them in the same sense. Taite v. Carlisle Local Board of Health, 2 El. & Bl. 492, 511. As class. In Rev. St. § 3449, providing a penalty for any person removing any liquors under any other name than that known to the trade as designating the kind of the contents of the package, the word "kind" does not refer to the maker or quality, or the excellence, of the goods. It means a well-known classification of spirituous and fermented liquors, as whisky, gin, etc. The standard of excellency of a product of any distiller is too vary ing and indefinite a standard for the measurement of a forfeiture and punishment. United States v. 132 Packages of Spirituous Liquors (U. S.) 65 Fed. 980, 982. As synonymous with grade. In an action involving the question whether certain lumber, ordered and charged for as "No. 3 siding," was in fact No. 3 or No. 4 siding, where the witnesses and the court sometimes use the word "grade" to designate the difference between the different kinds of lumber, and it was objected that the word "grade" really distinguished only a quality, and not a "kind," the court said: "We can see no difference in the words themselves as expressive of the same idea. The word 'grade' is perhaps somewhat more technical, but it is perfectly manifest that the classification of the lumber into numbered grades, as Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, was in the trade a practical division of it into different kinds. At any rate, this was the sense in which the witnesses and the court used the word 'grade,' and the jury could not be misled by it. It is a mere play upon words to say that, because grade means also quality, therefore only quality was meant when the word 'grade' was used. It is true that No. 4 siding was in quality inferior to No. 3, and this was necessarily developed in the examination of the witnesses; but that circumstance does not alter, but rather confirms, the fact that in the trade No. 3 siding was one kind, and No. 4 another." Whitehall Mfg. Co. v. Wise, 13 Atl. 298, 299, 119 Pa. 484. As kin. As relating to quantity. In a statute providing for the partition of land held by joint tenants, and that, if partition be not made between them, "wheth. er they be such as might have been compelled to make partition or not, or of whatever kind the estates or things holden or possessed be, the parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the survivors, but shall descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts, charges, curtesy, or dower," the word "kind" describes the quantity, not the quality, of the estate. The quality was already marked, by calling them "joint tenants." But, as there may be a joint estate in fee, for life, or years, and as it was the intention of the act to abolish the right of survivorship in all joint estates, it uses the expression "of whatever kind the estate" may be. Thornton v. Thornton (Va.) 3 Rand. 179, 187. KIND AND SOUND. A representation that a horse is "sound, kind, and true" is a false representation, within the meaning of a statute providing a punishment for obtaining goods by false pretenses, if made knowingly during negotiations for the sale of the horse, with intent to cheat and defraud the purchaser, and the latter is induced to purchase by reason thereof; the falsity not being apparent at the time. Watson v. People, 87 N. Y. 561, 564, 41 Am. Rep. 397. A statement in the negotiations of a sale that a horse is sound and kind may be a mere affirmation or expression, and may thus come under what is sometimes designated as "dealer's talk" and be treated as only the mere language of commendation by which the seller seeks to enhance the price of his goods. It may be also the assertion of a fact material to the negotiations, which the seller may properly make, if justified in so doing by his knowledge of the animal, as the basis on which the sale is to be made. When so made and intended, if it be false and known to him to be such, the seller is guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses, within the prohibition of the statute, if he thereby induces the buyer to part with his property. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16. The words "sound and kind in every respect," when used to characterize a team of horses, imports that the horses are not in the habit of making sudden plunges without cause, and therefore a warranty in such language is broken if the horses have such habits. Hall v. Colyer, 8 N. Y. Supp. 801, 55 Hun, 611. In a will by which testator, who leaves as his only heirs two half-brothers and one nephew of the whole blood residing in Louisiana and certain other nephews and nieces living in Texas, gave, devised, and bequeathed all his property "to all my blood kind in Louisiana and Texas," it was held that "blood kind" should be construed to mean "kin"; and as the testator had only one relative of the whole blood located in Louisiana to which the word "all" would apply, if he KINDERGARTEN. had intended to exclude his two brothers of the half blood, the will must be construed to mean such brothers of the half blood. Lusby v. Cobb, 32 South. 6, 7, SO Miss. 715. The name "kindergarten," meaning literally a "garden of children," was devised by Froebel, a German philosopher and educator, to apply to a system which he elaborated for the instruction of children of very tender years. "Children's garden" ought to be taken in its allegorical sense. The child is a plant, the school is a garden, and Froebel calls teachers "gardeners of children." His system guides the children's inclination for activity into organized movement, and invests the games, unknown to the child, with an ethical and educational value, teaching, besides physical exercises, the habits of discipline, self-control, and harmonious action and purpose, together with some definite lesson of fact; and an act making a city a school district, to be governed by a city board of education, and giving such board control over the public schools, with the power to determine the course of study, warranted an action of the board in adopting such a system into the methods of schools under its supervision. Sinnott v. Colombet, 40 Pac. 329, 330, 107 Cal. 187, 28 L. R. A. 594. KINDLE. The words "coal for fuel, with sufficient wood to kindle or start the fire," in a policy excepting fires caused by the use of steam engines on the premises insured, other than threshing machine engines, using coal as fuel, with sufficient wood to kindle or start the fire, meant that wood was permitted to be used only with coal, and for the one purpose of igniting the coal by aid of the more combustible quality of the wood, and that when the coal was once sufficiently ignited the use of wood was no longer allowed. Thurston v. Burnett & Beaver Dam Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 74 N. W. 131, 132, 98 Wis. 476, 41 L. R. A. 316. KINDLY TREAT. A bond given in consideration that the parties to a bastardy suit should marry, and that the bond and mortgage should be security to the wife that the husband would "support and kindly treat" her, should be considered so that the condition is violated where the conduct of the husband is such as to drive his wife from home. Porter v. Caylor, 45 N. E. 648, 649, 146 Ind. 448. KINDRED. See "Next of Kindred." “Kindred,” as used in Rev. St. c. 39, § 1, cl. 6, providing that if any intestate leaves a widow or surviving husband, and no "kindred," his or her estate shall descend to such widow or surviving husband, means "such kindred as are capable of inheriting." Wunderle v. Wunderle, 33 N. E. 195, 201, 144 Ill. 40, 19 L. R. A. 84. The word "kindred," when used in a will, without any specification of what kindred is meant, denotes only such as are within the statute of distributions. Varrell v. Wen dell, 20 N. H. 431, 435. The word "kindred" means a relation by birth or consanguinity. Makea v. Nalpa, 4 Hawaii, 221, 230. Adopting parent. "Kindred," as used in Pub. St. c. 148, § 7, relating to adopted children, and providing that the adopted child shall inherit from the adopting parent, but that such child shall not by such adoption become incompetent to inherit from his natural "kindred," canno be construed as including the adopting par ent. It is intended by this statute to save the right of inheritance from other parties than the adopting parent. Hence a grandson, who had been adopted by his grandfather could not inherit both as an adopted son and as the representative of his deceased parent. Delano v. Bruerton, 20 N. E. 308, 309, 148 Mass. 619, 2 L. R. A. 698. Collateral relations. Kindred means relations by blood, and includes collateral as well as lineal relations. It includes children and their descendants, brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, cousins, uncles, aunts, and other next of kin Butler v. Elyton Land Co., 4 South. 675, 676 84 Ala. 384. "Kindred," as used in Hurd's St. 1897, p 629, § 1, subd. 6, providing that, if any intes tate leaves a widow or surviving husband and no kindred, his or her estate shall descend to such widow or surviving husband, I will not be construed in a restrictive sense, so as to apply only to parents, brothers, and sisters, and their descendants, but should be construed in the larger sense, so as to include the phrase "next of kin,” and hence the surviving husband of a woman dying intestate without issue, but leaving uncles and aunts, inherits a part only of her estate. Lockwood v. Moffett, 52 N. E. 260, 262, 177 Ill. 49. "Kindred on the part of the mother," as used in Rev. St. Tex. art. 1657, providing that illegitimate children shall also be entitled to distributive shares of the personal estates of any of their kindred on the part of the mother, etc., embrace solely the mother's collateral relations, and import capacity in such child to take only personal estates from such collaterals. Blair v. Adams (U. S.) 59 Fed. 243, 246. Illegitimates. "Kindred," as used in Civ. Code, § 1387. one of the provisions of which, relating to the inheritable blood of an illegitimate child, is as follows: "But he does not represent his father or mother by inheriting any part port, only includes blood relations, and thereof the estate of his or her kindred, either fore the statute does not make the husband lineal or collateral, unless before his death of a lunatic liable for her support. "A bushis parents shall have intermarried"-relates band," said Lord Loughborough, "is not o to the kindred referred to in section 1386, kin to a wife, nor she to him." Watt v. and means lawful kindred, and is used for Watt, 3 Ves. 247. The kin obligated by law, the purpose of qualifying the general words within the meaning of the statute, are maniused in section 1387, and excluding an il- festly those only who, by Gen. St. c. 70, § 4, legitimate from inheriting through the lat- are made chargeable for the support of poor ter section the estate of all relatives. In re persons, namely, kindred in the line or deMagee's Estate, 63 Cal. 414, 416. gree of father or grandfather, mother or grandmother, children or grandchildren, of consanguinity. Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Allen, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 585, 586. In Laws 1820, c. 38, § 19, providing that after the payment of debts, funeral expenses, etc., if there be no kindred of the said intestate, then the widow shall be entitled to the whole of said residue, the term "kindred" means lawful kindred; and where the husband was illegitimate and left no issue, his widow was entitled to the whole of his estate, to the exclusion of his mother and her collateral kindred. Hughes v. Decker, 38 Me. 153, 161. The word "kindred," in Pub. Laws 1887, c. 14, authorizing a bastard child to inherit from its parents, or their lineal and collective kindred, is not confined to lawful kindred, but is to be construed, in connection with the subject of the statute, to include actual kindred. Messer v. Jones, 34 Atl. 177, 179, 88 Me. 349. By the rules of the common law the term "all kindred" includes only those who are legitimate, unless a different intention is clearly manifested. McCool v. Smith, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 459, 470, 17 L. Ed. 218. As kindred by blood. "A man's kindred, in the proper signification of the word, means such persons as are related to him by blood, and does not include relatives by marriage." Wetter v. Walker, 62 Ga. 142, 144. Primarily the words "nearest kindred" indicate the nearest degree of consanguinity, and they are perhaps more frequently used in this sense than in any other. Swasey v. Jaques, 10 N. E. 758, 761, 144 Mass. 135, 59 Am. Rep. 65. "Kindred," as used in the statute of de scents, is not confined to blood relations, but may include in its meaning a relation by blood and a relation by law. Power v. Hafley, 4 S. W. 683, 685, 85 Ky. 671. The word "kin" and "kindred," as ap plied to the descent of estates, shall be construed to signify kin or kindred by blood, and the degrees of consanguinity shall be computed by the civil law method; but collateral kindred, claiming through a nearer common ancestor, shall be preferred to those claiming through a more remote ancestor. Rev. Code Del. 1893, p. 43, c. 5, § 1, subd. 6. Rev. St. c. 46, § 5, provides that the kindred of any pauper in the line or degree of father, grandfather, etc., by consanguinity, etc., shall be bound to support such pauper, KINDRED OF THE HALF BLOOD. etc. Section 6 declares that the court of common pleas in the county where any one of such kindred to be charged shall reside, on complaint made by any town or by any kindred who shall have been at any expense for the relief and support of such pauper, may, on due hearing, assess and apportion on such of the kindred a certain amount of the expense for the relief and support of such pauper, etc. Held, that the word "kindred," as used in section 6, should be construed to mean the kindred enumerated in section 5, and who are previously, in the same section 6, termed "kindred to be charged"—that is, kindred by consanguinity; and hence the kindred by affinity of any poor person cannot maintain a complaint under the statute against the father of such person for the expense of his relief and support. Farr v. Flood, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 24, 25. The term "kindred," in a statute making a lunatic's kindred liable for his sup See "Half Blood." KINETOSCOPE. The kinetoscope, briefly described, is a mechanical contrivance involving, among other things, a transparent or translucent narrow film of very great length, on which a series of photographs, very extensive in number, are taken which photographs consecutively represent the continuous development of movement or action in the persons or things which are the subjects of such device is caused to pass with great rapidity photographs. This film by a photographic by a set of lenses, through which, by use of a powerful electric light, the scenes which are the subject of the series of photographs are much enlarged and thrown upon a white screen. As one picture of the scene photographed succeeds another upon the screen with great rapidity, the impression produced upon the retina of the eye by the preceding | execution, does not include household and picture continues longer than does the exist- kitchen furniture belonging to the head of a ence on the screen of the picture which pro- family and used in the conduct of a restauduces the impression. As a result the im- rant. Dodge v. Knight (Tex.) 16 S. W. 626, pression produced by one picture lasts ap- 628. proximately until the impression produced by the next succeeding picture occurs. The result is substantially that one sees a continuous moving picture, reproducing the action and movement of the scenes photograph ed upon the film. Barnes v. Miner (U. S.) 122 Fed. 480, 487. KING. Before the King, see "Before." KINGDOM. See "Foreign Kingdom." The term "kingdom," in its strict sense, means territories belonging to the king. Lonsdale v. Brown (U. S.) 15 Fed. Cas. 855, 857. KINSMAN. A kinsman of the whole blood is "he that is derived not only from the same ancestor, but from the same couple of ancestors." Wood v. Mitcham, 92 N. Y. 375, 379 (citing 2 Bl. Comm. p. 227). KISS MY FOOT. The words "Kiss my foot," when written by a drawee, together with his signature, on a draft presented to him for acceptance, are equivalent to and signify a refusal to accept. The words should be construed, as they are used in common parlance, to mean and express contempt for the person to whom the words were addressed, and, when used as a reply to a request, they imply, and are understood to mean, a decided, unquaMfied, and contemptuous refusal to comply with such request. Norton v. Knapp, 19 N. W. 867, 868, 64 Iowa, 112. KITCHEN FURNITURE. "Household and kitchen furniture," within the meaning of a statute exempting from execution to the head of a family his household and kitchen furniture, is limited to household and kitchen furniture for the use of the family, and does not include such furniture used in hotels and restaurants beyond that, which is used by the family. Heidenheimer v. Blumenkron, 56 Tex. 308, 314. The household and kitchen furniture of a family, which is exempt by statute from "Household and kitchen furniture," within the meaning of a statute exempting from execution all household and kitchen furniture of the debtor, includes all the furniture of a widow with one child, who occupies a house of seven or eight rooms, and incidentally keeps boarders for the purpose of support, although a portion of such furniture is in the rooms occupied by the boarders. Mueller v. Richardson, 18 S. W. 693, 694, 82 Tex. 361. KITING. "Kiting," in commercial parlance, means the lending of one commercial firm to another of its credit. Thus one friendly firm would borrow from another its check, draft, note, bill, or indorsement to tide over an immediate necessity for money, and when occasion arose the other firm would return the favor. Johnson v. Marx Levy & Bro., 34 South. 68, 71, 109 La. 1036. As explained by a witness, the term "kiting" means mailing checks out of town for larger amounts than the drawer had in the bank; he at the time knowing or feeling sure that he would have enough money in the bank to meet them when presented. Wood v. American Nat. Bank, 40 S. E. 931, 932, 100 Va. 306. KITTY. A "kitty" is a receptacle in a poker table into which a certain number of chips are placed or dropped when hands of a certain value are held by any of the players, and the contents belong to the proprietors of the place or table. Cochran v. State, 29 S. E. 438, 102 Ga. 631. KLEPTOMANIA. As insanity, see "Insane-Insanity." Kleptomania is a well-defined symptom of mania, consisting of an irresistible propensity to steal. Looney v. State, 10 Tex. App. 520, 525. Kleptomania is a species of insanity which renders its subject morally irresponsible for the crime of theft. Harris v. State, 18 Tex. App. 287, 293. "Kleptomania" is the scientific name for the disease of stealing. Persons who are victims of it will steal in spite of all restraints. They may be sane in mind in all other respects, may know perfectly well that stealing is wrong in every way, and may | the tension of the cloth. In a loom it is have no occasion to steal whatever, not be- necessary that the warp should be kept tight ing in want, or having prospect of it, and between the yard beam and the cloth beam. yet steal they will, at the risk of the terrible A knitting machine produces a fabric made exposure detection produces. The disease is by a succession of loops, and, as the necesof that character which undermines and sities of manufacture do not require that the overthrows the will, rendering its victim yarn or threads should be kept tightly powerless to control his conduct with re- drawn, a smaller expenditure of force is necspect to his temptation, though he possesses essary in the take-up than in a loom takehis will in its entire vigor in all other things. up." Holmes v. Plainville Mfg. Co. (U. S.) 9 There is no lack of the reasoning power as Fed. 757, 759. to the rightfulness or wrongfulness of his conduct or behavior, and yet the power, the ability, to do otherwise than what they do, is wanting. No enlightened criminal system of law punishes him for acts which, if the will was in a healthy state, would never be done, any more than it does the mere idiot, or person who never had any reason at all. State v. Reidell (Del.) 14 Atl. 550, 551, 552, 9 Houst. 470. KNOCKED DOWN. In common parlance and in the language of the auction room property is understood to be "knocked down" or "struck off" when the auctioneer, by the fall of his hammer or by any other adequate or visible announcement, signifies to the bidder that he is entitled to the property on paying the amount of his bid according to the terms of the sale. Sherwood v. Reade (N. Y.) 7 Hill, 431, 439. KNOT. The authorities define "kleptomania" as a species of mania, consisting of an irresistible impulse to steal. See 1 Clev. Insan. p. 177. Some of the books, however, regard it as a morbid propensity to steal, whether consciously or unconsciously. If kleptomania is simply an irresistible impulse to steal, regardless of the right and wrong test, then, notwithstanding it was formerly. recognized in the state as a defense in theft by the courts of the state, that doctrine has more recently been repudiated. Lowe v. State, 70 S. W. 206, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 224 (citing Hurst KNOW. v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 378, 46 S. W. 635, 50 S. W. 719). KNAVE. Calling one a "knave" imports that he is dishonest, and is actionable per se. Harding v. Brooks, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 244, 247. KNEW. See "Know"; "Well Knew.' KNIT GOODS. "Knit goods," as used in Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, although frequently used interchangeably with "knit fabrics," more appropriately describes manufactured articles, while knit fabrics refer more especially to manufactured material as piece goods. Arnold v. United States, 13 Sup. Ct. 406, 407, 147 U. S. 494, 37 L. Ed. 253. KNITTING MACHINE "A knitting machine has nothing in com "Knot," as used when the term is applied to a measure of distance, means Я marine mile. Rockland, Mt. D. & S. S. Co. v. Fessenden, 8 Atl. 550, 552, 79 Me. 140. See "Carnally Know." "Know," as defined by Webster, means "to have knowledge; to possess information, instruction, or wisdom." State v. Ransberger, 17 S. W. 290, 291, 106 Mo. 135. Code, § 3441, providing that, where the tracks of two railroads cross each other, the engineers and conductors must stop their trains within 100 feet of the crossing, and not proceed until they "know" the way is clear, means that the officers in charge shall be informed or made aware of the situation, shall be certain or made familiar with, and not be doubtful thereof. Southern Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 28 South. 445, 448, 125 Ala. 297. An allegation in a taxpayer's action to restrain the carrying out of a contract, which alleges that the municipal officer making the contract "knew it to be extravagant," is not equivalent to an allegation that it is extravagant. Madden v. Van Wyck, 72 N. Y. Supp. 135, 137, 35 Misc. Rep. 645. A verdict by a jury, in answer to a question contained therein that "We do not know," is equivalent to a simple denial. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shannon, 16 Pac. 836, 38 Kan. 476. mon with a loom for weaving, except that each has a roller, upon which the completed fabric is rolled, and a take-up. The office "Know," in reference to the liability of of the take-up in each machine is to regulate one who destroys personal property on which |