of Nature is eternal, or that the diversified forms of being which constitute the universe have existed in an eternal series. Others contended that the present constitution of Nature is an effect necessarily resulting from the operations of matter which had eternally existed. Such was the doctrine of Epicurus and his disciples in ancient times, and such is the opinion of modern atheists. Others contended that, though matter was an eternal substance, yet its laws, its orderly arrangement, and harmonious operations, as displayed in Nature, were the work of a wise, powerful, and beneficent Creator, self-existent and eternal. This was the doctrine of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and ancient philosophers in general. The Christian, diverse from all these theorists, believes that matter itself is a creature, brought into existence by the power of God-that the universe is his work, and that God alone is self-existent and eternal. These four systems of belief comprehend the general views of mankind in all ages, on the existence of the universe; and it is seen that each assumes, as a fundamental axiom, as an intellectual and physical necessity, the existence of an eternal something. Some contended for the eternity of matter alone, some for the eternity of mind alone, and some for the eternity of both matter and mind; but no sect of philosophers, however erroneous and extravagant in their opinions, ever contended that nothing was eternal, or even admitted its possibility. Every man who admits the existence of the universe, or even his own existence, is compelled to admit, if he for one moment reflect on the fact, that it involves the existence of an eternal something. What that something is, we shall endeavour to determine by the arguments which follow. CHAPTER II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MATTER IS ETERNAL. IN support of the atheistic system, it is alleged that matter is eternal, and this hypothesis is, indeed, essential to that theory. ence. It is important, however, to observe, that if matter were proved to be eternal, it would not overturn the doctrine of God's existFor without controverting the eternity of matter, volumes of evidence of the existence of God might be adduced, from the constitution of the universe; and whatever evidence of a God there may be in the arrangements, adaptations, and operations of Nature, that evidence cannot be annulled by the eternity of matter. That evidence, indeed, stands upon its own ground, and must be held at its proper logical value. But, on the other hand, the non-eternity of matter is fatal to atheism; for it gives a positive disproof to every argument which can be adduced in its support. The eternity of matter is a doctrine, then, essential to atheism. Without this the theory has neither a basis on which to rest, nor any power of cohesion in its parts. If the eternity of matter be a conjecture, the whole atheistic theory is an hypothesis. If this conjecture cannot be supported, the first stone in the foundation of the atheistic fabric cannot be laid. If this conjecture be disproved, the whole system of atheism is destroyed; for, if matter be not eternal, it is not self-existent, but created and dependent; and if created, it must have had a creator, and that Creator must necessarily himself be uncreated, independent, self-existent, and eternal; or, in other words, he must be God. Thus the eternity of matter is absolutely essential to the veriest shadow of an argument in support of atheism. Such being the importance of this principle in the atheistic system, let us carefully examine its claims to our belief. As a fundamental principle, on which the whole atheistic argument depends, the eternity of matter ought to rest on indisputable evidence. As the atheist professes to be a man of reason, a philosopher, ever on his guard against imposition and error, at the greatest possible distance from all credulity, holding it to be even a virtue to doubt until the most complete evidence be afforded, have we not a right to demand from him the clearest demonstration, or the most palpable certainty, of his fundamental principle-the eternity of matter? Have we not a right to insist upon his showing that this principle is either a self-evident truth, or capable of the most clear and obvious demonstration? and that, unless he is prepared to prove this, all his assertions about the sufficiency of Nature aloneabout the prolific powers of Nature being adequate to the production of all existing phenomena, are utterly without foundation? Undoubtedly we have. What, then, is the true character of the assertion that matter is eternal? Is it a self-evident axiom, a necessary truth? or is it a proposition sustained by high probable evidence? An answer to these inquiries must now be sought. 1. The eternity of matter is not a self-evident axiom or a necessary truth. The necessity for an eternal something is felt by every mind. We cannot but admit it; but that matter is that eternal something is not felt to be either a physical or a logical necessity. Some sceptics, indeed, have argued against even the actual existence of matter. We can, certainly, conceive it possible for matter not to have existed at all, and this possibility excludes the eternity of matter from the category of necessary truths. An atheistic writer, so far confirmed in infidelity that he gloried in the name of Antitheos,* and wrote a work expressly to disprove the being of God, says " We can conceive matter not to exist." Important admission from a materialist! for, if we can conceive matter not to have existed, its non-existence is thus admitted to have been possible, and, therefore, its actual existence was contingent; and, if contingent, its eternity is excluded from the category of necessary truths, even by the testimony of infidelity itself. Indeed, as the non-existence of matter is admitted to have been possible, it follows that its actual existence has no ground at all except the will and energy of a creator. 2. The objection that the creation of matter is impossible, has no foundation in reason. What is creation? It is simply an act by which a selfexistent being brings something into existence. What, then, Antitheos-a denier of God's existence. See Gillespie on Necessary Existence of the Deity," p. 253. "The we demand, is there impossible in this? Limited as are the capabilities of a human being, we can originate events. By a mere exercise of volition and muscular energy we can cause a variety of events to be, which at present have no existence. Why, then, cannot a self-existent being cause the existence of another being? What is there to limit and control the power of a self-existent and independent being? What is there to hinder such a being from effecting anything which does not in itself involve a contradiction? Nothing which we are able to conceive. In his causing a substance to exist which did not exist before, there is no more contradiction involved than in our causing an event to exist which did not exist before. The eternity of matter, therefore, cannot be sustained on this ground. 3. The alleged indestructibility of matter is no evidence of its eternity. * Mirabaud, indeed, affirms, "That which cannot annihilate itself exists necessarily; it is impossible to conceive that that which cannot cease to exist, or that which cannot annihilate itself, could ever have had a beginning. If matter cannot be annihilated, it could not commence to be." † This is feeble and fallacious reasoning. We admit, indeed, that matter cannot annihilate itself; but that matter cannot be annihilated is neither self-evident nor capable of proof. The entire argument is built on a fallacy, for it assumes that the absence of a power to effect a certain result implies the possession of the highest attributes! Because matter has not the power to annihilate itself, it must, therefore, necessarily possess the exalted attributes of self-existence and eternity! Wonderful logic is this! The absence of one power may, indeed, involve the absence of other powers; but how the absence of a power necessarily involves the actual possession of others, and those of the highest dignity and importance, we are at a loss to * I am aware that the " System of Nature" ascribed to Mirabaud is regarded as the production of Baron d'Holbach, or, as some state, of the Baron and Diderot conjointly. "Système de la Nature," tom. i., part ii., chap. 4. conceive. The absence of the power in matter to annihilate itself is a limitation, and only one limitation among many. Matter in its essential properties has not power to make any voluntary effort. It is absolutely helpless and passive, and can act in no way but as it is controlled and governed by fixed laws. It would, therefore, be just as logical to assert, that because matter is helpless it must be omnipotent, and because it is absolutely passive it must have an independent energy to do all things, as it is to assert that, because matter cannot destroy itself, it must therefore be self-existent and eternal! Such an absurdity is but seldom equalled. But there is another aspect in this question, which the atheist has overlooked. If matter be unable to destroy itself, is it not equally unable to preserve itself? If we are to be guided by evidence, we have no reason to suppose that matter has any more power to secure its own preservation than it has to effect its own annihilation. We believe, indeed, that all matter is preserved or continued in being, but there is not the least shadow of evidence that it preserves itself; and if there be no evidence that it preserves itself, there can be no evidence that it exists by itself, or is eternal and independent. On the contrary, the fact that matter is preserved in being, although it has no power of preserving itself, suggests to our reason that it is preserved by another; and if its existence is preserved by another, it argues that it must have been derived from another; and if derived, it cannot be eternal. As to the other part of the argument of Mirabaud, in which he asserts that "matter cannot be annihilated," a few brief remarks may suffice. It is true that matter cannot be annihilated by us, but that it cannot be annihilated by any other being is an assertion without proof, and we think contrary to reason. That matter cannot be annihilated by us is certainly an evidence that we cannot create it, but no evidence that another being cannot create it. The fact, indeed, that matter is not capable of either annihilating or preserving itself, or of being annihilated by man, suggests to our reason that its being is in the power of another, superior to both; a Being who gave it existence, and 2 |