thus foresee all the effects which transpire from the combined and multifarious operations of matter with the most perfect exactness, yet all such mechanical representations of the universe are calculated to mislead the mind, by suggesting an independent action to Nature; and, therefore, require to be qualified by the recollection of two important truths-namely, that God himself is the ever-present and all-pervading Agent, guiding and directing the whole; and that the general laws he has prescribed for the operations of Nature are not so absolute as to exclude special interpositions by his own almighty hand. Such interpositions, indeed, are repeatedly suggested by geological phenomena as having occurred in different epochs of our planet's history, and such will, doubtless, occur in its future history. The believer in the Christian revelation beholds many such special interpositions in the miracles recorded in the sacred Scriptures, and in these facts the records of Nature and of Revelation unite in their testimony to the same principle. These special interpositions, however, present no exception to the exactness of the Divine prescience: for they are a part of the Divine economy, foreseen and designed from the beginning, equally with the physical and mathematical results of mechanical laws.

With the same absolute certainty does God foreknow the actions and destinies of voluntary agents. But here we come to a subject on which the most opposite sentiments have been maintained. The Divine prescience has been pronounced incompatible with the free agency of man, and divines of opposite sentiments, to cut the knot they could not untie, have each adopted one side of the truth and denied the other. Some, to maintain man's freedom, have denied God's foreknowledge; and others, to maintain God's prescience, have denied man's freedom. It will be evident to every individual, at first sight, that one class of these divines must be in error, because each maintains an opposite proposition, and we think it not impossible to show that both are in error. Let us, then, test these opinions: first, by the dictates of reason; and, secondly, by the teachings of revelation.

SECTION III.-THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASON.

1. THE Divine prescience of all future events is as essential to God's absolute perfection, as his knowledge of the past is essential to his absolute perfection. In this respect there is no difference, for a defect in his knowledge of either one or the other is a defect, an imperfection-it is ignorance; and ignorance of any kind is incompatible with absolute perfection. Having already proved that God is an absolutely perfect Being, it follows that his knowledge is perfect; and if perfect, it must include all that is future, as well as all that is past.

2. The voluntary agency of man is a fact attested by our own consciousness. We need not a syllogism to prove this, for there is no fact to which our experience more clearly and emphatically bears testimony than to our moral liberty. We know we have power to commit or avoid a certain course of conduct, because our consciousness attests it. No sophistry, no metaphysical subtleties, can deprive us of this evidence; for it exists within us, and irresistibly remains in our consciousness, in spite of all plausible and wire-drawn reasoning to the contrary. Metaphysicians may bewilder a man's judgment, but they cannot obliterate his consciousness, nor suborn the testimony of his experience. Nature speaks with a voice too distinct, emphatic, and honest, to be bribed or silenced by any plausible theory of the subtle dialectician. We cannot get rid of this fact without denying our consciousness, and thus repudiating a fundamental principle, and casting doubt over everything else. If man's consciousness be denied, we deny the foundation of all knowledge, and may deny every other truth. But if the fundamental principles of truth are to be maintained, we must admit the evidence of consciousness; and if the evidence of consciousness be admitted, the doctrine of our moral liberty must be maintained.

While our consciousness attests this truth, our judgment perceives its conformity with our accountability to law, whether human or Divine; and the absolute injustice of any account

ability in the absence of this self-determining power. Hence, where reason and freedom end, accountability terminates. Human consciousness attests our freedom, and human reason acquiesces in the accountability of our actions, because we are conscious of our liberty, and not otherwise. Here are principles which no arts of sophistry ean evade. They are co-existent with mind; they are immutable and eternal: we can no more eradicate them than we can annihilate the mind itself.

Nor is there any real antagonism between the prescience of Deity and the moral liberty of man. Aristotle among the ancients, and Dr. A. Clarke among the moderns, have distinguished themselves by opposing this view, and they have had not a few followers; but their reasoning is, in our view, fallacious. Dr. Adam Clarke maintains that "God has ordained some things as absolutely certain. He has ordained other things as contingent. These he knows as contingent." To reconcile this doctrine with Jehovah's omniscience, it is urged, "that as omnipotence implies the power to do all things, so omniscience implies the ability to know all things, but not the obligation to know all things. He knows himself, and what he has formed, and what he can do ; but it is alleged he is not necessitated to know, as certain, what himself has made contingent; and that as God, though possessed of omnipotence, does not evidently exert it to its utmost extent-does not do all he might do-so, though he could know all things, yet that he chooses to be ignorant of some things, because he does not see it proper to know everything which he might know."*

We believe that the doctor here states the substance of all that can be urged in favour of his theory; but, with all due deference to his talents and learning, we regard his views as untenable.

(a) Our first objection to this theory is, that it gives an unamiable aspect to the Divine character. It does not, indeed, deny the capability of God to foreknow voluntary actions, but represents him as voluntarily refusing to know them-as de

* See Dr. Clarke's comment on Acts ii.

signedly excluding them from his cognizance. Such a procedure involves, at least, a partial knowledge or expectation of their character, and supposes a motive for refusing to know them more perfectly. God can be influenced by no motives but such as are wise and good; but if it be wise and good to constitute beings free agents, can it be wise and good to refuse to know the issue of their freedom? Such a notion seems to involve the idea that, had God known the result, he would not have given them such a constitution, nor have placed them in such circumstances. It represents the Deity as fearing to know the issue or moral results of his own work! How such reasoning harmonizes with the character and perfections of Deity—the wisdom, rectitude, and goodness of his administration, or the stability of his government-we are at a loss to know. In our view, it is incompatible with them all. If it be wise and good for God to constitute creatures voluntary agents and accountable beings, it is equally wise and good to know the issue of their nature and condition; and if it be incompatible with wisdom and goodness to know the result, it was incompatible with wisdom and goodness to give them the nature they possess, and place them in the circumstances of a probationary state. Our opponents will, we think, admit the correctness of this statement, and, admitting this, their denial of the Divine prescience must be abandoned.

(b) Our second objection to the theory is, that it denies to Deity the attribute of omniscience. The parallel which Dr. Clarke draws between omnipotence and omniscience is inadmissible. He states that, as omnipotence does not involve the necessity of doing all things within the range of almighty power, neither does omniscience involve the necessity of knowing all things possible to be known. But this is not a correct representation of the nature of the two attributes. Omnipotence is not an unlimited act of God, but the faculty to act with unlimited energy-not the exertion of power, but the ability to exert or put forth power to an unlimited extent. But omniscience, on the contrary, is not the mere faculty of acquiring or obtaining a knowledge of all things, but it is the actual know

ledge of all things. Dr. Clarke's view makes God merely omniscible, but denies his omniscience; it supposes the Deity to have a capacity for boundless knowledge, but denies that the capacity is filled. It supposes the Deity to be acquiring knowledge by experience, to know his creatures more fully by the development of their moral history, and to be growing wiser each day by observing the proceedings of moral agents. If our theorists shrink from these consequences, they must renounce the system which involves them.

(c) Our third objection to the theory is, that it denies the independence, the absolute perfection, and immutability of the Divine Being. This result is seen in the preceding argument. For if the Deity be destitute of knowledge in some respects, then he is partially ignorant; and a being to whom this quality applies cannot be absolutely perfect. Besides, if his knowledge be in part gradually derived from the moral history of his creatures, then is he so far dependent upon things extraneous to himself; and thus his independence is denied. If his knowledge accumulate by experience, then must his views change, his judgment alter, and thus his immutability is denied. We cannot see how these consequences can be separated from the denial of the Divine prescience; and if they are felt to be repugnant to our reason, and our respect for the Divine character, the theory which involves them must be repudiated.

(d) Our fourth objection to the notion in question is, that it is incompatible with the regularity and order of the Divine government. In the economy of the material universe, design and object are everywhere conspicuous; and system and means nicely adjusted to fulfil the design, to accomplish the object, are seen pervading every part of his works. Nothing is more obvious than that the intellect of Deity darted through every part of the complicated system ere it was created, and that the whole was adjusted and combined to fulfil the contemplated results. We should expect the same order and foresight to characterize his government in the world of mind, every rational creature being free, yet every event foreseen with intuitive certainty, and provision made for every exigency and state