1. Code Md. 1888, art. 75, § 94, which provides
that, in proceedings at law, parties may be re-
quired to answer bills of discovery only when un-
der the same circumstances they would be com-
pelled to produce original books, or answer such
bills under the usual rules of chancery practice,
does not curtail the jurisdiction of courts of equity
to entertain bills of discovery; it being an estab-
lished rule that a grant of equitable powers to a
court of common law will not oust the jurisdiction
of a court of equity.-Union Pass. Ry. Co. v. City
of Baltimore, (Md.) 933.

2. In New Jersey, a person who keeps a room to
which persons commonly resort for the purpose of
betting on horse-races, may be convicted of keep-
ing a disorderly house.-Haring v. State, (N. J.)
1079.

Construction of statute.

3. The New Jersey statute concerning gaming
(Revision, 458) makes wagers upon any race unlaw-
ful. By act March 11, 1880, betting upon a horse-
race was not thereafter indictable. By act March
30, 1887, the performance of any act exempted from
punishment by the act of 1880 was to render the
persons performing such acts amenable to the pro-
visions of the act to prevent gaming, to the extent
only that such acts shall be deemed unlawful in
any civil suit. Held, that the act of 1887 would
not be construed so as to exempt from criminal
prosecution one keeping a house where betting on
horse-races is carried on.-ld.

Evidence.

4. Upon trial for maintaining a disorderly house
by permitting lewd persons to frequent it, evi-
dence not only of the bad reputation of the women
resorting there, but of specific acts of unchastity
committed by them elsewhere than on the prem-
ises in question, is admissible.-Beard v. State,
(Md.) 1044.

5. If not competent, the error in the admission
of such evidence is cured if defendant himself
proves that the women were street-walkers, of
bad reputation, and that they had been seen in
houses of prostitution.-Id.

6. Under an indictment charging in separate
counts the keeping of a bawdy-house and the
keeping of a disorderly house, testimony of a
woman that she went to the house with a man,
whom she did not know, to get a drink; that they
got a room, and remained an hour; that she "staid
pression meant; that the man offered to keep her,
with him; "-witness understanding what the ex-
and pay her board and something more; and that
the traverser was not present, and witness did not
see him, is admissible to show that the house was
kept for the resort and unlawful commerce of
lewd persons.-Herzinger v. State, (Md.) 81.

Dissolution.

Of attachment, see Attachment, 9, 10.
partnership, see Partnership, 11-14.

District and Prosecuting Attor-
neys.

Misconduct, effect on indictment, see Grand Jury,
1-3.

DIVORCE.

Grounds-Failure to support.

1. Under R. L. Vt. § 2362, subd. 5, providing that
the wife may have a divorce when the husband,
fuses to support her, and act 59, Sess. Laws 1886,
being of "pecuniary ability," without cause re-
construing "pecuniary ability" to mean ability to
provide for a wife, either from labor, income of
property, or otherwise, a wife cannot obtain a di-
vorce because her husband, being able-bodied,
would not work, and had therefore no means, and
did not support her.-Jewett v. Jewett, (Vt.) 734.
Drunkenness and cruelty.

2. Drunkenness of a wife, though frequent and
accompanied by abusive and indecent language,
and occasioning domestic broils, is not alone "ex-
cessively vicious conduct," such as to justify a
divorce a mensa et thoro, under Code Md. art. 16,
§ 37.-Shutt v. Shutt, (Md.) 1024.

3. Though in addition to such conduct the wife,
when intoxicated, on two or three occasions as-
saulted her husband, a divorce on the ground of
"cruelty of treatment" will not be granted, as
danger of bodily harm, or to health,-a necessary
element of such cruelty,-is absent.-Id.
Alimony.

4. A defendant in a suit for divorce, who omits
to allege plaintiff's adultery in his answer, will
not afterwards be permitted to set it up in opposi-
sion to her application for alimony pendente lite,
when the only excuse offered for such omission is
the apparently false one of a desire to shield his
children from the disgrace resulting from such a
charge.-Pullen v. Pullen, (N. J.) 310.
Rights of divorced persons.

5. Where the common law is in force a divorce
a mensa et thoro does not change the property
rights of the parties. Its only effect is to compel
the parties to live apart, and to deprive the hus-
band of his control over his wife.-Supreme Coun-
cil Amer. Legion of Honor v. Smith, (N. J.) 770.

6. Decedent was a member of a mutual benefit
society, and the certificate of membership made
the benefits on his death payable to his wife.
Three months before his death decedent and his
wife were divorced a mensa et thoro. Held, that

1. On the question of a person's domicile, when
none of the physical facts are in dispute, the per:
son's intention is the sole issue for the jury, and
is decisive.-State v. Palmer, (N. H.) 977.
Change.

2. Decedent, unmarried, had lived for many
years in Baltimore county, where he carried on
business, and held the office of postmaster. Being
very sick with the malady which caused his death,
he told his sister, who lived in Baltimore city, that
he wanted to come and live with her as long as he
lived; that he would so arrange his property as to
secure an income which would support him; and
that in the summer he would go and visit his
friends in the county. She consented, and he
leased his property for a term of years, and stated
that he had given up everything in the county,
and never wanted to go back and live there again.
He remained with his sister for about three months,
when he died, declaring himself in his will as "of
Baltimore city." He never resigned his office of
postmaster, being unwilling to recommend a suc-
cessor. Held, that he was a resident of the city
at the time of his death, and the orphans' court
thereof had jurisdiction to probate his will.-Ga-
ble v. Mays, (Md.) 565.

DOWER.

Right to dower.

Dying Declarations.

See Homicide, 3-6.

Ejection.

Of passengers, see Carriers, 13, 14.
EJECTMENT.

See, also, Adverse Possession.
To determine adverse possession, see Partition, 2.
Title to maintain.

1. Plaintiff must prove either a paper title or a
title by adverse possession; and prayers based on
the principles of acquiescence and estoppel recog-
nized by courts of equity in relation to boundary
lines, are properly refused.-Winter v. White,
(Md.) 84.

2. Under act Pa. May 28, 1715, making all deeds
duly proved, acknowledged, and recorded equiva
lent to deeds of feoffment with livery of seisin,
etc., possession by the grantee is presumed to ac-
company such a deed, and such presumption is
stronger than the recital in a sheriff's return to a
writ of ejectment made two months after the sher-
iff's sale, under which plaintiff in ejectment claims,
that defendant, the grantor, was in possession
when the writ was served.-Yost v. Brown, (Pa.)

533.

3. Land belonging to G. was leased by his wid-
Held, in
ow, as administratrix, to defendant.
ejectment to recover the land after expiration of
the term, that the widow was improperly joined
as plaintiff with the heirs at law of G., it appear-
ing that her only interest was a right of dower.-
Gorton v. Potter, (R. I.) 909.
Pleading.

2. Under act Pa. March 29, 1832, providing that,
if the widow of a decedent shall be living when his
real estate is partitioned, the value of her dower
shall be charged on the premises, and the legal in-
terest thereon paid to her annually by the person
holding the land in lieu of her dower, and, if not
paid, such annual sum may be recovered by dis-
tress or otherwise as rents are recoverable, the
sum fixed in lieu of the dower of the widow of an
heir, in consent proceedings to partition his an-
cestor's land in the orphans' court, may be recov-
ered of the heir to whom the land was assigned,
though the proceedings were not for the partition
of the land of the deceased heir.- Baker v. Lei-
bert, (Pa.) 236.

Drafts.

See Negotiable Instruments.

DRUGGISTS.

ises in question.-Id.

Evidence.

5. In ejectment, where defendant claims under
the provision of a will of a living person that he
shall have immediate possession of the property
on condition that he will take testatrix to live with
him, and support her as one of his own family, ev-
idence is admissible to show that he took posses-
sion under the will, and still retains possession,
that testatrix lived with him for a long time, and
that defendant performed all his part of the con-
tract; as in that case he could not be deprived of
possession, though such contract is contained in a
testamentary paper.-Smith v. Tuit, (Pa.) 995.

6. In ejectment, defendant claimed under a lease
from plaintiffs, and, on defendant's offering the
lease in evidence, plaintiffs asked the purpose of
the offer. Held, that the ruling of the trial court
that the paper showed for itself what it was of-
fered for was proper.-Myers. v. Kingston Coal
Co., (Pa.) 891.

10.

License.

1. Under Gen. Laws N. H. c. 133, requiring retail-
ers of drugs, etc., to submit to an examination and
procure a license, and providing that it shall be law.
ful for one to be an owner of the stock in trade, if
he takes no part in conducting or keeping the shop,
it is no defense to the indictment, if defendants
took part in conducting the business, that they
had in their employ a duly licensed person, who
compounded the medicines called for by physicians'
prescriptions.-State v. Forcier, (N. H.) 577.

2. Nor is it any defense that no harm resulted
from the violation of the statute.-Id.

Drunkards.

Sales of liquor to, see Intoxicating Liquors, 20.
Drunkenness.

As ground for divorce, see Divorce, 2, 3.

the husband and heirs of the grantee after her
death and the death of the grantor, that plaintiffs
had the burden of proving payment of the consid-
eration, they being out of possession, and that de-
fendant should have been allowed to prove the hus-
band's refusal to perform the contract after his
wife's death, and his abandonment of the prem-
ises, and the subsequent agreement of defendant
to provide for the grantor, and the conveyance of
the premises to him in consideration thereof.-
Driesbach v. Serfass, (Pa.) 513.

8. In ejectment by the sheriff's vendee of the
who obtained title under an absolute deed, alleged
mortgagor against the vendee of the mortgagee,
to be a mortgage, plaintiff must prove that the
mortgage has been paid, or that a tender of the
sum due has been made before suit. Where there
is no allegation of payment or tender, and the tes
timony fails to show who had been in possession
of the premises up to the date of defendant's deed,
or what was the rental value of the property, the
sum for which the mortgage was given, the sum

9. When a judgment in ejectment is entered by
agreement to be released on payment of a certain
sum on or before a certain day, time is of the es-
sence, and, if payment be not made by the day
fixed, the judgment becomes absolute and inde-
feasible.-Beatty v. Hamilton, (Pa.) 755.

ELECTIONS AND VOTERS.

Sale of liquor on election day, see Intoxicating
Liquors, 25, 26.

Time of holding election.

The people of a township, with comparatively
few exceptions, were prevented by the great
storm, known as the "Blizzard," from attending
the township election of March 13, 1888. An act
was subsequently passed by the legislature au-
thorizing a township election to be held, where an
election had not been held by reason of the said
storm, and under that act an election was held in
said township on the 10th of April, 1888. Held,
that the persons who received the majority vote at
the election of April 10th were the duly-elected
officers of the township.-State v. Quinby, (N. J.)

952.

Emblements.

or, in case their report is appealed from, the amount
which shall be found by a jury; and that where
the land-owner refuses to accept a tender of the
appeal the amount found by a jury, then the pay-
damages assessed by commissioners, or in case of
ment of the amount assessed into the circuit court
shall be deemed a valid payment. Held, that a
railroad company which does not make a tender
until after appeal by the land-owner cannot take
possession of the land, until a tender is made of
the amount found by a jury.-Id.

7. While the mortgagor of land was in posses-
sion, petitioner, with his consent, but without
paying any damages, entered on and constructed
its railroad across the premises. Subsequently,
defendant, the mortgagee, brought suit to fore-
close, making petitioner a party defendant, and ob-
tained a decree of foreclosure, whereupon petition-
er instituted proceedings to condemn the land.
Defendant claimed that the corpus of the railroad
and improvements belonged to him, under the
maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, and
that he was entitled to compensation therefor.
Held, that the maxim does not apply. The mort-
gagor's consent, given at a time when defendant
had merely a lien on the land, was effective to
shield petitioner from being a trespasser as to ary
one.-St. Johnsbury & L. C. R. Co. v. Willard,
(Vt.) 38.

8. Under Const. Pa. art. 16, § S. providing that
"municipal and other corporations, and individuals

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The power.

1. Until what is just compensation has been as-
certained in the manner directed by law, and the
condemnation money paid, either actually or con-
structively, it is not within the power of the legis-
lature to dispossess the land-owner, and put anoth-
er person in possession of his land.-Johnson v.
Baltimore & N. Y. Ry. Co., (N. J.) 574.

Property subject to.

2. Land appropriated by a railroad company for
public use cannot afterwards be appropriated by
another company for a similar use, except in case
of a necessity so absolute that without such appro-
priation the grant to the latter company will be de-
feated, a necessity arising from the very nature
of things, over which the company has no control,
not one created by the company itself for the sake
of convenience or economy.-Appeal of Sharon
Railway, (Pa.) 234.

3. By a railroad crossing, within act Pa. June 19,
1871, is meant such a crossing only as appropriates
no part of the land of the company whose track
is to be crossed to the exclusive use of the com-
pany seeking to cross.-Id.

4. Where land has been acquired by one railroad
company under the right of eminent domain, it
cannot, in the absence of express or necessarily
implied statutory permission, be taken by another
company, to whom it would be convenient, but not
.necessary.-Barre R. Co. v. Montpelier & W.R. R.
Co., (Vt.) 923.

Compensation.

5. It is not necessary, where land is taken under
the general railroad law, that actual payment of
compensation to the land-owner should in all cases
precede appropriation. After the amount to be
paid as just compensation has been finally fixed,
either by the award of commissioners or the ver-
dict of a jury, a tender to the land-owner, and a
refusal by him to accept, will be regarded as equiv-
alent to payment.-Johnson v. Baltimore & N. Y.
Ry. Co., (N. J.) 574.

6. The general railroad law of New Jersey (Revis-
ion, p. 929, § 101) provides that an appeal by a land-
owner from the report of commissioners in condem-
nation proceedings shall not prevent the railroad
company from taking the land on filing the report,
but that the company shall in no case take posses-
sion of land until it has paid to the owner the

property for public use, shall make just compensa-
tion for property taken, injured, or destroyed by
the construction or enlargement of their works,
highways, or improvements, which compensation
shall be paid or secured before such taking," etc.,
the borough is alone liable for all the damages
caused by taking or injuring property in opening
or widening a street exclusively within the bor-
ough, under the general borough act of April 3,
1851, and act April 22, 1856, and the county cannot
be required to pay any part of such damages. -In
re Streets and Alleys in Borough of Parkesburg,
(Pa.) 27.

9. The provision of the act of 1851, as to the sep-
and of the other damages, is intended to apply to
arate assessment of the value of the land taken,
cases where the county is proceeding to extend a
highway into a borough, in which cases the ex-
penses are shared between the county and the bor-
borough under the act of 1856, to open or widen
ough; but it does not apply to proceedings by the
streets which are exclusively within the borough.

-Id.

Occupation of streets and high-

ways.

10. Though the construction stakes for a railroad
abutting owner, the right of action for injuries
are placed in a highway in the life-time of the
consequential upon the construction of the road
after his death is in the widow and heirs, and not
in the personal representatives; there being no in-
jury to such owner from the mere placing of the
construction stakes.-Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co.
v. Ziemer, (Pa.) 187.

11. A railroad company cannot build its track on
a street which has been laid out, but not opened,
until compensation, as required by Const. Pa. art.
16, § 8, has been made to the owners of the land on
which the street is located; and it is immaterial
that the assent of the city has been obtained, and
that the railroad company has given bond to pro-
tect the city.-Appeal of Beidler, (Pa.) 244.*

12. The doctrine that there can be no compensa-
tion for injury to property unaccompanied with
negligence, arising from the operation as distin-
guished from the construction of a railroad law-
fully occupying a street, when no property is tak-
en from plaintiff, and no change made in the grade
of the street in front of the premises, does not ap-
ply to a case in which the track is laid so close to
the premises as to entirely cut off, or to render
dangerous, all access to them. The injury being
the direct result of the construction, the case
stands on the same footing as to consequential