in any military operation beyond the frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions without the consent of Parliament. Standing thus, the clause would have rendered it impossible for any Go vernment, without clearly violating the law, to have ordered any of Her Majesty's troops to go from India to any other place -such as Abyssinia-for any purpose of war, without the previous consent of Parliament. Upon that ground the clause was objected to by Lord Palmerston. A debate arose; a division was taken; and the clause was carried with a slight modification. In the course of the discussion, however, Mr. Wilson had proposed an Amendment, and that Amendment would have made the clause as nearly as possible what it now is. He proposed, instead of saying that Her Majesty's forces should not be employed, to say the revenues of India should not be applied to such a purpose without the consent of Parliament. This, he said, would leave the Prerogative of the Crown unimpaired; it would be exactly analogous to withholding supplies to check military operations. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone) was willing to accept a slight verbal amendment proposed by the present Lord Cairns, but he did not think that the alteration suggested by Mr. Wilson was desirable. I can easily understand why the right hon. Gentleman was averse to the alteration, because he saw that it would make the clause of which he was the author much less effectual for the purpose which he at that time had in view. So the matter stood when the Bill left this House. When it reached the House of Lords the clause was struck out, and that now embodied in the Bill, and which I have just read to the Committee, was proposed by Lord Derby. In the course of his speech -it is so short that I might almost read it-Lord Derby clearly laid down what he considered to be the purport and object of the clause. The clause was inserted by the Lords, and when the Bill came back to this House it was unchallenged except as to a verbal matter, and was passed into law. I might found an argument upon the language employed by Lord Derby at the time he introduced the amended clause. I prefer to rest upon the authority of the action which was taken within a year and a half of the passing of the Bill by the Administration of Lord Palmerston, at the time of the third China war. I request the attention of the Committee to what was then done. The third China war was

com

commenced in the month of September, 1859. Parliament was not then sitting. Expenditure was ordered and was menced in India in the month of October, 1859. It was not until the 16th of March, 1860-five months afterwards that a Vote of credit was proposed in this House. It was a Vote of £850,000, to defray the charge as far as it could then be estimated. Upon that Motion a discussion was raised in this House. On the 17th of February, 1860, Sir Henry Willoughby, whom we all remember and respect, had asked the question, "Will there be any charge upon the Indian revenues?" The question was answered by Mr. Sidney Herbert, the then Secretary for War, to the effect that "the immediate charge will fall on the East India revenues, but the Imperial Treasury will have to account to them at a subsequent period." This is precisely what we thought we were entitled to do. That we understood to be the spirit of the Act as it stood, and that we might be guided by the precedent which was set by our immediate predecessors, within a year and a half of the passing of the Act. We proposed precisely what they proposed-namely, that the charge should ultimately fall upon the Imperial revenue. ["Oh!"] Some hon. Member gives utterance to dissent. But I may be permitted to reiterate that I do not understand in what respect a distinction can be drawn between what we proposed to do and what they actually did; if there be any it is on two points, and they are in our favour. In the first place, we called Parliament together within three months after we decided on our course of action, whereas our predecessors allowed the matter to rest for five months, until the usual time for the meeting of Parliament. Another point upon which we have rather the advantage is, that in the ultimate result they charged the revenues of India in respect of operations beyond the frontiers of India, but never from that day to this did they obtain any Resolution or Vote of Parliament authorizing that course of procedure; and Parliament has not found fault with them. If therefore there is any distinction to be drawn between us, it is in our favour, whose conduct has to the full been as legal and justifiable as that of our predecessors. I have thought it right to say this because we should have been chargeable with negligence if we had overlooked so important a point as the question whether we were or were not in har

tion of Parliament in making that appeal. My hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Darby Griffith) the other evening drew attention to what he called a stretching of the Royal Prerogative, and desired that this should be limited. I quite admit that the Prerogative should be kept within due bounds; but in our jealousy of what we call "Prerogative," we should consider how far we run the risk of endangering the efficiency of the public service; for the cardinal consideration, as I think, by which we ought to be guided is this-what is the best and most effectual way of conducting the public service? As I ventured to say the other night, if the House of Commons intends to take on itself the responsibility of prescribing what the action of the Executive shall be-if it requires to be consulted and to give its sanction beforehand on all matters of importance, especially in relation to our foreign policy and to the question of peace or war, the House must be prepared for a considerable alteration in the system under which our Government is carried on. The House must be prepared to be in permanent Session, or, at all events, be ready at any moment to be called together, and we must alter the relations which now subsist between Parliament and the Ministers of the Crown. At present Ministers of the Crown are appointed by the Crown, but hold their offices by the pleasure and through the continued confidence of Parliament. Parliament intrusts them with liberty to act as they think best in those matters properly belonging to the Executive, subject to this understandingthat if Parliament subsequently disapproves their action, it visits them with its displeasure, and renders it necessary for them to resign their offices. This being the relationship existing between Ministers and the Crown, it is necessary that Ministers should be allowed to some extent to act on their own responsibility, and, instead of seeking to obtain the assent of Parliament upon imperfect representations, and at a time when it is impossible that such assent could be given with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, they must rather come forward at a later period and say manfully

mony with the provisions of an Act of Parliament. But, however important it may be that Parliament should lay down clearly beforehand what its views are upon matters of this sort, in point of fact, when the question ultimately comes before Parliament, we must be judged, not by the question whether we have kept within the literal terms of this or that provision, but by a much higher standard than that. It would be absurd in us if we had undertaken so grave a responsibility as that of plunging the country into what may be a serious war, to come here and claim exemption because we could prove by special pleading that we had just kept within the limits of the wording of an Act of Parliament. The Committee knows what the answer would be. Parliament would say, "We do not care for your special pleading; we disapprove of the course you have taken; we hold you responsible for that which you have done; and whether you are within the Act of Parliament or not, we shall censure you, and you must take the consequences of your act. On the other hand, if it should appear that we have consciously or unconsciously overstepped the limits of the words of an Act of Parliament, Parliament after all has it in its power to condone what we have done, if it is satisfied, upon our explanation of the circumstances, that we have acted in good faith, without any intention to commit a breach of the law, and that in what we have done we have acted for the public interests. Although, therefore, I have thought it right to compare our conduct with that of our predecessors, I have not done so for the purpose of resting our defence on any recrimination, or on any special pleading, but simply for the purpose of showing how we stand. In point of fact, we come before you pretty much in the same position as the Government of the day did ten years ago, when Parliament was last called together for a November Session on occasion of a financial emergency-the suspension of the Bank Charter Act. We have called Parliament together to state that, upon an emergency of a different character, we have taken a course which the Executive thought necessary, even if not within the strict letter of the law, with regard to the Abyssinian expedition. We come to tell you what we have done and what we propose to do, and to ask your assent and your condonation and support, if we have unwittingly offended against an Act of Parliament. I trust we shall receive the sanc

"We have taken a definite course in this matter; we lay before you the grounds upon which we have acted; we trust you will support our action, and will leave the further conduct of this matter in our hands."

Sir, having said thus much, I will now address myself more immediately to the

Resolution I am about to submit to the Committee. I trust I may appeal to their indulgence if in doing so I may seem to offend in two particulars. In the first place, I shall have to include in my observations some topics which may appear to Members of this House not strictly relevant to the question before us, or which, at all events, are not very interesting to this assembly. But I am sure the Committee will do me the justice to remember that the matter on which I am speaking affects not only the British House of Commons, but the people of India, upon a matter deeply interesting to them, and that it is my duty in any observations I have to make to address myself as much to the people of India as to my more immediate audience. Upon another point I must also request the indulgence of the Committee. If, in what I say, I appear to speak rather much of my individual position as a Minister, they will do me the credit of believing that I do so not from any spirit of egotism, but because it is necessary for the argument which I have to submit that I should make it clearly understood what that position really is. Those who have cast even the most cursory glance over the blue book presented to Parliament will have perceived that the arrangements made for the conduct of this expedition have been in some respects peculiar; for, while it is in tended that the great bulk of the expenditure should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, the necessary arrangements were intrusted to the India Office-that is, to the Secretary of State for India. They were intrusted to me under circumstances which placed upon me a very heavy responsibility. The responsibility, of course, was shared with my Colleagues of having advised the commencement of this undertaking: but I had besides this peculiar responsibility cast upon me, of seeing that the management of the expedition was such as would best insure a prospect of success, and likewise such as to protect the purse of England against any unnecessary extravagance or waste. In addition to this, I had another responsibility weighing upon me, not as a Member of this House; but being Secretary of State for India, I felt under a deep responsibility to the people of India, being bound to see that their courage and their blood were not employed in an expedition which held out no prospects of success, and in which, in any event, they must undergo great sufferings, and in which possibly the very

best interests of our Indian Empire might be jeopardised. I can assure the Committee that I felt it no slight responsibility which rested upon me, and that from the moment I undertook this task I have never known what it was to be free from anxiety. But, at the same time, I have been supported by many considerations, and I have met with much cordial assistance. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my Colleagues for the kind and perfectly undeserved manner in which they have dealt with me throughout this matter. From those Departments with which I was more immediately brought into communication-from the Admiralty, the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury, and, I am bound to add, from the illustrious Duke at the Horse Guards-I have received the most cordial and friendly support throughout. I have also received support of a different but most valuable kind from the Members of the Indian Council and the Officers belonging to the Department. I remember that my noble Friend the Member for Stamford, speaking upon the Indian affairs, once talked of Councils as trammels to the competent, and screens to the incompetent.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I should be sorry if those words were taken as applying to the Indian Council. I was speaking of Councils in India connected with the Governor General, which were under discussion at the time. I did not intend that expression to apply to the Council here.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: I certainly should not have recalled that expression if I thought the noble Lord capable of applying the terms he used to the Indian Council. I know too well the feelings with which my noble Friend is regarded by the Members of that Council and the cordial relations which subsisted between them to suppose that he ever could have made such an observation intending it to apply to them. I quoted it for the purpose of venturing upon a definition of my own.

Councils such as this I believe may well be described as eyes to the blind and feet to the lame. If I had not been able to consult such a body-if it had not been for the experience and assistance of such men as Sir Robert Vivian, Captain Eastwick, General Baker, and our excellent Military Secretary, General Pears, I believe it would have been absolutely impossible to carry on the arrangements for this expedition. I also had support from another quarter, and that was from the authorities in India itself. I was called