On the 27th of August, 1845, General Paredes thus addressed the soldiers of the Mexican army:

"Soldiers: A rapacious and grasping race have thrown themselves upon our territory, and dare to flatter themselves that we will not defend the patrimony which our forefathers conquered with their blood. They deceive themselves; we will fly to snatch from them the spoils, the possession of which they are impudently enjoying; and they shall learn, by dearlybought experience, that they are not contending with the undisciplined tribes of Indians whom they robbed of their land, their heaven, and their country; and that the Mexicans will ardently combat the soldiers of a nation which has sanctioned by its laws the most degrading slavery."

In a letter addressed by Mr. Donelson to Mr. Buchanan, dated July 24, 1845, he says, "The common opinion of the citizens best acquainted with the Mexican population is, that the government will be obliged to declare war, in order to have the power to compromise with after events."

General Taylor to Adjutant-General Jones.

"CORPUS CHRISTI, Aug. 15, 1845. "I have the honor to report that, by New Orleans papers of the 7th instant, I have received intelligence of the preparatory steps taken by Mexico towards a declaration of war against the United States.

"I am enabled to say, upon information which is regarded as authentic, that General Arista was to leave Monterey on the 4th of this month for Matamoras, with 1500 men, 500 being cavalry. I learn by the same source, that there are 500 regular troops at Matamoras.”

Adjutant-General Jones to General Taylor, Aug. 26, 1845.

“Official information, at short intervals, is now the more necessary, as the country is filled with rumors of the movement of Mexican troops in direction of your head-quarters, as also of matters in relation to our own service."

COMMUNICATION ACROSS THE FRONTIER PROHIBITED UNDER PENALTY OF DEATH.

General Taylor to Adjutant-General Jones.

"CORPUS CHRISTI, Sept. 6, 1845.

"A decree has been issued, prohibiting, under the penalty of death, any communication, by writing, across the frontier a precaution which has been adopted on former occasions, and caused, no doubt, by our presence here."

We think that no one will be disposed to doubt the fact, that Mexico was uniform in her spirit and acts of hostility towards the United States, if in nothing else. To use the language of Mr. Madison, she was in "a state of war against the United States." It is the notoriety of these hostile manifestations which we would have the reader notice, as an important element of the subject.

During every period of the discussion upon the subject of annexation, from the first to the last, these manifestations of hostility on the part of Mexico have been known to Congress, and to all the political parties of the country.

By those who claimed that nothing could be generous that was not just, they were lamented; and by others, who claimed that party was above principle, we have too much evidence to believe that they were encouraged. Still, the vote for annexa

tion in Congress was a very decided one.

It has been assumed by some that we had but little evidence that Mexico intended hostilities. If hostilities were not intended, how could Peña y Peña say to Mr. Black, as he did, October 31, 1845, "The government of Mexico has given its orders, for the purpose of suspending, for the present, any act of hostility against the United States, and limits itself to the defensive, awaiting the issue of the negotiation proposed by the government of the United States, through the consul?" How could acts of hostility be suspended, if they had not been ordered? and of course the inference is plain, to be renewed if negotiation failed.

It may be true, perhaps, that Mexico intended no action but a display of threats without the slightest design of redeeming them. If she found us unmoved by these, her counsels of prudence were sufficient to produce other and equally safe expedients. But the decree alluded to by General Taylor was evidence enough that she intended war, and nothing but war. It was not, however, the open war of civilized nations that they looked for and desired, but for opportunities of sudden incursions and massacres! They would have ventured attacks upon unarmed citizens, asleep, in the night time, and possibly upon detachments of troops, if their numbers were so small as to give them no apprehension of danger. Not to enjoy such privileges of bloodshed was a sore disappointment to them. They did not expect to be met on the line, where they could have no chance to execute their acts of revenge upon the people of Texas without a check, or a shot that might injure them. They, indeed, claimed it as a right, that our army should remove beyond the Nueces, until the two governments had settled the boundary question. They had a sudden, and for them, a novel disposition, to protect their own soil, and their own people. But it was thought by our government that no evil could arise by giving protection to ALL the territory that Texas claimed, knowing full well that the tender mercies of Mexico could in no human probability exceed those which would be extended by our army, and without any expense to them. It was a matter of duty, however, paramount to every other consideration with our government, if persuaded that any protection was required, to give it with an amplitude that should insure entire and unquestioned safety to Texas, and preserve unsullied the integrity of the United States.

Let us now look on the other side. Let us see what was

THE PREVAILING SPIRIT OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS

MEXICO,

during this period of threatened hostilities on the part of that republic. We would not intentionally bias the reader in favor

of his own country, if she were in the wrong; nor would we endeavor to create prejudices in his mind against a sister republic, if she were in the right. Our purpose is, simply, to ask a candid attention to facts. Let the documents speak for themselves. Our limits allow us no alternative but to make extracts, and almost always at the expense of much evidence confirmatory of our views, which we are compelled to omit.

PLEDGE OF AMITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. Mr. Buchanan to General Almonte, March 10, 1845.

"The president sincerely regrets that the government of Mexico should have taken offence at these proceedings, [act of Congress annexing Texas ;] and he earnestly trusts that it may hereafter be disposed to view them in a more favorable and friendly light. Whilst entering upon the duties of the presidential office, he cheerfully declares, IN ADVANCE, that his most strenuous efforts shall be devoted to the amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint between the two governments, and to the cultivation of the kindest and most friendly relations between the sister Republics."

ACTS OF HOSTILITY FORBIDDEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Donelson, June 3, 1845.

"This government will studiously refrain from all acts of hostility towards that Republic, (Mexico,) unless these should become absolutely necessary in self-defence. Orders have been transmitted to Captain Stockton in accordance with this declaration."

ORDER FOR DEFENCE, NOT INVASION.

Secretary of War to General Taylor, June 15, 1845.

"You will limit yourself to the territory of Texas, unless Mexico should declare war against the United States."

ORDER TO SPARE ANY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS EAST SIDE OF THE RIO GRANDE.

Secretary of War to General Taylor, July 8, 1845.

"This department is informed that Mexico has some military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, which are, and for some time have been, in the actual occupancy of her troops. In carrying out the instructions heretofore received, you will be careful to avoid any acts of aggression, unless an actual state of war should exist."

This order has been frequently quoted to prove that our government was wrong in claiming to the Rio Grande, because a few Mexicans had been specially permitted by our government to remain between that river and the Nueces. This is certainly novel logic. We should suppose that the meaning was quite the contrary. If our government deemed it expedient to make such an exception, the fact of making it is evidence to prove that it considered its title to the territory undoubted; otherwise the act would have been one of inconsistent assumption. It was an act of deliberate indulgence. If the right of exception implies any thing, it implies the right of possession.

ORDER TO AVOID AGGRESSION, BUT TO PROTECT TEXAS.

Secretary of War to General Taylor, July 30, 1845.

"While avoiding, as you have been instructed to do, all aggressive measures towards Mexico, as long as the relations of peace exist between that republic and the United States, you are expected to occupy, protect, and defend the territory of Texas to the extent that it has been occupied by the people of Texas."

This was made subject to the exception given in the letter of July 8.