendent of insurance, and procured the president's resignation, the law does not impose on an insurance company any constructive contract obligation to pay the attorney for his services in the matter.-Caldwell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Ark., 230 S. W. 567. 4. Disrespectful Motion Papers.-Attorneys who submit on motion for reargument motion papers that are impertinent and disrespectful to the court, will be censured and reprimanded, and will be required to pay personally the costs allowed on denial of the motion.-Klein v. Smith, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 272.

5. Inexperience of Attorney.-An attorney, improperly writing a letter to a lady, demanding on behalf of his client the return of a diamond engagement ring and other valuables, with a statement that the recipient of the letter was liable for prosecution, but, if she returned the property, no further proceedings would be taken, censured, but disciplinary proceeding dismissed by reason of his youth and inexperience.-In re Penn, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 193.

6. Bailment-Burglary.-In action for goods delivered to defendant by plaintiff, to be manufactured for plaintiff, but which were stolen while in defendant's possession, evidence as to a hole in the floor through which the burglars had entered defendant's premises from the cellar. held to rebut presumption that defendant was liable.-Greenberg v. Mermelstein, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 250.

7.-Return Shipment. Where plaintiff shipped goods to defendant company for cleaning and return, the fact that the shipment was by express was an intimation, if not an instruction, that it should be returned by a common carrier who would be responsible for nondelivery, and return by parcels post uninsured, was unauthorized, and the government in its postoffice department did not become the agent of plaintiff to render defendant company not liable for loss of the shipment, it having assumed the risk by so shipping without insurance.-Green v. Ben Vonde Co., N. C., 107 S. E. 139. 8. Bankruptcy-Discretion of Court. Under Bankruptcy Act, § 70b (Comp. St., § 9654), requiring property of the bankrupt to be sold subject to the approval of the court when practicable, and not sold otherwise than subject to such approval for less than 75 per cent of its appraised value, the court had discretion to refuse to confirm a sale on the property at public auction, where the best bid was only 41% per cent of the appraised value.-Bryant v. Charles L. Stockhausen Co., U. S. C. C. A., 271 Fed. 921.

9. Banks and Banking-Bill of Lading.-When a bank gives unqualified credit for a draft attached to bill of lading, it becomes the owner thereof, and any funds collected thereon, and is not liable for any failure of the shipment to fulfill the terms of the contract between the seller and the purchaser, under U. S. Comp. St., § 8604.-Farmers' State Bank of Kenefick v. A. F. Hardie & Co., Tex., 230 S. W. 524.

10. Bill of Lading.-Where a bank issued a letter of credit to honor drafts against bills of lading for certain bags of "Java white granulated sugar," the bill of lading attached to the ensuing draft, describing the sugar as "Java white sugar," did not comply with the terms of the letter of credit, and the bank was not obligated to honor such draft.-Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 162.

11. Knowledge of Account. A bank is charged with knowledge of the state of its customer's account on which a check is drawn when it makes an election whether to pay the check or not, and the fact that the account appeared to be good when actually it was not, is immaterial, so that a bank whose bookkeeper falsified an account on which checks were drawn is liable for the acts of its bookkeeper as against an innocent holder of the checks to whom the bank had paid the amounts they called for, and cannot recover such amounts from such holder on any theory that a trust should be declared in the bank's favor on the amounts.-Liberty Trust Co. v. Haggerty., N. J., 113 Atl. 596.

12. Bills and Notes-Attorney's Fee.-In an action on a note brought by trustee to whom it had been indorsed, where judgment went for plaintiff, it was proper to enter judgment for attorney's fees, despite defendant's contention that there was no evidence, either that the note had been placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, or that the amount allowed was reasonable.-Gray v. Stolley, Tex., 230 S. W. 866.

13. Lack of Maturity Date.-That note for amount to be paid as liquidated damages on maker's breach of contract bore no maturity date did not affect its validity, the date of maturity in such case being the date on which maker repudiated the contract, which date was to be ascertained by the evidence.-Nesbitt v. Hudson, Tex., 230 S. W. 747.

14. Bribery-"Officer of the United States."A baggage porter, employed by a railroad under the control of the United States government, was not an officer of the United States, within Criminal Code, § 39, making it an offense to bribe an officer to influence his action.-Krichman v. United States, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 514.

15. Brokers Commission. An oral understanding at the time of giving a broker a contract to sell land that the purchaser procured by him was already the owner's customer, and that the broker should not attempt to sell him will not prevent recovery of a commission, as the broker's contract in such case was required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, and made no exception as to the persons to be dealt with.-Keith v. Peart, Wash., 197 Pac. 928.

16. Instant Ability to Purchase.-Where defendant refused to sell land to a purchaser procured by plaintiff solely on the claim that plaintiff had no authority at that time to sell at a price previously fixed, it was not necessary to show, in an action for a commission, that the purchaser had on his person or instantly within reach the amount of cash required to make the purchase.-Crow v. Casady, Ia., 182 N. W. 884. 17. Carriers of Goods-Care of Explosives.Compliance by a carrier with the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the transportation of explosives does not relieve it from its common-law duty to exercise such additional care as is required by the circumstances of the particular case.-Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Allied Machinery Co., U. S. C. C. A., 271 Fed. 900. 18. Lamage in Transit.-Under the tariff regulations of a railroad company, providing that carload shipments arriving at its general New York terminal and there held for further directions, after a stated term, should be subject to demurrage charges, and the liability of the company therefor should be that of warehouseman only, where a car was so held, the hability of the company as carrier held to have reattached on its receipt of an order for forwarding the shipment.-Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. John Lysaght, Limited, U. S. C. C. A., 271 Fed. 906.

19. Carriers of Passengers Negligence. While a carrier's trainmen have no affirmative duty to ascertain physical condition of a passenger, making it necessary to render special assistance to her in debarking, where the condition is observed or is such that they in the exercise of ordinary care in the discharge of their duties are bound to observe that she requires such assistance, it is their duty to render it.Payne v. Thurston, Ark., 230 S. W. 561.

20. Negligence.-Proof

that a passenger fell from a train moving at a speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour, and that when he recovered consciousness he was in the hospital suffering from serious injuries, is sufficient to warrant finding his injuries resulted from the fall, without direct tetimony to that effect.-Olivieri v. Hines, U. S. C. C. A., 271 Fed. 939.

Where

21. Chattel Mortgages-Conversion. vendor removed grain from land, his act in taking an elevator receipt in the name of himself and purchaser, who had been in possession, was such an admission of title in the purchaser as will carry to the jury an action of conversion by a third person claiming under a chattel mortgage given by the purchaser.-First Nat. Bank v. Montana Emporium Co., Mont., 197 Pac. 994. 22. Commerce-Interstate. A flagman, employed by a railway company which was engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, is employed in interstate commerce while engaged in flagging a train, regardless of whether that train was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, since his duties were essential to the safety of all trains and therefore his widow cannot recover compensation for his death under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law.-Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Di Donato, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 516.

Ratification

of to

23. Constitutional Law Amendment.-The Eighteenth Amendment the Constitution, which was to take effect one year after being ratified, became effective on Jan. 16, 1920, which was one year after the consummation of the ratification, though the Secretary of State did not proclaim the ratification until January 29, 1919.-Dillon v. Gloss, U. 8. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 510.

24. Corporations-Authority of Employe. Letters signed in the name of a corporation by one denominated as field manager are evidence of his authority if in response to communications

sent to it.-W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Woodward, Mo., 230 S. W. 647.

25.- Foreign Corporations.-Where defendant corporations were not authorized to and never had in fact transacted any business in this state, service on their officers temporarily in this state on business of their own was abortive.-Apgar v. Altonna Glass Co., N. J., 113 Atl. 593.

26.- Promoter's Contract.-A promoter's contract to sell stock in consideration of stock to the amount of 10 per cent of the sale price of the stock sold was not binding on the corporation promoted on the theory of ratification, as the corporation itself would not be authorized to make such a contract under Const. art 15, § 10, Rev. Codes, § 3894, as amended by Laws 1917, c. 89, forbidding issue of stock except for labor done, etc., and §§ 3853, 3854, and a ratification is not valid under § 5427, unless at the time of ratifying the principal has power to confer authority for such an act, and, under § 5428, an unauthorized act cannot be made valid, retroactively, to the prejudice of third persons, without their consent.-Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., Mont., 197 Pac. 1005.

27. Tort of Former Partnership.-An action in tort cannot be maintained against a corporation on the ground that it afterwards purchased the assets and assumed the liabilities of a partnership which had committed the tort complained of, although the stock of the corporation 18 owned by the members of the former partnership. Martin v. Culpeper Supply Co., W. Va., 107 S. E. 183.

29.

Al

28. Lasements Obstructions in Way. though such road or right-of-way runs partly through other land of the dominant owner, his subsequent purchase of the land constituting the dominant estate, and the vesting of the lesser in the greater estate covering that part of the way, will not extinguish his rights in the other portions of the way and deprive him of his use thereof.-McNeil v. Kennedy, W. Va., 107 S. E. 203. Eminent Domain-Market Value.-There is no fixed rule of law whereby the market value of property condemned for public purposes is to be determined by capitalizing the rent reserved in a lease thereof, or what experts consider the reasonable rental value, and there is no fixed rule with respect to the percentage on it the rule conversely that the fair rental value, which such capitalization should be made, nor is to determine the value of a leasehold, may be obtained by assuming that the rental should return a certain percentage on the value of the property. In re Seventh Ave. and Varick St., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 197.

30. Electricity-Degree of Care.-A company generating and distributing electricity is bound to exercise the utmost care to see that it does not escape and do injury to those who have a right to be where they are, and who in the performance of their duty might reasonably be expected to be injuriously affected by the current escaping because of the wire coming in contact with other harmless wires in close proximity.Weddle v. Tarkio Electric & Water Co., Mo., 230 S. W. 386.

31. Rates.-Under Public Service Commission Law, §§ 71-74, the mere fact that the city of New York, under § 66. subd. 12. had the right to complain, in the general interest of the public, of rates for electric current charged by two generating companies, did not give it the right to come into court in an action brought solely against the companies until it had first exhausted its remedies by complying with § 71 in lodging its complaint with the Public Service Commission, fully empowered to grant relief in proper case.-City of New York v. New York Edison Co., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 262.

32. Exchange of Property Rescission. If defendants induced plaintiff to trade horses by warranting their horse to be sound, when in fact he was not sound and by falsely representing the soundness of their horse with intent to deceive plaintiff, and if representations were not mere traders' talk, the plaintiff was entitled to rescind the trade by tendering back to the defendants their horse, and on defendants' refusal to rescind, plaintiff could bring an action

in detinue and for conversion of his horse.Ingram & Co. v. Eason, Ala., 88 So. 339.

33. Frauds, Statute of-Verbal Lease.-A lessee, who has entered into possession of land under a verbal lease which was not to be performed within one year and has completed the contract, is liable for the rent; and when a lessor has exercised a contractual right to terminate a verbal lease at the end of a yearly period, this constitutes the lease a completed the contract, and mere failure to discharge mutual monetary obligations on a verbal contract otherwise completed does not render such of contract unenforceable under the statute frauds. Fronkling v. Berry, Miss., 88 So. 331. Sales.34. Fraudulent Conveyances-Bulk The sale of restaurant fixtures such as tables, chairs, counters, ice boxes, etc., held not within the Bulk Sales Law.-Gallup v. Rhodes, Mo., 230 S. W. 664.

Petition.

Code, 35. Injunction-Filing of $4359, providing that no temporary writ of injunction shall be allowed by any judge during term time except the petition therefor be first filed with the clerk and entered on the court calendar, is directory and not mandatory, so that where a petition for injunction was presented to the judge during term time, and the order allowing the temporary injunction was granted without the petition being first filed and entered on the court calendar, the injunction will not be dissolved for such reason.-Denison Brotherhood of American Yeomen, Ia., 182 N. W.

873.

V.

36. Insurance-Burden of Proof.-In an action on a certificate issued by fraternal insurer, where the deceased member. a private in the army, while on a transport, died from two bullet wounds just above the heart, a finding that death was not the result of suicide or intentional self-destruction, held warranted, in view of the presumption of love of life and the fact that either of the wounds would have proven instantly fatal.-Bear v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., Mo., 230 S. W. 369.

37.- -Change of Occupation.-A fraternal order's local clerk, through whom only the member might communicate with the ruling officials, and who was required to report the standing of members, was the agent of the order, and a member's duty under the laws of the order to give notice of engagement in a hazardous occupation was complied with by giving notice to such clerk, and where notice was given and no notice of any increase of assessment was ever given, the order was estopped to deny payment of the proper dues, though, as authorized by Crawford & Moses' Dig.. § 6095, the laws of the order provided that no officer or agent could waive the provisions of the laws.-Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Key, Ark., 230 S. W. 576.

Where

of

38. Fraudulent Representations. insured in his application to a fraternal insurance society stated that he had never been advised to change his residence on account health, had never had a number of specific diseases, and had not consulted a physician since childhood, the fact that insured, who was passed by defendant's examiner as a first-class risk, was rejected very shortly after by the examiner for another insurance company, does not establish that his representations were fraudulent.Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. York, Colo., 197 Pac. 1012.

39. Military Service.-An insurance company or benefit society has the right to select the particular risks it is willing to assume, and there is no public policy against a contract exempting insurance company in advance from liability for the death of insured while in the military or naval service of the government, either voluntary or involuntary.-Marks v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, Ky., 230 S. W. 540.

40. Subrogation.-An insurer of a steamer's cargo, which paid the damage to the shipper after the sinking of tht steamer, and took an assignment of the shipper's cause of action, was thereby subrogated to the shipper's right of action against the ship and its owner.-The Viking, U. S. C. C. A., 271 Fed. 801.

the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor which are different from those in the Volstead Act does not make the state statute void.-People v. Cook, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 291.

42. Sufficient Indictment.

In prosecution

for violation of prohibition law, indictment that defendant sold and had in his possession "prohibittd liquors or beverages" held sufficient, as not against contention that the liquors were alleged to have been alcoholic or malt, or some device or substitute therefor.-Roberson v. State, Ala., 88 So. 355.

43. Landlord and Tenant-Renewal of Lease -Where there are two tenants, in order that they may make a new contract by exercising an their renew, it must option to be done by united action, either by giving oral or written notice, or by jointly holding over and thus raising the implication they have made such election.-Foster v. Stewart, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 151. 44. Licenses-Peddlers. Where employe of foreign corporation engaged in the sale of tea and other merchandise to the retail trade, with no distributing point in the state, divided the city into twelve routes, visited each customer on each route every two weeks and solicited orders for future delivery, sent orders to nearest distributing point, and delivered merchandise and made collection upon receipt of goods from such distributing point, the corporation was not required to pay a license tax for doing business as a peddler with a one-horse wagon.-City of Anniston v. Jewel Tea Co.. Ala.. 88 So. 351.

45. Malicious Mischief-Depositing of Dead Animals.-"Malicious mischief" is any malicious or mischievous injury either to the rights of another or the public in general, and is done in a spirit of wanton cruelty or black and diabolical revenge; and hence the depositing of rotten eggs or dead animals in another's well constitutes malicious mischief at common law.-Johnson v. State, Ala., 88 So. 348.

46. Master and Servant-Casual Employment. -One who volunteered to make repairs in a saloon which proved to be a job for a plumber is in an employment both casual and not in the course of his employer's business, so as to be excepted from the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 by § 8a thereof.-Roberts v. Industrial Accident Commission, Cal., 197 Pac. 978.

47.- -Conclusive Settlement. An employer cannot repudiate an agreed settlement with a claimant for compensation, in reliance on which the claimant had dismissed her petition for compensation and had taken out letters of administration on her husband's estate, on the ground that the settlement was entered into by the employer without a full knowledge of the facts.-Kuhn v. Pennsylvania R. Co., Pa., 113 Atl. 672.

48.- -Course of Employment.-Where, in a dispute concerning the damages to a shipment, plaintiff accused the express driver of lying, and, on the following day, after the damages had been satisfactorily adjusted, the driver armed himself without his employer's knowledge and on return to plaintiff's place of business to obtain a receipt and payment of the express charges, demanded an apology from plaintiff's husband and in connection therewith shot him, the demand for an apology was no part of his employment, and the express company was not liable.-American Ry. Express Co. v. Mackley, Ark., 230 S. W. 598.

49. Death from Cerebral Hemorrhage Compensable.-Death of an employe, suffering a cerebral hemorrhage while moving a flat car into position in a gravel pit, on a hot day, held compensable; it appearing that the day was one of the hottest of the year and that the radiation from the sand intensified the heat to an unusual degree, and that there was no breeze.Murray v. H. P. Cummings Const. Co., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 193.

50.- -Speed of Train.-The engineer of a passenger train going 25 to 30 miles an hour and visible for two miles while approaching a siding occupied by a waiting freight train, with signals indicating clear track, is not bound to anticipate that members of the freight crew will be on the track so as to impose on him the duty to reduce his speed, but he has the right to expect that