Body, His Majesty threw out the project of | was now held by the majority of Italian a Conference, in which the Powers of statesmen. The next light in which the Europe were to meet and consult upon question was to be considered was the the question of the temporal power of the remarkable fact of the absence of any sign Pope. There was no reason to suppose of movement and sympathy with the that the invitation to the Conference would Volunteers by the people of Rome. There be confined to the Catholic Powers of appeared to be, at all events, no immediate Europe, and he should regret if, at this desire on the part of the people of Rome moment, and before this question was fully to get rid of the Papal Government. It discussed, or the conditions of the Con- was not for the people of this country to ference foreseen, an opinion should be deny the right of any other people to given by any distinguished English states- govern themselves in the mode best adapted man as to the course to be taken by Her to their wants and wishes; but it was Majesty's Government with respect to the apparent that the desire for Rome as the matter. He trusted that when this invi- capital of Italy was not so strong as it tation came before the noble Lord the formerly was. He trusted that if a proSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he posal were made to England to join the would not decide until after long conside- Conference the matter would receive the ration by himself and discussion with his gravest consideration on the part of the Colleagues, and that they would remember Government. With regard to the other that the Papal question was territorial as topics alluded to in Her Majesty's Speech, well as religious. It would be very unfor- he would not now detain their Lordships tunate if Her Majesty's Government did there would be plenty of opportunity not consider that there was a political as for discussing them in the course of the well as a religious element involved in the Session. Italian question. If the question were left to be decided by a Conference of Catholic Powers alone, the result would probably be the permanent occupation of Rome by a joint force of those Powers, which would be a much greater grievance to the kingdom of Italy than the present occupation by French troops. If, on the contrary, it were so arranged that the Papal question were treated as a territorial one, and if the wishes of the people of Italy and of the present occupants of the Roman Territory were considered, it was just possible that the proposed Conference might lead to a successful solution of the question. There were two very important lights in which the question should be considered. One was that the strong, and almost universal desire, which once existed to make Rome the capital of Italy, had considerably diminished in the minds not only of the Roman people themselves, but also of the leading men of Italy. That remarkable patriot the late Massimo d'Azeglio was not of opinion that Rome ought to be the capital of Italy, and, in his interesting letters, he gave many efficient reasons why it might not be expedient that Rome should be the capital, and why the existence of the Papal Government at Rome in a certain degree of independence might rather add to than diminish the dignity and independence of the kingdom of Italy. That opinion had been gradually becoming more prominent, and

LORD LYVEDEN said, that their Lordships would have an ample opportunity hereafter of dealing with the other questions referred to in the Speech from the Throne, with the exception of the expedition to Abyssinia, which was a matter of pressing and immediate importance; and therefore he thought it desirable that their Lordships should direct their special attention to that subject, and endeavour, if possible, to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some explanation with regard to the motives that had guided their policy. For his own part, he regarded this expedition as one of the most formidable misfortunes which could have befallen the country; it was an evil the full extent of which could not be foreseen; and, although it might possibly be a necessity, more would be required of the Government in explanation of its policy than was contained in the Message from the Crown before the country would accept it as such. It should be shown, in the first place, that every alternative expedient had been well considered and dismissed on substantial grounds before the expedition was resolved on, and that there were no other means of attaining the object. It was well known that several suggestions had been made with reference to the method of carrying on the expedition, not a few of which had come from that distinguished traveller Sir Samuel Baker, who proposed, among other things, that the co-operation of the

Viceroy of Egypt should be sought in | Abyssinia was suggested. Some desired carrying on offensive operations, while reforming the religion of the country; other parties recommended that we should make use of the discontented subjects of King Theodore. The noble Earl at the head of the Government shook his head; he, perhaps, thought that a very unwise proposal; but had these things been considered, and if so, why rejected? They were certainly worthy of consideration, for if adopted they would materially reduce the cost of the expedition. It might, indeed, be inexpedient to adopt any of these courses; but these were points on which he should like to hear the views of Her Majesty's Government. Regarding the question of necessity, he noticed that the second paragragh of the Royal Message opened with this passage

*

buried himself in the interior of Africa; should he be followed? To do so would be almost impossible; but what had the Government resolved upon? All these matters must have presented themselves to the minds of Ministers; so that before the money was voted, and the despatch of the expedition had been formally endorsed, he insisted that the Government should clearly state what limit they intended putting on the operations of the expedition, and how those operations would be carried out. A noble Lord had stated that the country generally approved the expedition, and would willingly bear the cost of it; but he (Lord Lyveden) believed the country was very much annoyed at the expense being incurred, and would only be reconciled to it on being fully satisfied that the expedition was inevitable. He certainly believed that much fuller information than had yet been furnished was required before the country would fully regard this expedition as necessary and unavoidable.

any objection to the policy pursued by the Government in despatching an expedition to Abyssinia, but he, at the same time, reserves to himself- as he is perfectly entitled to do-the liberty of expressing any opinion he may come to after more mature I assure the consideration of the case. noble Earl and your Lordships that no Government ever came to a decision with more reluctance, or with a stronger sense of the imperative necessity which would alone justify such a decision, than Her Majesty's Government experienced in deciding on sending this expedition to Abyssinia. That decision would not have been taken had the Government not been deeply impressed with its imperative necessity, and with a firm conviction, shared in, I believe, by all the Members of both Houses of Parliament who have at all inquired into the subject, that the time had arrived when it would have been unworthy of the Government of this country, would have seriously detracted from the estimation THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, in in which England is held throughout the the first place, I have to return my sincere world, and would have exposed us to wellthanks to my two noble Friends who moved grounded reproach, had we decided to leave and seconded the Address to the Crown in Her Majesty's subjects in unjust captivity, answer to the Royal Speech. If I may and left Her Majesty's Crown and dignity draw a distinction between them, it will to be insulted with impunity by a semibe to refer particularly to my noble Friend barbarous Potentate. The noble Earl bewho addressed your Lordships for the first low the gangway (the Earl of Carnarvon), time this evening, and who, in the course has expressed an opinion that the course of his observations, spoke with remarkable pursued by Her Majesty's Government clearness and accuracy upon subjects re- with regard to the expedition is not the quiring very careful consideration, and most desirable that could have been perhaps more experience than could have adopted. But my noble Friend does not, been expected from so young a Member however, so much condemn the expedition of your Lordships' House. I hope, from itself as the course which had been prewhat we have heard to-night, that we viously taken; and, in point of fact, the shall hereafter frequently find my noble greater part of my noble Friend's obserFriend taking part in our debates. I have vations referred to a period long antecenext to express the satisfaction which Her dent to that at which Her Majesty's preMajesty's Government feel at being able sent Government acceded to office. to infer from the language of those noble objected to the mission undertaken by Mr. Lords who have addressed your Lordships Rassam; and he thought-I do not know that it is not intended to interfere in the whether with reference to that or a subslightest degree with the unanimity with sequent mission-that a Minister charged which your Lordships are disposed to sup- with the important function of representport the Address in answer to Her Ma- ing the Crown should have been sent to jesty's Speech. But it would be im- Abyssinia with an escort with a small possible for me to pass over in com- escort-of cavalry. I can only say, my plete silence some of the observations Lords, that if my noble Friend had volunwhich have been made by the noble teered to go upon that expedition, and Earl opposite (Earl Russell) and from had taken with him the Hampshire Yeoother noble Lords, and I must ask your manry, I should not have had the slightest Lordships' indulgence while I make a few objection to his trying his persuasive remarks. I understand from the noble powers upon the King of Abyssinia. For Earl opposite that, after carefully consider-myself, I can only say that if the mission ing the matter, he is not disposed to offer from this country was not to rely upon

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He

the authority of the Sovereign, no scheme, in my mind, could be more untenable, and no plan would be more certain to lead to absolute and discreditable failure than to send out a Minister with a small escort incapable of protecting him or of defending themselves, and who, if the Emperor objected to their presence, would certainly be devoted to destruction, or reduced to a state of captivity such as that which had befallen the previous prisoners. With regard, therefore, to the alternative so suggested, it is the one which in my mind, of all other alternatives, afforded the least prospect of success. But I am the more surprised to hear this objection raised on the part of the noble Earl, because when it was determined to send out Mr. Flad the noble Earl was a Member of the Cabinet, and he was a party to the sending out of that gentleman; and in vindication of my noble Friend and of ourselves, I must say that we had no other alternative with regard to Mr. Flad, because the circumstances when we came into office were these:-Our Consul had been imprisoned for three years, and during that time he had languished in a captivity which varied in severity according to the caprices of the Emperor. The Government sent out Mr. Rassam, whom they believed to be perfectly competent to deal with the question. He was at first received with great cordiality and kindness by the Emperor; but in one of the sudden caprices to which such minds are subject, the Emperor, while professing great attachment to Mr. Rassam, placed him in captivity, loading him at the same time with assurances of the most profound friendship and esteem. Mr. Rassam was the bearer of a letter from the Queen, which was treated by this Potentate with entire contempt. He was also the bearer of presents; but falling under the displeasure of the Emperor, he, together with the other prisoners, who had been actually liberated, and who had been sent for by the Emperor in order that there might be a formal reconciliation, were to be detained until certain artificers for whom the Emperor had asked for the purpose of instructing his people were forthcoming. Mr. Rassam thereupon inquired what messenger would be most acceptable to the King, and the answer was-) Mr. Flad, a German missionary; and it was arranged that he should come to this country and have a personal interview with Her Majesty, and receive from Her her commands. That was the state of things when we

assumed the responsibilities of office. Mr. Flad arrived in this country in July, which was about a month after we became Ministers of the Crown. In the course of October he returned to Massowah, bearing an autograph letter from the Queen, which he was to deliver to the Emperor, and also bearing with him certain presents and assurances that if the prisoners were released Her Majesty would overlook what had passed, and still entertain for Theodore sentiments of friendship and goodwill. At the same time, in compliance with the desire of the Emperor, and with their own consent, a certain number of artificers who had had the terms clearly explained to them were sent out, and these artificers were to proceed to the Emperor on the delivery of the captives. On the arrival of the presents and the artificers at Massowah, the Emperor expressed great pleasure, but said nothing about the release of the prisoners. Colonel Merewether regarded this as a one-sided proceeding, and accordingly intimated that the presents and the artificers would be sent on the release of the captives. No reply to this communication was vouchsafed, and the Emperor was informed that they would be returned to England, and that Her Majesty could not think of entering into friendly relations with him as long as the captives were detained. In April, 1867, my noble Friend and Relative at the head of the Foreign Department sent an imperative message to King Theodore, demanding the release of the captives on pain, in case of refusal, of forfeiture of Her Majesty's friendship and goodwill, and three months were allowed for an answer. The message was forwarded on the 15th of April, was received on the 13th of June, and from that time to this not the slightest notice has been taken of the communication. Thus matters stood before the prorogation of Parliament; and as some question has been raised partly as to whether all other means have been exhausted, and partly as to whether Parliament has been fairly dealt with in the matter, I hope that your Lordships will permit me to refer to what took place in the House of Commons on the 26th of July, about four weeks before the rising of Parliament. The question was brought forward by Mr. Seymour, and supported by Sir Henry Rawlinson, as well as by a more significant authority, when we consider the position he had occupied in the previous Government—I mean Mr. Layard.

The object of the Motion was to present a humble Address to Her Majesty, pray ing that proper steps might be taken to procure the release of the Abyssinian prisoners, if necessary, by force of arms. No opposition was offered to the Motion except on the part of Her Majesty's Go-I look on 'prestige' in politics very much as I

vernment.

I trust your Lordships will permit me to quote one or two passages from the addresses which were delivered in support of the proposal. Mr. Seymour said that some of the prisoners had been detained for upwards of three years, and the question was, what was to be done for their liberation? Conciliation had been tried and failed. Mr. Seymour then proceeded to state the courses which he thought were open to the Government :"In the first place, it was impossible that the captives could be left in their prisons. The missionary whom the King had permitted to leave Abyssinia had returned with the muchcoveted artizans and presents, and the autograph letter of Her Majesty, which was couched in the most conciliatory terms; but even this had not proved successful. Further attempts at conciliation would be not only useless, but derogatory to this country. It had been suggested that we should ask Egypt to assist us in obtaining the release of these captives. He thought it would not be wise to do so."-[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 233-4.] And I must say that I entirely concur in that opinion. Nothing would so surely tend to failure as to act in concert with Egypt, a country which has been regarded by Abyssinia for generations as her hereditary foe. The Princes and Chiefs in the latter country, who are at present at feud with Theodore, and who would rejoice at his overthrow, would at the supposition of our acting with the Egyptians effect a reconciliation with him. Mr. Seymour

continued

"The only course which remained was to undertake the release of the captives ourselves. After so great an insult had been inflicted upon

us we were bound to take this course, and send an expedition to Abyssinia from India."-[Ibid.] Sir Henry Rawlinson also thought it would be impossible to take any other

course

"

'We have done everything we could to obtain the release of the prisoners by fair means, and we have failed. If we abandon any further effort, and our present inactivity is prolonged, that the prisoners will, one and all, in due course, sink under their sufferings is almost a matter of certainty. The question, therefore, resolves itself into a choice of evils.”—[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 239.]

In answer to those who objected to the probable cost of the expedition, and disregarded altogether the question of prestige, Sir Henry Rawlinson said—

"Having been employed officially in the East the greater portion of that service in immediate for nearly thirty years, and having passed by far connection with Native Courts, my opinions with regard to 'prestige' are not derived from theory or from books, but are the result of personal experience and observation. I would say, then, that look on credit' in finance. It is a power which enables us to achieve very great results with very small means at our immediate disposal. Prestige' may not be of paramount importance in Europe, but in the East, Sir, our whole position depends on it. It is a perfect fallacy to suppose that we hold India by the sword. The foundation of our tenure, the talisman-so to speak-which enables 100,000 Englishmen to hold 150,000,000 of Natives in subjection, is the belief in our unassailable power, in our inexhaustible resources; and any circumstance therefore which impairs that belief, which leads the nations of the East to mistrust our superiority and to regard us as more nearly on an equality with themselves, inflicts a grievous shock on our political position."[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 241.] Mr. Layard said

"Matters, however, had now gone to a length when some step must be taken, something must be done on behalf of the unfortunate people still kept in captivity. . . . . With great reluctance he had come to the conclusion that there was only one course left to us now, and He did that was an expedition to Abyssinia. not conceal from himself all the difficulties of such an undertaking-difficulties which his hon. Friend who spoke last was near the truth in describing. The expedition would be really a very arduous one. But the question was, whether the honour and credit of the country did not render such an undertaking absolutely necessary. If he entertained the remotest hope that any kind of negotiation, or that any other measure would be likely to release the captives, he should be totally opposed to a military expedition; but with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, he had been compelled to relinquish all such expectations."[3 Hansard, clxxxix. 245-247.]

Here is the opinion of a Gentleman who had been Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and who for three years had been exhausting every means of conciliation to obtain the release of the captives. He says that all efforts have failed, and he has been compelled to come to the conclusion that nothing but force of arms can procure their release. And now I come to the answer made by my noble Friend and Relative the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. My noble Relative said

"I am sure, therefore, that the House will feel that, however anxious we may be to attain the object we all have in view, it would be madness to throw a British army into an unknown country, in a tropical climate, far from the sea, very far from its reserves and its supplies, without a full previous investigation as to the means of moving, feeding, and keeping them in health. That in