from a vessel, which sailed from London, on the high seas, when the vessel was lying off Wampa, in China. The vessel lay twenty or thirty miles from the sea. No evidence was given of the flowing of the tide, or otherwise, where the vessel

lay. On a case reserved, the court held

that the offence

was within the Admiralty jurisdiction. (d) Where the sea flows in between two points of land in England, a straight imaginary line being drawn from one point to the other, the courts of common law have jurisdiction of all offences committed within that line, though it is said the Admiralty has concurrent jurisdiction within the same. (e)

The great inland lakes of Canada are within the Admiralty jurisdiction, and by the Imp. Act 12 & 13 Vic., c. 96, there is authority in our courts and magistrates to take cognizance of an offence committed in the lakes, although in American waters, in the same manner as if committed on the high seas. The power may be exercised by all magistrates in the colony, as if the offence had been committed in the waters within the limits of the colony, and within the limits of the local jurisdiction of the courts of criminal justice in the colony; (f) for there is nothing in the statute to give any particular functionary jurisdiction, or to make the offence of a local nature, and, therefore, any magistrate in the province may act. (g) If a robbery be committed on lakes, harbors, ports, etc., in foreign countries, the Court of Admiralty indisputably has jurisdiction. (h)

A British court has no jurisdiction to punish a foreigner for an offence committed on the high seas in a foreign ship, against a British subject. (i) The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 9, ma kes provision for the trial in Canada of offences amounting to murder or manslaughter committed upon the sea. (j)

(d) Rex v. Allen, 7 C. & P. 664; Reg. v. Sharp, 5 U. C. P. R. 138, A. Wilson, J.

(e) Ibid. 139, per A. Wilson, J.; Rex v. Bruce, R. & R. 243.

(f) Reg. v. Sharp, 5 U. C. P. R. 135.

(g) Ibid. 140, per Wilson, J.

(h) Ibid. 139, per Wilson, J.

(i) Reg. v. Kinsman, 1 James, 62.

(j) See also c. 29, s. 9.

per

Customs and Excise offences.-These offences are now regulated by the 40 Vic. c. 10. (k) Although section 81 of that Act provides that persons removing goods from a bouded warehouse shall incur the penalties imposed on persons for smuggling, and by s. 76 of the same Act, sinuggling is made a misdemeanor, punishable by a penalty not exceeding $200, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by both, yet an indictment will not lie under s. 81, for the misdemeanor created by s. 76, for the 81st section does not declare that the parties offending, etc., shall be deemed guilty of the misdemeanor created by the 76th, and the clause cannot be extended to the creation of a new crime by implication. (4) It is unnecessary to allege, in the indictment for offences against this Act, that the warehouse is a customs warehouse, or one duly appointed and established according to the provisions of the law; for the meaning of the word "warehouse" is clearly defined by the Customs Act, and it would be matter of proof as to whether the building alluded to comes within that definition or not. Nor is it necessary to allege that the goods had been marked and stamped in accordance with the requirements of the Act, for the security of the revenue of Canada, nor that the goods had previously been duly entered for warehousing, in accordance with the provisions of law, nor to allege by whom the goods were kept in the warehouse, for not one of these statements is required by the statute; and, moreover, in official matters, all things are presumed to have been properly done. An allegation that the goods were fraudulently removed implies sufficiently that they were not legally cleared from, etc. (m)

On a statute somewhat similar to the 40 Vic., c. 10, s. 91, subsec. 2 (using, however, the words "information on oath shall be given"), it was held that, to justify the breaking open of a building, there should have been, first, a written informa

(k) See as to customs 31 Vic., cs. 5, 6, 7, 43 & 44; also 33 Vic., c. 9; and 34 Vic., cs. 10 and 11.

(1) Reg. v. Bathgate, 13 L. C. J. 299. (m) Ibid.

tion on oath; and, second, the actual presence of the justice at the breaking, so that the parties may understand the demand for admittance comes from the justice, by virtue of his legal authority, and magisterial character. (n)

Not opening a door, after a proper demand, is a sufficient denial within the Act. If the breaking open is unlawful, and the officer is concerned therein, he cannot justify the seizure of smuggled goods found within the building; but if a party, not concerned in the unlawful breaking, seized the goods, the case might be different. It seems that an order to enter given to a police officer, present with the revenue officer, would be sufficient, and that he would be presumed to be acting in aid. (o) If the door be closed, and admission denied, then the Act clearly intends that the justice should be the person to demand admittance, and to declare the purpose for which the entry is demanded. Possibly he might do this by the month of the officer, but it should be done in such a way as to be well understood as coming from the justice, by virtue of his legal authority and magisterial character. (p)

An indictment for smuggling, under the (N. B.) Rev. Stat., c. 29, s. 1, charged, in the several counts (1) that the defendaut unlawfully landed alcohol, subject to duty, and thereby smuggled the same; (2) that defendant unlawfully landed alcohol, subject to duty, without reporting to the treasurer, and thereby smuggled, etc.: (3) that the defendant landed the alcohol without a permit, and thereby smuggled ; and (4) that the defendant landed alcohol without paying the duties. The indictment was held insufficient, as (1) the mere unlawful landing of goods, without alleging any intent to defraud the revenue, did not constitute the offence of smuggling; (2) merely landing goods, without reporting them to the treasurer, or without obtaining a permit, though it may subject the party to a penalty, does not amount to smuggling; (3) and the mere landing of goods, without a previous payment of duty, is not

a breach of the revenue laws, as the duty may be secured as pointed out in the Act. The indictment must negative the fact that the duties were secured. (q)

The colonial legislature has power to impose additional grounds of forfeiture, for breach of the revenue laws, on goods subject to forfeiture, under an Act of the Imperial Parliament. (r)

In the Atty. General v. Warner, (s) the question was raised, but not decided, whether an information would lie under the 66th clause of the Imp. Act 8 & 9 Vic., c. 93, where the party informed against was a person shown not to have transported or harbored the goods of another, but his own goods. smuggled by himself, on his own account.

By this stat. 8 & 9 Vic., c. 93, gunpowder is prohibited from being imported into the British possessions in America, except from the United Kingdom, or some British possession. Gunpowder coming from a foreign country was held not liable to be proceeded against as a non-enumerated dutiable article under the Provincial Revenue Act, 11 Vic., c. 1, for being imported into the Province, at a place not a port of entry, contrary to the Act 11 Vic., c. 2, s. 21; but that it was liable to seizure and forfeiture, under the 17th section of that Act, for being landed without entry at the Treasury. (t) Spirits in casks less than 100 gallons were also held liable to forfeiture, under the (N.B.) 11 Vic., c. 67, though the vessel in which they were imported is over 30 tons register. (u)

In an information for the condemnation of goods as illegally imported, it is allowable, under a plea that they were not imported moda et forma, to show that the goods were landed through stress of weather. (v)

In an information, at the suit of the Crown, for goods seized at the Custom House, there must have been a substan

tive allegation that the goods were imported and brought in in violation of the Custom House regulations. (w) It has been held that the omission of the words "against the form of the statute" is fatal. (x) The omission of these words is probably cured by the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 23.

In an information for a penalty under the Customs Act, 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 59, for knowingly harboring smuggled goods, it was held that the scienter was a proper question for the jury; and that in such information, the particular illegal act, as that the goods were imported without payment of duties, etc., should be specified; and that the information should expressly show that the offence charge l to have been committed was contrary to the form of the statute, and that saying merely that the statute gives a right to the penalty was not enough. (y)

If a quantity of smuggled goods be purchased at one time, but seizures of them are made at different times, only one penalty for harboring them can be recovered. (2)

An entry at the Custom House declared that the packages contained articles not subject to duty, but some of them contained contraband goods. This was held but one entry, and that being false as to some of the packages, the goods were not duly entered, and the whole were forfeited under the (N.B.) 1 Rev. Stat., c. 27, s. 10. (a)

A revenue inspector, suing in the Queen's name for penalties under the 14 & 15 Vic., c. 100, was held not liable for costs, because he came within the ordinary common law rule, exempting the Crown from costs. (b)

The 34 Vic., c. 11, was passed for the purpose of preventing corrupt practices in relation to the collection of the revenue. Excise. The excise is at present regulated by 31 Vic., c. 8, as amended by 40 Vic., c. 12, and by the various statutes in