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so essential to impart rectitude to his thoughts, tranquillity to his feelings, and a right scope to his being. He will honestly endeavour to divest his mind of every selfish prejudice, of every sinister influence, and subject his opinions to the most rigid scrutiny; he will examine with calmness and candour the arguments of an opponent; he will open his mind to evidence from every source, and gladly follow the light of truth, wherever it may lead him; nor will he relinquish the pursuit until either he repose in the satisfaction of a settled conviction, or has done his best to obtain it.

Indeed, although an atheist should feel confident in the truth of his opinion, yet, unless he is as certain of his own infallibility as he is positive in his atheism, he will not be indisposed to re-examine the grounds of his sentiments. The broad and obvious fact, that the general verdict of the human mind in all ages is against him, is enough to suggest to a modest man the possibility of himself being mistaken-that it is, at least, as probable his individual mind may err on this one point, as that the great universe of mind has been deceived in all ages. If the common sense of the unlearned, and the elaborate deductions of the erudite, have combined in every age, with all but perfect unanimity, to sustain the conviction that there is a God, it is enough to moderate the confidence of the most stern atheist, so far as to induce him to listen with candour to an opponent, and deem the subject still open to his investigation.

As to the Christian, this subject will be as welcome to his feelings as it is important in his judgment. Though fully satisfied as to the stability of his principles, he is not unwilling to resume an examination of their foundation. While he challenges the scrutiny of an opponent, he is neither afraid nor reluctant to listen to his objections. The diamond acquires brightness by friction, and truth emits a more brilliant radiance from examination.

We propose to extend our argument from the existence, to the attributes and personal distinctions of the Deity, comprising the whole in three Books.

BOOK I.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

PART I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES, AND MODE OF CONDUCTING THE ARGUMENT.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES STATED.

THE proposition to be established is, that there is a God-and this, like all other rational propositions, must be examined by the common laws of evidence. The sacredness of its character is never assumed to exempt it from a rational ordeal. It asks no favour, but invites the closest and the fullest scrutiny; making no claim but that which absolute justice demands for all subjects-an investigation conducted in candour and uprightness.

In every argument there are certain principles which lie at its foundation. These should be distinctly stated, and rigidly adhered to; otherwise there can be no satisfaction in our reasoning-no certainty in our conclusions. Our fundamental principles are few and simple. They constitute the common ground of argument. In setting them forth we affect no metaphysical refinements, nor scholastic phraseology; we employ language in its popular acceptation, and are desirous only to convey a clear and definite idea of our meaning to men of common sense and honest hearts.

1. All intuitive and self-evident propositions are to be admitted as true.

By self-evident and intuitive propositions, we mean those which are so obvious that the mind sees their truth at once, and without the process of reasoning. All sober-minded men assent to them as soon as they are proposed; and they are equally evident to the illiterate and the philosopher, so soon as their terms are understood. Thus the propositions that a whole is greater than a part-that two material bodies cannot occupy the same absolute portions of space at the same moment of time that it is impossible for the same thing to exist and not to exist at the same instant-that there is a real difference between good and evil actions—and that a proposition cannot be, in the same sense, both true and false-are all self-evident. Our object, however, is not to furnish a list, but to give a specimen of self-evident and intuitive truths. It may be laid down as a principle, that every proposition is self-evident or intuitive, when the denial of it would contradict our consciousness and common sense, or involve a palpable contradiction and absurdity.

2. Every effect must have a cause, and the cause must be adequate to the effect.

This fundamental principle is verified by consciousness, by observation, and by instinct. We know from consciousness, that we have power to produce numberless effects which could not take place without our agency; and the power which consciousness attests as existing in ourselves, observation and experience witness as existing in others. In fact, the languages and the reasonings of men in all nations and in all ages, evince that this consciousness of personal agency is natural to man, and is the foundation of morals and responsibility. The man who denies his own agency contradicts his own consciousness, and might as well deny his own existence. Every voluntary action he performs convicts him either of insincerity of heart or insanity of mind.

When we turn our eye to the material universe, we behold innumerable phenomena exhibiting the relation of cause and

effect. Indeed, all the operations of Nature consist of a series of facts which stand in the relation of physical cause and effect. Whence comes the energy which gives to a cause its efficacy— whether that energy be essentially inherent in Nature, or whether it be derived from and directed by a power distinct from Nature, and superior to it, we do not now stop to inquire: we look merely to the fact that there is such an energy actually existing, so that the same cause produces, uniformly and constantly, the same effect; and the connection between a physical cause and its effect in inanimate Nature is as real as the connection between an intelligent agent and any effect which he may voluntarily produce. For example, the connection between the falling of a stone, as the effect of gravitation, is not less real than the connection between a volition of the mind and a corresponding action of the body. All philosophy acknowledges the reality of this connection, and is built upon it. What, indeed, is philosophy but an inquiry into the laws of Nature? and what are those laws but rules or principles, according to which the diversified phenomena are produced by their respective causes? The dependence, therefore, of effects upon their causes lies at the very foundation of all science. Without this axiom there could be no inquiry prosecuted, no laws demonstrated, no principles evolved.

It may be further affirmed that our confidence in the connection between cause and effect is an instinct of our nature. While we reject the doctrine of innate ideas, we are compelled to admit the existence of innate tendencies and impressions; and our confidence in the constancy and uniformity of Nature, or of the same cause producing the same effect, is instinctive. This confidence appears in the earliest developments of our mental constitution, before reasoning or experience has had time to originate it. If an infant has once felt the pain arising from touching the flame of a candle, he will carefully avoid putting his hand near the flame a second time. It is certain that in this case the mind of the infant connects the sensation of pain with the flame of the candle. There is here an obvious recognition between the cause and the effect, with a correspond

ing dependence on the constancy and uniformity of Nature; and as these impressions of the infant mind cannot be the result of reason or experience (for they are anterior to both), they must be referred to an instinct of our nature. This original impression continues with us through life; it never leaves us; no sophistry can expel it, nor even diminish its force. It is as natural for us to believe that every effect must have a cause, and that the same causes produce the same effects, as it is to confide in the certainty of our own existence; and as all the operations of Nature are in harmony with this principle, we have a demonstration that it has not been implanted in our nature in vain. It is not possible even to imagine an effect without a cause; the mind instantly resists every attempt to entertain such a conception, because it is contradictory to an instinctive and intuitive principle.

David Hume endeavours to resolve the connection between cause and effect into the mere relation of antecedence and succession; but this is a sophism unworthy of a philosopher, for this connection between antecedence and succession is either founded in Nature as a physical law, or it is not. If we say it is, then the dependence of effects upon their causes is admitted. If it be denied, then we demand, How is it that this connection is invariable and universal? How is it that those events which are called effects do not transpire without causes? If this connection were merely accidental, it would be proper to say that light is the cause of darkness, and darkness the cause of light, for they succeed each other daily; it would be just as proper to maintain that silence is the cause of sound (for these succeed each other), as it is to say that fire is the cause of heat. Again, if this succession were accidental, the order of it might, and indeed often would, be inverted. We demand, then, How is it that the class of facts called effects do not promiscuously change places with the class of agencies called causes? Why do not effects precede their causes, as often as causes precede their effects? How is it that the succession universally flows one way-from cause to effect? The only answer is, Because the inversion of this order is physically impossible, and impossible

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