cases have been properly appealed and submitted to this Court. This Court, however, as other Appellate Courts, has prescribed definite rules of practice with reference to taking and perfecting appeals, which are, of course, in harmony with our statutory laws on the subject of appellate procedure. These rules do not greatly differ from those of Appellate Courts of other states and need no special mention, with the exception of one rule, which has done much to keep from coming before this Court many useless and needless motions, and has facilitated and accelerated appeals to it. We will first state the old rule. "Any appeal in which the appellant shall not have served and filed his brief by the time the cause is reached for assignment for argument may be summarily dismissed or the decision appealed from affirmed, according as justice may require; and for failure of an appellant to serve and file his brief in time, or when the appellant shall not have served and filed his brief more than twenty days preceding the opening of the term, and such delay shall have inconvenienced opposing counsel, or needlessly delayed them in the preparation of the respondent's brief, this court will on a showing and application therefor, after notice, by respondent, place the cause at the foot of the calendar or impose such terms as may be just, or both. Delay by appellant in serving and filing briefs, until after the first day of the term, places the control of the cause on the calendar with the respondent. The respondent must serve and file his brief within thirty days after the service upon him of appellant's brief, and in any event at least ten days prior to the argument of the case; provided, that on notice and cause shown respondent's time for serving and filing his brief may be extended." It is not difficult to comprehend, that, under that rule, there could be many motions arise, some to compel appellant to file his brief, some to dismiss the appeal, because his brief was not filed in time, others to compel him to file and serve his brief within a definite time, etc. And just as many motions would arise as to the service and filing of the respondent's brief. In fact, hardly a week would pass in this Court, unless some such motion was made, and thereafter remain pending for determination. About a year and a half ago, the writer hereof proposed to and had adopted by the Court (to supplant the old rule), the following rule: "Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant shall fully prepare his brief and serve it upon the respondent, and file it with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken before or at the time the record of the case is transmitted to the Supreme Court, by the clerk of the District Court, and it shall be transmitted with such record. "Within fifteen days after the service of the appellant's brief, upon the respondent, as aforesaid, the respondent shall prepare his brief, and serve it upon appellant, and file it with the clerk of the Supreme Court." Since the adoption of this rule, if our memory serves us correctly, there has not been a motion before this Court, with reference to the making and filing of briefs by either the appellant or respondent in any case. This rule simply wiped out all such delay. It will be observed that, when the appeal is taken, and the record sent up, the appellant's brief must accompany it, so, as soon as the record arrives at the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, he is in position to notify the parties that the case is ready to be heard. In fact, a case can and does go right on the next monthly calendar. There are annually, approximately three hundred and fifty appeals to this Court. If the number of appeals annually were five hundred, this Court, under the reformed procedure above mentioned, could, nevertheless, entirely keep its work up to date, so, at the end of each month every case would be decided. We are firmly convinced that all Appellate Courts in the United States could have their work likewise up to date if they would proceed under a similar system of rules, governing the discharge of the duties of the members of the Court, if the Judges thereof will exercise the same degree of application to their work as do the members of the Supreme Court of North Dakota. The bringing up of the work and the saving of a vast amount of money, which is otherwise lost by the delays of the law, are not the only benefits to be derived. The work of the Court, as a whole, will be of a higher degree of merit and perfec- had a decision of the case within thirty days after the record reached the Appellate Court. Another benefit is the prevention of appeals taken solely for delay. These, on the average, constitute from fifteen to twentyfive per cent of the appeals to an Appellate Court, where the Court is from a year to three years or more behind in its work. No appeals are taken for deiay where it is certain the decision will be made within thirty days after the record is filed in the Appellate Court.. And, in this connection. there is also a great saving to litigants. The delays of the law, especially the delay of decision of cases in the Appellate Courts, are causing, we believe, a fair percentage of the people to lose confidence in, and respect for, the Courts. They are, to some extent, beginning, we believe, to feel, that the Courts are, to some degree, an ininstrumentality to be used by the strong to which cases were pending in the Supreme Court for as long as three years before, the regular order, argument could be had thereon-it is easy to see that, as a rule, the attorney's mind will be stale on the case. It has been pending so long that it is difficult for him to recall to his mind, clearly, the case as it was tried before the trial court. Hence, the argument, in such circumstances, is usually not very cnlightening to the Appellate Court, and likewise it will get a very imperfect view of the case. Another benefit which is gained by prompt and early decision of cases after appeal is that it does not delay justice, and, as is often the case, delay is denial of justice. A strong adversary may place a weaker one in such position with reference to property rights, he may hold him out of the enjoyment or acquisition of them, and may resist the payment of certain debts which he owes him, etc., by getting the benefit of delay in the Appellate Court, so that the latter, in sheer desperation, will submit rather than continue the unequal struggle; all of which perhaps would have been avoided if he could have oppress the weak and to defeat them of their just rights. Quite a percentage are. beginning to feel that there is not equality of right before the Courts; they are beginning to feel that they are not so sure that the Courts administer justice fairly and impartially, regardless of the wealth, prominence and power of one litigant, as compared with the poverty, obscurity and weakness of his adversary. If such should be the case the Courts themselves are largely to blame. And it is for them to eradicate the cause, if any, which brings about this. condition. It is the presumption, under our constitution and laws, that every litigant, no matter what his station in life may be, stands in a court of justice on a plane of equality with every other litigant who comes to the same Court. It is for the Courts to make that presumption a reality. It is for the Courts to brush aside the technicalities which are a curse and an impediment to the true administration of justice, and fairly, and without denial or delay, to measure the rights of all, whether of property or of person, by the same judicial yardstick, at the same time giving due consideration to the frailties of mankind. It is for the Courts, when opportunity so offers, to restrain the hand of avarice and greed, that it may not impoverish the weaker one. The greatest accomplishment that a judicial officer may have is the possession of a nature which demands that equity be done. Fortified with this as an element of his nature the true Judge will cause justice, as water, to seek its level. He will be deaf to the plaudits of the community, and inattentive to the waves of public opinion. And, regardless of these, will hold aloft the emblazoned banner of equal and exact justice to all. The Judges of Appellate Courts should not always have their faces turned towards the past. In other words, should not always be guided in their decisions, figuratively speaking, by the hands of the dead. In this day and age, they should, a good part of the time at least, have their faces toward the future. The age in which we live is far different in many respects than that of fifty years, a century, or five centuries ago. If a Judge of an Appellate Court of bygone ages has made a decision which enunciates a clear and unmistakable principle of good law, and the foundation thereof rests on principles of justice, the rule of stare decisis should be observed in deciding a case largely similar as to facts and in principle. But, if a decision was made a hundred years ago which states an unsound principle of law, and one whose foundation is unjust, an enlightened Judiciary should disregard it. For, if such decision is a mistake and an erroneous statement of the law, or enunciates an unsound principle, continued multiplication of the mistake and error can never cure the evil therein. agree with the principles of law therein We have heard of Judges who have written decisions where they did not themselves enunciated, and who would say, that, if the case were one of first impression, they would write their decision differently. but, on account of a certain decision, or decisions, which have been followed for a hundred years, or two hundred years, they feel bound to follow them, and thus more firmly intrench the error. Such a Judge simply lacks courage. He forgets that the civilization in which he participates is far different to that which existed at the writing of the erroneous decision. Past decisions founded in truth and justice are beacon lights to us of another generation, but those whose basis is error and injustice, are, figuratively speaking, an ignis fatuus, which lead both courts and litigants into an endless morass of uncertainty, and Several assignments of error are relied upon for a reversal of this judgment. The assignments that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial, in not sustaining the demurrer to the information, in not sustaining the motion of defendants for a directed verdict of not guilty, in refusing to give requested instruction No. 1, in giving instruction No. 8, and that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, all relate to one general proposition of law, and are grouped together in the brief of counsel representing defendants. Under these assignments of error, it is contended that the crime of robbery may not be committed by the taking of whisky from a person at a time and place, and under such circumstances, as would render the person from whom the whisky was taken guilty of violating prohibitory liquor laws, even though it be considered that all the elements essential to constitute the crime of robbery were present in the taking of the whisky. The information jointly charged defendants and two others with having robbed one Oscar Leming, in Jefferson county, of five cases of whisky, of which the said Leming was then possessed, the same being the personal property of said Leming, by force and violence, and by pointing a pistol and a Winchester rifle at the person of the said Oscar Leming. The evidence disclosed that the said Leming was to deliver to some of these defendants the five cases of whisky for the sum and price of $65 per case, and that, by previous arrangement, the said Leming was to meet some of these defendants at the point where the robbery took place, and that these defendants conspired together to rob the said Leming of said whisky by means of force and violence, and putting him in fear, in the manner and form as alleged in the information. The evidence further disclosed that the said Leming had conveyed said whisky to the said point in violation of the prohibitory liquor laws of this state. Section 3620, Revised Laws 1910, provides: "There shall be no property rights of any kind whatsoever, in any liquors, vessels, appliances, fixtures, bars, furniture and implements kept or used for the purpose of violating any provisions of this chapter." Other provisions of the prohibitory liquor laws make it an offense to manufacture, sell, barter, or give away intoxicating liquors withIn this state, and also to convey the same from point to point within the state, and also to have the same in possession with intent to violate any of the provisions of the act. It is apparent, therefore, that the prosecuting witness was possessed of this intoxicating liqour in violation of the prohibitory liquor laws of this state. The foregoing premises being conceded, counsel for these defendants strenuously contend that because the prosecuting witness under the statute had no property rights in the whisky of which he was admittedly robbed, that the crime of robbery was not committed; that if these defendants are guilty of any crime, it is of some other offense, such as pointing a weapon at another, which is a misdemeanor, and not of the felony of which they were convicted. The argument advanced by counsel for defendants in support of these various assignments of error, and the contention made thereunder, is that, to constitute robbery there must be the taking of personal property from another by means of force or violence, and that the thing taken must be of some value. Therefore, it is contended that because the prosecuting witness had no property rights of any kind in the whisky of which he was possessed for the purpose of violating the prohibitory liquor laws, no property was taken from him, and therefore all the essential elements of the crime of robbery were not present in the taking of this whisky under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. We cannot agree with this contention. Section 3620, Revised Laws 1910, supra, does not have the effect of altering or changing the inherent character or nature of whisky as personal property. An entire consideration of the prohibitory liquor laws of this state discloses that the intent of the Legislature was to provide that intoxicating liquors possessed by a person for the purpose of violating any of the provisions of the prohibitory liquor laws should be contraband property as between the state, its officers, and such person; that a person unlawfully possessed of intoxicating liquors, etc., could not claim to have property rights in such articles in a proceeding brought by the state to confiscate them; not that the articles and things condemned, when unlawfully kept or used, were not property. The conclusion is reached, therefore, that the pertinent inquiry is whether or not the chattel or thing taken is personal property, and not whether the possessor from whom it was taken was holding the same in violation of the laws of this state. Independent of the question of whether Leming was unlawfully possessed of the whisky, the whisky itself had all the characteristics of personal property. It was personal prop erty, and as such was the subject of larceny and of robbery, whether possessed lawfully or unlawfully, and this is true although the state, through its lawfully constituted officers, could seize (and destroy the same) from one unlawfully possessing it. That said property was of some value is clearly disclosed by the evidence. In fact, no contention is made that the whisky taken was without value. Counsel rely solely, to sustain their contention, upon the proposition that the prosecuting witness had no property rights in it. It is not the policy of the law to encourage culpable defenses to criminal actions. It is the duty of this court to so construe the criminal laws of this state as to effectuate their purposes and give force and effect to the evident legislative intent. It is the business of the state, through its duly constituted peace officers, to bring such action as the law prescribes against contraband property and its users, and it is not the privilege of highwaymen to hold up at the point of a gun the possessors of contraband property and take it away from them by force, nor did the Legislature so intend by merely providing that such possessor should have no property rights in the property when unlawfully kept. Ample provision of law is made for the confiscation and taking of such contraband personal property, and it must be taken in the manner prescribed. distin The contention of counsel for defendants confound matters necessary to be guished. The effect of their contention is to urge the right of the state to extinguish property rights in contraband things, such as whisky, as a defense to criminal conduct resorted to by them to obtain possession of the contraband property, with intent to make the same unlawful use of it against the state which they assert as a defense to its taking. The fallacy of this contention is apparent a lawful right of the sovereign people is urged to sustain the unlawful conduct of the individual. The right of the state to seize and confiscate intoxicating liquor, when unlawfully possessed, through proper court action, does not include the right of the individual to confiscate such property at the point of a gun. The alleged error of the trial court in refusing to give a requested instruction is without merit. An examination of the instructions given discloses that the substance of the matter contained in the requested instruction wast covered in the general charge. The follow ing instruction was given, over the exception of defendants: "The fact that the property taken was whisky, and was unlawfully in the possession of Oscar Leming, and was being transported by him in violation of the law of this state, does not make the act of robbery, if it was committed, any less a crime." It necessarily follows from that heretofore stated to be the law of this case that the giv ing of the foregoing instruction was not error. For reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed. NOTE.-Unlawfully Possessed Intoxicating Liquor as Subject of Theft.-In the case of Tom Thomas v. State, 13 Okl. Cr. 414, 164 Pac. 995, which was a conviction for the crime of murder committed by defendant while engaged in the perpetration of a whisky robbery, the contention was made that defendant was not guilty of the crime of murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery, because whisky used in violation of the law was not the subject of robbery. In passing upon this contention, this court, in the body of the opinion said: "The contention that because whisky is contraband property in this state, as against the state and its officers, others are entitled to rob and murder ***to obtain possession of it from one who is using it unlawfully, is wholly without merit. Neither robbery nor murder may be justified or excused on such a ground." In Mance v. State, 5 Ga. App. 229, 62 S. E. 1053, it is held: "Intoxicating liquor may be the subject-matter of larceny, though it is not the subject-matter of lawful sale." "In Osborne v. State, 115 Tenn. 717, 719, 92 S. W. 853, 5 Ann. Cas. 797, it is held to be 'well settled that a chattel kept for an unlawful purpose, such as intoxicating liquors kept for sale in violation of law, or gambling paraphernalia, the possession of which is prohibited, may be the subject of larceny.' In Smith v. State, 187 Ind. 253, 118 N. E. 954, L. R. A. 1918D, 688, it is held: "Although property is illegally held and used for gambling purposes, in violation of Burns' Ann. St. § 2474, it is nevertheless a subject of larceny." One of the leading cases on this subject is Commonwealth v. Rourke, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 397, 399. In that case it was said: "The law punishes larceny because it is larceny; and therefore one may be convicted of theft, though he do but steal his own property from himself or his bailee. 7 H. VI 43a; 3 Co. Inst. 110. And the law punishes the larceny of property, * * * because of its own inherent legal rights as property; and therefore even he who larcenously takes the stolen object from a thief whose hands have but just closed upon it may himself be convicted therefor in spite of the criminality of the possession of his immediate predecessor in crime. Of the alternative moral and social evils, which is the greater, to deprive property unlawfully acquired of all protection as such, and thus to discourage unlawful acquisition, but encourage larceny, or to punish, and so discourage larceny, |