BLOOMER VS. BLOOMER. tion must be determined, the statute has adopted the broad rule, that "a will" is revoked by the birth of a child if no provision is made in the will for that contingency. It is not necessary that the will shall dispose of the whole estate. All wills are revoked by the birth of a child -all legacies-all testamentary dispositions, total or partial. (Revised Statutes of Connecticut, 1849, Title xiv, Ch. 1, § 6.) Having recognized this rule in relation to written bequests, the same principle may justly be applied to donations causâ mortis, a form of gift in view of death, by no means of so solemn and deliberate a character as a will.— In the nature and reason of things, there seems no substantial ground for not applying the same principle to unwritten as to written legacies, so far as relates to an implied revocation by the birth of a child. Having attained the point that by the law of the testator's domicil, a total disposition is not essential for the application of the doctrine of implied revocation, there is nothing in the way of applying that rule alike to gifts in view of death, by parole and delivery, or by written instrument. I am of opinion, therefore, that the claim made on the ground of this alleged donatio mortis causâ, should be rejected. It appears that, before the will was denied probate in the State of Connecticut, the executrix, acting under the directions contained in the will, paid out of the personal estate, a mortgage on some lands at Greenwich. This payment having been made in good faith (2 R. S., p. 63, § 38, p. 78, § 46, p. 79 §47), must be allowed, and the legatees and next of kin will have their claim against the land, for the sum so paid. HARRING vs. COLES. HARRING 28. COLES. In the matter of the guardianship of HENRY COLES. A TESTATOR gave his property equally among his children, directing that the shares of his daughters should be invested independently of any control of their husbands, but "the same shall be and accrue, solely and exclusively, to the benefit of my said daughters and their lawful issue." One of the daughters having died, leaving six children surviving, Held that on the subsequent decease of one of the six, intestate, leaving no descendant or widow, the father, after administration, was entitled to her share. Where the father was guardian of his children, and, possessing limited means, was compelled to labor for their support, and in consequence of the decease of their mother was put to increased expense, Held, that it was reasonable under the circumstances, to charge a portion of the expense for their maintenance upon the income or interest of the shares of his wards. W. A. SEELY, for Petitioner. S. W. JUDSON, for Guardian. I. Henry Coles, as sole surviving parent of Henrietta Coles, deceased, is entitled to the whole of her share of her mother's estate. (2 R. S., p. 160, 3d ed. (marg. p. 97), § 79, sub. 7. 1. A guardian has a right to appropriate the whole income of his ward towards her support, maintenance, education, &c., and this for past as well as present and future maintenance. (In the matter of Bostwick, 4 John., Ch. R., 100; Wilkes vs. Rogers, &c., 6 Johns. R., 566; DePeyster vs. Clarkson, 2 Wend., 77; Hopk., 424; In the matter of Davison, 6 Paige, 136; Bradley vs. Amidon, 10 Paige, 235, 240, 242, 243; In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185, 187, 188; In the matter of Kane, 2 Barbour, p. 375; Myers vs. Wade, 6 Randolph's R., 444 (Va.); Foreman HARRING VS. COLES. vs. Murray, 7 Leigh., 412 (Va.); Davis vs. Harkness, 1 Gilman, 173 (Ill.); Anderson vs. Thompson, 11 Leigh., 439 (Va.); Jackson vs. Jackson, 1 Grattan, 143 (Va.); Hooper vs. Royster, 1 Munford, 119 (Va.); Long vs. Norcom, 2 Iredell's Ch. R., 354 (N. C.); Whitledge vs. Callis, 2 J. J. Marshall, 403 (Ky.); Chapline vs. Morse, 7 Monroe, 150 (Ky.); Davis vs. Roberts, 1 Smedes & Marsh, Ch. R., 543 (Ky.) 2. The principal may also be appropriated towards support and maintenance; but in general, application to the court is necessary for this purpose, except under extraordinary circumstances, as will appear from the foregoing cases. In the present case, the guardian has not expended the principal, and does not claim it. 3. A Court of Chancery has no power to order or compel a parent to support his child. (Matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185.) II. A common-law liability of a father to support his infant children, is recognized generally in the cases upon the subject; but this liability is usually limited or restricted to a necessary maintenance only; and in all cases an allowance out of the separate estate of the infant, is granted, unless the father has ample and unquestionable means for such support: such allowance is made, as a matter of course, out of the income of the infant's estate, but not out of the principal without application to the court. The following cases will show the general rule of law upon the subject of a person who stands in the relationship of father and guardian to his infant children. (2 Kent's Com., 7th ed., p. 181, 182, marg. p. 190, 191, 2, notes d., &c. &c.; Newport vs. Cook, 2 Ashmead, 332.) The rule as to the father's obligation to support his child, has become considerably relaxed. (2 Kent., 181, 190, 2 Ashmead, 332, 339, 340, as above), 2 Barb. Ch. R., 375, 377, HARRING vs. COLES. 379, 380, In the matter of Kane. In this case, the father was of sufficient ability, worth $25,000, resided in the country; yearly income, $500, and besides this, allowed annually by his mother, $2,000,-amount $2,500; only 2 children, pages 375, 76; decided father entitled to some allowance, &c., p. 381. (Addison vs. Bowie, 2 Bland's Md. Ch. R., 606.) Wm. Bowie's estate, worth $22,433.33, p. 613; had three or four children, pages 608-9, 613; principal decision, p. 627. (Cunningham vs. Cunningham, Virginia, 4 Grattan, 43.) This was the case of a mother. Allowance made, although accounts not regularly kept, &c. Reasonable allowance. 1. The guardian, II. Coles, expended $1,200, principal, of his own property, over and above all his income, for the maintenance of his wards. And he has contributed towards the maintenance of the said Sarah B. Coles, now Sarah B. Harring, out of his own estate and income, in the ratio of $71 14 to $53 86. 2. There having been so many wards, in the relation also of children, namely six, and five living, is a fact to be taken into consideration before imposing upon one surviving parent, of very moderate and limited means, the whole maintenance. 3. The deceased wife of Henry Coles, never having enjoyed or derived any income from her father's estate, it is but just and reasonable upon principles of equity, that the income therefrom, after her decease, should be appropriated towards the support, &c., of her minor children and heirs-at-law, of whom the said Sarah B. Harring is one. 4. As to Commissions, see Rapalje vs. Norsworthy, 1 Sandf. Ch. R., 399; Vanderheyden vs. Vanderheyden, 2 Paige, 287. THE SURROGATE. Upon the settlement of the account of the guardian, some charges were objected to as improper. The guardian is the father of the ward, and sup HARRING vs. COLES. ported and maintained her from the date of his appointment, October 29, 1842, to the time of her marriage. The entire estate of the daughter consisted of one-sixth of the sum of $4,937 76, that being the amount of the interest of Mr. Coles's deceased wife in the estate of her father, and which on her decease passed to her six children. The share of each child, then, was $822 96, and the interest on this about fifty-seven dollars a year. Four thousand five hundred dollars of the entire amount were secured by mortgage, given by Mr. Coles in the lifetime of his wife, to the executors of her father's estate. 1. One of the children having died intestate, under age, and without issue, it is now insisted that her share fell to her brothers and sisters. The will of William Bell, from whom this property was derived, directed the sale of his property, and the equal division of the proceeds among all his children. Then followed this clause: "It is however, my further will that the share of each of my said daughters be invested by my executors, in safe securities, for the benefit of my said daughters. It being my express intention that neither of the husbands of my said daughters shall have or exercise any control over their said respective shares, but that the same shall be and enure solely and exclusively to the benefit of my said daughters, and their lawful issue. And I do hereby constitute and appoint my said executors to be the trustees of the shares of my said daughters." On the supposition that it was designed by this provision to limit the estate of Mrs. Coles to a life interest, and give the fund on her decease to her issue, it is obvious that when she died each of her six children became entitled to one-sixth of the fund. On the decease of any one of the children intestate, his or her share would become the subject of administration; and then, under the statute of distributions, if the deceased left a father and no descendant or widow the father would take the whole. Where the intestate has an absolute |