As included in term "land," see "Land."

550.

MINE-RUN COAL.

curring in nature, homogeneous, and having a definite chemical composition, which can be expressed by a chemical formula, and, further, having certain distinguishing physical characteristics. Bainb. Mines (4th Ed.) p.

MINER.

As workman, see "Workman."

The term "miner" is defined by Webster to be "one who mines; a digger of metals and other minerals." Watson v. Lederer, 19 Pac. 602, 604, 11 Colo. 577, 1 L. R. A. 854, 7 Am. St. Rep. 263; In re Mine Foremen's Qualifications, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 99, 100.

The word "miner" imports neither skill nor learning. Watson v. Lederer, 19 Pac. 602, 604, 11 Colo. 577, 1 L. R. A. 854, 7 Am. St. Rep. 263.

A miner need not necessarily be a digger of metals. The definition is satisfied if he is a digger for metals. A person might be a long time digger for minerals and yet never actually mine them. The word "miner," as used in the anthracite mining law, is not confined in its application to the person who actually mines and cuts the coal, but may include laborers, loaders, starters, roadmen, repairmen, and others who work in the mines but do not actually cut coal. In re Mine Foremen's Qualifications, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 99, 100.

MINER'S INCH.

The term "miner's inch" cannot be definite without specification of the head or

pressure. Longmire v. Smith, 67 Pac. 246,

250, 26 Wash. 439, 58 L. R. A. 308.

MINER'S WEIGHT.

"Miner's weight," as used in a coal mining lease, stipulating for a specified royalty per ton, "miner's weight." means such quantity of coal as was computed as a ton in paying the miner who mined by the ton. It did not mean a net ton of 2,000 pounds. The phrase "miner's weight" meant such quantity of coal, slate, and dirt as was agreed on to be sufficient to make a ton of prepared coal. Drake v. Lacoe, 27 Atl. 538, 540, 157 Pa. 17.

ever, in the most enlarged sense, be described as comprising all the substances which now form or which once formed a part of the solid body of the earth, both external and internal, and which are now destitute of or incapable of supporting animal or vegetable life. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg (U. S.) 104 Fed. 425, 428, 43 C. C. A. 620.

In the most general sense of the term, "minerals" are those parts of the earth which are capable of being got from underneath the surface for the purpose of profit. The term, therefore, includes coal, metal, ores of all kind, clay, stone, slate, and coprolites. Williams v. South Penn. Oil Co., 43 S. E. 214, 217, 52 W. Va. 181; Murray v. Allred, 43 S. W. 355, 358, 100 Tenn. 100, 39 L. R. A. 249, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740.

A mineral is a natural body destitute of organization or life. Jenkins v. Johnson (U. S.) 13 Fed. Cas. 525, 527.

A mineral is anything that grows in mines and contains metals. Coleman v. Coleman (Pa.) 1 Pears. 470, 474 (citing Jacob's Law Dict.).

"Mineral," is defined by Webster to be "any inorganic species having a definite chemical composition." Marvel v. Merritt, 6 Sup. St. 207, 208, 116 U. S. 11, 29 L. Ed. 550.

Chromate of iron.

"Minerals" means all ores and other metallic substances which are found beneath the surface of the earth, and all substances which are the object of mining operations, and includes chromate of iron. Gibson v. Tyson (Pa.) 5 Watts, 37, 38.

Coal.

"Mineral," as used in Rev. St. § 3921, giving treble damages for the unlawful digging or removal of minerals, includes coal; the word embracing all minerals. Henry v. Lowe, 73 Mo. 96, 99.

"Mineral land," as used in a treaty with the Cherokee Indians July 19, 1866, by which certain lands were ceded to the United States, but in which it was provided that, whenever there were improvements of a certain value made on lands other than mineral lands which were owned and personally occupied by any persons for agricultural purposes, such persons should be entitled to purchase

such lands, was construed to mean lands containing deposits of lead and zinc, as it was known at the time of the treaty that such deposits existed near, if not within, the territory ceded, but not to include coal lands. Stroud v. Missouri River, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. (U. S.) 23 Fed. Cas. 257, 260.

"Mineral lands," as used in grants by the United States reserving mineral lands, would include coal land which was known to be such at the time the grant was made. Mullan v. United States, 6 Sup. Ct. 1041, 1014, 118 U. S. 271, 30 L. Ed. 170.

Gas.

As used in Tariff Act 1890, par. 651, "minerals" is to be read in its common acceptation, in the absence of a different commercial signification, and does not include a gas, but means something which in ordinary parlance is "mined." United States v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. (U. S.) 78 Fed. 110, 112, 24 C. C. A. 4.

A reservation, in a conveyance of lands of mines, minerals, and metals, includes natural gas. Murray v. Allred, 43 S. W. 355, 356, 100 Tenn. 100, 39 L. R. A. 249, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740.

The term "mineral" includes gas and water, "but they are minerals with peculiar attributes, which require the application of precedents arising out of ordinary mineral rights, with much more careful consideration of the principles involved than of the mere decisions." Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 Atl. 724, 727, 130 Pa. 235, 5 L. R. A. 731; Ridgway Light & Heat Co. v. Elk County, 43 Atl. 323, 324, 191 Pa. 465; Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v.

915, 155 Ind. 461, 50 L. R. A. 768; Ohio Oil Co. v. State of Indiana, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 582, 177 U. S. 190, 44 L. Ed. 729.

Granite and stone.

The words "minerals and ores" in a deed, standing alone, will be construed to include granite, but where the surface rights granted are only "sufficient land to erect suitable buildings for machinery and other buildings necessary and usual in mining and raising ores," they will be understood to include only minerals obtained by underground working. Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 42 N. E. 186, 187, 147 N. Y. 495, 49 Am. St. Rep. 683.

Land chiefly valuable for granite which it contains, suitable for quarrying and of good merchantable quality, is "nrineral land," within the exception in the grant of July 2, 1864, to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and did not pass under such grant. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425, 428, 43 C. C. A. 620.

ing that, if the lord of a manor enter upon "Minerals," as used in 33 Geo. II, providany of the lands for the purpose of digging any coals or other minerals, he should make satisfaction to the proprietors of the lands for the damage done, includes stones dug from quarries. Micklethwait v. Winter, 6 Exch. 644, 654.

"Minerals," as used in the Inclosure Act, 55 Geo. III, c. 18, reserving to the lord of the manor all mines and minerals within certain commons, being construed according to the object of the act, which was to give to

the commoners the surface for cultivation, is not to be understood in its general sense, as signifying substances containing metals, but in its proper sense, as including all fossil bodies or matter dug out of the mines-that is, quarries or places where anything is dugand the clause reserved to the lord the right to the stratum of stone in the lands. Wainman v. Earl of Rosse, 2 Exch. 800; Earl of Rosse v. Wainman, 14 Mees. & W. 855, 872.

The term "mineral," within the rule that not only the ore, but other mineral product, becomes the property of one acquiring a mining claim, includes stone, and therefore one who files a coal declaratory statement on public lands, and enters into possession thereunder, becomes the owner of all building stone taken from such land in developing the claim, even though the statement is not filed in good faith. Johnston v. Harrington, 31 Pac. 316, 318, 5 Wash. 73.

Iron ore.

"Mineral substance," as used in U. S. Rev. St. 1874, tit. 33, p. 478, which provides that the duty on mineral and bituminous substances in a crude state, not otherwise pro

vided for, shall be 20 per cent. ad valorem, includes iron ore. Marvel v. Merritt, 6 Sup. Ct. 207, 208, 116 U. S. 11, 29 L. Ed. 550.

Magnesia.

A deed by which B. conveyed to F. a tract of land in fee simple, "excepting and reserving for himself," etc., all "mineral or magnesia of any kind," etc., is not to be construed as including magnesia only within the reservation, but includes magnesia and all other minerals, since ordinarily magnesia is not considered a mineral, and apparently was used by the parties as not being. Gibson v. Tyson (Pa.) 5 Watts, 34, 41.

Oil.

Oil in place under the soil is a mineral, and a part of the realty. Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. (7 Casey) 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760; Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 201 (citing Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. [3 P. F. Smith] 229); Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl.

201, 35 L. R. A. 816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601; Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl.

564; Jennings v. Bloomfield, 49 Atl. 135, 136, 199 Pa. 638; Wilson v. Youst (W. Va.) 28 S. E. 781, 39 L. R. A. 292, 43 W. Va. 826; Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. 436, 25 L. R. A. 222; Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S. W. 169, 171.

In a deed, a reservation of "all minerals" will be construed to mean only minerals of a metallic nature, such as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc., and not petroleum oil, that being the meaning placed on the word generally, though technically it would include salt, rocks, clay, sand, petroleum, oil, etc. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43, 47 Am. Rep. 696, 40 Leg. Int. 318.

Act April 25, 1850, providing that in all cases in which any coal or ore mines or minerals have been or shall be held by two or more persons as tenants in common, and have been or shall be taken from the land, it shall be lawful for any one or more of the tenants in common to apply for an account, should be construed to include coal oil, which is enough mineral in its character to bring it within the term "minerals." Thompson v. Noble (Pa.) 3 Pittsb. R. 201, 203.

Lands from which petroleum is obtained may with propriety be called "mining lands." Gill v. Weston, 1 Atl. 921, 110 Pa. 312.

A reservation, in a conveyance of lands, of "mines, minerals, and metals," includes petroleum. Murray v. Allred, 43 S. W. 355, 356, 100 Tenn. 100, 39 L. R. A. 249, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740; Wagner v. Mallory, 62 N. E. 584, 585, 169 N. Y. 501; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N. E. 399, 401, 57 Ohio St. 317, 39 L. R. A. 765, 63 Am. St. Rep. 721.

Paint stones.

A conveyance of "mines and minerals" includes a paint stone which is found in

strata below the surface of the soil, and distinct from the ordinary earth, and worked by the ordinary means of mining. The words "mines and minerals," as so used, should not be confined to the metals or to the metallic ores merely. Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. (2 Stockt.) 128, 136, 64 Am. Dec. 448.

Salt lakes and springs.

"Minerals," as used in Const. 1866, whereby the state released to the owner of the soil all "mines and mineral" substances, would include salt lakes, springs, etc., as well as gold, silver, and copper mines. State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 265, 268.

Water.

Water is a mineral. Ridgway Light & Heat Co. v. Elk County, 43 Atl. 323, 324, 191 Pa. 465.

Water, like gas and oil, is a mineral, but cisions in ordinary cases of mineral rights, a mineral with peculiar attributes. "The deetc., have never been held as unqualified precedents in regard to flowing, or even to percolating, waters. Water and oil, and still selves, if the analogy is not too fanciful, as more strongly gas, may be classed by themminerals feræ naturæ. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and tendency to escape without the volition of the owner. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 Atl. 724, 727, 130 Pa. 235, 5 L. R. A. 731.

·MINERAL DISTRICT.

All other mineral districts, see "All
Other."

"Mineral district," as used in United States statutes, being neither known in law or in fact as the designation of any well-defined or exact locality, is a word of no meaning, and as incapable of application as the phrase "tree district," "stone district," or "water district." There is no method known to the law by which a district of country can be prospected, surveyed, or declared to be a mineral district, and, though there are some mineral lands and mining districts in a state, it is not known that there are any considerable sections of the country to which the term "mineral district" could properly be applied, and it is certain that there are none to which it is applied by law. United States v. Smith (U. S.) 11 Fed. 487, 490.

MINERAL LAND.

As to what constituents make land mineral land, see supra, under main title "Mineral."

Mineral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but all such as are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a mineral charac

ter, which are useful in the arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 23 Sup. Ct. 365, 367, 188 U. S. 526, 47 L. Ed. 575.

As known mineral lands.

In a grant of lands excepting mineral iands, the term "mineral lands" means lands known to be mineral lands when the grant took effect, or which there was then good reason to believe were mineral lands. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Barden (U. S.) 46 Fed. 592; Francoeur v. Newhouse (U. S.) 40 Fed. 618, 621, 43 Fed. 236; Cowell v. Lammers (U. S.) 21 Fed. 200, 206; Davis v. Wiebbold, 11 Sup. Ct. 628, 633, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. Ed. 238; Mullan v. United States, 6 Sup. Ct. 1041, 1044, 118 U. S. 271, 30 L. Ed. 170; Hermocilla v. Hubbell, 26 Pac. 611, 89 Cal. 5.

As dependent on quantity of minerals. Within the meaning of the statute providing that lands containing valuable mineral deposits shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, lands in which mineral of different kinds are found, but not in such quantity as to justify expenditures in the effort to extract them, are not included within the designation of "mineral lands." Deffeback v. Hawke, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, 100, 115 U. S. 392, 29 L. Ed. 423.

"Mineral lands,” as used in grants by the United States which except from their operation mineral lands, do not include all lands in which minerals may be found, but only those where the mineral is in sufficient quantity to add to the richness of the land and to justify expenditure for its extraction, and this fact must be known at the date of the grant in order to bring the land within the exception. Smith v. Hill, 26 Pac. 644, 645, 89 Cal. 122.

The term "mineral lands" includes land which is worth more for mining than for agriculture. The fact that the land contains some gold or silver would not constitute it mineral lands if the gold and silver did not exist in sufficient quantities to pay to work it. Davis v. Wiebbold, 11 Sup. Ct. 628, 633, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. Ed. 238.

The mere fact that land contains particles of gold or veins of gold-bearing rock does not necessarily impress it with the character of "mineral land," within the meaning of Act Cong. July 1, 1862, and Act Cong. July 2, 1864, granting alternate sections to the Pacific Railroad, but reserving from the grant mineral lands. Alford v. Barnum, 45 Cal.

482.

quartz would not impress it with the character of mineral land. It must at least be shown that the land contains mineral in quantities sufficient to render it available and valuable for mining purposes. Merrill v. Dixon, 15 Nev. 401, 406.

Rights of way.

"Mineral lands," as used in the charter of the Northern Pacific Railway Company granting to the railroad, for the purpose of aiding in the construction, certain lands, with the exception of mineral lands covered by the description, should be construed to mean mineral lands not covered by the right of way. Nothing could possibly be given in lieu of any lands which might be needed for the right of way, and it would be destructive of the rights of the railway company if mining claims could at any time be located and worked upon the tract and land covered by the right of way. Wilkinson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 6 Pac. 349, 352, 5 Mont. 538.

MINERAL LAND ENTRY.

The phrase, "entry of mineral land," in Act July 1, 1898, authorizing the entry of mineral lands in the Colville Indian reservation, implies the discovery of precious metals in paying quantities in the lands to be entered, and the doing of work upon the claims necessary to develop and successfully operate mines. It requires labor and the use of implements, and carries with it the right to go upon the land for the purpose of working mines therein; the right to have a habitation for workmen, and to take their implements and conveniences for doing work. The word "entry" as it has been heretofore used in the land laws of the United States, means that act by which an individual acquires a receptive right to a portion of the unappropriated soil of the country by filing his claim. The act in question certainly was not intended to authorize any person to file in the land office a claim to a piece of land unless he had previously discovered and developed a mine thereon. United States v. Four Bottles Sour Mash Whisky (U. S.) 90 Fed. 720, 723.

MINERAL LEASE.

See "Mining Lease."

MINERALS FERÆ NATURÆ.