89 App. Div. 311, 85 N. Y. Supp. 967, 181 N. Y. 515, 73 N. E. 1124; Lehr v. Steinway & H. P. R. Co. 118 N. Y. 556, 23 N. E. 889, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 635; Donnelly v. H. C. & A. I. Piercy Contracting Co. 222 N. Y. 210, 118 N. E. 605, 18 N. C. C. A. 434; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 44 L.R.A. 216, 52 N. E. 679; Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200; Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co. 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39; Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 1, 19 L.R.A. 365, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690, 33 N. E. 142; O'Brien v. Erie R. Co. 139 App. Div. 291, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1040; Kinsella v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 162 App. Div. 926, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1120; Schachter v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. 70 Misc. 558, 127 N. Y. Supp. 308. It was error to charge the jury that there could be no recovery if plaintiff went upon the trestle of his own accord, or without invitation from the conductor, and that unless the jury found that he asked plaintiff to show him where Herbert fell, and plaintiff went up in response to such request to point out the place, and the conductor followed with a lantern to near where plaintiff himself fell, the verdict must be no cause of action. Eckert v. Long Island R. Co. 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Thomp. Neg. § 199. Messrs. Cohn, Chormann, & Franchot, for respondent: The trial court committed no error in instructing the jury that they could not find a verdict based upon any alleged negligence of the defendant prior to or leading up to the first accident, when Herbert Wagner fell from the car. Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618, 46 L.R.A. 672, 73 Am. St. Rep. 715, 55 N. E. 401; Trapp v. McClellan, 68 App. Div. 362, 74 N. Y. Supp. 130; Fanizzi v. New York & Q. C. R. Co. 113 App. Div. 440, 99 N. Y. Supp. 281; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 101, 44 L.R.A. 216, 52 N. E. 679; McGovern v. DegnonMcLean Contracting Co. 120 App. Div. 524, 105 N. Y. Supp. 408; Murphy v. New York, 89 App. Div. 93, 85 N. Y. Supp. 445; Jex v. Straus, 122 N. Y. 293, 25 N. E. 478; Storey v. New York, 29 App. Div. 316, 51 N. Y. Supp. 580; Leeds v. New York Teleph. Co. 178 N. Y. 118, 70 N. E. 219; Cleveland v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 68 N. Y. 306; Mars v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 54 Hun, 625, 8 N. Y. Supp. 107; Luedeke v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 164 App. Div. 104, 149 N. Y. Supp. 525; Beetz v. Brooklyn, 10 App. Div. 382, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1009; McVay v. Brooklyn, Q. C. & Suburban R. R. Co. 113 App. Div. 724, 99 N. Y. Supp. 266; Dulfer v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 115 App. Div. 670, 101 N. Y. Supp. 207; Knaisch v. Joline, 138 App. Div. 854, 123 N. Y. Supp. 412. Cardozo, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The action is for personal injuries. The defendant operates an electric railway between Buffalo and Niagara Falls. There is a point on its line where an overhead crossing carries its tracks above those of the New York Central and the Erie. A gradual incline upwards over a trestle raises the tracks to a height of 25 feet. A turn is then made to the left at an angle of from 64 to 84 degrees. After making this turn, the line passes over a bridge, which is about 158 feet long from one abutment to the other. Then comes a turn to the right at about the same angle down the same kind of an incline to grade. Above the trestle, the tracks are laid on ties, unguarded at the ends. There is thus an overhang of the cars, which is accentuated at curves. On the bridge, a narrow footpath runs between the tracks, and beyond the line of overhang there are tie rods and a protecting rail. Plaintiff and his cousin Herbert boarded a car at a station near the bottom of one of the trestles. Other passengers, entering at the same time, filled the platform, and blocked admission to the aisle. The platform was provided with doors, but the conductor did not close them. Moving at from 6 to 8 miles an hour, the car, without slackening, turned the curve. There was a violent lurch, and Herbert Wagner was thrown out, near the point where the trestle changes to a bridge. The cry was raised, "Man overboard." The car went on across the bridge, and stopped near the foot of the incline. Night and darkness had come on. Plaintiff walked along the trestle, a distance of 445 feet, until (232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 he arrived at the bridge, where he thought to find his cousin's body. He says that he was asked to go there by the conductor. He says, too, that the conductor followed with a lantern. Both these statements the conductor denies. Several other persons, instead of ascending the trestle, went beneath it, and discovered under the bridge the body they were seeking. As they stood there, the plaintiff's body struck the ground beside them. Reaching the bridge, he had found upon a beam his cousin's hat, but nothing else. About him there was darkness. He missed his footing, and fell. The 1917A, 7, 112 N. E. 727. Carrier-negli er. He is ac- gence to passenuntable as if he ger-liability to ad. Ehrgott v. rescuer. The trial judge held that negli- New York, 96 N. Y. 264, 280, 281, gence toward Herbert Wagner 48 Am. Rep. 622. would not charge the defendant The defendant says that we must with liability for injuries suffered by the plaintiff, unless two other facts were found: First, that th plaintiff had been invited by th conductor to go upon the bridg; and, second, that the conductor hd followed with a light. Thus linted, the jury found in favor of the defendant. Whether the limitaion may be upheld is the question be answered. Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons torelief. The law does not ignore the reactions of the mind in tracing onduct to its consequences. It reognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wong that imperils life is a wrong o the imperiled victim; it is a wrng also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid. Gilney v. State, 137 N. Y. 1, 19 L.R.A 365, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690, 33 N. E. 142. The railroad company whose train approaches without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails, but a wrongdoer also to the bystander who drags him from the path. Eckert v. Long Island R. Co. 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721. Cf. Waters v. William J. Taylor Co. 218 N. Y. 248, L.R.A. stop, in following the chain of causes, when action ceases to be "instinctive." By this is meant, it seems, that rescue is at the peril of the rescuer, unless spontaneous and immediate. If there has been time to deliberate, if impulse has given way to judgment, one cause, it is said, has spent its force, and another has intervened. In this case the plaintiff walked more than 400 feet in going to Herbert's aid. He had time to reflect and weigh; impulse had been followed by choice; and for choice. choice, in the de- Negligence-in- N. E. 605, Bird v. St. 224 N. Y. 18 N. C., A. 434; Paul F. & Ins. Co. 47, 54, 120 T. E. 86, 13 A.L.R. 875. So swing an exception, if recognized would leave little of the rule. "Th human mind," as we have said (ople v. Majone, 91 N. Y. 211, 212, "acts with celerity which it is sontimes impossible to measure." Tl law does not discriminate betwee the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. i is enough that the act, whether mpulsive or deliberate, is the child f the occasion. Trial-jurynegligence of rescuer. The defendant finds another o. stacle, however, in the futility of the plaintiff's sacrifice. He should have gone, it is said, below the trestle with the others; he should have known, in view of the overhang of the cars, that the body would not be found above; his conduct was not responsive to the call of the emergency; it was a wanton exposure to a danger that was useless. Miller v. Union R. Co. 191 N. Y. 77, 80, 83 N. E. 583. We think the quality of his acts in the situation that confronted him was to be determined by the jury. Certainly he believed that good would come of his search upon the bridge. He was not going there to view the landscape. The law cannot say of his belief that a reasonable man would have been unable to share it. He could not know the precise point at which his cousin had fallen from the car. If the fall was from the bridge, there was no reason why the body, caught by some projection, might not be hang ing on high, athwart the tie rods or the beams. Certainly no such reason was then apparent to the plaintiff, or so a jury might have found. Indeed, his judgment was confirmed by the finding of the hat. There was little time for delay, if the facts were as he states them. Another car was due, and the body, if not removed, might be ground beneath the wheels. The plaintiff had to choose at once, in agitation and with imperfect knowledge. He had seen his kinsman and companion thrown out into the darkness. Rescue could not charge the company with liability, if rescue was condemned by reason. "Errors of judgment," however, would not count against him, if they resulted "from the excitement and confusion of the moment." Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 472, 49 L.R.A. '15, 78 Am. St. Rep. 825, 45 Atl. 070, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 563. The Iason that was exacted of him was nt the reason of the morrow. We reason fitted and proportioned to he time and the event. It Whether Herbert Wagner's fall was due to the defendant's negligenc, and whether plaintiff, in going t the rescue, as he did, was foolhardy or reasonable in the light & the emergency confronting him, wre questions for the jury. The udgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. Hiscock, Ch. J., and Hogan, Pound, McLaughlin, Crane, and Andrews, JJ., concur. ANNOTATION. Liability for death of, or injury to, one seeking to rescue another. I. Scope, 5. II. Rules in general: a. Contributory negligence generally, 5. b. Danger must appear imminent and real, not speculative or imaginary, 10. II.-continued. c. Dangerou: condition about by rescuer, 11. brought d. Negligence of defendant, 11. e. Where rescue is not spontaneous, but deliberate, 13. f. Proximate cause, 13. II.-continued. g. Employees; assumption of risk, 14. III. Application: a. Dangers arising from operation of trains or street cars: 1. Rescue of persons on or near 2. Engineers or other train I. Scope. The question of imputability to the rescuer of antecedent negligence of the rescued person is treated in the annotation following Bond v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 5 A.L.R. 206, and is excluded from the present note. The questions both of negligence and of contributory negligence are within the scope of the annotation, so far as they are distinctive to the class of cases under consideration. But questions of negligence arising on the particular facts are usually common to cases of attempted rescue and to other classes of cases also; and, where this is true, they are not especially considered in the present annotation. Cases involving exposure to danger in order to save property are not included in the annotation, the same principles not necessarily applying as in cases of attempts to save life. See, for example, Condiff v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. (1891) 45 Kan. 256, 25 Pac. 562. Nor does the annotation include cases where there was no attempt to rescue another from peril, but merely an act in an emergency to save one's own life; although some of the principles, of course, involved in the cases in the present annotation, are involved, also, in the other class of cases, such as the doctrine that one need not adopt the least hazardous course when called upon suddenly to act in a dangerous situation, created by the negligence of another. As an example of this class of excluded cases, see Twomley v. Central Park, N. & E. R. R. Co. (1877) 69 N. Y. 159, 25 Am. Rep. 162, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 217, where a passenger on a street car sustained injury in jumping from the car, III. a-continued. 4. Stopping runaway cars, 24. 5. Dangers incurred in attempts to flag trains, 26, 6. Miscellaneous, 27. b. Attempts to stop runaway horse, 28. c. Danger from vehicles negligently driven, 30. d. Danger from fire, 30. e. Danger from gas, 31. f. Danger from electric wires, 32. g. Miscellaneous, 32. when a collision was threatened, but did not in fact occur, with a train, as the street car was crossing the railroad tracks. II. Rules in general. a. Contributory negligence generally. As to imputability of negligence of rescued person, see note in 5 A.L.R. 206. The rule is well settled that one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the negligence of another cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as matter of law, in risking his own life, or serious injury, in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. Some of the cases do not state the proviso, but probably it is implied in practically all of them. They all agree that the fact that the injury is sustained in attempting to save human life is a proper element for consideration upon the question of contributory negligence, and that the latter question ordinarily is one for the jury, and not for the court. Attention is called to the following cases in support of the rule: United States.-Henry v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (1895) 67 Fed. 426; Great Northern R. Co. v. Harman (1914) L.R.A.1915C, 843, 133 C. C. A. 631, 217 Fed. 959; Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Green (1917) 158 C. C. A. 632, 246 Fed. 676; Hodges v. Erie R. Co. (1919) 168 C. C. A. 498, 257 Fed. 494. See also Thomason v. Southern R. Co. (1902) 51 C. C. A. 67, 113 Fed. 80 (rule implied). Alabama.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr (1898) 121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35; Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Thorn Georgia.-Central R. Co. v. Crosby (1885) 74 Ga. 737, 58 Am. Rep. 463, 14 Am. Neg. Cas. 140. Illinois.-West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Liderman (1900) 187 Ill. 463, 52 L.R.A. 655, 79 Am. St. Rep. 226, 58 N. E. 367; Devine v. Pfaelzer (1917) 277 Ill. 255, L.R.A.1917C, 1080, 115 N. E. 126, 16 N. C. C. A. 167; White v. Chicago (1905) 120 Ill. App. 607 (rule recognized); Ingram v. Jackson (1917) 206 Ill. App. 466 (recognizing rule). Iowa. Saylor v. Parsons (1904) 122 Iowa, 679, 64 L.R.A. 542, 101 Am. St. Rep. 283, 98 N. W. 500, 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 543. See also Tyler v. Barrick (1916) 178 Iowa, 985, 160 N. W. 273. Kansas.-Condiff v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. (1891) 45 Kan. 256, 25 Pac. 562; McCallion v. Missouri P. R. Co. (1906) 74 Kan. 785, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 866, 88 Pac. 50. Kentucky. Becker v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1901) 110 Ky. 474, 53 L.R.A. 267, 96 Am. St. Rep. 459, 61 S. W. 997; Murphy v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. (1903) 114 Ky. 696, 71 S. W. 886; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Lang (1909) 135 Ky. 76, 121 S. W. 993; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Brown (1913) 152 Ky. 479, 153 S. W. 753. Louisiana. Whitworth v. Shreveport Belt R. Co. (1904) 112 La. 363, 65 L.R.A. 129, 36 So. 414, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 58; Bourdier v. Louisiana Western R. Co. (1912) 131 La. 690, 60 So. 78; Jones v. Mackay Teleg. Cable Co. (1915) 137 La. 122, 68 So. 379; Peyton v. Texas & P. R. Co. (1889) 41 La. Ann. 861, 17 Am. St. Rep. 430, 6 So. 690. See also DeMahy v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. (1893) 45 La. Ann. 1329, 14 So. 61. Maryland.-Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney (1898) 88 Md. 482, 42 L.R.A. 842, 71 Am. St. Rep. 441, 42 Atl. 60, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 159; American Exp. Co. v. Terry (1915) 126 Md. 254, 94 Atl. 1026, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 650. Mississippi. Billingsley v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1911) 100 Miss. 612, 56 So. 790. Missouri.-Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. (1884) 83 Mo. 560, 53 Am. Rep. 594; Schroeder v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 322, 18 L.R.A. 827, 18 S. W. 1094; Eversole v. Wabash R. Co. (1913) 249 Mo. 523, 155 S. W. 419; Sherman v. United R. Co. (1919) 202 Mo. App. 39, 214 S. W. 223. See also Clark v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co. (1885) 16 Mo. App. 463, and Williams v. United States Incandescent Lamp Co. (1913) 173 Mo. App. 87, 157 S. W. 130. Montana.-Da Rin v. Casualty Co. of America (1910) 41 Mont. 175, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1164, 137 Am. St. Rep. 709, 108 Pac. 649; Bracey v. Northwestern Improv. Co. (1910) 41 Mont. 338, 137 Am. St. Rep. 738, 109 Pac. 706. Nebraska.-Omaha & R. Valley R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl (1896) 48 Neb. 553, 67 N. W. 447; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Lyons (1898) 54 Neb. 633, 75 N. W. 31, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 172. New York.-WAGNER v. INTERNATIONAL R. Co. (reported herewith) ante, 1; Eckert v. Long Island R. Co. (1871) 43 N. Y. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Gibney v. State (1893) 137 N. Y. 1, 19 L.R.A. 365, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690, 33 N. E. 142; Roll v. Northern C. R. Co. (1878) 15 Hun, 496, affirmed without opinion in (1880) 80 N. Y. 647; Williams v. United States Mut. Acci. Asso. (1894) 82 Hun, 268, 31 N. Y. Supp. 343, affirmed without opinion in (1895) 147 N. Y. 693, 42 N. E. 726; Sann v. H. W. Johns Mfg. Co. (1897) 16 App. Div. 252, 44 N. Y. Supp. 641, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 432; Hirschman v. Dry-Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. (1899) 46 App. Div. 621, 61 N. Y. Supp. 304; Manthey v. Rauenbuehler (1902) 71 |