gether with the verdict, and such acquittal shall not then avail as a bar or defence upon an indictment for such burglary.

Robbery. This offence consists in the felonious taking of money or goods, of any value, from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear of purpose to steal the same. (i)

Robbery is, in effect, larceny, aggravated by circumstances of force, violence, or putting in fear; and a party indicted for robbery may be convicted of larceny, as the latter crime is included in the former. (j) Force is a necessary ingredient in robbery, but not in larceny. (k)

Merely snatching property from a person unawares, and running away with it, will not be robbery, () because fear cannot, in fact, be presumed in such a case. The rule appears to be well established that no such sudden taking or snatching is sufficient to constitute robbery, unless some injury be done to the person, or there be a previous struggle for the possession of the property, or some force used to obtain it. (m)

The fear must precede the taking, for if a man privately steal money from the person of another, and afterwards keep it, by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is subsequent to the taking. (n)

The goods must be of some value to the party robbed; and therefore, where the defendant compelled the prosecutor, by threats, to sign a promissory note for a sum of money, it was holden by the judges not to be robbery, because the note was of no value to the prosecutor, who had not even a property in or possession of the paper on which it was written. (0) Under such circumstances, however, the defendant might now be indicted for the felony described in the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 47.

(i) Re Burley, 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 50, per J. Wilson, J.

(j) Reg. v. McGrath, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 210-11, per Blackburn, J.

(k) Ibid.

(1) Reg. v. Baker, 1 Leach, 290; Reg. v. Walls, 2 C. & K. 214. (m) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 413-14.

(n) Ibid. 416.

(0) Ibid.; Reg. v. Smith, 2 Den. 449; 21 L. J. (M. C.) 111.

The goods must be taken either from the person of the prosecutor, or in his presence, (p) and against his will. If the party robbed consent to the robbery, the offence will not be made out; but it is sufficient to prove that the goods were either taken from him by force and violence, or delivered up by him to the defendant, under the impression of that degree of fear and apprehension which is necessary to constitute robbery. (q)

The goods must appear to have been taken animo furandi, as in other cases of larceny; and if a person, under a bona fidé impression that the property is his own, obtain it by menace, that is a trespass, but not robbery. (r)

An actual taking, either by force, or upon delivery, is necessary—that is, it must appear that the robber actually got possession of the goods. The goods must also be carried away, as in other cases of larceny; but if the property be once taken, the offence will not be purged by the robbers delivering it back to the owner. (s)

Upon an indictment for robbery, or for an assault with intent to rob, in different counts, it has been held that the prosecutor ought to elect upon which count he would proceed. (t) But now, on the trial of an indictment for robbery, the jury may convict of an assault with intent to rob, (u) so that the necessity of several counts in such case is obviated. (v)

The proviso in s. 17 of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, was intended to meet a difficulty which arose in Reg. v. Skeen. (w)

Larceny.-Theft is wrongfully obtaining possession of any movable thing which is the property of some other person, and of some value, with the fraudulent intent entirely to deprive him of such thing, and have or deal

(p) See Reg. v. Francis, 2 Str. 1015; Reg. v. Hamilton, 8 C. & P. 49. (q) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 416-17.

(r) Ibid.; Reg. v. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409.

(8) Arch. Cr. Pld. 417.

(t) Reg. v. Gough, 1 M. & Rob. 71.

(u) 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 40.

(v) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 70.

(w) Bell, 97; 28 L. J. (M. C.) 91.

with it as the property of some person other than the owner. (x) Larceny has been also defined as the wrongful or fraudulent taking, and carrying away, by any person, of the mere personal goods of another, with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's) own use, and make them his own property, without the consent of the owner. (y)

The goods taken must, in the absence of any express statutory enactment, be personal goods, for none other can be the subject of larceny at common law. (2) Bonds, bills, etc., being mere choses in action, are not the subject of larceny at common law, for they are of no intrinsic value. (a) But the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 15, and following sections, now render the stealing, destroying, cancelling, obliterating, or concealing of any valuable security, or of any deed relating to land, or any record of any court of justice, or other legal documents, felony.

The police court of Toronto is a court of justice within the meaning of these sections. (b)

The indictment under these sections must particularize the kind of valuable security stolen. (c)

When a note, which had been by mistake made out in favor of the defendant, and on discovery of the error returned by him unstamped and unendorsed, and afterwards stolen by him, and by him stamped and endorsed, it was held not a valuable security. (d)

A party cannot commit larceny of a bond made by another person to himself, and, especially, he could not be guilty of larceny in stealing a bond from the obligor because a bond in the hands of the obligor could be of no value to him, as a bond, under any possible circumstances;

(x) Cr. Law Comrs. 3rd Rep.

(y) Reg. v. McGrath, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 209, per Kelly, C. B.; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 7.

(z) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 316.

(a) Ibid. 317.

(b) Reg. v. Mason, 22 U. C. C. P. 246.

(c) Reg. v. Lowrie, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 61; 36 L. J. (M. C.) 24.

(d) Scott v. Reg., 2 S. R. C. 349.

and when the 2 Geo. II., c. 25, was in force, no other than a bond for the payment of money could be the subject of larceny. (e)

Certificates treated and dealt with on the London Stock Exchange, as scrip of a foreign railway, are "valuable security" within the 7 & 8 Geo. IV., c. 29, s. 5, and the subject of larceny. (ƒ)

On an indictment for stealing a piece of paper, the defendant could not be convicted of stealing an agreement, though unstamped, for building certain cottages, the work under which agreement was actually in progress. (g)

Larceny cannot be committed of things which are not the subject of property. (h) But partridges hatched and reared by a common hen, while they remain with her, and from their inability to escape, are practically under the dominion and in the power of the owner of the hen, may be the subject of larceny, though the hen is not confind in a coop, or otherwise, but allowed to wander with her brood about the premises of her owner. (i)

Dogs not being the subject of larceny at common law, are not chattels within 7 & 8 Geo. IV., c. 29, s. 53, (j)

There is no absolute property in animals feræ naturæ, but only a special or qualified right of property-a right rationi soli to take and kill them; and when killed upon the soil, they become the absolute property of the owner of the soil

When the thing is not, in its original state, the subject of larceny, it is necessary that the act of taking should not be one continuous act with the act of severance, or other act, by which the thing becomes the subject of larceny. (k)

(e) Caverley v. Caverley, 3 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 341, per Robinson, C. J. (f) Reg. v. Smith, 2 U. C. L. J. 59; Dears. C. C. 561.

(g) Reg. v. Watts, Dears. 326; 23 L. J. (M. C.) 56; see now 32 & 33 Vic. c. 21, s. 15.

(h) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 318.

(i) Reg. v. Shickle, L. R. 1 C.C.R. 158; 38 L.J. (M.C.) 21 ; Reg. v. Cory, 10 Cox, 23, followed.

(j) Reg. v. Robinson, 5 U. C. L. J. 143; Bell, 34; 28 L. J. (M.C.) 58.

(k) Reg. v. Townley, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 317, per Bovill, C. J.

Thus where poachers, of whom the prisoner was one, wrongfully killed a number of rabbits upon land belonging to the Crown, and placed the rabbits in a ditch upon the same land, some of the rabbits in bags and some strapped together; having no intention of abandoning the wrongful possession of the rabbits which they had acquired by taking them, but placing them in the ditch as a place of deposit till they could conveniently remove them, which they did about three hours afterwards; it was held that the taking of the rabbits and the removal of them was one continuous act, and that the removal was therefore not larceny. (1)

But if the goods vest in the owner, in the interval between the severance and the removal, it is larceny. (m) Potatoes severed from the soil, or dug and in pits, are clearly the subject of larceny. (n)

The distinction between grand and petty larceny has been abolished, and now all larcenies, whatever be the value of the property stolen, shall be deemed to be of the same nature, and shall be subject to the same incidents in all respects as grand larceny was before the distinction between grand and petty larceny was abolished. (0)

There must be an actual or constructive taking of the goods, on the ground that larceny includes a trespass. (p) There must also be a carrying away; but, as the felony lies in the very first act of removing the property, the least removing of the thing taken from the place where it was before, with intent to steal it, is a sufficient asportation. (9)

There must also be an animus furandi: i. e., a felonious intent to take the property of another against his will. The essence of the offence is knowingly taking the goods of another against his will. (r) If the goods were taken with the consent

(1) Reg. v. Townley, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 315.

(m) Ibid. 318, per Bramwell, B.

(n) Hunter v. Hunter, 25 U. C. Q. B. 146, per Hagarty, J.

(o) 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 2.

(p) 2 Russ. Cr. 152.

(g) Ibid.; see also Reg. v. Townley, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 319, per Black burn, J.

(r) Reg. v. McGrath, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 210-11, per Blackburn, J.; see Reg. v. Prince, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 150; 38 L. J. (M. C.) 8.