1. Attorney and Client- Disbarment.-A disbarment proceeding is not a prosecution for crime. San Francisco Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, Cal., 198 Pac. 7.

2.-Lien.Where an attorney was retained by a temporary administratrix to collect moneys on deposit belonging to the estate, but collected nothing in the actions he brought, which did not come to trial, his lien against the estate, if any, attached only to papers in his possession in the actions for which he was specifically retained; there having been no services renuered by him inuring to the benefit of the es ate.-In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 374.

3. Bailment—Admissibility of Evidence.-In an action to recover the value of a set of furs shipped to defendants to be repaired, which plaintiff claimed was expressed by them, by mistake, to one T., the admission of testimony of one of plaintiff's witnesses that he saw Mrs. T. wearing some furs like Some he saw exhibited in the courtroom, which plaintiff had testified were similar to hers, did not justify a new trial-Rhyne v. Munter, N. C., 107 S. E. 238. Bankruptcy--Devise Trust.-One

4.

to whom and was devised in trust for the heirs of his body had no title which he could mortgage or convey or which passed to his trustee in bankruptcy.-City Nat. bank v. Slocua, C. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 11.

3. Discharge.-A bankrupt's discharge was not barred on the ground that he made a false oath in his schedule, in that he denied ownerShip of certain lots, where a creditor, more than a year before the bankruptcy, had secured judginent against him, Which became a lien upon, and for several times the value of, the lots, and within less than 20 days after the alleged false oath the same creditor got a tax titie to the lots, and, more than two years before the alleged false oath, the bankrupt had executed a ranty deed to the lots, but it had never been Tecorded. In re Lundberg, U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 107.

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6.Mortgaged Property.-A sale of a bankrupt's mortgaged property free from liens under an order of the bankruptcy court gives the purchaser the same title as if the sale were made in any other court of equity to foreclose the mortgage or marshal the assets of an insolvent, and his title is good against the privies of the mortgagor and mortgagees, including the wife of the mortgagor, who has renounced her dower --Gantt v. Jones, U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 117. 7. Powers of Trustee.-Under Bankruptcy Act. § 47a, subd. 2, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, § 8, and in view of sections 70a and 70e

(section 9654), a trustee in bankruptcy is deemed vested with all the rights and powers of a creditor holding an unsatisfied execution, and may avoid any transfer fraudulent as to creditors which a creditor might have avoided, had bankruptcy not intervened.-Ignatius v. Farmers' State Bank, U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 33.

8. Preferential Payments.-The payment of a dividend, by the receiver of a state court appointed for an insolvent partnership in a suit by one partner for dissolution. to such creditors as presented their claims within four months prior to bankruptcy of the partnership, held to operate as a voidable preference, as against other creditors, who were without notice and did not participate, and to entitle them, on proving their claims in bankruptcy, to payment of an equal percentage thereon before further dividends were paid; for the primary purpose of the bankruptcy act is to give to all unsecured creditors the same percentage of their claims, and a court of bankruptcy should administer it broadly as a court of equity to that end.-Farnsworth v. Union Trust & Deposit Co., U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 92.

9. Banks and Banking-Authority of Cashier. -A cashier of a bank is not, simply by virtue of his position as cashier, vested with authority to bind the bank if he agrees with one of the makers of a note to sell collateral, especially when the collateral is not salable at as high a price as agreed upon between the cashier and a maker of the note.-Hager v. President, Etc., of Hagerstown Bank, Md., 113 Atl. 730.

10. -Certified Check.-After a check is certified by a bank, at the request of the holder or payee, the defense that the check is void because the consideration is illegal is not open to the bank. The transaction is this: The bank says. The check is good; we will pay it now, if you will receive it. The holder then says, No, I will not take the money now; you may retain it for me, until the check is presented for payment. The bank replies. Very well; we will do so-thus substituting a new contract between the holder of the check and the bank.-Jones v. National Bank of North Hudson, N. J., 113 Atl. 702.

11. Credit for Check.-A printed notice, sent by mail by bank which received check drawn on it by mail from depositor: "We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 8-6. We have entered to your credit $3,567.50. All other items than those drawn on this bank are credited subject to final payment"-and the making of a deposit slip, a copy of which was inclosed with the notice, showed an intention to give the depositor absolute credit for the amount of the check.-Cohen v. First Nat. Bank of Nogales, Ariz., 198 Pac. 122.

In view

12. Bills and Notes-Negotiability. of Rev. St. 1919, § 790. despite section 791, notation on a note that it was given to secure the difference between $15.000 and $13.820 did not destroy its negotiability under section 788, "secure" meaning to make secure to protect, or to free from danger, risk, or hazard, to make safe. Morehead v. Cummins, Mo., 230 S. W. 656. 13. Carriers of Goods-Damages. A rule of the railroad during the war that shipper must load ears within 24 hours had no application in an action for damages for failure to furnish a car on Tuesday, in compliance with an order for a car to be set in at a station to be coopered on Monday and loaded the day following, and agreement to do so, it appearing that the car was placed the previous Saturday and, after being coopered by plaintiff on Monday, was withdrawn on Tuesday, the day on which the shipper ordered it for loading and when he was ready to do so.-Bartlett v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., Mo., 230 S. W. 660.

14. Switching Service. When a cement company having its plant located five or six miles from its quarry, where it obtains its rock and shale used in the manufacture of cement, contracts with a railroad company to transport its rock and shale from the quarry to the plant, the rock and shale being loaded into the cars by the cement company's employees, the railroad company by its employees attaches its engine to said cars, connects them up hauls the loaded cars to the cement plant, and returns the empty cars to the quarry, this constitutes a switching

service, and not a road haul, notwithstanding the railroad company may use approximately five miles of its main line of road in transporting such cars from the quarry to the plant and returning the empties to the quarry.-St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co. v. State, Cal., 198 Pac. 73. 15. Carriers of Live Stock-Act of God.-A carrier is liable for damages proximately caused by an act of God, in case its failure to use reasonable diligence to prevent or mitigate the damage contributes to the loss.-Rice v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., Idaho, 198 Pac. 161.

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16. Carriers of Passengers-Assault.-In minor's action for personal injuries through being shot by a deputy sheriff on being ejected from a train for non-payment of fare, evidence that the conductor caused rocks to be thrown at plaintiff while on top of a coach, and firing a shot in the air for the purpose of scaring him, held not to show an unlawful assault or wrongful exercise of authority in accomplishing the ejection.-Samaritano v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., Tex., 230 S. W. 1049. 17. Negligence.-In an action against railroad for injuries to a passenger. where a count of the complaint contained a description of the means of injury and of the physical circumstances surrounding it, together with a general averment of negligence for which defendant railroad was liable and there were also allegations showing the relation of carrier and passenger, on injury being shown, the burden was cast on defendant railroad to acquit itself of negligence.-Tennessee, A. & G. Ry. Co. v. Rossell. Ala., 88 So. 362.

18. Negligence.-A street car conductor was not negligent in failing to prevent passengers from crowding as they left the car, where there

was

no reason to expect anything unusually dangerous; the passengers not being disorderly or unruly or acting in such a manner as to call for any interference by the carrier or its agents. -Ritchie v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., Mass., 131 N. E. 67.

19. Negligence.-A carrier's failure to adopt reasonable expedients to avoid danger from crowds struggling to get on its cars is negligence rendering it liable for injury thus proximately caused.-Grubb v. Kansas City Rys. Co., Mo.. 230 S. W. 675.

20. Constitutional Law-Divorce.-Laws 1917. p. 183, § 10, providing that the death of either party to a divorce action during the six months following the findings and conclusions of law shall operate automatically to grant a divorce to person to whom divorce might have been granted. had the full period expired, held not unconstitutional as an encroachment upon the judiciary in violation of Const. Art. 3.-Parsons v. Parsons, Col.. 198 Pac. 156.

21. Corporations-Assignment of Contract.One suing on a conttract claimed to have been assigned to him by a corporation could not recover, where there was nothing to show by whom the alleged assignment was executed that the person executing it had any authority to act for the corporation, that there was any ratification of his act by the corporation or its directors, or that there was any acquiescence in the assignment or knowledge of it by any other officer of the corporation.-Pritchard v. Uphams Corner Theatre Co., Mass.. 131 N. E. 70.

22. Exchange of Stock.-A contract whereby defendants, who exchanged certain corporate stock for stock of other corporation owned by plaintiff, agreed to return to plaintiff such other stock, on 30 days' notice of plaintiff's desire to have such stock. instead of defendant's stock. given within 60 days from date of contract, held valid as against contentions that it was unilateral and was void for want of mutuality and lack of consideration.-Fast v. Baker. Ind.. 131 N. E. 57.

23.- -Intrastate Transaction.-Where a Michigan corporation conducting business in Illinois purchased standing timber from the owner of land in Kentucky, held, that the transaction was not interstate, so that Ky. St. 8 571, requiring the filing of statement showing the corporation's office or offices, and agent or agents within the state, was applicable.-E. C. Artman Lumber Co. v. Bogard Ky., 230 S. W. 953.

24. Damages-Purchasing Power of Money.In a personal injury action, the jury in deter

mining the amount expended by the plaintiff for doctor's blils and medicines may consider the difference between the purchasing power of a dollar at the time plaintiff expended it and its purchasing power at the time of the trial.-Tennessee River Nav. Co. v. Woodward, Ala., 88 So. 364. 25. Easements-Light and Air.-Where a deed describing a lot as bounded in the rear by vacant land which was to be forever kept open for light and air created an easement, in so much of the vacant land as was reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the easement, a distance of 10 feet from the dividing line between the dominant and servient estates is a reasonable distance at which structures excluding light and air may be erected unless some extraordinary circumstances are shown.-Tidd v. Fifty Associates, Mass., 131 N. E. 77.

26.

Elections-Mark on Ballot.-Court properly held that a curved line of lighter shade connecting the ends of the two lines making the cross with which the ballot was marked in the circle of the Democratic emblem was not a distinguishing mark, where it did not appear to have been made by design, but was probably made by some nervous twitch of the hand holding the pencil.-Roberts v. Donahoe, Ind., 131 N. E. 33. Eminent Domain-Exclusive Use.-Under Code Supp. 1913, § 2120t, authorizing an electric power company to condemn a 25-foot strip for a right of way, the company does not acquire an exclusive use of such strip, but only a necessary interest in the land to enable it to exercise its franchise.-Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., Iowa, 182 N. W. 896.

27.

St.

28. Ann. -Just Compensation.-Burns' 1914, § 934. meets the constitutional requirement as to manner of condemning property, in that it provides the procedure to be followed, reserves title to the owner until payment therefor is fully made, and meets "just compensation" at the time of notice of intended appropriation by requiring "actual value" of all property actually taken, and "actual value" as the basis of damages to the landowners' property not actually taken, but injuriously affected by such appropriation.-Schnull V. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co., Ind., 131 N. E. 51.

29.

Executors and Administrators-Res Adjudicata. An order of sale of a two-thirds interest in land under a petition filed by administrator to sell such interest to pay the debts of deceased, claimed by administrator to be the owner of the entire land, was not res adjudicata as between the widow of deceased and her children and their privies as to the other third. the widow's right to one-third not being in issue. and the widow and children not being adversary parties.-Mossman Yarnelle Co. v. Fee, Ind., 131 N. E. 59.

30.

Frauds, Statute of-Contract to Make Will-Where services have been performed in consideration of decedent's oral promises to make a will in favor of claimant against his estate, a contract unenforceable under the statute of frauds, claimant is entitled to recover the value of his services, not pursuant to the terms of the contract but on a quantum meruit; the value of the services performed, and not the value of the property agreed to be conveyed, being the measure of damages.-Hensley v. Hilton, Ind., 131 N. E. 38.

31. Insurance "Accidental Means."-Railway postal clerk, who was ruptured while lifting heavy sack of mail while engaged in his customary work, where the bag was not any heavier than any other bags which he had lifted in the same way and the pile upon which he was attempting to place it was not any higher than usual, was not entitled to recover under certificate insuring him against injuries "through external, violent, and accidental means"; the means used by him to place mail bag on pile being exactly those used on other occasions, and therefore not "accidental means," within the certificate.-Fane v. National Ass'n Railway Mail Clerks, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 222.

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32.- -Change of Employment.-Where laws of benesciary society gave it the right to cancel the certificate on change of employment by member if the new employment augmented the risk, and required the member to notify the society in such case, the member's failure to

give notice of change in occupation was no defense in action on certificate, where the change in occupation did not increase the hazard.Porter v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., Pa., 113 Atl. 688.

33. Dispute.-Under St. 1907, c. 576, § 60, prescribing a standard form of fire insurance policy, providing for a determination of the loss in case of dispute by reference to three disinterested referees, and that such reference shall be a condition precedent to any right of action, and the further provision of section 60 for appointment of the third referee by the insurance commissioner in case those chosen by the parties fail to agree, where the third referee was never chosen and no application for his appointment was ever made to the insurance commissioner, and defendant waived none of rights, there could be no recovery-Nadeau v. Insurance Co., Mass., 131 N. E. 69.

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34. Liability of Medical Examiner.-Where agents of a life insurance company had a physician who took out a policy appointed medical examiner for the insurer on his agreement to pay the note given for the premium advanced by such agents with funds received for examinations, such physician, who received some $485, but paid only $85 on the premium note of $258, while tenaciously holding the policy, is estopped to deny his liability on his premium note to the agents, despite partial breach on the agents' part through failure to give the physician enough examinations in the six months at the end of which the note became due to pay it, such provision having been waived by the physician's agreement to give the agents all he might make for six months more.-Dobbs Johnson, Tex., 230 S. W. 1035. 35.

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Intoxicating Liquors-Alaska Bone Dry Law. The Alaska Bone Dry Law, approved February 14. 1917, was not impliedly repealed by Const. Amend. 18. or the National Prohibition Act.-Koppitz v. United States, U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 96.

36. Possession.-Since the passage and approval on January 25, 1919, of the act known as the "Weekly Bone Dry Law," it has been unlawful for any person to have in his possession or to possess in the state any spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, or any other prohibited liquors or beverages, in any quantity whatsoever.Lyles v. State, Ala., 88 So. 375.

37. Possession.-Though C. S. § 3379, makes it indictable to have any quantity of intoxicating liquor in possession for the purpose of sale and makes the possession of more than one gallon prima facie evidence of the illegal purpose, it is not against the state law to have in possession liquor lawfully obtained for one's own use. State v. Helms, N. C., 107 S. E. 228.

38.- -Prima Facie Case.-In prosecution for having in possession prohibited liquor, state made out a prima facie case where witness testified that he had drank beer that the contents of the bottle in question looked like beer and foamed like beer, that it smelt and tasted like beer, and that the only difference that he had found was that it did not have the kick-Patterson v. State, Ala.. 88 So. 360.

39. -State Statute.-Act 36th Leg. 1st and 2d Called Sess. (1919), c. 78, making it unlawful to possess intoxicating liquors for other than enumerated purposes, is not unconstitutional because Const. art. 16, § 20, amended, while forbidding manufacture and sale of such liquors, does not forbid possession thereof; especially as it authorizes prohibitory laws and laws in aid thereof.-Banks v. State, Tex., 230 S. W. 994.

40. Landlord and Tenant-Landlord's Lien.As a lease, stipulating for liquidated damages for default to be a lien on lessee's household goods, created a lien of no higher order than a chattel mortgage and was subject to Burns' Ann. St. 1914, §§ 8636, 8637 declaring possession shall remain in the mortgagor until sale, the landlord, in a suit to foreclose his lien. had no right of possession before final judgment foreclosing the lien, and so was not entitled to have a receiver appointed.-Cowles v. Bick, Ind., 131 N. E. 36.

41. Reasonable Rent.-In a summary proceeding by landlord against tenant for possession of premises and for non-payment of rent, under Code Civ. Proc. § 2231, as amended by

Laws 1920, c. 945, the justice may decide what is a reasonable amount of rent and that the stipulated rent is unreasonable, for, although, such statute does not delegate such power, chapter 944 does in relation to actions for rent only, and Code Civ. Proc. § 2244, as amended by Laws 1920, c. 132, provides for determination of the amount of rent in case of establishment of a defense or counterclaim in whole or in part.— Needelman v. Levine, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 364.

42. Summary Proceedings.-Under Laws 1920, c. 945, summary proceeding for non-payment of rent cannot be maintained, unless the landlord alleges and proves that the rent of the premises described in the petition is no greater than the amount for which the tenant was liable for the month preceding, and hence, where the landlord's proof admittedly showed that the rent sought exceeded the rent for the previous month, the proceeding cannot be maintained, regardless of any waiver by the tenant's answer. Spinelli v. Michelli, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 321.

43. Libel and Slander-Actionable per se.Where defendant stated that he went on a note with plaintiff and had to pay it all and that plaintiff would not talk about repaying it and was a rascal, the words were not actionable per se, for the term "rascal," while an opprobrious expression, does not charge an offense indictable under the law. and it did not appear that the words were spoken of plaintiff concerning his business and employment; hence, in the absence of averment and proof of special damages, only nominal damages could be recovered.-Jones v. Spradlin. Ala., 88 So. 373.

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44. Licenses-Not Recoverable. Assuming that the statute requiring demand for the return of an illegal tax to be made within 30 days after payment of the tax did not apply to a license tax illegally imposed by a city on the operation of an automobile for hire, the tax could not be recovered back, when not paid under protest as required at common law.. Blackwell v. City of Gastonia, N. C., 107 S. E. 218.

45. Master and Servant-Arbitration Stipulation. A contract between a traction company and its employees, by which it was mutually agreed that if at, or within 30 days prior to the expiration of this agreement, any controversy should arise between the traction company and its employees as to the wages to be paid after the expiration of the agreement, the matter should be referred to arbitrators, does not apply to a dispute arising during the term of the contract. In re Division 132 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street & Electric Ry. Employees of America, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 353.

46. Course of Employment.-Fatal injuries to physician's chauffeur, while taking friends on a pleasure trip before he was to call at a designated place for the physician, did not arise out of his employment within the contract of the insurance carrier, and does not entitle his wife to compensation. though the physician stated that his chauffeur was continuously in his employ, and that he made no objection to his driving the car, so long as he appeared at the time and place ordered.-Lansing v. Hayes, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 329.

47. Monopolies-Restraint of Trade. Contract between manufacturer and dealer giving dealer exclusive right of sale in certain territory and obligating him not to sell similar goods of any other manufacturer in such territory held in violation of the state anti-trust statutes.Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Coonrod, Tex., 230 S. W. 1099.

48. Municipal Corporations-Fire Protection. Where a municipality owned a waterworks, the failure to furnish water for fire protection, which resulted in the destruction of property, does not expose the municipality to action, for while the municipality has the liabilities of a private owner with respect to water furnished for private use to individual citizens. its action in furnishing water for fire protection is governmental, and such is the declared rule of C. S. $ 2807-Mack v. Charlotte City Waterworks. N. C., 107 S. E. 244.

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-Ice on Sidewalk. -Where a builder engaged in erecting a building is authorized by the city to occupy a portion of the adjacent street and

to lay a temporary walk around the obstruction, his acts done under and witnin the authority no hable to a granted are lawful, and he is pedestrian or injuries caused by stamping or snow accumulation of shipping on an and ice 101med by natural causes on a temporary walk constructed under such authority.--Boecher v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 182 N. W. 908.

50. injury by Ponce Oncer.--where plaintiff, alleged to have been injured by negligence of a police officer, sued on a bond given by the officer, who was required by the city to perform certain duties in the fire department in addition to his other duties, it was not incumbent on plaintiff to determine Whether at the time of the accident the officer was doing more duty as a ponceman than as a freman, if he was performing any duty as a policeman.-Manwaring v. Geisler, Ky., 230 S. W. 918.

51.-Negligence.-Complaint in action by employee of city contractor against city that city and its agents were negligent "in failing to inspect the same, and in faming to give the deceased notice of the insecure, unsafe, and dangerous condition, and allowing the deceased to work and climb a pole without notice of its the deunsafe and dangerous condition; that fendant had due notice of such unsafe and dangerous condition, and of the fact that work was Lo be done thereon by deceased and others, and that the condition of said pole rendered work thereon unsafe and dangerous, held to state a cause of action against the city for negligence. -Miller v. City of Rochester, N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 335.

52.--Nuisance.-A municipal corporation may be enjoined from maintaining and operating a sewage disposal plant or tank which is too smail to care for the sewage flowing into it, thereby polluting a stream, where the structure can be so enlarged or added to as to stop the continuance of the nuisance; for in operating a sewer a city exercises a corporate power, as distinguished from a governmental function.-City of Pittsburg v. Smith, Tex., 230 S. W. 1113.

53. Zoning Ordinance.—A village zoning ordinance is invalid under P. L. 1920, p. 455, granting authority to pass such ordinances, where it does not apply to all persons alike throughout the zone, but provides for special permits to be granted by the board of trustees after a hearing. Village of South Orange v. Heller, N. J., 113 Atl. 697.

54. Railroads Donation of Right of Way.Where plaintiff desired to have defendant's railway located near his premises and clearly understood that he was being solicited to grant a right of way along the street in front of his property without compensation, a statement of defendant's agent, that other landowners three miles or more distant from plaintiff's place and not owning land on the same street, had agreed to donate a right of way, was not such a material representation of an existing fact as could be made the basis of the rescission of plaintiff's contract, even if false-Smith v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., Iowa, 182 N. W. 890.

55. Sales-Law of Domicile.-The domicile of the owner is not always controlling as to the law which governs a contract for the sale of personal property, but such sale may, like all sales of land, be governed by the law of the place where the property is situated.-Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada v. Warner, U. S. C. C. A., 272 Fed. 56.

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56. Measure of Damages.-In case of a sale calling for delivery of the goods in New York City, where payment was to be made on presentation to plaintiff buyer of a sight draft with bill of lading attached, after exercise of the buyer's privilege of examining the goods on arrival, the value of the contract to plaintiff buyer is to be fixed by the market price in New York of the goods deliverable there, and breach of the contract by defendant seller by its total failure to deliver the damage sustained by plaintiff buyer was the difference between the purchase price as fixed by the contract plus the freight charge to New York and the market price in New York City at the time when they were deliverable, despite a provision of the contract fixing the price f. o. b. San Francisco.Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., N. Y., 188 N. Y. S. 358.

57.

Ships and Shipping-Breach of Warranty. in a un in rem against a vessel under charter for failure to deliver cargo, which was lost by the sinking of an unseaworthy barge hired by the charterer for use in discharging the ship. the charterer heid entitled to bring in Dotn the broker from whom it hired the Darge and und.sclosed owner, for whom the oroker acted as agent, and to a joint and several decree against both for preach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness of the barge; for the doctrine 01 election 48 not applicable, as the wrong Sounds in tort as much as in contract.-The Jungshoved, U. S. D. C., 272 Fed. 122.

od. Specific Performance--Implied Condition. The qetendant leased to the plaintiff for 10 years a large tract of land in which there was a partially developed stone quarry, and agreed to convey to him one-half of the land at the expiration of the lease, it being then in force. The plaintiff did not agree to develop a quarry and expressly exempted himself from liability for a failure to do so. The parties contemplated, as a vital part of the consideration for a grant one-half the lands. that the plaintiff would develop or make a genuine effort to develop a quarry, and such development or effort to develop was an implied condition of the agreement to convey. There was no such development or effort to develop and the court rightly denied specific performance.-Reynolds v. Pike-Horning Granite Co., Minn., 182 N. W. 906.

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59. -Signature of Wife.-A bill by the purchaser against the vendor and his wife for specific performance of the contract of the vendor to sell and convey his land, not signed or acknowledged by his wife, but with whom she Joined in an undelivered deed therefor, is good on demurrer, if not appearing from the bill that defendants had refused to execute the contract by delivery of the deed because of the wife's revvocation of her undelivered deed and her refusal to join with her husband in the delivery thereof, such matter, if good, being matter of defense not presented by demurrer to the bill.-Walter v. De Moss, W. Va., 107.

60. Street Raitways-Increase in Fare.Where a railway company's track is unsafe, imperiling life and limo of passengers, and its condition makes riding physically uncomfortable, and trains are not run according to schedule, and the equipment is insufficient, such defects diminish the company's revenue, and its excuse for allowing such a situation to exist after having been ordered by the Board of Public Utilities to remedy such defects that it has no money with which to do so is no reason why the railway should be equipped and operated at public expense.--New Jersey Central Traction Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, N. J., 113 Atl. 692.

61.- -Rate Base.--In fixing the present value of a street railway company for the purpose of a rate base, the reproduction method should be applied reasonably, and as applied to the inflated values which have arisen since and because of the war it must appear that the level of prices is not transitory.--Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, U. S. D. C., 272 Fed. 147. 62. Taxation-“Gain Derived."Where, in year 1919, when Income Tax Law went into effect, owner sold securities for less than the price at which he had purchased them prior to that year, but in excess of their market value on January 1st of that year, the state comptroller improperly included in the gross income of the seller, as defined by section 359, the difference between the market value on January 1, 1919, and their selling price, since the "gain derived," spoken of in section 353, means such gain as is described and referred to in section 359.-People v. Wendell. N. Y.. 188 N. Y. S. 301. 63.- Insane Asylums.--St. 1914, e. 518. § 1. providing that real and personal property of charitable corporations, occupied as an insane asylum, etc., shall not be exempt from taxation unless at least one-fourth of such property is used for the treatment of indigent insane persons, etc., as resident patients without charge. is not invalid as creating an irrational, oppressive, arbitrary, or unequal classification, though such classification in fact includes only two corporations. Massachusetts General Hospital Inhabitants of Belmont, Mass., 131 N. E. 72.

V.

Central Law Journal.

St. Louis, Mo., September 9, 1921.

HOW THE ENGLISH CHASED THE AMBULANCE CHASER.

When it existed in England, they called it "running-down actions." Just why our cousins so described the energetic gentry. who once sat upon the hospital steps, sent flowers to "prospects" and had co-conspirators to write effusively to the injured of their "fine qualifications" as "damage suit" lawyers, excites the curiosity only. The English ambulance chaser is as extinct as the dodo. It is proposed to describe how this festering sore was cut from the body of English juristic activities with the hope that a splendid example will be emulated in America. What is to be said will prove as interesting to active charity workers as to the judge and lawyer. A description of the activities of "ambulance chasers" would be surplusage, since the breed is the same wherever it flourishes and its mode of depredating upon the helpless or ignorant was about the same in England as it is in America.

As soon as the Judges of England were set free, by the adoption of rules of court, to exercise their God-given discretion and good judgment, one of the first things they did was to stop abuses, committed by a few bad lawyers, it is true, but abuses that had reflected upon the good name and intent of the Bench and Bar, and that tended to lower the high ethical standing of a noble and necessary profession. The first offender, because he was the most flagrantly wicked, to feel the restraining hand was the "ambulance chaser." It required several efforts, as will now be shown.

The life of the ambulance chaser depends upon money-"damage money." The famous Order XXII, Rule 15, promulgated

in 1883, therefore went to the heart of the problem when it took away from them, and placed under the control of the judges, all money recovered in any trial court by an infant or by a "person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition." Instead of paying the proceeds to the "counsel in the case" or to some other person, the judge was empowered to pay reasonable compensation and to direct the disposition of the balance. This he did by causing the defendant to pay it into Court, to be invested or otherwise used, both as to principal and interest, in the sound discretion of the judge. Upon becoming sui juris the beneficiary was entitled to receive the money.

On account of the manner of selection, compensation and retirement, of which we shall later speak, there is no such thing as a corrupt or incompetent judge in England, though there may be some arbitrary ones, for judges are human. The funds were, therefore, safe from dissipation. But, as will presently be seen, this point is immaterial, since the practical Englishman soon made the handling of these sacred funds a separate, and it became, a large business. However, in the meantime, the rule was discretionary and was not applied in every case, not only on account of the high standing of some counsel, but of the business ability of the next friend of the infant. In all instances, however, the court regulated the compensation to be paid to counsel, which is the crux of the problem.

Now the crafty "ambulance chaser," as might have been expected, soon set about discovering a way around this formidable barrier of the court. Order XXII, Rule 15, only authorized the judge to act "at or after the trial," but not before the trial. The more venal of the tribe promptly brought about a compromise of the case without a trial and thus circumvented the control of the judge over the fund and the compensation, whereupon the poor infant or “person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition" was, if possible, placed in a more unfortunate position than before. With