would do well to let Time clear the air and smooth the waters--yet he did not question the justice of her complaint. Had he done so, she would have scoffed at his advice and hastened other-whither. Aye, and fared worse, for he did much to restore the sway of reason.

Libel to the contrary, lawyers do a great deal to discourage divorce. Not those lawyers, however, who, in an excess of virtuous self-esteem, proclaim a rule not to participate in divorce cases. One very good friend of ours prints on his letter head, “No employment desired in criminal cases, or divorce cases." These men are ostentatiously shirking their duty. The law authorizes divorces for certain causes. Lawyers administer the law. The field of the law is as broad as life itself. To fence off one portion of the field and refuse to do one's share toward weeding out of it the tares of disrepute is to stand in the sandals of the Man with One Talent. If unworthy things are done in the conduct of divorce litigation, the selfrespecting practitioner can, by taking his part in the fray, see that the rules are observed and the best principles of justice vindicated. Whether or not he be sucessful in this, he is a sworn minister of the law, and it approximates contempt in him to refuse service where the law commands it. Such an attitude is very similar to, and quite as reprehensible as, that exhibited by another friend of ours, who attaches to his card in a law directory the warning: Collections under $1000 not solicited," forgetting that the chief reward of the profession is the opportunity to do charity.

No, we need a draft law to subject some of the purple purists of our guild to the burdens that the rank and file of us bear. But, even left to ourselves, the rest of us strive to exalt our mistress to the limit of our puny strength. The sum of our efforts with reference to the divorce problem is distinctly an alleviation of the evil.

When the family trouble has passed the stage of cure through the medicines of sympathy and forgiveness and has poisoned

the body of the family so as to require surgical treatment-then we are called in. And we find a curious condition of things.

For one thing, we learn that something like eighty per cent of the divorce cases are consent affairs. This, of course, includes in the definition of "consent" examples of mere utter indifference. The trial judges sense this. The lawyers know it. Compare the number of "fought" divorces with the number of those uncontested. It is comparatively seldom that the parties tilt the issue out in court. When they do, heaven forfend the lawyers engaged. The parties are so acrimonious, the evidence is so disputatious and sometimes so revolting, that the lawyer promptly forswears marriage, for now and for the life to come.

Customarily, on the other hand, the battle is over before the legal proceedings have begun. The parties have "agreed to disagree" permanently. In such a case, so incessantly recurring, it is for the lawyer to diagnose the situation. Having sized the matter up, he can pretty well tell whether there is hope of a reconsideration. Oftentimes, his investigation is ex parte; but quite frequently, both parties appear and detail and retail their difficulties. At this point. the essential thing is not to study the facts from the point of view of their adequacy as a basis for divorce; but rather to develop the possibilities for the future in case the present fracas is adjusted. Once convinced that, regardless of the consequences, the cohabitation is forever ended or vice-versa. the lawyer can proceed to examine the complant in its legal bearings. In the event he has concluded that no divorce is necessary, he can often bring about peace by rejecting the case made as insufficient in law. On the contrary, should he adjudge the severance complete-and should no especial equities intervene--he can afford to be relatively indifferent to the case-made. He is. in this latter instance, "making the best of a bad business." These people are done with each other. Then, certainly, it will subserve the State's interests better to regular

ize their status. Under these circumstances, there is a pitiful revamping of aged slights and ill-treatment. Some of the bills that are drawn, and in the absence of opposition, "stick" are almost laughable. Simmered down, and with the verbiage boiled out of them, they amount after all to a rehash of ancient and half-forgotten tiffs united with some single recent occurence that brought about the present crisis. Yet they serve their purpose. No defense is made. Quite possibly, in a round-about way, the respondent pays the costs of court and the fee of complainant's lawyer. The decree issues. If there is anything improper in the proceedings the bench shares the opprobrium thereof with the bar, for the bill and the evidence goes through the court's hands. None of those wise and human jurists—and, believe me, the nisi prius wool-sack is adorned by a fine body of men-is deceived. They know the insides of these matters. They can read the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth from between the lines of the papers. They see the "other man" peering round the corner with hands outstretched to the emancipated “injured” one. They understand the disappointment that comes when one, who has married for wordly possessions, learns, in disillusionment, that poverty is to be her, or his, portion. They appreciate that trouble-breeding condition that arises when the "old man" marries again and brings in a new and young wife to occupy the home and divide the inheritance with adult offspring of a forThese factors are the roots of the divorce evil. They do not appear in the language of the records; but one can hold the parchment to the light and they will become visible as water-marks stamping the whole character of the case. In the outcome of divorce suits, the State is interested. The Judges are the conservators of the State's interest. But though they see the collusion, and know the insubstantiality of the case made, they have also to recognize that, ultimately, in personal affairs such as these, the event is in the hands of the par

mer union.

ties. If they will not keep their marriage Vows, the court's coercion cannot avail. Refuse these slackers freedom, and immorality will increase. Thus, rebelling against the inevitable, the Judges must continue to cut the gordian knot of marriage, on the most trivial evidence, where both parties invite the sword of separation. Naturally, collusion is frowned upon, and, when the evidence thereof appears, blasted with the fire of condemnation. Yet the court rolls fire of condemnation. mutely attest its prevalence in the huge proportion of undefended divorce suits. A circuit judge of our acquaintance, appointed about a year ago, states that he has signed divorce decrees at a rate of one every other day since taking office. His circuit is a small one, thinly populated.

Where a contest is waged, and especially where the interest of minor children is involved, or a property settlement is necessitated, the Judge becomes far more than a lay figure. Now, indeed, the procedure becomes solemn and the case real. In such circumstances it is that that judge, whom we personally most love and admire, shines forth best of all as a Judge of supreme merit. The case is practically taken from the lawyer's hands. Incessant consultations occur. First one of the parties and then the other is summoned alone to the judge's chambers. At last, the lawyers sitting ineffectively by, are informed of the result. A reconciliation or a compromise has been accomplished. The instructions are imperative. "Draw an order to that effect." Marvelous the achievements of this man over the recalcitrant and even the incorrigible! Many a home has him to bless. He sees in his office the power and privilege to do equity-and he does it with a strong arm and a compelling spirit of service.

As the stories of matrimonial tribulation come to us--and they come, of course, continually, many more in number than ever eventuate in litigation-the causes are, by and large, easy to classify. The tap-root cause of all is mere bad sportsmanship. These people have not really meant that

you what to do." Obviously, this put a fresh complexion on the matter. What chance was there now of negotiating a peace? He had put himself beyond help.

The real burden of this essay is to pass the responsibility for the existence of the divorce evil back to the parties to the litigation. So far as the services of a reputable lawyer are engaged, it is to assuage this social sore. Admittedly there are shysters, there are men who bid for this business, foster it and encourage it. But no respectable lawyer abets these disagreements. Sometimes such a lawyer may, in the interest of public morals, sign his name to flimsy bill. He sees beyond the formal averments. Sometimes a judge may grant a decree in an ex parte case that he would not suffer in a disputed matter. In divorce cases, there are parties not of record to be thought of-children, the State. Be it remembered that, to an astonishingly large section of the public, divorce is a luxury. Such people-negroes are especially fallible in this regard-will accomplish their ends anyhow. They are unmoral. That they come asking for a divorce bespeaks at least aspirations toward morality.

Reverting now to the citation given at the begining of this article. The woman in question may have been right in this, that the lawyer she employed did not search out the truth with sufficient rigor. One thing, however, is sure. No lawyer drew a bill for her, no judge granted a decree for her, on the facts as she told them to her confidant. She had to perjure herself to get her freedom, and it is safe to say that she did not trust her lawyer with the truth. So the sin and the obloquy are wholly hers. Can lawyers do more than they are doing to abate the nuisance? They can. They can make of the proceedings for divorce a much more "real" process. They can avoid the appearence of casualness or formality. They can name and maintain fees sufficient to deter splenetic excursions into such litigation. They can test more thoroughly the conscience of their client by examining

into, and exposing to the eye of that conscience, the real and remediable errors of prejudice and jealousy and selfishness that jaundice the disposition of the complainant.

They can do more of these sorts of things and do them better. Make no mistake, however. They are already laboring in this field. And all that they can do will never go very far to bring about a state of blessedness for everybody, without more.

Marriage must be a more serious obligation in its inception before the divorce evil is cured. Children must learn to keep their vows and to face life bravely and to do their part regardless of the derelictions of others, before we advance very far. This brings us back to the schools and the churches and the home. To these three institutions we must look for regeneration. GEORGE PALMER GARRETT.

Kissimmee, Fla.

MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY BY CO

EMPLOYEE.

HINCHUK v. SWIFT & CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 22, 1921.

182 N. W. 622.

An employee injured during the course of his employment, though by the willful act of a coemployee, is within the Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8203, 8230), if there is some causal relation between the employment and the injury, that is if the injury be one which may be seen to have had its origin in the nature of the employment. An injury inflicted by a coemployee as a result of a quarrel over the manner of doing their work is within the rule.

HALLAM, J. This case arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Alex Bush was in the employ of defendant at its packing plant at South Saint Paul. He and a workman named Harper were engaged in trucking meat to a washing machine. When the truck reached the machine it was unloaded piece by piece. Two men worked together on a truck. One would pull and the other would push and the fair way was to take turns. Bush and Harper quarreled over the moving of the truck, each claimed he was being compelled to do more than his share. The testimony is somewhat in conflict, but one witness testi

fied that they quarreled over who should push and who should pull the truck. Finally Bush took the handles and pulled and Harper pushed. When they reached the washing machine they quarreled some more, each calling the other names. When they finished the argument Bush started to work unloading meat, but Harper walked 12 or 15 steps away, picked up a piece of iron pipe that lay there and struck Bush over the head and caused his death. The trial court allowed compensation under the statute.

The statute is that compensation shall be paid by the employer, "in every case of personal injury or death of his employee, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment." G. S. 1913, § 8203. The word "accident" is defined to mean "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body." G. S. 1913, § 8230 (h). The act is declared not to "in**a third perclude an injury caused by * son or fellow employee *** because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his employment." G. S. 1913, § 8230 (i).

Section 8230 (h) gives us no trouble. Section 8203 and section 8230 (i) taken together may clearly include an injury inflicted by the willful act of another. See State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court, 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713, L. R. A. 1916F, 957; State ex rel. Johnson Sash & Door Co. v. District Court, 140 Minn. 75, 167 N. W. 283, L. R. A. 1918 E, 502. This is the prevailing construction of similar statutes as applied to cases similar to this.

In Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 31, 120 N. E. 530, two employees in culling barrel staves became involved in a dispute because one took staves from the rack of the other. One injured the other. Compensation was allowed.

In Swift & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 Ill. 564, 122 N. E. 796, an employee whose duty it was to repair leaks in steam pipes in a large packing plant was injured in a fight with the foreman of a department to which he had been summoned, the altercation growing out of matters connected with the injured employee's work. The statute was held to apply.

In Matter of Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750, L. R. A. 1917A, 344, claimant, employed as a driver by a brewing company took exception to the manner in which a fellow workman washed off the horses.

A quar

rel ensued and in physical encounter that grew out of it, claimant was injured. Held, entitled to compensation.

In Polar Ice & Fuel Co. v. Mulray (Ind. App.); 119 N. E. 149, an employee of an ice company, employed to check and collect for shortage of drivers, was shot and killed by a driver as a result of a quarrel over collections. Compensation was allowed.

In Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398, a worker on a railroad section was told by the foreman to drop his shovel and get his time, but the man refused and the foreman undertook to take his shovel from him and was injured. Compensation was allowed.

In McIntyre v. A. Rodgers & Co., 41 Scottish Law Reporter, 107, two workmen engaged in a tussle over the possession of a brush to be used in the work and one was injured. The statute was held to apply.

The principle applicable to such cases is that the injury is included within the statute if there is some causal relation between the employment and the injury. Not that the injury must be one which ought to have been foreseen, but it must be one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the nature of the employment.

This is such a case. Bush and Harper became involved in a quarrel over the manner of doing the work in which they were jointly engaged. There was no personal antipathy. Differences over the work caused the whole trouble. The trial court evidently took the view that there was no real cessation of hostilities from the time trouble started until it was over. We think the evidence sustains this position and that the court properly held the case to be within the statute. Affirmed.

NOTE.-Injury by Willful Act of Co-Employee as Compensable.-An injury resulting from an assault by a workman upon a fellow workman while the latter is engaged in the work of the employer is an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Stasmas v. State Industrial Com'n, Okla., 195 Pac. 762.

The above rule is not applicable, however, where the injured workman provoked the assault. Thus, where a factory oiler, upon being told that he was using too much oil, called his foreman a liar, and the foreman struck him, it was held that the oiler was neither injured in nor by his employment, and hence was not entitled to compensation. Knocks v. Metal Package Corp., 185 N. Y. Supp. 309.

Where an employee engaged in unloading a freight car refused to get a drink for a negro workman when he was getting one for himself,