VOL. XVI. No. 10.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1809. [Price 18. "His Holiness the POPE, and may he be delivered from his actual state of bondage, as the Children of "Israel were from the Land of Egypt.”- LORD WELLESLEY'S TOAST. See below. 3211 [322 distance from Talavera, the Viscount having got so far on his retreat.- -The Dispatch is addressed to Lord Castlereagh. It is rich in subjects whereon to comment;' and, as it will, in the end, be found to be of great importance, in many respects, I shall take it paragraph by paragraph, and observe upon each part as I proceed. "MY LORD; Iapprized your lordship on the 1st inst. of the advance "of a French corps towards the Pu"erto de Banos, and of the probable "embarrassments to the operations of the 66 army, which its arrival at Plasencia "would occasion; and these embar"rassments having since existed to a degree só considerable, as to oblige "us to fall back, and to take up a "defensive position on the Tagus, I "am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject." SUMMARY OF POLITICS. TALAVERA, its VISCOUNT, and the CONSEQUENCES of his VICTORY.It was evident, from the first, that there had been no victory at Talavera; and, it is now but too clearly proved, that the defeat has led to consequences the most disastrous; disastrous, I mean, because it has caused the loss of so many of our men, and the suffering of so many more.--The hirelings, whose business it is to deceive and cheat the English people, cannot any longer disguise the fact, that Douro and Talavera is running away, before he has hardly heard of his newly-bestowed titles. Still have they recourse to palliatives. Still do they tell lies to the public, in order to justify the bestowing of those titles. They say, that Talavera's retreat is a most masterly one. Miscreants! They would have sl the same if their mothers had been left behind by him to the mercy of the The grammar of this paragraph I will "Vandals." Will these unprincipled hire- not dwell upon, taking it for granted, that lings deny, that, only the last week, they Douro and Talavera has been taught the represented the French in Spain, as feroci- "learned languages," which is, now-aoris barbarians?. Will they deny this; or will days, I perceive, allowed to be good plea they deny, that this newly enabled hero of exemption from the obligation of writing has left a great number of brave English- correct English, and even from that of men, with festering wounds, to the humanity writing common sense. The reader of these ferocious barbarians ?· But,come; will bear in mind, that, in my first article let us see his dispatch. Let us see this Wel- upon the battle of Talavera (page 201) I lesley dispatch, written by the vanquisher pointed out to the public the cause of susof Victor at Talavera. Let us see it. Let picion, which it was easy enough to discous hear what this conqueror has to say in ver in the not publishing of the whole of defence of his running away from the Douro's letters of the 1st of August, of army he had just vanquished, and for leav- which letters (two in one day) we were ing his sick and wounded behind. Come, treated only with extracts. We now see Baron Douro of Wellesley in the county the reason for giving us only extracts of of Somerset and Viscount Wellington of those letters; for here, at the very outset, Talavera, and of Wellington, in the said Douro reminds Lord Castlereagh, that, in County; come, thou man of many names; those letters, he apprized him of the probable come, thou, whom the Morning Chronicle approaching embarrassments to the operations placed in the first rank of British heroes; of his army, Not a word of this did our come Baron Viscount, Douro and Talave-ministers tell us; not a word of this did ra; come, and let us hear, in thine own way, thine own long and piteous story. The Dispatch, which was published in London last Saturday, the 2nd instant, is dated at DELEYTOSA, on the 8th of August, which place is at about 50 or 60 miles they publish along with the Park-andTower-gun account of their victory of Talavera. The nation were bidden to rejoice; and rejoice they did; the hirelings of the press cut their jokes, as usual, upon the chap-fallen state of the factious; the vi L Baron Douro of Wellesley as a sort of special pleading in bis defence; that is to say, in defence of his conduct in entering Spain, and in pushing on, in the manner that he did, tili he, or at least, a con-iderable part of his army, overtook a Tartar. It is a set defence, ac ompamed with numerous proofs dicu nentory; and, to this defence I must beg the reader to pay some little attention. "When i entered Spain, I had a "communication with general Cuesia, through sir Robert Wilson and "colonel Roche, respec.ing the oc "cupation of the Puerto de Banôs and "the Puerto de Perales, the former "of which, it was at last settled, "should be held by a corps to be "formed under the marquis de la Reyna, to consist of two battalions "from general Cuesta's army, and "two from Bejar; and that the Puerto "de Peraics was to be taken care of "by the duque del Parque, by de"tachments from the garrison of "Ciudad Rodrigo.-I doubted of the gour and wisdom of the ministry were we deserve to be treated.The present subjects of praise; Castlereagh was a war-dispatch is evidently looked upon by minister without parallel, and Douro was a second Cæsar. This was going on, while the ministry had the letters of the 1st of August in their pockets. This they suffered to go on, while they knew, that, so far from advantages having been gained at Talavera, the most disastrous consequences were to be apprehended from the battle there fought and from the march thither. Nay; if this had been all, they. might have found some excuse; they might have said, that they had no power over the press; and, that it was not for them to waste their time in putting a stop to public delusion. But,with the letters of the 1st of August in their pocket; with the proof in their possession, that the battle of Talavera had led to no advantageous consequence; and that, by that battle, together with his march after Victor, Wellesley had got into fearful embarrassments; being, in short, in possession of what must have convinced any men of common discernment, that what has happened would happen, and that flight and misery would be the consequence of Wellesley's operations; in possession of this, they publish, in the king's name, the unprecedented GENERAL ORDER, inserted in my last, in which Order they speak of Victor's as of a vanquished army, at the same time that they eulogize the generalship of Wellesley through the whole of the campaign; and ail this with the evident view of preparing a justification for the titles they were going to confer upon him. There was this foolish nation, for five or six days, gabbling about "the gallant Sir Arthur," and cutting their jokes upon the Spaniards, who had no share of the glory; and there was the Nabob's Paper, the Morning Post, telling the welldressed rabble of St. James's street about the three bullet holes, that had been made in "the gallant Sir Arthur's" hat and coat, which put us, in the country, in mind of Jack Falstaff's hacking his sword and running spear grass up his nose.All this while, the dispatches of the 1st of August lay snug in the minister's pocket; and, in the next gazette, out come the bruce of titles, which are hardly notified to the public, when there comes another dispatch, which makes the truth known to us, but which is not, however, published till the substance of it has leaked out to us in hireling paragraphs. Thus it is, that we are treated; thus we have long been treated; and thus, on account of our own baseness, do capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment to "the latter, but so little of the effec"tual occupation of the former, that "in writing to marshal Beresford on "the 17th of July, I desired him to "look to the Puerto de Perales; but "that I considered Banôs as secure, "as appears by the extract of my let"ter which I inclose." The two posts, of which he speaks here, were situated in his rear, when he was at Talavera. He had left them in his rear when he advanced after Victor. They were two posts, which lay between his line of advance and Soult; and he is here endeavouring to explain how it happened that these posts became an annoyance to him, instead of a security, and compelled him to retreat in such haste from Talavera, which retreat, it will be observed, he is greatly solicitous not to ascribe to the dread of Victor, whom he had "vanquished" at Talavera.Well, Baron; now let us have it. "On the 30th (of July, the next day "after the battle of Talavera) intelligence was received at Talavera, "that 12,000 rations had been ordered "at Fuente Duenos for the 28th, and "24,000 at Los Santos for the same day, for a French corps, which it "was believed was on its march to- | been sent; and, as to the blame openly "wards the Puerto de Banôs." enough attempted to be thrown upon That is to say towards one of the posts, Cuesta, he might merit it; but the Baron's to secure which he had got the Spaniards logic does not prove that he did merit it, to send troops. Now we are going to even admitting the facts to be as he states hear of the harmony between the English them. This is, however, quite a new way and Spanish generals. We are going to of proceeding towards allies; to accuse see how eager they were to fly to this post them, in this unqualified manner, in disof danger. We must bear in mind that patches, which, probably, they may not we are now about to read of what took see for many weeks after they are pubplace on the day of battle, or a day or two lished. Cuesta is here accused of being before, respecting this post at Banôs; sensible of the benefit to be derived to the cause though from this confused dispatch, the from not sending sir Robert Wilson to equal of which I never read, it is very dif- Banôs, while he was proposing to send ficult to get at a clear chain of dates, whe- sir Robert Wilson to Banôs. He is accused ther of time or of place. of admitting the necessity of a reinforcement to Banos, while he refuses to send such reinforcement.- -But if it was of great importance to send a reinforcement to Banôs, why did not the Baron send one from his own army? "General Cuesta expressed some "anxiety respecting this post, and "sent me a message, to propose that "sir Robert Wilson should be sent there "with his corps.-Sir Robert was on "thot day at Talavera, but his corps "was in the mountains towards Esca lona; and as he had already made "himself very useful in that quarter, "and had been near Madrid, with "which city he had had a com nuni"cation, which I was desirous of keep«ing up, I proposed that a Spanish 61 corps should be sent to Beôs withou << loss of time.-I could not prevail with general Cuesta, although he certainly admited the necessity of "a reinforcement when he proposed "that sir Robert should be sent to "Banôs; and he was equally sen"sible with myself of the benefit to "be derived to the cause, from sending "sir Robert back to Escalona.--At this "time we had no further intelligence "of the enemy's advance, than that "the rations were ordered; and I had hopes that the enemy might be de"terred from advancing, by the in"teligence of our success on the "28th, and that the troops in the "Puerto might make some defence; "and that under these circumstances "it was not desirable to divert sir R. "Wilson from Escalona." Hence it appears, that our Baron was for sending Spaniards to this important post, and that the Spanish general was for sending Portuguese and English. Cuesta's reasons we do not hear; but, really, those of our Baron do not seem to have much in them. The communication with Madrid was, I should think, by this time, become of little consequence. I do not see, why air Robert Wilson's corps should not have ceived accounts that the enemy had "entered Plasencia in two columns. "The Marquis de la Reyna, whose "two battalions consisted of only 600 men, with only 20 rounds of "ammunition each man, retired from "the Puerto and from Plasencia, with"out firing a shot, and went to the "bridge of Almaraz, which he de"clared that he intended to remove; "the battalions of Bejar dispersed "without making any résistance." Were not the subject so serious; could we forget, for a moment, our poor unfortunate sick and wounded, left to have their wounds dressed and their hearts cheered by "Vandals" at the place whence our new-made Viscount takes his title, and whence, in all probability, he will pounce upon us for a pension; if we could forget these things, for a moment, we might laugh at the confusion of ideas that reigns through this paragraph, which sends a Spanish division in a letter to gen. O'Donoghue, and encloses lord Castlereagh a copy, but without effect.Here, however, one thing is intelligible enough; fond of the company of the English army as Cuesta himself was. The answer, that he would either go or stay does not appear to have much merit in it. It was rather a pouting answer. The Spanish General could not help having the command of forces inferior to the English; nor was there any merit at all in our General in having the command of soldiers of a superior sort. Why not divide the army? I see no reason against it. The measure afforded a chance, at least, of success at both points; whereas the resolution not to divide it seemed to leave no such chance. and, that is, that it was very foolish in- | deed to rely upon any defence, on the part of those who had been left to defend these important posts. What would have been the use of sending more Spanish troops, if such was the conduct of those already there? Cuesta appears to have been right. He appears to have known, and, probably, he said, that his countrymen alone would do nothing.--The same opinion, in which every event shows him to have been right, appears to have guided his propositions with respect to the future movements of the army; but, here again, we shall find his propositions rejected; and, I must confess, that, as far as I can judge, they are rejected without any good reason. -The reader will bear in mind, that the French, under Soult and others, were now known (on the 30th of July) to be coming on upon the rear of the allied army, while Victor lay, with his "vanquished" army in their front, and at no great distance between them and Madrid, where, as we were assured, the people were ready to rise upon Joseph Napoleon, and where sir Robert Wilson had already open-back; why such a clutter about the rear, ed an useful communication. "The General (Cuesta) called upon "me on that day, and proposed that half of the army should march to the "rear to oppose the enemy, whilst the "other half should maintain the post "at Talavera.My answer was, "that if by half the army, he meant half of each army, I could only an"swer that I was ready either to go "or to stay with the whole British "army, but that I could not separate "it. 66 He then desired me to choose "whether I would go or stay, and I preferred to go, from thinking that "British troops were most likely to "do the business effectually, and without " contest; and from being also of opinion, that it was more important to "us than to the Spanish army, to open "the communication through Placentia, although very important to "them. With this decision General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied." This was a refusal on the part of Wellesley; for Cuesta meant, it is very clear, for the half of each army to go and the other half to stay. I am not so inclined to laugh at this proposition as some people appear to be. Cuesta knew, that his troops, when alone, were not to be relied on; and "the "gallant Sir," though his eulogists laugh at poor Cuesta, seems to have been full as -Besides, if Victor was "vanquished,” (here we pinch the Baron); if Victor was vanquished," why care for him or his movements? Why care about what was passing in the rear? Why not push on against the vanquished Victor, and, over him, to Madrid, where the people were ready to revolt against the tyrant and to proclaim Ferdinand? Why send back to scek-a battle with Soult, especially as Marshal Beresford (Marshal Beresford!) was coming up in the rear of Soult? Why lock if there was nothing but a "vanquished" army between them and the loyal metropolis of the kingdom? All this is to be an swered by these facts, and by nothing else; namely, that the army in front was not vanquished;" that the battle was, at most for us, a drawn battle; that the allied army dared not advance an inch; and, that it is much to be doubted, whether, even for 24 hours longer, they would have been able to keep possession of Talavera. The reasons which Baron Douro gives for choosing to go rather than stay do not appear to me sufficient by any means. He thought, that the British troops were "more likely to do the business effectually, and without contest." What! did he think the French force so small, then, under Soult? He hardly supposed, that the very sight of our whiskers would frighten any thing of an army away. He thought, that, by going away with the whole of his army, what there was to be done, would be done " without contest." Would it not have been better, then, to divide the armies, as advised by Cuesta, and, by having a little fighting at each end of the line, to defeat the French in both places?. Never was a worse reason than this. Baron seems to have fallen in love with doing the business" without contest." Ido not blame him for that; but, surely, I would not have taken all my army from Our But, Baron, good Baron, if you really did think, that it was probable, that Cuesta would be unable to maintain his position against Victor, whom you had just " van Talavera, in order to achieve a victory | and-tow soldiers had so much of precauwithout contest, unless I could have taken tion about them. What did you put it in my sick and wounded with me.There writing for? "Why, you fool, to send was another reason, however, and that was, home to my lord Castlereagh, to be sure, the utility of opening a communication "in order to prove, that I urged the Spawith Plasencia; but, if this was so import"niards to collect carts in order to remove ant, why was this communication suffered "my hospital." Well; but, good Baron, to be closed; and, besides, all the argu- what made you suspect, that such proof ments against the other reason are good would be necessary? Did you actually against this. It is manifest, that the Baron anticipate, then, what would befall that Douro of Wellesley was in violent haste to unhappy hospital? Did you suspect, that get away from Talavera; and it appears Cuesta would, after all, leave great part to me, that when the question was, which of your suffering sick and wounded beof the two armies should remain at that hind, in case he was attacked by Victor? place, the army which had the place full of its sick and wounded ought to have remained. The army of Victor, though “vanquished," was in movement in the frout; and, as it was notoriously superior" quished," why did you choose (for you in numbers to that of Soult, how could tell us you chose it) to go away, and that, Lord Viscount Talavera imagine, that Cu- too, against an inferior force; a force that esta was more fit to meet it than he was? you expected to be able to demolish with-We now come to the movements. out a contest? This question I leave to be "The movements of the enemy in answered by the hirelings of the press."our front, since the 1st, had induced The putting of the conversation in writing "me to be of opinion, that, de- speaks volumes. It shows, as clearly as "spairing of forcing us at Talavera, day-light, what was anticipated. It was they intended to force a passage by at general O'Donoghue's desire, it seems, "Escalona, and thus open a commu- that it was put in writing, in order that "nication with the French corps he might have a copy to send to Cuesta.. coming from Plasencia.-This sus- Aye, aye! And so, as my Lord Talavera 'picion was confirmed on the night happened, I suppose, to have a copy of it "of the 2d, by letters received from leit, he sent that copy to my Lord Cas"sir Robert Wilson, of which I en- tlereagh. It is an old saying, that you close copies; and before I quitted should always keep a useless thing seven "Talavera on the 3d, I waited upon years, and if you do not find a use for it General O'Donoghue, and convers- in that time, throw it away. My lord "ed with him upon the whole of our Douro found, it seems, a use for this paper situation, and pointed out to him in just five days after it was written, though "the possibility, that, in the case of when he drew it up, he does not appear to "the enemy coming through Esca- have foreseen any use in it, as he states "lona, general Cuesta might find him- that he drew it up at the desire of General "self obliged to quit Talavera, before O'Donoghue. 66 I should be able to return to him; and "I urged him to collect all the carts "that could be got, in order to remove our hospital. At his desire I put “purport of this conversation in writing, "and sent him a letter to be laid be"fore general Cuesta, of which I in"close a copy." 46 66 the From this paragraph we clearly perceive, the Baron Douro foresaw, before he quitted Talavera, that Cuesta would soon be after him. Mark the cautious diplomatic turn, which the communications between these generals had now taken! He "put the purport of the conversation in writing." And, for what? For what, vaHant soldier? I did not know, that fire The British army marched on "the 3d to Oropesa, general Basse"court's Spanish corps being at CenItinello, where I desired that it 66 66 might halt the next day, in order "that I might be nearer it.-About "five o'clock in the evening, I heard "that the French had arrived from "Plasencia at Navalmoral, whereby they were between us and the bridge of Almaraz.-About an hour "afterwards, I received from gene"ral O'Donoghue the letter and its "inclosures, of which I enclose copies, announcing to me the inten"tion of gen. Cuesta to march from "Talavera in the evening, and to leave |