and of feeling the delights of the evening scenery, every modification, quality and property of such perception and of such feeling; in short, every mental circumstance by which they were attended, was an idea of the mind, however many of them may have escaped the notice of consciousness, and many of them, in my opinion, did so escape. If so, then we certainly have ideas which do not owe their origin immediately to perception or consciousness. As there are many external objects which we do not perceive, so there are many internal workings of the mind of which we may not be conscious. If we say that we have no ideas except what we perceive, or are conscious of, we make the perception or consciousness of our idea necessary to its existence, which I do not believe.

UPHAM ON THE MIND AND ITS DISORDERS.

Professor Upham, in his treatise on "Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action," arranges his subject according to the analysis of the mind in its natural state and operations-considering, in order, the imperfections and diseases which affect each faculty.

His classification of mental operations coincides in the main, with the old division of the mental capaci ties, into the understanding, the affections and the will. The nomenclature which he adopts is intellect, sensibilities and will. The intellect he subdivides into exterior and interior, corresponding, in most respects, with Locke's division into sensation and reflection. The exterior intellect derives knowledge from the outward world through the medium of the senses; the interior derives it from a consciousness of the mind's own operations, from original suggestion, relative

suggestion or judgment, and reasoning. To original suggestion, he assigns the origin of our notions of time, number, motion, memory, sameness, personal identity, present existence, etc., which Stewart, after Dr. Reid, attributes to common sense.

Now, it seems to me that a more simple analysis may be made of the operations of the mind. I find no fault with the general division into understanding, affections and will. The mental operations, or states indicated by these three designations, are entirely distinct in their nature, and seem to comprehend all of which the human mind is capable. We perceive things, facts, truths. This is the operation of the understanding; and is a matter of pure intellection. We can conceive of beings purely intellectual, who might be endowed with this capacity, without being subject to any emotions or affections. But we are differently constituted. We are also affected by our perceptions. Hence the affections or sensibilities, which form a distinct and component part of our mental structure. The understanding and the affections constitute us perceptive and passive or affective beings. We are thus rendered capable of knowledge and emotion. But our nature does not end here. We are not only perceptive and passive, but active. We are capable not only of knowledge and emotion, but of volition. We not only understand and feel, but we will. Hence the third and last great division of mental operations

the will.

When we come to subdivide the operations of the understanding, it seems to me that the perception of the ideas of time, space, number, motion, etc., belongs to precisely the same category as the perception of outward objects does. It is true we do not perceive

these things immediately by one of the five external senses, but there is a sixth sense by which we do perceive them. They belong to the framework and constitution of this outward world into which our Maker has placed us, and I consider the formation in the mind of a comprehension of this outer world and the things therein contained, of its constitution, its manner of existence, as a source of knowledge, homogeneous in its character, and appreciable by a department of the understanding which is one and indivisible. Call this the exterior intellect if you will. Names are not things, but I think the understanding is a better word to denote the power or capacity of the mind to comprehend the world as it is, nature, or the exterior universe, than any other that can be chosen.

There is an exterior or more transcendental intellect, I admit, which is cognizant of ideas that the senses do not reveal, and that the outer world does not even suggest. Those ideas are the spiritual ones on which our moral nature depends-such as justice, purity, faith, sincerity, generosity, or, perhaps, personal identity, present existence, etc., belong to this class. (Memo.-Think further on this subject.)

I think Prof. Upham's arrangement of the subject of mental disorder very philosophical and correct. Disorder is the correlative of order in all departments of nature and life. The physician considers the human system under three aspects-that of physiology, pathology and therapeutics. The lawyer divides his science into rights, wrongs and remedies. The divine treats of religion under the heads of holiness, sin and redemption. In like manner, the true division of mental philosophy is into mental physiology, pathology and treatment of the insane, etc., etc., etc.

THE HUMAN MIND.

The mind of man may be compared to a bird ascending with her eye fixed upon the sun. Her light form is successively borne in contrary directions by the shifting winds as she passes onward and upward through the various strata of the atmosphere. So, the mind, as it rises in its progress toward fixed and eternal truth, the centre and ultimate object of all its inquiries, is, at first, borne along with the various prejudices and opinions of the world, often in conflict with each other. At one stage of its progress, it adopts notions and views that are often modified or entirely changed by more information, or an acquaintance with new or more plausible expositions, and it is only when it acquires sufficient strength and courage to mount above the floating current of popular thoughts, and out of the reach of the breath of public opinion, that it can pursue, with eagle speed and unflinching eye, that straight and luminous path which leads to the pure and immutable sources of intellectual and moral perfection.

The general influence which the several sciences naturally exert upon each other, is a truth too commonly known to merit a remark here. But some of the particular instances of this influence are striking and worthy of a passing notice. I was lately forcibly struck with the influence of the discovery of the art of making paper in the eleventh century, and the art of painting in the fifteenth century, on all the departments of literature and science. There had been giant minds in the darkest ages, but their wisdom could never be

recorded-perhaps they themselves were ignorant of letters, and so all died with them that might have benefited and enlightened the world.

May we not also compare a man's individual mind to the literary and scientific mind. A man may be possessed of a large and capacious mind, may start many brilliant thoughts, and give great promise of becoming useful and great, but if he suffers his mind to rest on its own extemporaneous energies-never exerting himself to store his memory with formulæ of truth—that man will be like the dark ages. His startling thoughts will be lost in the flux of events-he makes no progress in the net amount of knowledge at his command, but as fast as he receives knowledge, he negligently permits it to pass out of his mind. This, I fear, is in some measure the case with

September 9, 1837.

THE ENGLISH GUTTURAL Ŭ, AS HEARD IN
BUT, HUT.

To show the proclivity of English-speaking people to drop into this guttural, the following sentence will show every vowel pronounced in that way:

"The Editor will insert the burning of the Martyrs in his next circular."

Here we have ar er ir or ur and yr, all pronounced in the same way; and indeed, it is almost impossible for an English speaker to pronounce er or ir otherwise than if spelled ur. And yet we have great difficulty in learning to pronounce the German ö, as in Goethe, although it has nearly the same sound as the English