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be withdrawn if the Americans would agree to reinstate them in the same positions when peace was made between Spain and the United States.
This proposal seems to have impressed General Anderson as reasonable, but General Merritt, to whom it was referred, informed the commissioners that he could not give such a promise and that they must rely on the good-will and sense of justice of the American people. The commissioners then returned to Aguinaldo for further instructions, but one of the members left with General Anderson a letter in which Aguinaldo claimed that he had been treated harshly and that he had given up the trenches before Camp Dewey on a promise that there should be cooperation in future military movements. It is certain that no such promise was made by General Greene.
General Merritt directed that Aguinaldo should be informed that if he had been treated with apparent harshness it was from military necessity and that, while we might recognize the justice of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have but one army in Manila at a time. Aguinaldo, in reply, agreed to the latter proposition but evidently felt that the army should be composed of Filipino instead of American troops.
During the operations which resulted in the capitulation of Manila, the American army had nineteen men killed and one hundred and three wounded. At this cost approximately ten thousand American soldiers, with the assistance of the navy, captured a city of more than two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, thirteen thousand Spanish prisoners, twenty-two thousand small arms, ten million rounds of ammunition, seventy-five modern guns, several hundred ancient bronze cannon well adapted for decorating parks and plazas, and nine hundred thousand dollars of public money.
The Peace Protocol and the Treaty of Paris
Spain Sues for Peace Negotiations Through French Ambassador-The Protocol-Status of Spain in Philippines-Effect of the Capitulation—The Peace Commissioners-Opening of the Conference-Uneasiness about Philippines--Spanish Preliminary Demands-Proposals for Treaty~Assumption of Sovereignty over Cuba-The Colonial Debts-Refusal of the United States to Assume Debts-Original Instructions as to Philippines-Growth of Sentiment in United States-Investigations by Commission-Conflicting Opinions-Final Instructions-Claim of Conquest-The Philippine Public Debt-Continental Sentiment Favors Spain—British Attitude-Offer of $20,000,000—Spain Accepts America's Terms—Certain Minor Issues--The Treaty-Purchase of Additional Islands - The End of a Colonial Empire.
By the middle of July, 1898, it had become apparent to the Spanish government that the prolongation of the war could only add to its already heavy accumulation of disasters. Spain had entered upon the war with the confident expectation that she would be able at least to inflict sufficient injury upon the United States to enable her to secure creditable terms of peace. But the accomplishments of her army and navy had been so slight that the proud old monarchy was left in a position perilously near the ridiculous. Judged by the results, neither army nor navy had been able to make even a reasonable showing, and Spain's prestige as a military power had vanished. Further delay might mean the loss of everything and even the humiliation of having the Peninsular coasts visited by an American fleet.
Having come to a realizing sense of the actual conditions, Spain lost no time in opening negotiations for peace. The Duke of Almodovar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, directed the Spanish ambassador at Paris to ask for the good offices of the French government in conveying to the United States the desire of Spain
for an immediate suspension of hostilities preliminary to negotiations for a treaty of peace.
There was some delay in Paris, occasioned by the absence of the president of the Republic and the unwillingness of the minister of foreign affairs to assume the responsibility of instructing M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, to act on behalf of Spain. This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the French minister irritated Almodovar, who fully appreciated the value of time, and the ambassador at Paris was instructed to say that the request did not admit of delay. In fact, extreme haste was necessary, as the loss of even a few hours might be of the gravest consequence to Spain. The capitulation of Manila might occur at any time, and additional victories would probably result in greater claims being advanced by the United States,
Without further delay M. Cambon was directed to represent the interests of Spain, and on July 26 he presented a communication which expressed a desire to learn from the president
and the war thus brought to an end. The request was so worded as to imply that the future of Cuba was the only question at issue between Spain and the United States. During the conversation which followed Secretary Day, in the presence of President McKinley, stated that he understood that Spain desired to know also upon what conditions it would be possible to terminate hostilities at all points where they then existed, and M.
1 Duke of Almodovar to Señor Leon y Castillo, Sp. Dip. Corr. and Docs. (1896-1900), p. 200.
The documents and correspondence relating to the war and the treaty of peace will be found in Foreign Relations, 1898; Spanish Red Book, Negociácions diplomaticas desde el principio de la guerra con los Estados Unidos hasta la firma del protocolo de Washington (1898); Conferencia de Paris y tratado de paz de io de diciembre de 1898 (1899), and the volume published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ncgociations pour la paix entrez l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis (1898). The formal record of the Conference is in Senate Doc. No. 62, 55 Cong. 3rd Sess, Part I. The instructions of the president and the cable correspondence were printed as Sen. Doc. No. 148, 56 Cong. 2nd Sess. The matter is the same as For. Rel. 1898. See an article entitled "Revelations of a Senate Document" in the North Am. Rev. for June, 1901. For the question of the debts, see Magoon's Repts. (1902), pp. 180-183. For Mr. Reid's private letters to the president, see Olcott's Life of McKinley, II, Chap. XXVIII.
Cambon replied that such seemed to be the effect of the Spanish communication.
Before a formal reply could be made M. Cambon received a despatch from the Duke of Almodovar stating that Spain would accept any conditions which would result in the pacification of Cuba, whether they involved absolute independence, independence under a protectorate or annexation to the United States. The latter was preferred, as it would guarantee security for the lives and property of Spaniards who were established in Cuba.”
It was assumed that the United States would demand something by way of indemnity, but on that subject M. Cambon was instructed to “maintain reserve." Spain did not want to be held responsible for the expenses of military expeditions undertaken against territory remote from Cuba, as, according to Almodovar's theory, the war should have been localized. What he feared was that the United States might hold the islands she had captured on what may be called collateral expeditions as indemnity for the expenses of their capture. M. Cambon was directed particularly to ascertain the disposition of the president toward Porto Rico and the Philippines, and if he was found reasonable from the Spanish point of view, to press for the immediate suspension of hostilities.
Spain thus opened the negotiations for peace with a proposal to abandon Cuba, with the expectation-not expressed, however —that something would have to be done toward indemnifying the United States for the expenses of the war, but hoping to save Porto Rico. It is hardly probable that she then seriously feared that she would lose all of the Philippine Islands, as the Americans at that time had done nothing in that part of the world except destroy the Spanish fleet.
On July 30 Almodovar was informed that the United States, as a condition of the suspension of hostilities, would require:
"First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.
2 For. Rel., 1898, p. 819.
"Second. The president, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, would not at that time make any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of American citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States of the islands of Porto Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.
“Third. On similar grounds the United States was entitled to occupy and would hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.''3
From these terms there was never thereafter any material departure. The word possession originally used in the paragraph relating to the Philippines was changed to disposition, on the earnest representation of M. Cambon that it would when translated into Spanish carry a meaning which would make it impossible for the negotiations to proceed.
M. Cambon struggled desperately to secure some material modification of these terms, particularly as regards the demand for Porto Rico, which he characterized as evincing a spirit of conquest inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with which the United States had commenced the war. The temper manifested is illustrated by his statement that in making this claim for the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones, the United States evidently considered as a definite conquest all territory "upon which the fortune of arms has permitted an American soldier to set his foot," thus ignoring the fact that
but in lieu of a money indemnity. The provision relating to the Philippines he charged must have been inserted for the purpose of putting an end to the present negotiations, as Madrid would certainly construe it as casting doubt upon her present and future sovereignty in the Archipelago. Such charges of bad faith and insincerity were not well calculated to secure modifications
3 For. Rel., 1898, p. 820. These terms were drafted by the president personally, Olcott's Life of McKinley, II, p. 67.