by suggestion and friendly criticism, or where the decisions themselves disclose a patent ambiguity in some particular section of the Act, the Conference prepares a uniform amendment to the Act which it recommends to each state legislature. This promptly cures the defect.

We believe it to be to the interest of every lawyer as a lawyer, as well as a citizen, to bring about the passage of all the great codifications of commercial law proposed by this Conference, and such of the special acts as comport with the policies of his particular state. Uniformity is especially desirable in the great commercial codes to the end that commerce may flow freely and without the fear of uncertainty with respect to obligations created by ordinary commercial compacts brought about by loose, ambiguous and widely divergent state laws.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

LAW PROHIBITING REMOVAL OF UNTAXED LIQUORS REPEALED BY VOLSTEAD ACT.-Just how far former laws regulating the sale and transportation of intoxicating liquors are enforceable has been the subject of much recent discussion. In the recent case of Reed v. Thurmond, 269 Fed. Rep. 252, it was held that the Volstead Act was a radical departure from the policy of the former laws to derive revenue therefrom, and completely covers the same subject-matter including the transportation of such liquors, so that it impliedly repealed Rev. St. § 3296, which imposed on the removal from a distillery of liquors on which the tax had not been paid a penalty more severe than was imposed by the Volstead Act on the illegal transportation of liquor.

In this case defendant was prosecuted under section 3296 of the Revised Statutes for unlawfully removing certain distilled spirits upon which the tax imposed by this statute had not been paid from a certain distillery. versing a conviction under this indictment, the Court of Appeals (4th Cir.) said:

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tion. And to our minds the Volstead Act in its entire scope and purpose, is plainly inconsistent with the scheme of revenue protection embodied in the Revised Statutes and in the section under review.

"Specifically it is enough to point out that under the former law defendant incurred the penalty for the offense of which he was convicted of both fine and imprisonment, whereas under the present law the punishment for a first offense is limited to a fine of not more than $500. Nor does it seem doubtful that the Volstead Act embraces the entire subject-matter of section 3296. Certainly it covers everything defendant did or was accused of doing; that he could have been convicted under it is not open to question. In short, we are of opinion that offenses of the kind here in question, which have been committed since the Volstead Act went into effect, are punishable only under that act."

The same result was reached in United States v. Windham, 264 Fed. Rep. 376, where the Court said:

"Taking the new statute as a whole, its provisions would appear to cover and provide for the punishment of every act which could be punished under the former provisions of the Revised Statutes with regard to the manufac ture and sale of liquors for beverage purposes. To hold that the old law is continued would therefore be to hold that two inconsistent sets of statutory provisions punishing the same substantial act, and with differing penalties, were of force, and that a person could be prosecuted and punished under section 3 and section 6 of the new statute for transporting any liquor at all, without the required permit, and at the same time prosecuted and punished under the provisions of section 3296 for transporting liquor without having previously paid the tax that he is forbidden by law to pay."

IS AN ACTION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT ONE IN CONTRACT, TORT OR FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A STATUS OBLIGATION?-The California Law Review calls attention to an important case in that state construing an act extending the benefits of the California Workmen's Compensation Act to "controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state in those cases where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in this state." The Supreme Court of California, on the first hearing, held this act unconstitutional as an attempt to extend the operation of the laws of California beyond its territorial limits. On rehearing, however, the court receded from this position and held the act constitutional on the theory that it was not a wrongful act (or tort) for which a defendant must pay under the Act, but an obligation arising out of a status or relation created

in California. Quong Ham Wah v. Industrial Accident Commission, 192 Pac. 1021. In justification of this decision, the Court says that this statute can only mean that an act occurring beyond the geographical limits of the state is recognized as the basis for the creation, or condition for the enforcement, of a right created and enjoyed within California.

The California Law Review calls attention to the fact that all obligations are classified as contractural or delictual, and that this classification is too rigid for the new rights and obligations created by laws like the Workmen's Compensation Acts, which recognize the duty of society to protect those who labor in dangerous occupations. On this point our learned contemporary says:

"The courts have apparently felt impelled to classify the obligation as either contract or tort. Some have held that compensation acts, though not strictly delictual, were designed partially to supersede a particular branch of the law of torts, and are co-extensive in their territorial application with the laws thus superseded. The rule of conflict of laws applicable to torts generally is therefore invoked, and the acts held to have a strictly territorial operation only. The prevailing theory, however, is that the obligation created by such an act rests on 'contract.' The provisions of the act enter into the terms of the contract of hiring and regardless of where the accident occurs compensation is recoverable in the state where the contract was made, being purely a discharge of a contract obligation. The principal case rejects both the territorial rule and the contract theory. The act does not create a tort liability. The modern theory of the law of torts is predicated on fault, whereas compensation rights and obligations have no reference is made optional either on the part of the employer. Nor is it contractual in a strict sense. The contract theory may perhaps fit those optional acts, where the application of the act is made opional either on the part of the employer or the employee. But the California act is compulsory. The liability to pay compensation does not rest on the mutual agreement of the parties; it arises from the law itself. The principal case decided that the obligation created by the act is a law-imposed liability, in a class by itself, being neither strictly contractual nor delictual.'"

It seems to us that the obligation here created is rather that arising out of a status than out of a private wrong. The contract itself is as immaterial as is the marriage contract in governing the relationship or status arising out of the contract. Parties are free to contract to create the relationship of employer and employee, but the law may attach to the relationship thus assumed whatever obligations it sees fit to impose. Since all obligations arising out of status or one's personal relationships are controlled by the law of one's

In his article Mr. Justice Bronson demonstrates quite clearly the beneficent results which have followed the adoption by the Supreme Court of North Dakota of a system of procedure for the guidance and government of the members of the Court in the discharge of their respective duties.

The result of operating under this procedure has been to eliminate delay and to bring the work of this Court entirely up, so, that, at the expiration of each month, there remain no undetermined nor undecided cases. In other words, we have a term of court, commencing on the first Tuesday of each month, at which all cases on the calendar must be argued and submitted.

For example: fifteen days before the first Tuesday of each month all appeals then accumulated are placed on the calendar for argument and decision. The decisions of the different cases on the calendar

*This explanation of the new rules of procedure of the Supreme Court of North Dakota by one of the Judges of that Court will no doubt be read with much interest by lawyers in other states.

(1) 90 Cent. L. J. 333. (2) 91 Cent. L. J. 83.

any month are always completed and wholly disposed of before the next ensuing monthly term. This Court is entirely up with its work. It is always waiting for work to accumulate. In other words, it is always ahead of its work.

There is no doubt that the law's delays most frequently result in the denial of justice. The law's delays, which could be wholly avoided, it is quite safe to say, at least double the expense of litigation. We have no way of knowing how many millions, or hundreds of millions, of dollars, are annually expended within the United States in litigation, but, unquestionably, it is a vast sum. And, doubtless, half this enormous sum could be saved to the litigants.

The reason of the results which have been obtained, as set forth in Justice Bronson's article, are the rules of procedure adopted by this Court for its guidance and government, in the discharge of its duties, all of which it was the writer's privilege to originate and to procure to be adopted by this Court.

In order that the bench and bar may understand the nature of those rules, we will here indicate the substance of them. But, before doing so, we wish to observe that, at the meeting of almost every State Bar Association, or meeting of the American. Bar Association, much has been said and much thought has been expended to originate or invent some way of curing the law's delays. But nothing has ever been done. The question has been held one not admitting of solution. As far as we are concerned, we are fully convinced this is wholly a mistaken conclusion. The law's delays can be wholly eliminated. And, if the writer ever has the opportunity of attending a meeting of the American Bar Association, he would not hesitate to state, and to demonstrate, that it can be done. The way to eliminate the law's delays is to eliminate them; and the principal elements which will assist in the elimination are: the adoption by Courts of proper rules,

relative to the discharge of their duties, and the application of systematic work thereunder.

But, to proceed further, when the writer became a member of the Supreme Court of North Dakota, he found that there were 150 cases which were of record in this Court, awaiting argument and decision; and, of course, thereafter cases continued coming at the rate of about 20 to 25 per month. It, indeed, was a formidable task to bring all of the work up to date; i.e., to hear and decide the 150 accumulated cases and dispose of the new ones accumulating each month, as above stated.

Under the procedure then existing, which will be shortly explained, it seemed impossible to make any progress in bringing up the work. In fact, after working two years exceedingly hard, it became apparent that the work never could be brought up under the then existing mode of procedure.

That procedure was, in short, about as follows:

Assume there were placed on the calendar at a given term, 40 cases for argument and decision, and then, after conclusion thereof, the Chief Justice would assign the cases, in equal number, to the members of the Court, who were five in number. In the course of time each Judge would formulate and circulate the opinions in all of the cases which were allotted to him Then, some day, a conference would be called, not because there was any rule fixing a day of conference, but because some member, or members, of the Court would finally conclude there should be a conference. In other words, it was a conference by accident, rather than design At that time, it was also the custom among the Judges, when they had written a case, to inquire of the others if they agreed or disagreed with it, and if they agreed, they would have them sign it, or, sometimes, this was done in conference. But in any event, at that time an opinion had to be disposed of by all tive Judges, either by signing it, or by a

majority signing and the remainder by dissenting from it.

In other words, every Judge had to act upon every opinion before it could be filed, so that if four Judges signed the opinion, and one had not made up his mind, and had arrived at no decision, the case was held up interminably. Many were thus held up for six months, some as long perhaps as eight months or a year.

I preserved a list of one lot of these accumulated cases, in which opinions were written and circulated, but were not disposed of for the reason that one or more of the Judges had not arrived at a decision. It is a list of 73 cases, or matters, at one time awaiting final disposition. Now, just imagine a Judge endeavoring to carry around in his head, from week to week and from month to month, 73 law suits or matters upon which decisions were quired. To cure this evil, the writer suggested a rule which, in substance, provides, that when an opinion is circulated, and at conference is signed by three members who agree with it, it is then immediately filed with the clerk, and if not signed by or dissented from by the other two members within ten days, it becomes the decision in the case.

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This rule worked like magic. Within a year after its adoption, the 150 cases above mentioned had been disposed of, and the work of the Court was entirely up. The delay in the decision of cases was wholly eliminated. Instead of a litigant waiting from a year to a year and a half for a decision, he gets it within thirty days after the case is argued in this Court.

Surely, in the average case, after an opinion has been written therein and circulated, ten days is sufficient time within which any Judge should make up his mind, either to agree with the opinion written or dissent. If a given case is particularly complicated, and a Judge desires a few days additional, the Court may extend the ten-day period, but no Judge so far has found any need of applying for additional time.

Another rule which greatly assisted in bringing up the work, was one providing for a conference at three o'clock on Tuesdays and Fridays of each week. This was also adopted and now when three o'clock comes on these days, every Judge starts for the conference chamber. He does not have to be told; he does not have to ask any other Judge, or Judges, for a conference. Automatically, that matter is arranged.

Another rule is one that automatically assigns the cases to the Judges, wherein they are to formulate opinions. It may be explained as follows:

When the record on appeal arrives at the clerk's office, he files it, noting thereon the date and hour of filing; and, for the sake of clarity, we will assume there are five such cases filed, and that the first is filed on the first day of March, and other four cases filed in the following order: one on the second, one on the third, one on the

fourth, and the last on the fifth day of March. The names of our Judges are then arranged in alphabetical order, and, as ar

ranged they are B, B, C, G and R. Now, the first case filed goes to B, because it was filed first, the next case filed goes to the second B, the third to C, the fourth to G, and the fifth to R. All cases are thus assigned automatically, as they are filed.

The time of filing operates automatically to assign the cases to the Judges. The clerk must file the cases in the order they are received by him. If he should receive two or more records in the same mail, he may file that which he happens to examine first.

This rule is found to be of much advantage, for it distributes the work evenly among the judges, not only as to the number of cases assigned, but also as to the degree of difficultness of them. In other words, a Judge, in the course of any given period of time, will draw just as many difficult cases as those that are less difficult, or those which are simple in character and easy of solution.