10-26.

Of paupers, see Poor and Poor-Laws, 1-4.

Sheriffs and Constables.

Constable's arrest without warrant, see Arrest,
1, 2.

Levy of attachment, see Attachment, 3-5.
Liability for not levying execution, see Execu-
tion, 9.

Slander.

See Libel and Slander.

SOCIETIES.

Consolidation.

1. Before 1882 there were two organizations of
the colored masons in Pennsylvania, known re-
spectively as the "Most Worshipful Grand Lodge
of Free and Accepted Masons of Pennsylvania,
and the "Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free
and Accepted Ancient York Masons of Pennsyl-
vania. " Their constitutions, "land-marks" and
objects were similar, and they had both formerly
belonged to the National Grand Lodge, though
they had withdrawn from it. Property had been
conveyed to trustees for the benefit of the latter
institution, and of certain of its subordinate lodges.
Held, that the two lodges had the power to unite
in one organization, and, having done so, the prop-
erty was held in trust for the new institution.-
Appeal of Woolford, (Pa.) 524.

2. The constitution of each lodge provided that
nothing could be adopted in derogation of the "an-
cient landmarks" of the lodge, or affecting the in-
terests of the whole fraternity, except at a stated
annual communication. The general regulations
provided that the grand lodge should be held in
Philadelphia on two days mentioned, and an annual
meeting should be held on St. John's day, at which
officers should be installed, and all matters affect-
ing the craft generally should be considered and
acted on, and that special communications might
be held at other times at the master's request, but
that no legislation affecting the constitution, regu
lations, etc., of the grand lodge or of the craft in
general should be made "except at the stated com-
munications." Held, that nothing therein required
business affecting the craft generally to be trans-
acted at the meeting on St. John's day, and there-
fore the adoption of the plan of union at another
annual meeting was valid.-Id.

3. A clause in the constitution, authorizing the
grand master to exercise the executive functions
of the grand lodge when it is not in session, would
not give him power to forbid delegates of the sub-
ordinate lodges from attending a convention held
for the purpose of forming the new organization,
the articles of union adopted by the lodge having
provided for sending such delegates, as such power
would be equivalent to a nullification of the act of
the lodge. Id.

Proceedings to wind up.

4. A bill by some of the members of a voluntary
association, organized for fishing, hunting, and
boating, against the others, to have the affairs of
the association wound up, a receiver appointed,
etc., alleged that there were irreconcilable differ-
ences between the parties, and that defendants
had wrongfully excluded complainants from the
enjoyment of the property of the association. The
answer alleged that complainants were lawfully
expelled, and that defendants were, under the by-
laws, the lawful custodians of the property. Held,
that no steps will be taken before final hearing,
except to restrain defendants from disposing of
the property.-Gobert v. Eckhard, (N. J.) 305.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Jurisdiction.

1. Equity will not compel the specific perform-

or sickness. "-Mowers v. Fogg, (N. J.) 296.

2. Equity will not assist one party to gain an ad-
vantage from the mistake of another party, but
will leave him to his remedies at law.-Mansfield
v. Sherman, (Me.) 300.

3. Equity has jurisdiction to compel specific per-
formance of an agreement between two railroad
companies in regard to a crossing of their tracks
at grade, which provides that "in the use or work-
ing of the railroads of the parties hereto at or near
the point of crossing, all trains, engines, or cars of
the party of the second part shall come to a full
stop at a distance of at least 200 feet from the
point of crossing, and shall not proceed until the
proper signal shall have been given by the watch-
man in charge. All engines and trains of the
party of the first part shall have priority of pas-
sage over the trains and engines of the party of
the second part. "—Appeal of Cornwall & L. R. Co.,
(Pa.) 427.

4. One H. leased certain land to plaintiff without
special reference to any preceding memoranda.
A few days later, under hand and seal, the parties
to the lease executed a supplemental agreement,
covenanting that a certain agreement of sale, with
the memoranda attached thereto, made before the
execution of the lease, should be binding on them,
their heirs and assigns, as if embodied in the lease.
This agreement contained restrictions as to the
buildings to be erected on the land, and the uses
to which they were to be put, etc. The lease was
duly recorded. Held, that the restrictions, if not
running with the land, were such as equity would
enforce against one having notice of them, and
plaintiff was not entitled to a specific performance
of a contract entered into by defendant for the
purchase of the land, plaintiff agreeing that the
title was to be free from all incumbrances and re-
strictions.-Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., (Md.)
372.

Requisites of contract.

5. Where a vendor makes a material mistake as
to the extent and boundaries of one of the lots bar-
gained for, the vendee cannot, on being apprised
of the vendor's mistake, insist on specific perform-
ance.-Mansfield v. Sherman, (Me.) 300.*

6. A bill to enforce a written contract which does
not specify the time it is to continue, is properly
dismissed, where it appears that the parties made
a contemporaneous agreement that the contract
should continue in force "only so long as both par-
ties should desire," and that defendant has ter-
minated it.-Appeal of Real-Estate Title Ins. &
Trust Co., (Pa.) 450.

Discretion of court.

7. A bill for a decree for the specific perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of real estate is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the court.—
Mansfield v. Sherman, (Me.) 300.
Performance by complainant.

8. Where complainant refuses to perform his
part of an agreement, he is in no position to de-
mand specific performance.-Carswell v. Walsh,
(Md.) 335.*

Pleading and evidence.

9. In all cases for specific performance the con-
tract must be accurately stated in the bill, and the
proof must in every essential particular corre-
spond with the contract thus set up.-Id.
10. In a suit by the vendor against the vendee to
enforce the specific performance of a contract to
sell land, the defendant may set up a contempora
neous verbal agreement by which certain mutual
accounts were to be settled and the balance due
him credited on the purchase money, without fil-
ing a cross-bill.-Redfield v. Gleason, (Vt.) 1075.
11. Such an agreement may be proved by oral
evidence.-Id.

Spirituous Liquors.

§ 1, and under act May 14, 1874, exempting the
property of all institutions "founded, endowed, and
maintained by public or private charity, not-
withstanding its revenues are to some extent de-
rived from payments for board and lodging by the
young women for whose "temporal, moral, and re-
ligious welfare" the association exists; such rev-
enues not being intended as a source of profit, and
being in fact insufficient to defray expenses, the
annual deficit being made up by voluntary contri-
butions.-City of Philadelphia v. Women's Chris-
tian Ass'n, (Pa.) 475.
Assessment.

money,

* * *

7. Acts Vt. 1882, No. 2, § 29, provides that each
lister shall, before entering upon his duties, take
the following oath: "I, do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will appraise all the personal and
real property, subject to taxation in the town,"
etc., so far as required by law, at its true value in
and will faithfully discharge all
the duties conferred upon me by law. So help me
God." As the oath was first formulated, in 1872,
it simply required a faithful performance of duty,
to the best of the judgment and ability of the listers;
but in 1880 the oath was recast, and the words, "to
the best of my judgment and ability, "were omitted,
as also in the act of 1882. Held, that where listers
supplemented the oath prescribed by the act of 1882
with the words, "to the best of our judgment, "the
oath, and so the tax-list, were vitiated.-Lynde v.
Town of Dummerston, (Vt.) 45.

8. Under Pub. St. R. I. c. 43, §§ 3, 18-20, requir
ing all property liable to taxation to be assessed at
its fair cash value, and providing that when the
assessment is completed the assessors shall date
and sign it, and deposit it in the office of the town-
clerk, who shall forthwith make a copy thereof,
and deliver it to the town treasurer, and that the
latter shall forthwith affix his warrant thereto
authorizing the collector to collect the taxes there-
in assessed, after the assessment is completed and
delivered to the clerk, the assessors cannot add
the name of an omitted property holder, and as-
sess him with personal property.-Sullivan v. Peck-
ham, (R. I.) 997.

9. R. L. Vt. § 331, provides that the listers shall
arrange in alphabetical order an abstract of the
personal lists, and lodge the same in the town
clerk's office by a certain time for the inspection
of the tax-payers. Held, that papers not so au-
thenticated as to show their character, and not
signed and certified by the listers as the personal
list of the tax-payers for that year, and not bear
ing the names of the listers, except the signatures
of two of them as listers at the end of the last
page, were insufficient, and not admissible in evi-
dence.-Smith v. Hard, (Vt.) 481.

10. But papers left in the clerk's office as the
personal lists for a certain year, and having on
the last page a certificate that they are the person-
al list of all the tax-payers of the town for that
year, signed by the listers, are sufficient.-Id.

11. R. L. Vt. § 329, requires the listers, before
entering on their duties, to take and subscribe an
oath. The listers took, but did not subscribe, the
oath. In an action to collect the taxes assessed on
the grand list, held, that an act declaring such list
valid cured the informality, and that the list was
admissible in evidence. Following Smith v. Hard,
8 Atl. Rep. 317.-Id.

12. A notice of the day and place of the meeting
of the listers to hear grievances is sufficient, though
it does not give the hour; there being no evidence
that the person complaining has suffered by the
omission, and the statute (R. L. § 346) requiring
the notice to state "on what day and at what place
they will meet, " etc.-Id.

13. The tax to be levied for payment of a judg-
ment, in addition to the regular taxes, must be as-
sessed and collected at the same time and in the
same manner with the general assessment of taxes,
and not by a special and distinct assessment at an-
other time.-State v. Assessors of Rahway, (N. J.)
122.

14. The action of the tax-listers of a town in set-
ting the list of a deceased person's estate in a cer-
tain school-district is not conclusive as to the ques-

tion of the last residence of the deceased.-Preston
v. King, (Vt.) 790.
Collection.

15. A tax collector is not required to examine
what title a party has to land for the taxes with
which he is assessed.-Cooper v. Holmes, (Md.)
711.

16. If a township collector pay over to the col-
lector of the county all the taxes levied for county
purposes in the township for a given year, as di-
rected by Revision N. J. p. 1142, §§ 11, 83, he is
not liable to the county for a portion thereof cred-
ited to taxes due from said township for a previ-
ous year, in which there was a deficit, under the
orders of the township committee, thus reducing
his credit for the year for which the collection was
made, as the appropriation, being illegal, would
not bind the collector, and he should be credited
with the full amonnt of his payment.-State v.
Mathe, (N. J.) 305.

Lien.

17. Commissioners of adjustment of taxes of a
city appointed under act N. J. March 30, 1886, con-
cerning the settlement and collection of averages
of taxes, etc., cannot make reassessments against
lands purchased by the chancellor under foreclos-
ure of mortgages representing funds in court,
where the city was made a party to the proceed
ings, and answered, setting up the taxes and as-
sessments as liens on the lands.--State v. The
Chancellor, (N. J.) 942.

for full value, are also exempt from reassessments
18. Purchasers of such lands from the chancellor,
for the same taxes and assessments.—Id.
Sale for non-payment-Notice.

19. A description of property advertised for sale
for taxes as situated in a certain district in a cer-
tain county; that it contains 200 acres, more or
less; and is called "Pleasant Prospect," and is as-
sessed in the name of C.,-is sufficient.-Cooper v.
Holmes, (Md.) 711.

Tax-titles.

20. Act Vt. 1886, No. 85, providing that when land
has been listed to the grantee in a collector's deed,
or to his grantees, for a period of 20 years or more,
and taxes paid thereon, the title of such grantee
shall be valid against persons subsequently enter-
ing on the land without legal title thereto, does not
apply to a person who, after land has been so listed,
but before the expiration of the 20 years, enters
into the actual adverse possession of it under color
of title.-Downer v. Tarbell, (Vt.) 482.

21. Where one claims title to certain land under
certain tax-deeds, but he has never had the actual
nor the constructive possession of it, and he pro-
duces no evidence as to the proceedings in relation
to the tax-sales prior to the execution of the deeds,
no presumption will be made in favor of the regu
larity of such deeds as against one in actual ad-
verse possession of the land under claim and color
of title. -Id.

22. Act Md. 1874, c. 483, provides that if no cause,
or an insufficient cause, be shown, a tax-sale shall
by order of the court be ratified and confirmed, and
the purchaser shall, on payment of the purchase
money, have a good title to the property sold. A
local law (act of 1882, c. 317) provides that the court
shall ratify a sale if it appears that the collector
has complied with the requirements of this act,
and, if not redeemed within the prescribed time,
the treasurer shall convey the property in fee-
simple to the purchaser thereof. Held, that there
is no substantial conflict between the general and
the local law, and that under such laws an order
of ratification throws upon a party resisting the
sale the burden of showing the illegality of the
proceeding.-Cooper v. Hoimes. (Md.) 711.

23. But in order to sustain such burden success-
fully it is no necessary that it be shown by "pos-
itive testimony" that there was some defect in the
tax-sale.—Id. .

24. Where a witness testifies that he prepared an
order of ratification, and it appears that such an
order was filed, but the contents of the order are
not shown, it is erroneous to conclude as a matter

Rights of purchaser at invalid tax-sale.
25. The purchaser at a tax-sale, whose title is
declared invalid, and who is made a party defend-
ant to the foreclosure of a mortgage given after
the sale, can claim as a lien the amount paid for
the title, and also the taxes assessed and paid by
him after he accepted the title and before it was
declared invalid, the assessment itself being de-
clared good, though the two-years limitation fixed
by the New Jersey statute, during which the land
shall remain liable for taxes, has expired.-Colum-
bia Bank v. Jones, (N. J.) 808.

26. As the purchaser did not take possession of
the land, but allowed the owner or his lessees to
remain in possession, he is not accountable for the
rents and profits.-Id.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
Limitation of liability for negligence.
Where a telegraph company, through neglect,
makes an error in the transmission of a message,
it is liable in damages to the sender, though the
blank on which the message was sent contains the
condition that for such mistakes, caused “by the
negligence of its servants or otherwise," it shall
not be liable beyond the amount paid for sending
the message; such condition being against public
policy and void.-Gillis v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
(Vt.) 736.

TELEPHONE COMPANIES.

Discrimination.

1. A public telephone company, having furnished
telephonic facilities to one telegraph company with
the consent of its licensor, cannot refuse to furnish
like facilities to all other telegraph companies, not-
withstanding it is forbidden to do so by its contract
with the owner and licensor of the patent. Such
portion of the contract is void.-Commercial Union
Tel. Co. v. New England Telephone & Telegraph
Co., (Vt.) 1071.

2. The validity of such a contract cannot be
maintained under Rev. St. U. S. § 4884, providing
that every patent shall give the patentee, etc., the
exclusive right to make, use, and vend the patent-
ed article. The monopoly conferred by a patent
cannot exclude any portion of the public from the
benefit of it, when it is used for a public purpose.
-Id.

TENANCY IN COMMON AND
JOINT TENANCY.

When relation exists.

1. In trespass qu. cl. fr., where plaintiffs show
title to only three-fourths of the land, and defend-
ants are in possession of the remainder, claiming
title thereto, the parties must be held to be tenants
in common, though defendant's title is defective.
-Bush v. Gamble, (Pa.) 865.

Rights and remedies inter se.

to have been in their own right, and for their own
benefit.-Appeal of Wistar, (Pa.) 460, 461.

4. Plaintiff and defendant were co-heirs of a de-
cedent, and defendant occupied real property be
longing to the estate under a lease by which he
agreed to pay an annual rental therefor. In an ac-
tion for such rent, held, that an affidavit of defense,
alleging that it was the agreement that necessary
repairs made on the premises by defendant should
be applied on the rent, did not contradict the lease,
and that defendant was entitled to credit for such
repairs.-Johnson v. Blair, (Pa.) 663.

5. A tenant in common of land is entitled to pay
for services rendered in improving the estate un-
der an understanding with his co-tenant that he
shall receive a fair compensation for them.-Red-
field v. Gleason, (Vt.) 1075.

6. Plaintiff paid the tax assessed in one sum on
land owned by her and defendants in common.
The land not having been sold for the tax, held,
that the lien was discharged by the payment, and
plaintiff could not be subrogated to any right un-
lien for her reimbursement, especially as she might
der it, and that equity would not establish a new
have had her interest taxed separately.-Preston
V. Wright, (Me.) 128.*

Trespass.

7. Under act Pa. May 4, 1869, (P. L. 1251,) pro-
viding that in case of the cutting or removal of
timber trees by tenants in common, without con-
sent of all the co-tenants, "the parties injured
shall have every remedy in law and equity
for the recovery of damages * * which they
now have against an entire stranger to the title,
tenants in common may maintain trespass against
co-tenants for the wrongful cutting and removal
of timber trees, but can recover only single dam-
ages, and not the damages provided for by act
March 29, 1824, § 3.-Bush v. Gamble, (Pa.) 865.
Rights against third person.

8. Where a tenant in common cut timber grow-
ing on the land, and delivered it to defendant, and
afterwards brought an action, joining his co-ten-
ant, to recover damages from defendant for cut-
tered a nonsuit.-Ramsey v. Brown, (Pa.) 207.
ting the timber so delivered, the court properly en-

TENDER.

Sufficiency-Review on appeal.

1. Plaintiff and several insurance companies,
against whom he had claims, referred them to ar-
bitration, and a certain sum was awarded plaintiff.
In an action against one of the companies, defend-
ant pleaded a tender to plaintiff, in behalf of itself
and the other companies, of the entire award.
Held that, such plea not being demurred to, an ob-
jection that others than defendant were included,
and a gross sum tendered for all, cannot be raised
on appeal.-Hall v. Norwalk Fire Ins. Co., (Conn.)
356.

2. Nor can the objection that the tender was al-
leged to have been made "in satisfaction" of plain-
tiff's claim, and that this imports a condition, be
raised for the first time on appeal.-Id.

3. The finding of a trial court that a tender was
unconditional is conclusive on appeal.-Id.

4. An objection that the money was not actually
produced at the time of the alleged tender cannot
be sustained where the trial court found that plain-
tiff told defendant's agent at that time that he need
not make a formal tender, as he (plaintiff) would
not accept it.-Id.

Term-Time.

Testamentary Capacity.

Testamentary Powers.