such stock injured or killed by reason of the | judgment of the Legislature as to the security want of such fence for the value of the property needed by society. When the calling, profesor damage caused, unless the same was occasion or business of parties is unattended with sioned by the willful act of the owner or his danger to others, little legislation will be necesagent; and in order to recover it shall only be sary respecting it. Thus, in the purchase and necessary for the owner to prove the injury or sale of most articles of general use, persons destruction of his property; and if such corpo- may be left to exercise their own good sense and ration neglects to pay the value of or damage judgment, but when the calling or profession done to such stock within thirty days after no- or business is attended with danger, or requires tice in writing, accompanied by an affidavit of a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon such injury or destruction, has been served on which others must rely, then legislation propany officer, station or ticket agent employed in erly steps in to impose conditions upon its exthe management of the business of the corpo- ercise. Thus, if one is engaged in the manuration in the county where the injury com- facture or sale of explosive or imflammable plained of was committed, such owner shall be articles, or in the preparation or sale of medicentitled to recover double the value of the inal drugs, legislation, for the security of sostock killed or damages caused thereto." ciety, may prescribe the terms on which he will be permitted to carry on the business, and the liabilities he will incur from neglect of them. The concluding clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment simply requires that such legislation shall treat alike all persons brought under subjection to it. The equal protection of the law is afforded when this is accomplished. Such has been the ruling of this court in numerous instances where that clause has been invoked against legislation supposed to be in conflict with it. Thus, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 J. S. 27 [28:923], it was objected that a municipal ordinance of San Francisco, prohibiting washing and ironing in public laundries, within certain designated limits of the city, between the hours of ten at night and six in the morning, was in conflict with that Amendment, in that it discriminated between laborers engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other kinds of business, and between laborers employed within the designated limits and those without them. But the court held that the provision was merely a police regulation; that it might be a necessary meas

The validity of this law was assailed in the state court, and is assailed here, as being in conflict with the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the railway company of property without due process of law, so far as it allows a recovery of double the value of the animals killed by its trains; and in that it denies to the company the equal protection of the laws by subjecting it to a different liability for injuries committed by it from that to which all other persons are subjected.

It is contended by counsel as the basis of his argument, and we admit the soundness of his position, that corporations are persons within the meaning of the clause in question. It was so held in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 396 [30:118]; and the doctrine was reasserted in Pembina C. S. Mining Company v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189 [31:650, 653]. We admit also, as contended by him, that corporations can invoke the benefits of provisions of the Constitution, and laws which guarantee to persons the enjoy-ure of protection in a city composed largely of ment of property, or afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.

forced, as it does the limits within which wooden buildings must not be constructed; and that restrictions of this kind, though necessarily special in character, do not furnish ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons or property under the same circumstances and conditions. "Class legislation," said the court, "discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated,is not within the Amendment."

wooden buildings like San Francisco, that occupations in which fires are constantly required should cease during certain hours at We will consider the objections of the rail- night, and of the necessity of such a regulaway company in the reverse order in which tion that municipal body was the exclusive they are stated by counsel. And first, as to the judge; that the same authority which directs alleged conflict of the Law of Iowa with the the cessation of labor must necessarily preclause of the Fourteenth Amendment ordain-scribe the limits within which it shall be ening that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. That clause does undoubtedly prohibit discriminating and partial legislation by any State in favor of particular persons as against others in like condition. Equality of protection implies not merely equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with others in like condition from charges and liabilities of every kind. But the clause does not limit, nor was it designed to limit, the subjects upon which the police power of the State may be exerted. The State can now, as before, prescribe regulations for the health, good order and safety of society, and adopt such measures as will advance its interests and prosperity. And to accomplish this end special legislation must be resorted to in numerous cases, providing against accidents, disease and danger in the varied forms in which they may come. The nature and extent of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the

In Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 [28: 1145], an objection was taken to a similar ordinance of San Francisco, that it made an unwarrantable discrimination against persons engaged in the laundry business, because persons in other kinds of business were not required to cease from labor during the same hours at night. But, the court said, there may be no risks attending the business of others, certainly

not as great as where fires are constantly required; and that specific regulations for one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon business of a different kind. "The discriminations which are open to objection," the court added, "are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the law."

of punitive damages." And as to the objection that the Statute of Missouri denied to the defendant the equal protection of the laws, the court said that it made no discrimination against any railroad company in its requirement; that each company was subject to the same liabilities, and from each the same security was exacted by the erection of fences, gates and cattle guards, when its road passed through, along or adjoining inclosed or cultivated fields or uninclosed lands; and that there was no evasion of the rule of equality where all companies are subjected to the same duties and liabilities under similar circumstances.

In Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. MacIn Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. key, 127 U. S. 205 [32: 107], a Statute of KanHumes, 115 U. S. 512 [29: 463], a Statute of sas, providing that Every railroad company Missouri requiring every railroad corporation doing business in that State should be liable within it to erect and maintain fences and cat- for all damages done to any employé of such tle guards on the sides of its roads, where the company in consequence of any negligence of same passed through, along, or adjoining in- its agents, or by any mismanagement of its closed or cultivated fields, or uninclosed lands, engineers or other employés, to any person and, if it did not, making it liable in double the sustaining such damage," was assailed on the amount of damages to animals, caused thereby, ground that it was in conflict with the Fourwas assailed as in conflict with the Fourteenth teenth Amendment to the Constitution in that Amendment, on the same grounds urged in the it deprived the company of its property without present case; namely, that it deprived the de- due process of law, and denied to it the equal fendant of property without due process of protection of the laws. In support of the first law, so far as it allowed a recovery of damages position the company referred to the rule of for stock killed or injured in excess of its value, law that prevailed previously in Kansas and and also that it denied to the defendant the some other States, exempting from liability an equal protection of the laws, by imposing upon employer for injuries to employés, caused by it a liability for injuries committed which was the incompetency or negligence of a fellow not imposed upon other persons. But the court servant, and contended that the Law of Kansas, said that authority for requiring railroads to in creating on the part of the railroad company erect fences on the sides of their roads, so as to a liability in such cases not previously existing, keep horses, cattle and other animals from in the enforcement of which their property going upon them, was found in the general might be taken, authorized the taking of proppolice power of the State to provide against ac-erty without due process of law, and imposed cidents to life and property in any business or employment, whether under the charge of private persons or of corporations; that in few instances could that power be more wisely or beneficently exercised than in compelling railroad corporations to inclose their roads with fences having gates at crossings and cattle guards; that they are absolutely essential to give protection against accidents in thickly settled portions of the country; that the omission to erect and maintain them, in the face of the law, would justly be deemed gross negligence; and that if injuries to property are committed, something beyond compensatory damages might be awarded in punishment of it. Referring to the rule which prevails, of allowing juries to assess exemplary or punitive damages where injuries have resulted from neglect of duties, the court said: "The statutes of nearly every State in the Union provide for the increase of damages where the injury complained of results from the neglect of duties imposed for the better security of life and property, and make that increase in many cases double, in some cases treble and even quadruple the actual damages. And experience favors this legislation as the most efficient mode of preventing, with the least inconvenience, the commission of injuries. The decisions of the highest courts have affirmed the validity of such legislation. The injury actually received is often so small that in many cases no effort would be made by the sufferer to obtain redress, if the private interests were not supported by the imposition

a special liability upon railway companies that was not imposed upon other persons, and thus denied to the former the equal protection of the laws. But the court answered that the law in question applied only to injuries subsequently committed, and that it would not be contended that the State could not presc..e the liabilities under which corporations created by its laws should conduct their business in the future, where no limitation was placed upon its power in that respect by their charters; that whatever hardship or injustice there might be in any law thus applicable to the future must be remedied by legislative enactment; that the objection, that the railroad company was denied the equal protection of the laws, rested upon the theory that legislation special in its character was within the constitutional inhibition, but that so far from such being the fact the greater part of all legislation was special, either in the objects sought to be attained by it or in the extent of its application; that when such legislation applied to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it was not open to the objection that it denied to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence were treated alike under the same conditions; that the hazardous character of the business of operating a railway called for special legislation with respect to railroad corporations, having for its object the protection of their employés as well as the safety of the public, which was not required by the business of other

From these adjudications it is evident that the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit the subjects in relation to which the police power of the State may be exercised for the protection of its citizens. That this power should be applied to railroad companies is reasonable and just. The tremendous force brought into action in running railway cars renders it absolutely essential that every precaution should be taken against accident by collision, not only with other trains, but with animals. A collision with animals may be attended with more serious injury than their destruction; it may derail the cars and cause the death or serious injury of passengers. Where these companies have the right to fence in their tracks, and thus secure the roads from cattle going upon them, it would seem to be a wise precaution on their part to put up such guards against accidents at places where cattle are allowed to roam at large. The Statute of Iowa, in fixing an absolute liability upon them for injuries to cattle, committed in the operation of their roads by reason of the want of such guards, would seem to treat this precaution as a duty. It is true that, by the common law, the owner of land was not compelled to inclose it, so as to prevent the cattle of others from coming upon it; and it may be that, in the absence of legislation on the subject, a railway corporation is not required to fence its railway, the common law as to inclosing one's land having been established long before railways were known. But the obligation of the defendant railway company to use reasonable means to keep its track clear, so as to insure safety in the movement of its trains, is plainly implied by the Statute of Iowa, which also indicates that the putting up of fences would be such reasonable means of safety. If, therefore, the company omits those means, the omission may well be regarded as evidence of such culpable negligence as to justify punitive damages where injury is committed; and if punitive damages in such cases may be given, the Legislature may prescribe the extent to which juries may go in awarding them.

corporations not subject to similar dangers totional amount allowed there would be few their employés; and that the legislation in instances of prosecutions of railroad companies question met a particular necessity, and all where the value of the animals killed or inrailroad corporations without distinction were jured by them is small, as in this case; the cost subject to the same liabilities. of the proceeding would only augment the loss of the injured party. As said in the Missouri case cited: "The injury actually received is often so small that in many cases no effort would be made by the sufferer to obtain redress, if the private interest were not supported by the imposition of punitive damages. The legislation in question has been sustained in numerous instances by the Supreme Court of Iowa. In Welsh v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rairoad Company, 53 Iowa, 632, which was an action to recover double the value of a horse alleged to have been killed by one of the defendant's engines at a point where it had the right to fence the road, the court below instructed the jury that it was the duty of the company to fence its road against live stock running at large, at all points where such right to fence existed; and it was objected to this instruction that no such duty existed, upon which the Supreme Court of the State, to which the case was taken, said: "While it is true the statute does not impose an abstract duty or obligation upon railroad companies to fence their roads, yet as to live stock running at large a failure to fence fixes an absolute liability for injuries occurring in the operation of the road by reason of the want of such fence. The corporation owes a duty to the owners of live stock running at large, either to fence its road or to pay for injuries resulting from the neglect to fence.' And in Bennett v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, 61 Iowa, 355, the same court said: 'We think the only proper construction of the statute is that, in order to escape liability, the company must not only fence, but keep the road sufficiently fenced; and this has been more than once ruled." As it is thus the duty of the railway company to keep its track free from animals, its neglect to do so by adopting the most reasonable means for that purpose, the fencing of its roadway as indicated by the Statute of Iowa, justly subjects it, as already stated, to punitive damages where injuries are committed by reason of such neglect. The imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in such cases cannot be opposed as in conflict with the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. It is only one mode of imposing a penalty for the violation of duty, and its propriety and legality have been recognized, as stated in Day v. Woodworth, 54 U. S. 13 How. 363, 371 [14: 181], by repeated judicial decisions for more than a century. Its authorization by the law in question to the extent of doubling the value of the property destroyed or of the damage caused, upon refusal of the railway company, for thirty days after notice of the injury committed, to pay the actual value of the property or actual damage, cannot therefore be justly assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The Law of Iowa under consideration is less open to objection than that of Missouri, which was sustained in the case cited above. There double damages could be claimed by the owner whenever his cattle had strayed upon the track of the railway company for want of fences on its sides, and had been killed or injured by the railway trains. Here such damages can be claimed for like injuries to cattle, only where the company has received notice and affidavit of the injury committed, thirty days before the commencement of the action, and has persisted in refusing to pay for the value of the property destroyed or the damage caused. There must be, not merely negligence of the company in not providing guards against accidents of the kind, but also its refusal to respond for the actual damage suffered. Without the addi

Judgment affirmed.

CITY OF SHREVEPORT, Piff. in Err., | city became indebted to petitioners; and that

"Petitioners represent that the assessed value of all property subject to tax by said city is one million eight hundred and fifty-three thousand eight hundred and twenty dollars; the income of the City of Shreveport, which "That if the jury find from the evidence that the tax thereon, at the rate of ten mills on is collected under provision, art. 208, is insuffithe dollar, amounts to the sum of eighteen cient to pay more than the amount necessary thousand five hundred and thirty-eight and fo for alimony, and that the operation of art. 208 dollars; that the amount which the city is au- will prevent city from collecting taxes suttithorized to levy for license tax on trades, pro-cient to pay its debts, then as to any debt fessions, and occupations does not exceed for contracted prior to the adoption of State Conany one year the sum of seventy-five hundred stitution of 1879, said art. 208 violates the Condollars. stitution of the United States, and is null and void."

To this petition the City of Shreveport filed on May 2, 1882, its exceptions and plea to the jurisdiction, stating "that there is no law, ordinance or constitutional provision in Louisiana which would impair the obligation of the alleged contract between the plaintiffs and de-tution of 1879. fendant, and no probability of the courts of the State throwing any obstacles in the way of the execution of a judgment in their favor if one