9, s. 21, there was not sufficient evidence to support a conviction. (u)

Where, on an indictment for forgery of the prosecutor's name as endorser of a promissory note, the prosecutor swore that he was a marksman, and had on several occasions endorsed notes for the prisoner, sometimes allowing the prisoner to write his name, and sometimes making his mark, and the only evidence offered in corroboration was that of the prosecutor's son, to the effect that his father was a marksman; it was held (v) that such corroboration was sufficient to warrant a conviction. (w) But the court were not unanimous in their decision, and the authority of the case may well be doubted. Furthermore, it has been held in Quebec, that the corroboration of the evidence of an interested witness cannot be based on something stated by that witness. (x)

The offence of forgery is not triable at the Quarter Sessions. (y)

Great care was formerly requisite in describing the instrument in an indictment for forgery, but now it is sufficient to describe the same by any name or designation, by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or fac simile thereof, or otherwise describing the same or the value thereof. (2)

It is not necessary, in an indictment for forgery, to allege an intent to defraud any particular person, but it is sufficient to allege that the party accused did the act with intent to defraud. (a)

Where goods were obtained by false pretences, through the medium of a forged order, the uttering of which was felony, the indictment must formerly have been for the felony,

(u) Reg. v. Giles, 6 U. C. C. P. 84. As to what is sufficient corrobora tion, see Reg. v. McDonald, 31 U. C. Q. B. 337.

(v) Cameron, J. dissenting.

(w) Reg. v. Bannerman, 43 U. C. Q. B. 547.

(x) Reg. v. Perry, 1 L. C. L. J. 60.

(y) Reg. v. McDonald, 31 U. C. Q. B. 337; Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 U. C. Q. B.

118.

(z) 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, s. 49.

(a) See s. 51.

otherwise an acquittal would have been directed on the ground that the misdemeanor was merged. (b)

In an indictment for forging a receipt, it must be alleged that such receipt was either for money or goods, etc., as mentioned in the Con. Stats. Can., c. 94, s. 9. (c)

Where the instrument is set out in hæc verba, in an indictment for forgery, the description of its legal character is surplusage, and unnecessary. (d)

It is no defence to an indictment for forging a note, that the prisoner may have expected, and fully intended, to pay it when it became due. (e)

The offence of forgery, at common law, was only a misdemeanor, and it fell within the general class of cheats. (ƒ)

Cheats and frauds.-These offences at common law consisted in the fraudulent obtaining the property of another, by any deceitful and illegal practice or token, short of felony, which affects, or may affect, the public, or such frauds as are levelled against the public justice of the realm. (g) But every fraud on private individuals is not a penal offence. (h)

In the case of forgery, it was sufficient that the party might be prejudiced by the false instrument, but nothing could be prosecuted as a cheat at common law without an actual prejudice, which was an obtaining on the statute 33 Hy. VIII. (i)

If a person, in the way of his trade or business, put, or suffer to be put, a false mark or token upon any article, so as to pass off as genuine that which is spurious, if such article be sold by such false token or mark, the person so selling may be indicted for a cheat at common law, but the indictment must allege that the article was passed off by means of such false token or mark.

(b) Reg. v. Evans, 5 C. & P. 553; but see now 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 50. (c) Reg. v. McCorkill, 8 L. C. J. 283.

(d) Reg. v. Carson, 14 U. C. C. P. 309; Reg. v. Williams, 2 Den. C. C. 61. (e) Reg. v. Craig, 7 U. C. C. P. 244.

(f) 2 Russ. Cr. 709 et seq.

(g) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 94, per Drummond, J.; and see 2 Russ. Cr. 613.

(h) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 89.

(i) 2 Russ. Cr. 613; Ward's case, 2 Str. 747.

Where an indictment alleged that the prisoner, being a picture dealer, knowingly kept in his shop a picture whereon the name of an artist was falsely and fraudulently painted, with intent to pass the picture off as the original work of the artist whose name was so painted, and that he sold the same to H. F., with intent to defraud, and did thereby defraud him, but without stating that the picture was passed off by means of the artist's name being so falsely painted, it was held that such painting of the artist's name was putting a false token on the picture, and that the selling by means thereof would be a cheat at common law, but that the want of such last averment was fatal. (j)

Where a person contracts to deliver loaves of bread, of a certain weight, at a certain price, the delivery of a less quantity (i. e., less in weight) than that contracted for, is a mere private fraud, and not indictable, if no false weights or tokens have been used. (k)

False personation.-Falsely personating a voter at a municipal election is not an indictable offence. Our statute law contains no provision on the subject, nor is it an offence at common law. (1) It is different, however, with regard to parliamentary elections, for by 37 Vic., c. 9, s. 74, it is enacted that "a person shall, for all purposes of the laws relating to parliamentary elections, be deemed to be guilty of the offence of personation, who, at an election of a member of the House of Commons, applies for a ballot paper in the name of some other person, whether such other name be that of a person living or dead, or of a fictitious person, or who having voted once at any such election, applies at the same election for a ballot paper in his own name."

To complete the offence of inducing a person to personate a voter, it would seem not necessary that the personation should be successful, and a conviction for the offence was

(j) Reg. v. Closs, 4 U. C. L. J. 98; Dears. & B. 460; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 54. (k) Reg. v. Eagleton, 1 U. C. L. J. 179; Dears. 515; 24 L. J. (M. C.) 158. (1) Reg. v. Hogg, 25 U. C. Q. B. 66; Reg. v. Dent, 1 Den. C. C. 159.

held good, though it did not set out the mode or facts of the inducement. (m)

It would seem that in an indictment for this offence there should be an averment negativing the identity of the defendant with the voter suggested to be personated. (n)

Malicious injuries.-Injuring or destroying private property is, in general, no crime, but a mere civil trespass, over which a magistrate has no jurisdiction, unless by statute. (0)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 22, contains provisions respecting malicious injury to property; but, to bring a case within this statute, the act must have been wilfully or maliciously done. (p) But the malice, to be proved, need not have been conceived against the owner of the property, in respect of which it shall be committed. (q) And where a man does an act to an animal which he knows may prove fatal, not from ill-will towards the owner or animal, but simply to gratify his depraved tastes, such act is malicious within the statute. (r) But where the prisoner threw a stone at a crowd intending to hit one or more of them, but not intending to injure the window, it was held that there was no malice, actual or constructive. (s) On principle, one would have thought that the malice would have been transferred to the window.

It would seem to be necessary to allege that the property injured is the property of another person. (t)

It is not necessary that the damage done should be of a permanent kind. Plugging up the feed pipe of a steam engine is an offence within s. 19 of this Act. (u)

It was held under the former statute, 4 & 5 Vic., c. 26, s. 5, the words of which were not so comprehensive as the

(m) Reg. v. Hague, 12 W. R. 310.

(n) Reg. v. Hogg, 25 U. C. Q. B. 68, per Hagarty, J.

(0) Powell v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Q. B. 155, per Robinson, C. J.

(p) Powell v. Williamson, supra; Reg. v. Elston, 5 All. 2.

(q) See. 66; Reg. v. Bradshaw, 38 U. Č. Q. B. 564; Reg. v. Elston, 5 All. 2.

(r) Reg. v. Welch, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 23.

(8) Reg. v. Pembleton, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 119.

(t) Reg. v. Elston, 5 All. 2.

(u) Reg. v. Fisher, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 7; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 57.

S

present statute, that an apparatus for manufacturing potash, consisting of ovens, kettles, tubs, etc., was not a machine or engine, the cutting, breaking, or damaging of which was felonious. (v)

If the defendant sets up and shows a bona fidé claim of title to land, the jurisdiction of the magistrate is ousted, (w) even though he believe the claim to be ill-founded. (x)

Under s. 45 of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 22, upon an indictment for maliciously wounding a horse, it is not necessary to prove that any instrument was used to inflict the wound, and the word "wound" must be taken in the ordinary sense. (y)

Secs. 20 and 28 of the 4 & 5 Vic., c. 26, gave a summary remedy, not for trespassing on the close, but for malicious injuries to the tree. (z)

A summons for malicious injury to property, under the former statute, must have been upon complaint under oath, and a conviction stating that the offence complained of was committed" depuis environ huit jours," was held bad for uncertainty. (a)

The offence of wilfully injuring a fence, etc., under the (N.B.) 1 Rev. Stats., c. 153, s. 11, was a misdemeanor, not punishable by summary conviction. (b)

An indictment charging that the defendant in a secret and clandestine manner cut off the hair from the manes of two horses, the property of one W. B., discloses an offence within the Rev. Stats. of Nova Scotia, c. 169, s. 22; and where an act is committed wrongfully and intentionally, and with full knowledge of the ownership of the property, malice will be presumed. (c)

(v) Reg. v. Dogherty, 2 L. C. R. 255.

(w) Reg. v. O'Brien, 5 Que. L. R. 161; ex parte Donovan, 2 Pugsley, 389; Reg. v, Taylor, 8 U. C. Q. B. 257.

(x) Reg. v. Davidson, 45 U. C. Q. B. 91.

(y) Reg. v. Bullock, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 115; 37 L. J. (M. C.) 47.

(z) Madden v. Farley, 6 U. C. Q. B. 213, per Robinson, C. J.

(a) Ex parte Hook, 3 L. C. R. 496.

(b) Ex parte Mulhern, 4 Allen, 259.

(c) Reg. v. Smith, 1 Sup. C. R. (N. S.) 29.