subservience and adaptation of means to ends, the regularity, order, and certainty everywhere prevalent, argue a unity of purpose and design in the mind of the great Creator, but these manifestations furnish no evidence against a plurality of Persons in the Godhead. As Paley justly observes, in reference to the argument drawn from Nature as to the unity of GodCertain, however, it is, that the whole argument for the Divine unity goes no farther than to a unity of counsel." If, indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity taught that there existed three supreme intelligences, co-equal, but separate in nature, and different in disposition and attributes, then the doctrine would both involve a physical impossibilty, and be contradicted by the harmony, regularity, and order of Nature. But the doctrine asserts the opposite of this-it proclaims unity of essence and attributes, and, by necessary consequence, the same union of disposition, counsel, purpose, and operation in the Divine Persons as we see demonstrated in the harmonious economy of Nature.

When no further objection against a doctrine can be established, we often hear the murmur of dissent uttered on account of its mysteriousness. Thus it is with respect to the Holy Trinity. When the dissident is disarmed of his arguments one by one, he still urges that he is not able to conceive how such a plurality and unity can exist in the Deity. We reply, Sober reason does not require us to explain the "how" a thing exists, but to furnish evidence that it "does" so exist. The mode of a thing's existence is quite distinct from the evidence which determines the certainty of its existence, and a logical reasoner will constantly keep this distinction in mind. He will never reject the evidence which proves a fact, merely because he cannot explain every mode connected with that fact. He will accept clear and satisfactory evidence of a truth, and rest in the certainty of the same, and wait for further light as to its mode. The same principle should guide us in seeking for Divine truth; it is subject to the common laws of evidence, and both logic and candour require its evidence to be treated like that on all ordinary subjects. The duty of any inquirer is,

therefore, not to demand such an explanation of the Godhead as shall unfold to him every mystery respecting the Trinity, but to seek for satisfactory evidence respecting its truth, and allow his judgment to be determined by the character and strength of that evidence. Until that is done, his unbelief is an offence against reason as well as against God. There are multitudes of facts in the economy of Nature which are irresistibly evident, and yet they involve inquiries which no one can answer-mysteries which no philosopher can explain. We know the human mind can act directly upon matter, but who can explain its mode? We are familiar with the facts of nutrition, growth, assimilation, animal and vegetable life, chemical affinity, gravitation, heat, combustion, &c., but inquiries into each phenomenon soon show how short is our sounding-line. We almost immediately get into depths we cannot fathom, and meet with ultimate facts which our reason can no more explain than it can the mode of God's existence, and the mystery of the Trinity. But though we cannot explain the mode of natural phenomena, we never question their reality, for that would be to deny the evidence of reason, and often the evidence of sense. So with regard to the Trinity. It belongs to the category of ultimate facts, and anything inexplicable as to its mode must be regarded as quite distinct from the evidence of its truth. We have already shown that there is nothing in the doctrine incongruous with either abstract or actual truth, and now we submit to calm and candid consideration some evidence in its support.

SECTION

II. WHILE THE

DOCTRINE OF A TRINITY IS IN HARMONY WITH TRUTH, IT IS SUSTAINED BY CORRELATIVE TRUTHS.

IN conducting our argument on the direct evidence for a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, it will conduce to order, and facilitate reference, if we arrange the successive steps of the argument into several general propositions.

PROPOSITION I.-Our first proposition must be merely d compendious summary of truths previously established. The existence of the Deity is a necessary truth, and, if so, all the attributes of Deity must exist necessarily and eternally, even as his essence; they cannot be separated from it even in conception.

To suppose that any of God's attributes were derived, would be to suppose that he was dependent upon something, which is incompatible with his necessary existence. To suppose that they had a beginning, would be to suppose that there was a prior eternity in which he existed without possessing them, which is the same thing as to undeify him. To suppose that any of his attributes can ever cease to exist is absurd, because it is to suppose him to cease to be what he essentially is-the self-existent, independent, and immutable Jehovah. If his existence be essential and eternal, so must all his attributes be essential and eternal. Whatever may be predicated of the nature of God now, may be predicated as belonging to that nature through all eternity past and to come. Therefore absolute perfection, all-sufficiency, immutability, omnipresence, omniscience, wisdom, omnipotence, infinite goodness and love, perfect holiness, and a disposition for communion, being attributes of the Eternal God now, always were his attributes, and for ever will be, without deterioration or change in any respect. The truths embodied in this proposition have been fully established in the Second Book of this work, and are so generally acknowledged by divines of all persuasions that it is unnecessary to do more than to give this brief statement of them as the foundation of our argument.

PROPOSITION II.-Some of the attributes and perfections of the Deity are active powers or faculties, such as the attributes of intelligence or wisdom, of power, love, holiness, a disposition for communion, &c. These are active now. The Scriptures declare it, and reason corroborates it; and having existed eternally and immutably in God, they must have existed not as latent qualities or mere capacities, but as essentially and eternally active. Their activity is as essential as their existence, and, therefore, eternal.

Several of the ancient philosophers held the eternal activity of the Divine attributes as a truth so self-evident and so fully established, that they erroneously grounded upon this the eternity of matter. Plato reasons that the world is an eternal effect, proceeding from an eternal Cause; for he says, "The will of God and his power of acting being necessarily as eternal as his essence, the effects of that will and power must be supposed coeval to the will and power themselves; in the same manner as light would eternally proceed from the sun, or a shadow from an interposed body, or an impression from an imposed seal, if the respective causes of these effects are supposed eternal." * On this ground he maintained the eternity of the world. Aristotle, after him, held the same doctrine. He contends that "God, who is an immovable (immutable) nature, whose essence is energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world." † The reasoning of these men is exceedingly like that of powerful minds, without the advantage of the light of the Christian revelation. It is partly true, and partly erroneous; the premises are true, but the conclusions are false. The proposition they laid down, as an established and incontrovertible principle-namely, the eternal activity of the Divine attributes -is true; this was too clear to be doubted; but the eternity of matter does not follow from thence. If there were no other mode in which the Divine attributes could have been exercised than in the creation of matter, or in reference to some extraneous objects, then their reasoning would have some force: but this assumption is not true. There are other modes in which the active powers of the Divine Being can be employed, without the creation of either matter or spirit, without the existence of any extraneous objects whatever, as we shall prove hereafter. Were it not so, indeed, there would be no adequate mode in which the Divine attributes could find their full and appropriate operation, for the attributes are infi

"Zachariæ Scholast. Disput."

+"Met. Lib.," xiv., c. 6.

nite, and creation, however vast, is but finite and limited. Besides, the eternity of matter, and the eternity, too, of any created mind, has before been disproved. Yet the testimony of the above distinguished philosophers is valuable, as to the fundamental principle contained in our present proposition. It was with them a settled principle, an axiom which lay at the foundation of their reasoning, that the active powers, or attributes, of Deity must have been eternally exercised. This is the doctrine in the proposition now before the reader, and it is sustained by the following argument.

1. Great absurdities and contradictions would be involved in maintaining the contrary. The nature of the argument requires us to notice these absurdities, but let every allusion to the Divine nature be made with modesty, reverence, and awe. Be it observed, then, that to deny the eternal exercise of the Divine attributes, is to suppose that God was eternally in a state of inactivity; for if the exercise of his attributes be not eternal, there must have been a period when they began their action; and if there was a period when their action began, there must have been a prior eternity in which they did not operate; and this involves the most absurd consequences. Thus, if this supposition be applied to his intelligence, it affirms there was an eternity in which the Divine Being knew nothing. If applied to his power, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he did nothing. If applied to his love, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he loved nothing. If applied to his disposition for communion, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he communed with nothing. If applied to his holiness, it affirms that there was an eternity in which this attribute was never exercised. Indeed, the notion involves such absurdities, that the mind recoils from them, as insulting to that glorious Being who is the object of our contemplations.

It avails nothing to plead that infinite faculties were eternally in the Divine Being, and though not eternally exercised, they were inherent in his nature, and ready to be brought into exercise at any period when the Divine Being should determine. The attributes of Jehovah are not mere faculties, or negative