ART. I.-Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 1862-3. BY WILLIAM GIFFORD PALGRAVE. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond., 1865.

MR. PALGRAVE'S Central Arabia is, we think, upon the whole, the most provoking book that we can remember to have read. It is not only a very clever and amusing. book, but it is evidently the work of a clever man. Having told us that he is to "fill up a blank in the map of Asia," by giving us a description of a country of which we know little or nothing," its plains and mountains, its tribes and cities," he proceeds to describe a country which has been as well known for nearly half a century as it is now. He leads us to expect from him a full, accurate, and faithful account of its inhabitants, their "governments and institutions," their "ways and customs," and their social condition;" but, instead of fulfilling these expectations, which he was quite capable of fulfilling, he gives us an account which is not only defective in many essential particulars, but which contains such inaccuracies and fictions, that we know not what to accept as true, and what to reject as erroneous or fabulous. That the book, at the same time, has great merits, which have obtained for it extensive popularity and much praise, we readily acknowledge. This indeed is the reason why we have considered it our duty, even at this late hour, to state freely some at least of the grounds on which we consider it calculated to mislead the numerous readers who may have been induced to rely upon it.

have said that the book has great but they do not consist in the more ..ous discussions in which the author VOL. XLIV. N-1

freely indulges. For everything relating to Mohammedan theology, the origin and connexion of Arab races, and such grave matters, there are other authorities on which, for sufficient reasons, we should be more disposed to rely. We cannot say that he has added anything appreciable to Our knowledge of the geography of Central Arabia, or of any branch of physical science in connexion with it; indeed, he tells us that "the men of the land, rather than the land of the men, were my main object of research and principal study." Of much that relates to the men of the land, however, and both influences and illustrates their life and character; of the municipal organization prevailing in the numerous towns and villages scattered over the country, and in which there must be, to a great extent, local self-government, as in all the countries of Asia; of the means of education which the Mohammedans have never neglected, where there was a settled population to take advantage of them; of the tenure of land, so important an element in the social condition of every Asiatic people; of the nature and extent of the agriculture of the country, its condition, or its produce; of the commerce carried on by the numerous traders of Central Arabia who frequent Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, Bagdad, and other places; in short, of anything material or tangible he tells us little or nothing. Neither does he tell us much about the condition-the comparative comfort or misery

of the great mass of the settled popula tion; but of some of the higher, and a portion of the middle classes of Central Arabia, he gives such an account as we have not from any one else, and as no one who had not lived amongst them on the familiar

terms on which Mr. Palgrave describes himself as associating with them, could be expected or could pretend to give.

Mr. Palgrave writes well; his pen is fluent, we had almost said affluent; his command of language, his powers of description and dramatic delineation are considerable; and we cannot doubt that he writes with facility. These are great advantages, but they are also great temptations. To a man who commands those powers, and to whom it costs no unpleasant effort to exercise them, the temptation to rely upon these, rather than upon the accuracy that demands patient investigation, is strong; and to a man who feels in himself the power to embellish almost indefinitely any story or narrative that may take his fancy, the temptation "to touch it up" may be irresistible.

When Sir Walter Scott, in playful mischief, anticipated his friend William Clerk, and told the story which he knew it was Clerk's intention to tell that evening, he could not refrain from embellishing it, or, as he said, "putting a cocked hat on its head and a cane in its hand." But Clerk, a keen and accurate historical antiquary, who valued the story because it was strictly true, accused Scott of spoiling it. Scott had no doubt improved it as a story, and perhaps had not much impaired it as a picture of manners; but he had converted a fragment of authentic history into a bit of fiction, more attractive, no doubt, than the original, but no longer an authentic record. It may perhaps be more Mr. Palgrave's misfortune than his fault that his story, which is always well told, should so often suggest the idea of the cocked hat and the cane. At the same time, a somewhat careful perusal of the book has led us to the conclusion, that whatever may be the ideal embellishments, they do not destroy the general likeness, and that the portraiture is still true, at least in the sense in which the higher kind of fiction is true, to the life and manners which it professes to delineate.

What were the special objects which led Mr. Palgrave to undertake a journey attended with so much personal risk, in a country of which we already knew nearly all that we much cared to know, except latitudes and longitudes, which he had not the means of ascertaining, he does not distinctly inform us. He tells us indeed that he was then "in connexion with the order of the Jesuits, an order well known in the annals of philanthropic daring;" and that his expenses were paid by the Emperor of the French. He hints, too, at some mysterious object, the nature of which he does not choose, or does not feel at liberty, to

divulge. What so clear-sighted a sovereign could employ Mr. Palgrave to do for him in Central Arabia, unless to purchase Arab horses, we confess ourselves unable to conjecture; but if we are to judge of Mr. Palgrave's qualifications for that office by his vague and unsatisfactory observations on the steeds which he saw in Nejd, we should be led to fear that he could not have been a very suitable agent to execute such a commission for one who knows a good horse as well as most men. What Mr. Palgrave's real views or purposes may have been, we have no means of knowing; and for our present purpose we have no concern with these, except in as far as they may be supposed to have influenced his manner of regarding what he saw and heard, or the freedom and fidelity of his communications to the public. At the same time, we have found it impossible to resist the conviction that his journey into Central Arabia must have been unpremeditated and suddenly undertaken. Had it been otherwise, it cannot be supposed that he could have failed to make himself acquainted with what was already publicly known of the region in which he contemplated travelling. We have not, however, discovered any trace of his having sought such information. On the contrary, unless we were to attribute to him unworthy motives, we are bound to assume that he was not aware that Central Arabia had been visited and described by any European; and that when he entered the desert at Maan, on his way to Nejd, he imagined that he was about to enter a country. unknown to Europeans. It is very remark. able, too, that he never appears to have got rid of this curious notion. His book, we presume, must have been written after his return home; yet none of his readers, we think, could have discovered, from anything that he has told them, that he was not the first European who had ever been in that country. It is not the less true that, since the conquest of Nejd and the overthrow of the Wahaby power by the army of Mohammed Aly of Egypt, in 1818,-that is, for nearly half a century,-Nejd, or Central Arabia, has been better known in Europe than perhaps any other part of the Peninsula. The European officers who held prominent places in the army with which İbrahim Pacha subdued the Wahaby kingdom, and which continued to occupy the country for several years, did not fail to collect, and to make public, an amount of detailed information regarding Nejd, such as only their position in the service of the conqueror could have enabled them to obtain from trustworthy sources, and such as

we do not possess, in a shape so authentic, regarding any other part of Arabia.*

The Wahabys, as is well known, are not a nation, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but a sect, composed of men of many different tribes and principalities. They may be shortly described as Mohammedan Puritans. The sect takes its designation from its founder, Ibn-Abd-ul-Wahab, who, about A.D. 1746, began to inculcate his religious opinions at Derayeh, which became the Wahaby capital. He required the most rigid observance of all the precepts of the Coran, from which the Mussulmans had everywhere widely departed. He rejected all the legends, and all but the well-authenticated traditions, with which successive commentators had overlaid the original text. He taught that to address prayers or supplications to Mohammed, or any other departed mortal, or even to associate in prayer any other name with that of the One God, is idolatrous. He enforced the obligation of praying five times daily, and strictly observing the fast of Ramadan. He prohibited the use of anything intoxicating, and of games of chance; required that certain crimes and moral delinquencies should no longer be tolerated, but should be severely punished; enforced the obligation of giving a certain proportion of a man's means in alms, and of putting a stop to usury; and he enjoined at least one pilgrimage to Mecca. These are all in strict conformity with the precepts and injunctions of the Coran. He farther forbade the use of tobacco, or of silk or gold in man's attire, holding these and other adornments of the person to be fit only for women, He ordered all domes and other monuments that had been erected over the graves of reputed saints to be destroyed, and forbade the erection of any such, because persons were thereby induced to address prayers or supplications to beings who had been but mortals like themselves, and thus to be guilty of idolatry.

Such are the leading doctrines inculcated by Ibn-Abd-ul-Wahab more than a century ago. They were enforced by the sword of Saoud, chief of Derayeh, the reformer's efficient patron and disciple, and are still professed and enforced in like manner by the Wahabys, with the whole power of their government, and with unabated fanaticism.

A succession of hereditary chiefs, who

* It may be proper to explain that the term Central Arabia, as used by Mr. Palgrave, means the Wahaby kingdom, commonly known as Nejd, which embraces not only the ancient province of Nejd, or

were able administrators and distinguished military leaders, enabled the Wahabys to extend their dominions, to consolidate their power, and to found a kingdom, which now includes the whole country from the shores of the Persian Gulf to the vicinity of Mecca and Medina, and which for a time included also the whole of the Hejaz.

In a country the normal condition of which was such as prevailed in Arabia, where every tribe was at war with its neighbor, and not unfrequently one division of a tribe was at war with another; where revenge for blood was regarded as a sacred obligation, and the object of almost every contest was plunder, and its result devastation, the growth of and power strong enough to maintain peace and give security to agriculture and commerce, to person and property, must be a mighty gain. But, strange as it may seem, it is still true that the only basis on which a power has hitherto been established or maintained in Central and Northern Arabia has been religious fanaticism. It was so with the first Mohammedan empire; it has been so with the other minor powers that have established their domination over a part of the country for a time; it has been, and it is now, with the Wahabys. No other bond seems to be strong enough to bind these Arabs together, and when the fanaticism has cooled the bond has been loosed. It may, however, be centuries before it has so cooled in Nejd. The facts that the Wahabys are a small minority, yet strong enough to be aggressive, and that they occupy a country singularly difficult of access to an organized force, from whatever side it may advance, together with the knowledge that they are hated, as only Orientals can hate, by the Mohammedan populations around them, may probably suffice to keep alive the burning fire of their zeal.

The history of their military successes has been for the most part, as that of Asiatic conquerors has generally been, but a chronicle of massacre and pillage. While they were led by such men as Saoud, the founder of their power, or his son Abd-ul-Azeez, or his son, the second Saoud, their military successes were almost uninterrupted; but under the feeble and avaricious Abd-Allah, son of the latter Saoud, they made an unskilful and ineffectual resistance to Ibrahim Pacha. Had the father of Abd-Allah, who died before the Egyptians invaded Nejd, survived to conduct the war, the result would probably have been disastrous to the Egyptian

army.

Mr. Palgrave gives us in some detail,

ties, which have been annexed to it either by conquest or by voluntary submission.

Wahabys; but his information was collected

orally, and as he did not take the trouble to consult, or did not choose to credit, any of the various authentic accounts that have been published, both here and on the Continent, he has failed to acquire anything approaching to an accurate knowledge of it. Of his own account he says

"That such an account may contain several discrepancies in dates, and even in persons, from what has been by others reported or published on these topics, I well know; nor yet do I intend to claim for it the merit of superior accuracy, though it seems to me in some points clearer, and possessed of greater intrinsic probability." -Vol. ii. p. 37.

He thus not only recommends his own account to his readers, but, by implication, questions the intrinsic probability of what had been reported or published by others.

The history of the Wahabys, from the rise of their power under the first Wahaby chief, Saoud, till its overthrow by Ibrahim Pacha, extends over little more than seventy years, and embraces only four reigns. Saoud, the first chief, died in 1765, and was succeeded by his son, Abd-ul-Azeez, who was assassinated in 1803, and was succeeded by his son Saoud, who died in 1814, and was succeeded by his son Abd-Allah, who surrendered to Ibrahim Pacha in 1818, and was executed at Constantinople. The year in which the more remarkable events of each of those reigns occurred was well known to every one who had given attention to the subject, excepting Mr. Palgrave; but that gentleman, without any regard to facts which he could easily have ascertained, for they were already published, has chosen to give as history such a complication of errors as it would be impossible to correct by any general statement, and which must therefore be unravelled in detail.

The first Wahaby chief, Saoud, the founder of the Wahaby power, died, as we have stated, in 1765, and was succeeded by his son, Abd-ul-Azeez, whom he had nominated several years before, and whom the Wahabys had willingly recognised as his destined successor. Mr. Palgrave represents Abd-ulAzeez as having succeeded in 1800, ❝or about that time;" but he had been for thirty-five years, or about that time, ruler of the Wahabys. According to Mr Palgrave's account, he could not have reigned more than five or six years, and he describes his reign as short; but he reigned thirty-eight years. Mr. Palgrave gives a highly rhetorical account of the short reign which he assigns to Abd-ul-Azeez, and attributes to it events which did not occur till long after the death of that prince; while on the other hand, he

ascribes to an imaginary successor the most memorable achievements of Abd-ul-Azeez's reign. These were the capture of Meshed Hoossein, or Kerbela, the most sacred of places in the eyes of the Persians, and other Mohammedans of the Sheeah sect, which was sacked in the spring of 1801; and the capture of Mecca, the place of pilgrimage of the whole Mohammedan world, in the spring of 1803. These events, both of them signal military successes, Mr. Palgrave attributes to Abd-Allah, the brother of Abd-ul-Azeez, whom he imagines to have succeeded to the Sovereignty; but Abd-Allah did not succeed to the sovereignty, neither did he lead the Wahaby army to Kerbela or to Mecca.

Of the latter of these events, the capture, or more properly the surrender, of Mecca, perhaps, in the estimation of Mussulmans, the most important in the recent history of the Mohammedan nations, Mr. Palgrave tells us, that when the Wahabys took the town they massacred the Turkish garrison; but we know, from better authorities, that the Shereef of Meccá, Ghaleb, having fled to Jeddah, after setting fire to the cita del where he resided, Saoud and his Wahabys quietly took possession, without committing any excesses. The shops were open the next day, and the Wahabys paid, in ready money, for what they obtained from them. We also know that when the Wahabys entered Mecca there was no Turkish garrison in the place. Such Turkish soldiers as Ghaleb had with him in the citadel or palace-these are often convertible terms in the East-he had carried away with him to Jeddah, to assist in the defence of that place, which, with their aid, he maintained successfully.

In the Précis de l'histoire des Wahabys, by M. Jomard, being an Appendix to M. Mengin's Histoire de l'Egypt sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed Ali, the following is the notice of the surrender of Mecca :

"Pendant ce temps, le cheryf Ghâleb quitta la Mekke et se rendit a Geddah. Avant de partir il mit là feu la forteresse. Souhoud se porta sur cette première ville, où il entra sans coup férir; ensuit il attaqua Geddah."

Sir Harford Jones Brydges, who was for many years resident at Bagdad, and was the Political Resident of the British Government at the time when these events occurred,-who gave opportune pecuniary aid to the unfortunate widows and orphans who escaped the massacre at Kerbela, and had for years maintained a Courteous intercourse with the Wahaby chief, in order that the messengers bearing his despatches might be allowed to pass in safety,

-is able, in his Brief History of the Wahauby, by reference to his official correspondence at the time, to fix, with great precision, the dates of these events. The following is his account of the surrender of Mecca, and of the assassination of Abd-ul-Azeez

"It was in this year also(1802) that the Syrian caravan which departs from Damascus, and comprises the pilgrims from all parts of Asia Minor, Constantinople, and the two Irâks, Araby and Agemy, performed its pilgrimage for the last time: for in 1803 the Wahauby had effected the complete conquest of the Hedjaz, having in the early part of that year laid siege to Mecca, which was bravely defended by Shaik Ghaleb, the shereef; who at last contrived to leave the town with his family, having previously set fire to such part of the furniture of the palace as he could not carry away. Mecca then submitted to Abdul Aziz, whose troops, on entering the sacred city, committed no excesses. The shops were opened the next day, and everything was purchased by the troops with ready money, These events took place in April and May: and on the 13th November following, Abdul Aziz was assassinated while at his prayers, by a Persian whose relations the Wahaubys had murdered at Kerbela. Abdul Aziz therefore did not live to see the complete conquest of Hedjaz, which was effected by his son Saoud.

"In speaking of these transactions I speak of them as the transactions of Abdul Aziz, he being then the head of the Wahaubys; but they were principally conducted by his son Saoud, who succeeded him, and who placed at the head of the Meccan Government the brother of the fugitive Shereef Ghaleb."

Mr. Palgrave gives a clever melodramatic sketch of the assassination of Abd-ul-Azeez by a fanatic Persian, who, he says, had been instigated by the Court of Teheran to commit the crime; and he asserts that on the body of the assassin was found, "the written engagement, countersigned by the Governor of Meshed Hoseyn." He then tells how "Abd-Allah, who was now Sultan of Nejd, swore that his first vengeance for his brother's death should be on the city that had harbored his assassin;" how thereupon AbdAllah led his army towards the sacred places of the Persians, Meshed Ali and Meshed Hoossein, or Kerbela; how he "scattered the forces assembled to check his onset at Zobeir, at Sook-esh-Sheyookh, and at Samowah" how he laid siege to Meshed Ali, but having been repulsed with considerable loss, he left Meshed Ali to its defenders, and "marched northward with new rage against Meshed Hoseyn or Kerbelah, the main object of his hatred."

Now, in this circumstantial account of an event, important in Oriental history, there is hardly one statement that is historically

true.

There is nothing to justify the assertion that the assassination of Abd-ul-Azeez was instigated by the Court of Teheran; and Mr. Palgrave, so far as we are aware, is the first author who has alleged that a written engagement, bearing the signature of the Governor of Meshed Hoossein, was found on the corpse of the assassin, or anything else. Of the authorities who have given an account of the matter, founded on investigations conducted at the time of the occurrence, or not many years thereafter, by persons who had the best means of ascertaining the facts, there is not one, so far as we can discover, who alleges that a paper bearing any signature was found, while those who mention that a paper was found, state expressly and distinctly that it did not bear any signature.

Abd-ul-Azeez was not succeeded, as Mr. Palgrave asserts, by his brother Abd-Allah, who never even pretended to have a claim to the sovereignty. Neither did he lead the army to the attack of Kerbela, as Mr. Palgrave alleges. Abd-ul-Azecz, as already stated, was succeeded by his son Saoud, who led the Wahaby army to the attack of Kerbela.

The expedition to Kerbela could not have been undertaken to avenge the death of Abdul-Azeez, for the very sufficient reason that it took place during the life of that prince, and two years and a half before he was assassinated.

The Wahabys did not, as Mr. Palgrave states, attack Meshed Ali on their way to Meshed Hoossein. The attack and repulse which he alleges to have occurred in 1801, when Kerbela was attacked, did not occur till 1807. Neither do we believe that their advance on that occasion was opposed by troops collected at Zobeir, Sook-Sheiookh, or Somowah.

What is true is, that, on the 2d of April 1801, the Wahabys, under Saoud, the son of the then reigning sovereign, Abd-ul-Azeez, unexpectedly attacked Meshed Hoossein, or Kerbela, took it, massacred the greater part of the inhabitants, pillaged the town, plundered and destroyed the tomb and mausoleum of Hoossein, the grandson of Mohammed, and carried off a vast amount of jewels, treasure, and other articles of value; and that, on the 13th of November 1803, Abd-ul-Azeez, then eighty-two years of age, was assassinated while at prayers in the Mosque of Derayeh, by a fanatical Persian Seyud, or descendant of Mohammed, whose family had been murdered by the Wahabys at Kerbela in 1801, and who sacrificed his life to avenge the murder and the foul dishonour then done to the tomb and