페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

does not appear in the description of the act denounced as an offense, and it is not neces. sary for the state to so allege. If it becomes an issue on the trial, lack of knowledge on the part of a defendant that he had injured someone would excuse him and be a defense to a prosecution under the article in question. The trial judge recognized this as the law, and submitted that issue to the jury.

THE PROPER PROCEDURE UNDER EQUITY

RULE 29 TO TEST AUTHORITY OF AT-
TORNEY TO REPRESENT PLAINTIFF.

Believing the article of the statute should be upheld as construed in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Note-Validity and Construction of Statute Requiring Motorist Striking a Person to Render Assistance.-Statutes have been held valid which require the driver or owner of an automobile, in case its operation causes injury to person or froperty, to stop and give his name and address ind other information, to the person injured in verson or property, or to some other suitable per son, and to render assistance to the injured Woods v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129; People v. Fodera, 33 Cal. App. 8, 164 Pac. 22, rehearing denied by Supreme Court; People v. Finley, 27 Cal. App. 291, 149 Pac. 779; State v. Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482.

A statute which makes it a crime for the driver of a motor vehicle, or of any other vehicle, and the person, if any, therein having control over the driver, in case of a collision with any person or vehicle, to refuse to stop and render to the person struck, or to the occupants of the vehicle collided with, all necessary assistance, and to give such injured person or persons the number of his vehicle, his name and address, and the name of the owner of such vehicle, is not violative of the constitutional provision that “no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Woods v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129; People v. Diller, 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797; Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983, Ann. Cas. 1913C 923.

Rule 29 of the new Federal Equity Rules, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court at the October term, 1912, reads as fol. lows:

"Demurrers and pleas are abolished. Every defense in point of law arising upon the face of the bill, whether for misjoinder, nonjoinder, or insufficiency of fact to constitute a valid cause of action in equity, which might heretofore have been made by demurrer or plea, shall be made by motion to dismiss or in the answer; and every such point of law going to the whole or a material part of the cause or causes of action stated in the bill may be called up and disposed of before final hearing at the discretion of the court. Every defense here. tofore presentable by plea in bar or abatement shall be made in the answer and may be separately heard and disposed of before the trial of the principal case in the discretion of the court. If the defendant move to dismiss the bill or any part thereof, the motion may be set down for hearing by either party upon five days' notice, and, if it be denied, answer shall be filed within five days thereafter or a decree pro confesso entered."

This rule is almost identical with Equity Rule 32 of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia adopted in 1909. The question which this paper will discuss is whether under the above rules the motion to dismiss is a proper proceeding to test the authority of an attorney representing the plaintiff. A brief analysis of Rule 29 will enable us to settle the question more readily. By the effect of this rule:

(1) Demurrers are abolished. Pleas are abolished.

(2) Defense in point of law arising upon the face of the bill heretofore made by demurrer or plea shall be made by (a) Motion to dismiss, or (b) In the answer.

(3) Defenses heretofore presentable by (a) Plea in bar, (b) Plea in abatement, shall be made in the answer. (Discretion of court to hear separately.)

(4) Motions to dismiss may be set down for hearing.

From the above analysis it is clear that it it were possible before the rule was adopted, either by a plea in bar or by a plea in abatement, to raise the question of the authority of the attorney to represent his client in a suit, then that question should be raised by the

"In each of these cases it is pointed out that the operation of an automobile upon the public highways is not a right, but only a privilege which the state may grant or withhold at pleasure, and that what the state may withhold it may grant upon condition. One condition imposed is that the operator must, in case of accident, furnish the demanded information. This condition is binding upon all who accept the privilege. The defendant also claims that the statute is unconstitutional, in that it requires him to furnish evidence which might be used against him in a criminal proceeding. Bill of Rights, art. 15. The same question has been raised in other states, and in each the conclusion has been reached that the statute is valid.” State v. Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482 (1916).

Further, see Berry, Automobiles (3d ed.), secs. 57, 1601.

defendant in his answer. If, on the other hand, before the adoption of the rule, the question could not have been raised in a demurrer, then it now may be taken advantage of either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain by what method, previous to the adoption of Equity Rule 29, the authority of counsel to institute a suit might be questioned.

Since attorneys are officers of the court, there is a firmly established presumption in favor of an attorney's authority to act for any client he professes to represent, and, therefore, ordinarily it is unnecessary for an attorney to show his authority.1 But, on account of the relation of the court to its attorneys, who are its officers, and the power which it has over them, it can, if the facts submitted warrant it, call upon a plaintiff's attorney in any suit to show his authority. And so it has been held that either party to a suit may ques. tion an attorney's right to appear.3

However, as the objection to an attorney's authority to appear is of a dilatory character, such objection must be made at the first opportunity. It has been held that after answer had been filed and the case called for trial, it was too late for defendant to demand that the plaintiff's counsel produce his authority for appearing.5 Sed quaere.

When we come to ascertain the methods employed in raising the question of an attorney's authority to represent his alleged client, it has been held that such a question cannot be raised by demurrer to the complaint.6 Nor can it be presented in a plea,i or raised collaterally or in the answer. The proper method is set out by Delaney, District Judge, de

livering the opinion of the court in Bonnifield v. Thorp: 9

"The practice is also well settled that the authority for an attorney to appear cannot be called into question except by a motion directly for that purpose, based upon affidavits, showing in the first instance prima facie a want of authority; and, upon the hearing, such want must be established by clear and positive proofs. The proceeding may be by motion to vacate the appearance, to dismiss the action, or for an order requiring authority to be shown; and in cases where the validity of an order, judgment or decree depends upon the jurisdiction of a court over the person of a party, acquired solely by an appearance of attorneys, the authority of such attorneys may be attacked upon a motion to vacate the order, judgment or decree. In the absence of some such proceeding, directly challenging the authority, the court will not hear or inquire into the question of the authority of the attorney for his appearance."10

The rule is thus stated in Cyc.:11

"The question of an attorney's authority to represent an alleged client cannot, it has been held, be raised collaterally, or on a demurrer, nor should it be set up in a pleading, but must be raised on motion directly for that purpose, and supported by affidavits."

And in Story's Equity Pleading it is stated as follows:12

"When the plaintiff in a suit at law is a fictitious person, the defendant may plead it in abatement. In equity a different and more summary course is adopted, and upon motion the court will direct a stay of the proceedings, or that the bill be taken off the files, and will order the solicitor to pay the costs for his contempt in instituting the suit. If the name of a complainant should be used without his authority, a similar course would be pursued."

Thus it will appear that, independently of the above rules, it is improper to raise the question of an attorney's authority to represent his client by demurrer, plea or answer. The reason for this seems clear, especially in the case of an attorney representing the plaintiff. It is in the nature of a dilatory question which, under the civil law, would be raised

(1) 6 C. J. 635, 4 Cyc. 928, and cases cited.

(2) New York City and County Com'rs Purdy, 36 Bard. 266; Hollins v. St. Louis & C. R. Co., 57 Hun 139, 11 N. Y. Supp. 27, 25 Abb. N. C. 93; Vincent v. Vanderbiit, 10 How. Prac. 324, 1 abb Prac 19:5. Ninety-Nin) Plaintiffs v. fanie, 11 N. Y. Super Ct. (4 Duer) 632.

(3) People v. Mariposa Co., 39 Cai. 683; In re Gillespie, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 325.

(4) Miss v. People, 116 Ill. 265, 4 N. L. 783; Rogers v. Comelin, Fed. Cas. No. 12,00).

(5) Roland v. Gardner, 69 N. C. 59.

(6) State v. Baxter, 38 Ark, 462; Gibson v. State, 59 Miss. 341. Mix v. People, supra.

(7) North Brunswick v. Booream, 10 N. J. L. (5 Halst.) 257.

(8) Bonnifield v. Thorp, 71 Fed. 924; Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. Maddy, 103 Ind. 200, 2 N. E. 574; Louisville, St. L. & T. R. Co. v. Newsome, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 174; People v. Lamb, 85 Hun 171, 32 N. Y. Supp. 584.

(9) 71 Fed. 824 (appeal dismissed, 83 Fed. 1022).

(10) Citing Hollins v. St. Louis & C. R. Co., supra; Insurance Co. v. Pinner, 43 N. J. Eq. 52, 10 Atl. 184; Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall. 453; McKiernon v. Patrick, 4 How. (Miss.) 336; Howe v. Anderson (Ky.), 14 S. W. 216; Reynolds v. Fleming, 30 Kan. 106, 1 Pac. 61; Williams v. Canal Co., 13 Colo. 469, 22 Pac. 806; affirmed in Dillon v. Rand, 15 Colo. 372, 25 Pac. 185; Winters v. Means, 25 Neb. 241, 41 N. W. 157: Turner v. Caruthers, 17 Cal. 432; People v. Mariposa Co., supra.

See also 6 C. J. 635, and cases cited (11) 4 Cyc. 930. (12) $ 498.

before the praetor in order that he might de

on So. Just think what a good character Mr. cide whether the case should go before the Byrne gave your man. Sure we'd never have

the known what a fine fellow Patsy was if he judge, like a question which must be raised ante litem contestam. In other words, it is hadn't stolen that watch.”—Pittsburg Sun. not a question of pleading, but a question that goes to the good faith of a sworn officer of An indictment had been found against a the law in his relations to the court, and on colored man, relates the Jacksonville Observer, this account, the courts have uniformly held for (as the indictment read, following the that it is such a question as must be taken up words of the statute) "breaking and entering independently of the pleadings and by a mo- into a dwelling house in the nighttime, with intion directly for the purpose.

tent to commit a felony." The point which we are called upon, there. The case coming on for trial, the defendant fore, to determine is whether the above rules pleaded “not guilty.” The testimony showed, reverse this well established doctrine. As without any doubt, that the prisoner, on the their titles show, they are directed to the night in question, climbed up the piazza to the subject of defenses and the methods of pre- second floor, and then broke in through a win. senting them. Prior to their adoption, defenses dow upstairs, into an upper room, Just then might be presented by demurrers, pleas and a man rushed into the room and grabbed him answers. Demurrers and pleas are abolished

before he had a chance to get anything. No by the rule, and, as a substitute for the de evidence was introduced to the contrary. After murrer, the motion to dismiss is adopted. the arguments of the counsel pro and con, and The question of the authority of an attorney

the charge of the court to the jury, the jury to represent a plaintiff, therefore, does not

retired to consider their verdict. In a very present a defense to a suit. Since, before these

few minutes the jury had all agreed except rules were adopted, it was not proper to raise one, on a verdict of guilty. This one, however, the question either by demurrer, plea or an

was a colored preacher, who said he could swer, it seems clear that the rules were not not agree to such a verdict because, he said, intended to contract the sphere of the motion

the indictment read that the "breaking and to dismiss, but rather to enlarge it and to re

entering was to be with intent to commit a felquire that such motions should be used in the

ony." “Now,” said he, very emphatically, future where formerly it was not customary

"whar was de evidence of de intent? Then to do so. And since, before the adoption of

a long argument ensued over the question of the rules, it was proper to raise the question

"intent" between the white jurors and the of an attorney's authority to représent his al

colored preacher, who repeatedly and leged client by a motion to dismiss and improp

phatically inquired, "Whar was de evidence er to do so by the pleadings, it would seem

of de intent?” The white jurors hated to that it is still proper to raise this question by

come into court and say that they could not a motion to dismiss, and not by the answer.

agree upon a verdict of guilty in such a plain CHRISTOPHER B. GARNETT, in the Virginia Law

case as that, but they could not see any other Review.

way to do.

But just then a colored juror, who had been

sitting quietly alį through the discussion, say. HUMOR OF THE LAW.

ing nothing, turned to the preacher, looking

him straight in the face, and said: "See heah, She. You ought to be ashamed of stealing youse a preacher isn't you?” a kiss.

“Yes, I is. I is a minister ob de Gospel," He. You are equally guilty. You received straightening up proudly. the stolen goods.—Edinburg Scotsman.

"Well, den, I specks you believes de Bible?"

“Yes, sah I believes ebery word in de Bible." Patsy Doolan was taken up on the charge of "Well, den, don' the Bible somewhar say dis: stealing a watch. His employer was called as ‘Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that entera witness to character, and said that he had eth not by the door, but climeth up some other always found the accused honest and upright. way, the same is a thief and a robber?'” (St. Unfortunately there was evidence to the con- John chap. 10, 1st verse.) trary with regard to the case at issue, and The preacher gasped and came im nediately Patsy was convicted and sent to prison, to down. “Dat so, dat so,” he said. "I guess he the great distress of his wife, who left the | guilty. Yes, he guilty.” court weeping bitterly. A neighbor, seeking to ! And so the verdict was brought right in.comfort her, said: "Och now, Mary, don't take Case and Comment.

em

1

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the

State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this Digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Alabama

.13, 22, 24, 31, 34, 53 California

...1, 16, 17, 32, 51, 61 Georgia

.43, 45, 57 Indiana

...15, 18 Iowa

-,12, 39 Kentucky

35, 47, 49 Maryland

.21, 36, 60, 62 Michigan

.27, 30, 38, 41, 42, 44 Minnesota

- 23, 26 New York

.14, 19, 28, 48, 50, 56, 58, 63 North Carolina

.....,3, 25 Oklahoma

.20, 33 South Dakota

40 Texas

..4, 46, 59 United States C. C. A...

.7, 8, 10, 37, 54, 55 United States D. C.....

..5, 6, 9, 52 West Virginia

.., 2, 11, 29

1.

Attachment-Amendment of Complaint.A surely company, executing a bond to release an attachment, such bond undertaking to pay any judgment obtained in the action is not aischarged, under Cin, Code, Š 2819, by an amendment or the complaint, not setting up a new cause of action, but mereiy increasing the amounts demanded for breach of contract.Turner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, Cal., 200 Pac. 959.

2. Attorney and Client-Attorney's Lien.An attorney by whom a judgment or decree was obtained for his client has a lien upon a fund arising from enforcement of such judgment or decree against the land of the debtor, by another attorney employed by his client, prior and superior to the lien thereon of such subsequently employed attorney, unless he has expressly or impliedly assented to such subsequent employment or, in some way, relinquished his right further to represent his client in the matter, or, by negligence or other misconduct warranting his discharge, has lost it. -Brown v. Erwin, w. Va., 108 S. E. 605.

3.-Authority of Attorney.-In a summary proceeding in ejectment, where the jury gave possession of the property to the owner and fixed the rental at $111.66, contrary to the testimony of what a fair rental should be, and an intimation by the court that the verdict would be set aside as against the weight of evidence, unless plaintiff consented to a reduction in the rental to $60, held, where it is established that attorney's consent to such reduction and compromise is without express authority from the client and contrary to his instruction, such judgment will be set aside.- Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., N. C., 108 S. E. 439.

4.- Value of Services.-An attorney employed to perfect title to certain land under a contract entitling him to certain interest in the land for such services could not, on client's termination of contract before he had fully performed services, recover as reasonable value of the services, upon quantum meruit, more than the value of the land which would have been his compensation for his services had the title been perfected.--Smith v. Thompson, Tex., 233 S. W. 876.

5. Bankruptcy-Motion to Intervene.—Motion to intervene in bankruptcy proceedings by applicants who allowed a default of nearly two months to run against them without any excuse whatever may be denied, in the discretion of the court.-In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, U. S. D. C., 274 Fed. 1011.

6.-Partnership.-Bankr. Act. § 5a, providing that a partnership may be ajudged a bankrupt, treats a partnership as an entity, and in view of General Order in Bankruptcy No. 8, providing that a member of a partnership who refuses to join in a petition to have the partnership declared bankrupt "shall be entitled to resist the prayer of the petition in the same manner as if the petition had been filed by a creditor of the partnership," that he shall be served with notice, and "shall have the right to appear

and to make proof if he can that the partnership is not insolvent or has not committed an act of bankruptcy and to make all defenses which any debtor proceeded against is entitled to take by the provisions of the act, “a petition filed against a partnership by one partner alone must conform to the requirements of an involuntary petition and must allege insolvency and an act of bankruptcy by the partnership.-In re Ollinger & Perry, U. S. D. C., 274 Fed. 970.

7.--Priority of Payment.-The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, incorporated under the general corporation law of the District of Columbia pursuant to Act. Sept. 7, 1916, $$ 11, 13, given the President's authority to construct, purchase, and requisition vessels under Act June 15, 1917, by the President's executive order of July 11, 1917, was not entitled to priority of payment under Bankruptcy Act. $ 64, and Rev. St. § 3466, of a debt due it from a bankrupt with whom the corporation made a contract as a principal, and not as the agent of the United States government, on the theory that the debt was one due to the United States, since, the corporation having been organized as a private corporation under the District of Columbia's general incorporation law, the government's ownership of the stock did not divest it of its character as a private corporation, in view of $$ 607, 608. -In re Eastern Shore Shipbuilding Corporation, U. S. C. C. A., 274 Fed. 893.

8.-Taxes.—Under Bankruptcy Act, $ 64a, claim of the government for taxes is not ordered paid in its entirety as matter of course and the trustee remitted to proceedings under Rev. St. $ 3226 to have the money returned, but the bankruptcy court passes on and determines validity of the tax in the first instance; it not being a case where the trustee is seeking to maintain a suit for recovery of internal revenue taxes illegally assessed, the government and not the trustee being the moving party, and this notwithstanding the trustee moves that the government's proof of debt be reconsidered and rejected, a verified proof of debt in bankruptcy having probative force and making out a prima facie case requiring the objector to go forward.—In re General Film Corporation. U. S. C. C. A., 274 Fed. 903.

9.-"Unincorporated Association." The Tidewater Coal Exchange, an association organized by shippers of bituminous coal during the war with Germany, at the instance of the Council of National Defense, for the purpose of speeding the transshipment of coal from cars to ships at tidewater, etc., involving a general pooling arrangement for coal, with debit and credit charges against and for each member, held an "unincorporated company". within Bankruptcy Act, § 4B, so as to give the District Court jurisdiction of an involuntary petition against it.-In re Tidewater Coal Exchange., U. S. D. C., 274 Fed. 1008.

10.-Voluntary Petition.—There is no presumption of authority in an officer of a corporation to make and file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and he may not do so without the consent of the directors.-Regal Cleaners & Dyers v. Merlis, U. S. C. C. A., 274 Fed. 915.

11. Bills and Notes-Liability of Endorser.To render an endorser liable on a negotiable note, it must be presented at the particular time

and place specified therein and timely notice of its dishonor given the endorser, unless it is alleged and proven that he in some way waived such notice.—Hastings v. Gump, W. Va.. 108 S. E. 600.

Brokers-Commission.-A commission is earned when the broker produces a purchaser accepted by the principal, and the subsequent

12.

a

a

[ocr errors]

agreement of the principal and the buyer to abandon the contract will not defeat the broker's claim for commission, nor place on the broker the burden of restoring to the purchaser a deposit on the price not in excess of the agreed commissions.-Smith v. Eells, Iowa, 184 N. W. 385.

13. -Commission.-A broker who undertakes to find a purchaser for land at a stipulated price earns his commission when he procures and produces to his principal a person who is able, ready, and willing to buy at that price, and he does not earn his commission if he fails to produce such a purchaser; but, if a broker has brought the parties together and they conclude a contract, he is not deprived of his right to a commission by the fact that the contract differs in terms from the one which he was authorized to negotiate, provided the negotiations commenced by the broker continued uninterruptedly.-Dancy v. Baker, Ala., 89 So. 590.

14. Constitutional Law-Due Process.-It is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, if a judgment in a personal action is enforced, which has been entered by default on the service of the summons by publication: but, unless process is issued on the judgment in an effort to enforce it defendant cannot claim his rights are violated.-Cahill v. Broadwell Productions, N. Y., 190 N. Y. S. 225.

15. Contracts-Mutual Agreement.-A contract, “We, the undersigned, children of R., and the only beneficiaries under her will," agree to turn over to the executor an eighth part of the property of the testatrix from our distributive share, with the understanding that the same shall be paid to disinherited grandchildren, who did not sign held obviously drawn as a mutual agreement between the several parties, to be signed by all of them, which was not binding on any of them, where all did not sign.-Hess v. Lackey. Ind., 132 N. E. 257

16. --Public Policy.-In contracting with a lumber company that the latter assume liability for the loss of lumber deposited on a wharf during a strike of longshoremen. the whartinger violated no law against public poliny.Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Pacific Wharf & S. Co. Cal.. 200 Pac. 935.

17. Corporations-Purchase of Stock. — An agreement of a corporation with an intending purchaser of stock to take back the stock on demand is enforceable by such purchaser.Williamson v. Marshall. Cal., 200 Pac. 1058.

18. Criminal Law-Sufficiency of Indictment. -Burglary indictment, charging that defendant broke into named person's private garage, held to charge crime with sufficient certainty. notwithstanding failure to define the word "garage," or to state that the private garage was a building; the word "garage" being well understood to mean a building for the storage of antomohile vehicles.-Taylor v. State. Ind., 132 N. E. 294,

19. Eminent Domain-Railroad Property.Railroad property is not to be condemned for a street, though it be not actually in use, it it will be needed for the company's use in the future and this, though the railroad's franchise from the city to operate on certain streets has been forfeited hv the city.-In 221st Street, N. Y., 190 N. Y. S. 235. 20.

a valid gift, where it was not shown that such depositor, in his lifetime, released control and dominion over it.—Pearre v. Grossnickle, Md., 115 Atl. 49.

22. Guardian and Ward-Illegal Agreement. -Although the guardian, mother of the ward, had a right to use and enjoy his property as her residence during her life, her contract as guardian, with a purchaser made privately, to let him have all the property would bring on sale by court order above a certain amount, was known to the purchaser to be illegal and void, and he cannot maintain an action against her personally thereon.--Wilson v. McKleroy. Ala., 89 So. 584.

23. Highways Negligence. Where the traveled track of a public road is to one side of the center thereof, it is not negligence as a matter of law to drive in such track, though it be upon the left side of the road to the particular driver.-Keane Butner, Minn., 184 N. W. 571.

24. Homicide - Trespasser. - Officers who went on the porch of accused's house in peaceable manner and with lawful purpose, and without intent to search his barn for intoxicating liquors without warrant. if he objected were not trespassers, and court properly refused to so charge in a homicide case. Lakey v. State, Ala., 89 So. 605.

25. Insurance Crops.-Although under C. S. $ 2355, the possession and title to all crops raised by tenant or cropper in the absence of a contrary agreement are deemed to be vested in the landlord until the rent and advancements have been paid, this does not divest the tenant of an insurable interest in the crops before division.-Batts v. Sullivan. N. C., 108 S. E. 511.

26. -"Immediate Notice.”—The policy corering the case required that, in event of accidental death, immediate notice must be given to the company. This means within a reasonable time. Almost immediately after death the soliciting agent who negotiated the policy procured it and surrendered it to the company as plaintiff claims without her authority. It was never returned to her though later de. manded. Held, this and other circumstanceg in the case excused plaintiff from giving notire of death.-Frommelt v. Travelers' Ins. Co. Minn.184 N. W. 565,

27.—-Proof of Loss.-Where insurer's adjuster, on being notified by insured that his automobile had been stolen. promised to take care of him, took charge of the matter, examined the policy and other papers, made a record of the

from answers to questions asked of insured, and promisen they would return the car or pay for it within 60 days, it waived subsequent tender of proof of lose. Doubles Insurance Co. of North America, Mich., 184 N. W. 539.

28.-Repairs.-A marine policy provision that no claim of loss shall go hevond the cost of actual repairs. considered with provision for estimating loss, held merelv limitation or claim for loss to the cost of repairs. if made, and if no repairs are made. ineuren mav re

damages found survev.-Walker Liverpont & Tondon & Globe Ins. Co.. X. Y.. 190 N. Y. S. 255.

Fish-Police Power. The state mav, under its police power. for the protection in the streams, lakes, and ponds of this state, and for the purpose

of encouraging the breeding of fur-hearing animals and other game which have access to the public waters of the state prohibit the depositing of crude nil and other deleterinus substances therein.-State v. Wheatley, Okla.. 200 Pac. 1004.

21. Gifts-Joint Bank Deposit.-A bank's transfer of a savings account, if made in conformity with an order of the depositor authorizing its change to a joint account between himself and wife, subject to withdrawal by check of either, the balance on the death of either to belong to the survivor would not be

29. Insurrection and Sedition-Martial Law. ---Martial law operating, in the

government of territory, as a substitute for the civil law, or as an addition thereto. so as to restrict the liherties of citizens and angment the powers of offirers, is an incident of military oneratione and of actual militarv ocrunation of the tersi. tos so governen: wherefore it rannnt ahtain in the absence of such operations and Onnintion.--Ex narte Lavinder, W. Va., 108 s E. 128.

30. Intoxicating Liquors Liability for Wife's Acts.-In a prosecution of a husband. his wife already having pleaded guilty to violation of liquor law in their home, the act being malum prohibitum and not malum in se, it is not necessary to prove his criminal intent, his liability. if not doing what he could to prevent her violating the law, resting. not on the presumption of his coercion of his wife. but on his authority to control the household

case

а

rover

on

re

« 이전계속 »