specified in the contract the parties have thereby given a sanction by adopting it before maturity; they have admitted. it to be a fair compensation for the use of the money. The debtor's omission to pay the debt when due should have the unconditional.' Judge Safford held (in which Gayle also concurred) that where the rates of interest were exorbitant, and there was no time of forbearance fixed by the contract, they were not within the statute." Bell v. Mayor, 10 Paige, 49. Cook v. Fowler, L. R. 7 H. L. Cas. 27, was an action upon a warrant of attorney given to secure the payment of £1,330 "on the 2d of June next," with interest at five per cent. per month, " judgment to be entered up forthwith." The lord chancellor remarked upon the stipulation for interest up to a certain day, without any mention of subsequent interest upon the face of the instrument. He says: "No doubt, prima facie, the rate of interest stipulated up to the time certain might be taken, and generally would be taken, as the measure of interest; but this would not be conclusive. It would be for the tribunal to look at all the circumstances of the case, and to decide what was the proper sum to be awarded by way of damages." The house of lords declined to award damages at the rate of sixty per cent. because it was highly inequitable. The holder not having entered up judgment, nor made any definite claim against the debtor's estate {such debtor having died), for the space of four years and upward, it was held that the tribunal before which the claim at last came was justified in awarding by way of damages such a rate of interest as the holder of the warrant of attorney would have been entitled to, according to the ordinary rule of the court of chancery, had he entered up judg ment on the day named in the defeasance to the warrant of attorney, namely, at the rate of four per cent. It was held, also, that there is no rule of law that upon a contract for the payment of money on a certain day, with interest at a fixed rate down to that day, a further contract for the contínuance of the same rate of interest is to be implied. In Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118, the supreme court of the United States held that such a contract is spent when the day of payment arrives; that there is no stipulation in relation to interest after the debt becomes due; and that if the right to interest depended altogether on contract, and was not given by law in such a case, the creditor would be entitled to no interest whatever after the day of payment. The contract being entirely silent as to interest, if the notes be not punctually paid, the creditor is entitled to interest after that time by operation of law, and not by any provision of the contract. Therefore the interest after maturity should be after the rate established by law, where there is no contract to regulate it. There were two notes sued on, one stipulating interest at the rate of twenty and the other twenty-four per cent. per annum. Taney, C. J., said: "Nor is there anything in the character of this contract that should induce the court by supposed intendment of the parties, or doubtful inferences, to extend the stipulation for interest beyond the time specified in the written contract. The law of Minnesota has fixed seven per cent. per annum as a reasonable and fair compensation for same effect to continue that rate after maturity, on the ground both of intention and admission of its fairness, where it exceeds the legal rate, as the silence and inaction of the [548] creditor where the rate is less. The statutory provis the use of money; and where a party desires to exact from the necessities of a borrower more than three times as much as the legislature deems reasonable and just, he must take care that the contract is so written in plain and unambiguous terms; for with such a claim he must stand upon his bond." 1 Beckwith v. Trustees of Hartford, etc. R. Co., 29 Conn. 268. A railroad company issued bonds, by virtue of a statute, bearing interest payable semi-annually at the rate of seven per cent. per annum; the interest coupons were paid up to the time when the principal of the bonds fell due. And the question was submitted to the court whether the bondholders were legally entitled to seven per cent. interest or only to six, the legal rate. Hinman, J., says: "We are of opinion that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to seven per cent. per annum for the detention of his money after the principal became due. Technically speaking, it is no doubt true that the sum recoverable for such detention is treated as damages for the breach of the contract rather than interest for the money loaned, because, strictly speaking, interest can only be claimed under a contract to pay it, either express or implied, and the express contract, of course, ceased on the day when the principal was to be paid, and no implied contract can be raised from a total refusal to pay anything. But damages are recoverable for the breach of the contract; and courts, in order to give to him to whom the money is due what he fairly may be supposed to have suffered by withholding it from him, and at the same time to prevent the borrower from making a profit by the breach of his contract, have regulated the damages for such breach by the usual rate of interest at the place where the money is de tained. This though an arbitrary rule will generally operate justly and is much more convenient than any other which could be adopted. But the usual rate of interest at any place is itself as arbitrary a provision of law as the damages dependent upon it, and is by no means uniform. It is not only known to differ in different states and countries, generally depending upon positive statutes, but may vary from the ordinary or more general rate by the parties agreeing upon a lesser rate, or if authorized so to do, as in the case under consideration, by their agreement upon a higher rate; or there may be a general statute authorizing a higher rate for money borrowed for some particular purpose, or by a particular class of persons or corporations; . . . and the different rates thus agreed upon become the legal rates of interest in respect to the particular contracts during their existence. And the rates of interest thus established by agreement must be presumed to be just and equitable under the circumstances; that is, a fair compensation in such case for the use of the money between the parties during the time the contract had to run. Then, why should we not presume, as between the same parties, that such continues a fair compensation for its use until the contract is performed; as well ions enacted in many states that judgments shall bear the same rate of interest as that expressed on the face of the contract, or the contract rate, is a legislative sanction [549] of the same rate after as before maturity.1 8 10 6 In some states the rate stipulated to be paid during the period of credit has no influence in determining the rate afterwards, but the legal rate is uniformly applied. This is so in Minnesota, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Alabama, Maryland," Arkansas, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Georgia (according to the understanding of the judge of the federal circuit court)," California by virtue of the code,12 and formerly in Indiana.13 The same principle is held by the supreme court of the United States, where the question does not come before it from a after as before the day when the principal was to be paid; and thus permit the rate of interest agreed upon to control the damages to be paid for the detention of the money, as well as the interest for its use. There is no equity in favor of one rate of interest rather than another, where they are both legal and within reasonable limits, and the defendants ought not to complain as long as it is in their power, by paying the principal, to protect themselves from paying what they thought a reasonable rate when they borrowed the money." 1 Hand v. Armstrong, 18 Iowa, 324. 2 Talcott v. Marston, 3 Minn. 339; Mason v. Callender, 2 id. 350; Kent v. Bown, 3 id. 347; Chapin v. Murphy, 5 id. 474; Lash v. Lambert, 15 id. 416; Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 id. 84. 7 Brown v. Hardcastle, 63 Md. 484. 8 Newton v. Kennerly, 31 Ark. 626; Woodruff v. Webb, 32 id. 612; Pettigrew v. Summers, id. 571; Gardner v. Barnett, 36 id. 476. 9 Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 223. 10 Langston v. South Carolina R. Co., 2 S. C. 248; Maner v. Wilson, 16 id. 469; Thatcher v. Massey, 20 id. 542; Bell v. Bell, 25 id. 149. 11 Sherwood v. Moore, 35 Fed. Rep. 109. But see Daniel v. Gibson, 72 Ga. 367; Cauthen v. Central Georgia Bank, 79 id. 733; Trippe v. Wynne, 76 id. 200. 12 Sec. 1917, Civil Code; Nash v. El Dorado Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 252. See Falkner v. Hendy, 80 Cal. 636. 13 Burns v. Anderson, 68 Ind. 202, overruling Kilgore v. Powers, 5 Blackf. 22; Richards v. McPherson, 74 Ind. 158. Burns v. Anderson is overruled by Shaw v. Rigby, 84 Ind. 3 Robinson v. Kinney, 2 Kan. 184; 375. Searle v. Adams, 3 id. 515. 4 Gray v. Briscoe, 6 Bush, 687; Rilling v. Thompson, 12 id. 310; White's Adm'r v. Curd, 86 Ky. 191. 5 Duran v. Ayer, 67 Me. 145; Eaton v. Boissonnault, id. 540. 14 Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118; Burnishel v. Firman, 22 Wall. 170; Holden v. Trust Co., 100 U. S. 72. If the obligation does not specify the rate after maturity and provides 6 Kitchen v. Brauch Bank, 14 Ala. that the interest due before it is pay 233. able shall be added to the principal, state in which the law is settled to the contrary. In several of the enumerated states the question is solved according to the intention of the parties. Thus, where the stipulation is for an unusually low rate of interest, there is no presumption that it was contemplated to be continued after maturity, and the legal rate will govern. A note payable one day after date with interest in excess of the minimum legal rate bears the stipulated rate after maturity. The expressions of the parties also control, though they fall short of being distinct. In England the stipulated rate before maturity would seem to be prima facie the rate afterwards, but subject to easier relaxa the legal rate will govern thereafter. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143. 1 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 57, an Iowa case; the conventional rate was continued: Ohio v. Frank, 103 id. 697; Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n v. Miles, 137 id. 689. See Perry v. Taylor, 1 Utah, 63. 2 Brown v. Hardcastle, 63 Md. 484. 3 Capen v. Crowell, 66 Me. 282; Paine v. Caswell, 38 Me. 80; Casted v. Walker, 40 Ark. 117; Gray v. Briscoe, 6 Bush, 687; White's Adm'r v. Curd, 86 Ky. 191; Piester v. Piester, 22 S. C. 139. But a note dated in February, payable one day after date, with interest at one per cent. per month from the first of the preceding January, bears only the legal rate after maturity. "The time named from which the interest was to runsomething more than a month before the execution of the note — made it possible to count the interest for a 'month' without going beyond its maturity, and excluded the conclusion, otherwise necessary, that the phrase 'per month' could not have its full effect without touching time beyond the maturity of the note." The court remark that "this may look like a small difference to produce such consequences, but we think it is founded on principle and the de cided cases." Smith v. Smith, 33 S. C. 210. 4A note payable with "ten per cent. per annum from date," and stipulating that if the interest is not paid annually it shall become principal and bear the same rate of interest, continues to carry the contract rate after maturity. Vaughan v. Kennan, 38 Ark. 114; Miller v. Hall, 18 S. C. 141. And so with a note payable one day after date "with interest from date at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum, interest to be paid annually." Sharpe v. Lee, 14 S. C. 341. A note payable twelve months after date "with interest from date, interest payable annually," was described in a mortgage contemporaneously executed by the same person as a note "with interest thereon at the rate of twelve and a half per cent. per annum until paid." The language of both instruments indicated an indefinite extension of credit and interest at the specified rate. Mobley v. Davega, 16 S. C. 73. 5 Cook v. Fowler, L. R. 7 H. of L Cas. 27; Keene v. Keene, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 144; Morgan v. Jones, 8 Exch. 620. A note conditioned for the payment of the principal sum with interest "until the repayment thereof" tion and broader discretion conceded to the jury than is consistent with the rule established by a preponderance of American authority, which is believed to be that the [550] rate stipulated for in general terms before maturity will be continued until verdict. A mere change in the form of a means until the day fixed for payment, and is not a contract to pay the agreed rate beyond that time. In re European Central Ry. Co., 4 Ch. Div. 33. See Ex parte Fewings, 25 id. 399. Where the promise was to pay seven per cent. so long as the principal or any part thereof should remain due, a judgment did not merge the contract in it so as to prevent the creditor from recovering the difference between the judgment and the contract rate. Popple v. Sylvester, 22 Ch. Div. 98. 1 Du Belloix v. Waterpark, 1 D. & R. 348, n.; Cameron v. Smith, 2 B. & Ald. 305; Bann v. Dalzel, Moo. & M. 228; Page v. Newman, 9 B. & C. 378; Arnott v. Redfern, 3 Bing. 353; Higgins v. Sargent, 2 B. & C. 348; Calton v. Bragg, 15 East, 223; Keene v. Keene, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 144; Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch. 25. 2 Meaders v. Gray, 60 Miss. 400; Tishmingo Savings Inst. v. Buchanan, id. 496; Hydraulic Co. v. Chatfield, 38 Ohio St. 575; Shaw v. Rigby, 84 Ind. 375, overruling cases to the contrary; Kimball v. Burns, id. 370; Hume v. Mazelin, id. 574; Shipman v. Bailey, 20 W. Va. 140; Brown v. Steck, 2 Colo. 70; Buckingham v. Orr, 6 id. 587; Broadway Savings Bank v. Forbes, 79 Mo. 226, affirming S. C., 9 Mo. App. 575; Kerr v. Haverstick, 94 Ind. 178; Kellogg v. Lavender, 15 Neb. 256; Hager v. Blake, 19 id. 12; Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla. 980, 1009; Borders v. Barber, 81 Mo. 636; Bowers v. Hammond, 139 Mass. 360; Parks v. O'Connor, 70 Texas, 377; Bressler v. Harris, 19 Ill. App. 430; Joiner v. Enos, 23 id. 224; Thorn v. Smith, 71 Wis. 18; Barbour v. Tompkins, 31 W. Va. 410; Kohler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 597; Beckwith v. Trustees of Hartford, etc. R. Co., 29 Conn. 268; Adams v. Way, 33 id. 419; Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 id. 524; Kilgore v. Powers, 5 Blackf. 22; Gordon v. Phelps, 7 J. J. Marsh. 619; Pate v. Gray, Hemp. 155; Henderson v. Desha, id. 231; Spencer v. Maxfield, 16 Wis. 179; Pruyn v. Milwaukee, 18 id. 367; Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer, 25 Ohio St. 621; Monnett v. Sturges, id. 384; Besser v. Hawthorn, 3 Ore. 129; Etnyre v. McDaniel, 28 Ill. 201; Williams v. Baker, 67 Ill. 238; Brewster v. Wakefield, 1 Minn. 352; Van Beuren v. Van Gaasbeck, 4 Cow. 496; Montgomery v. Boucher, 14 Up. Can. C. P. 45; Pridgen v. Andrews, 7 Texas, 461; Hopkins v. Crittenden, 10 id. 189; Harden v. Wolf, 2 Ind. 31; Engler v. Ellis, 16 id. 475; Hand v. Armstrong, 18 Iowa, 324; Thompson v. Pickel, 20 id. 490; Wilson v. King, Morris (Iowa), 106; Burkhart v. Sappington, 1G. Greene (Iowa), 66; Guy v. Franklin, 5 Cal. 416; Corcoran v. Doll, 32 Cal. 82; McLane v. Abram, 2 Nev. 199; Overton v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 762; Warner v. Juif, 38 Mich. 662; Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. 1; Burgess v. Southbridge Savings Bank, 2 Fed. Rep. 500; Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63; Union Institution v. Boston, 129 id. 82; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51; Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, 5 Dill. 219; Hovey v. Edmison, 3 Dak. 449 (it is so provided in the |