Where a statute directs justices of a division, or near a certain place, to do a certain act, any justice of the county may do it. (s)

It is no objection under R. S. O., c. 3, that a conviction by justices for an offence tried in the county is signed by one of the justices, in a city having a police magistrate. (t)

Where a statute gives justices power to make by-laws and impose penalties, they cannot, without express authority from the legislature, levy such penalties by distress. (u)

Proceedings under the Rev. Stat., c. 146, s. 3 (N. B.), for knowingly solemnizing a marriage where either party is under twenty-one, without the consent of the father, are properly taken before two justices. The proceedings in such a case need not be in the name of the Queen. (v)

It has been held in New Brunswick, that where a summons has been issued by two justices, the cause must be tried before the same two justices, unless there be some special reason for not doing so, (w) which must appear on the face of the conviction, or at least it must show that the absent justices consented to it. (x) But one justice may issue the summons on a complaint, (y) and grant an adjournment, (2) though the penalty is recoverable before two justices.

Where two justices have heard a case, they must concur in their judgment; (a) but in a case before three, judgment may be rendered by two. (b) And the fact that one justice issued the summons in a matter over which he, sitting alone, might have jurisdiction, does not render him sole judge of the case; but if he allow other justices to sit with him, they

(8) Reg. v. Wheton, 3 Allen, 269.

(t) Langwith v. Dawson, 30 U. C. C. P. 375.

(u) Kirkpatrick v. Asken, Rob. & Jos. Dig. 1992.

(v) Reg. v. Gallant, 5 Allen, 115.

(w) Weeks v. Boreham, 2 Russell & Chesley, 377.

(x) Dubord v. Boivin, 14 L. C. J. 203.

(y) Reg. v. Simmons, 1 Pugsley, 158.

(z) Ex parte Holder, 6 Allen, 338.

(a) St. Gemmes v. Cherrier, 9 L. C. J. 22.

(b) Ex parte Lumley, 9 L. C. J. 169; ex parte Trowley, 9 L. C. J. 169; ex parte Brodeur, 2 L. C. J. 97.

have an equal voice with him in determining the question before them. (c)

On the examination of any person before a justice, on a charge of an indictable offence, with a view to his commitment for trial, no person has any right to be present without the permission of the presiding justice. (d) But it is different. where the justices are sitting to try the offender under the Summary Conviction Act. (e)

Where the magistrate or justices are not simply holding a preliminary investigation, but proceed to adjudicate finally under the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, it seems necessary, in order to confer jurisdiction on them, that an information should be properly laid, (f) for by the express words of the statute, (g) their power of final adjudication is limited to "cases where an information is laid before one or more of Her Majesty's justices of the peace," etc. The power of justices to convict summarily results only from legislative sanction, and in all cases such authority must be shown, (h) and the maxim, omnia presumuntur rite esse actu, has no application to the acts of inferior courts. Therefore, on a prosecution for a penalty under a by-law of a corporation, the by-law must be proved, that the jurisdiction of the justices may appear on the proceedings. (2) And a conviction by summary process for an aggravated assault, committed on a voting day at an election for the House of Commons of Canada, was in Quebec held to be void, as the statute which constitutes the offence renders it punishable by indictment; and the offence is not included in those mentioned in the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 32, ss. 2 and 3. (j)

(c) Reg. v. Milne, 25 U. C. C. P. 94. (d) 32 & 33 Vic., c. 30, s. 35.

(e) 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, ss. 29 and 30.

(f) Caudle v. Ferguson, 1 Q. B. 889.

(g) Friel v. Ferguson, 15 U.C.C.P. 584; Appleton v. Lepper, 20 U.C.C.P. 142, per Hagarty, J.; Powell v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Q. B. 151; Ex parte Eagles, 2 Hannay, 53-4, per Ritchie, C. J.; Connors v. Darling, 23 U. C. Q. B. 546.

(h) Bross v. Huber, 18 U. C. Q. B. 286, per Robinson, C. J.; Reg. v. O'Leary, 3 Pugsley, 264.

(i) Reg. v. Wortman, 4 Allen, 73; Rex v. All Saints, Southampton, 7 B. & C. 785.

(j) Reg. ex rel. Larouche v. Lenneux, 5 Q. L. R. 261; ss. 2 and 3.

But the objection to the want of an information must be taken before the investigation is proceeded upon; for if the party appears and defends the suit without an information being laid or the issue of a summons, the objection cannot afterwards avail him. () And the rule is applicable in the case of a defective information or summons. (1)

Unless a statute require that the information should be in writing, or on oath, it need not be so. (m)

An information stating that a woman did "unlawfully take and carry away from his (the informant's) protection her daughter, S. W.," does not give a justice authority to issue a warrant. (n)

Neither does a complaint charging a "clandestine removal of property;" the utmost that it does justify is the issuing of a summons under the Act relating to petty trespasses. (2)

An information charging that the defendant did on, etc., "obtain by false pretences from complainant the sum of five dollars, contrary to law," omitting the words "with intent to defraud," might by intendment be held to charge the statutory offence. (p)

If a statute gives summary proceedings for various offences, specified in several sections, an information is bad which leaves it uncertain under which section it took place. (2)

In summary proceedings for assault it is not necessary that the fact that the complainant requested the case to be tried summarily should appear on the proceedings, if the form given by the statute be followed. (r) And even when

(k) Ex parte Wood, 1 Allen, 422; Reg. v. McMillan, 2 Pugsley, 110; Reg. v. O'Leary, 3 Pugsley, 264.

(1) Ex parte Coll, 3 Allen, 48; Crawford v. Beattie, 39 U. C. Q. B. 13; Stoness v. Lake, 40 U. C. Q. B. 320.

(m) Friel v. Ferguson, 15 U. C. C. P. 594; Re Conklin, 31 U. C. Q. B. 168, per A. Wilson, J.; see s. 24, 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31.

(n) Stiles v. Brewster, Stev. Dig. 811.

(0) McNellis v. Gartshore, 2 U. C. C. P. 471, per McLean, J.

(p) Crawford v. Beattie, 39 U. C. Q. B. 13.

(q) Thompson and Durnford, 12 L. C. J. 287, per Mackay, J. (r) Reg. v. Shaw, 23 U. C. Q. B. 616.

not, after conviction it will be intended that such request was made. (s)

In a complaint for breach of a by-law, it is not necessary to insert the by-law itself, or to make a distinct allegation that it is in force.

A complaint may be made and a summons issued for twooffences, provided the defendant has not been arrested in the first instance, and a conviction for one of such offences specifying it is valid. Service of a copy of a summons, issued by a magistrate, followed by appearance of the defendant, is sufficient. (t)

Where two or more persons may commit an offence under an Act, the information may be jointly laid against them. (u) But where the penalty is imposed upon each person, it is wrong to convict them jointly, even when they are charged on a joint information. (v)

If either the penalty be imposed by the Act on each person convicted (even where the offence would, in its own nature, be single), or if the quality of the offence be such that the guilt of one person may be distinct from that of the other, in either of these cases the penalties are several. (w)

At Petty Sessions, an information was laid against two defendants, charging that they did unlawfully use a gun and kill two pheasants, contrary to the 1 & 2 Wm. IV., c. 32, s. 3. Each claimed to be tried separately, in order to call the other as a witness. The justices refused, and heard the charge against both together, and convicted them, and a conviction was drawn up separately against each defendant imposing a penalty of £3; and it was held that it was in the discretion of the justices whether they would hear the charge separately or not; that as the penalty was imposed on every person acting in contravention of the statute each defendant was separately liable to the whole penalty;

(8) Reg. v. O'Leary, 3 Pugsley, 264.

(t) Corignan v. Harbor Comrs. Montreal, 5 L. C. R. 479.
(u) Reg. v. Littlechild, L. R. 6 Q. B. 295, per Lush, J.
(v) Ibid. 295, per Mellor, J.

(w) Ibid. 296, per Hannen, J.

and that separate convictions were right, although the prisoners were charged on a joint information. (x)

Where a limited authority is given to justices of the peace, they cannot extend their jurisdiction to cases not within it, by finding as a fact that which is not a fact. (y) So neither does a discretion, whether they will do a particular thing, enable them, having heard the case, to refuse a warrant, because they think the law under which they are called upon to act is unjust. (2)

Where the charge laid, as stated in the information, does not amount in law to the offence over which the justice has jurisdiction, his finding the party guilty by his conviction, in the very words of the statute will not give him jurisdicdiction. The conviction would be bad on its face, all the proceedings being before the court. (a)

In a prosecution before justices, their jurisdiction is ousted by the accused setting up a claim of right; (b) yet that claim must be bona fide, and the mere belief of the accused, unsupported by any ground for the claim, (c) or a claim of right, which cannot by law exist, is insufficient. (d) And in such case they cannot inquire into or determine summarily any excess of force alleged to have been used in the assertion of title, (e) or the validity of the claim set up. (f) Proceedings by indictment are then the proper course. (g)

A complaint for assault under s. 43 of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, cannot be withdrawn by the complainant, even with the consent of the justice; (h) for the charge has become a

(x) Reg. v. Littlechild, supra.

(y) The Haidee, 10 L. C. R. 101; The Scotia S. V. A. R. 160.

(z) Reg. v. Boteler, 4 B. & S. 959; 33 L. J. (M. C.) 101.

(a) Re McKinnon, 2 U. C. L. J. N. S. 327, per A. Wilson, J.

(b) Reg. v. O'Brien, 5 Q. L. R. 161.

(c) Reg. v. Cridland, 7 E. & B. 853; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 28; Reg. v. Stimp son, 4 B. & S. 307; 32 L. J. (M. C.) 208.

(d) Hudson v. McRae, 4 B. & S. 585; 33 L. J. (M. C.) 65; Hargreaves v. Deddanes, L. R. 10 Q. B. 582.

(e) Reg. v. Pearson, L. R. 5 Q. B. 237.

(f) Reg. v. Davidson, 45 U. C. Q. B. 91.

(g) Reg. v. Pearson, L. R. 5 Q. B. 239, per Lush, J.

(h) Re Conklin, 31 U. C. Q. B. 160.