The reply was that the country was dealing with conditions and not theories; that the situation had not been voluntarily created; that out of the war had come unexpected duties and obligations which could not honorably be shirked; that having destroyed the power of Spain in the islands, the United States could not, consistent with its duty to foreign residents as well as to natives, abandon them to disorder or anarchy; that the Filipinos had never been promised independence; that they were without experience in self-government and incapable of establishing a government which would be able to maintain law and order and protect the lives of foreigners; that such a condition would be a temptation to predatory powers and a threat to the peace of the world; that the title to the islands under the treaty with Spain was perfect in morals and in law, and that it was the solemn duty of the United States to assume the government in a spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice for the good of the natives and of humanity in general.

America, it was said, had always been a colonizing nation, the policy of expansion was not new, and while the administration of a distant dependency would present new problems, they would not be unsolvable. It was conceded that the islands must be governed for the benefit of the natives and that possibly they would for many years constitute a burden upon the United States. Until the natives were educated and trained for self-government their future should be left undetermined. It was generally implied, however, that when they should be capable of self-government they would be given the right to determine whether to remain under the American flag or set up a government of their Own.21

(1898); Speeches by Carl Schurz at Conference on the Foreign Policy of the United States, Chicago, Aug. 18, 1898; Univ. of Chicago, July 4, 1899; Philadelphia, Apr. 7, 1899; Cooper Union, New York, May 24, 1900. Hugo Munsterberg (The Americans, 1902) gives a very good summary of the arguments for and against holding the Philippines.

The fear that the Philippines would be made a state of the Union was soon dissipated. The history of the short-lived Filipino Federal party showed that the natives as well as the Anti-Imperialists were opposed to it.

21 Messages and Speeches of President McKinley, Olcott's Life of McKinley (1916), Reid's Problems of Expansion (1900), Coleridge The United States as a World Power (1908), Speeches of Lodge, Spooner and Foraker in Congressional Records from 1899 to 1902.

Three special facts—pride in a suddenly realized sense of international importance, altruism and commercialism-operated in different degrees and upon different types of mind in inducing the American people to favor the policy of expansion. The people for the first time realized what had long been an established fact, that the United States was one of the great powers of the world.22 The effect which the acquisition of the Philippines would have upon the future international policy of the United States was greatly exaggerated. As a matter of fact, it bound her to no necessary change of national policy. Her abstention from participation in European politics from the first had been voluntary, not compulsory. The explanation is found in the simple fact that her interests were elsewhere. But she had always been recognized as a member of the family of nations and had been invited to send representatives to nearly all the international congresses which had met in Europe during the preceding century.

The United States has always been active diplomatically in the Orient, where her policy has been of a peaceful and commercial character. While abstaining from interference in Europe, Africa and the Levant, she has from the first asserted equality with European powers in the extreme Orient. The implied limitation on her activities which were supposed to result from the Monroe doctrine has never been held to apply in the Far East. American diplomats, from Burlingame to Foster, have exerted great influence in the domestic and foreign affairs of China. Ward, a Yankee from Salem, organized, and until his death, led the "Ever Victorious Army," which for the time saved the Manchu dynasty and later brought fame to Gordon. Commodore Perry opened Japan to the world and started the country on its spectacular course. In fact, the policy of the United States in that part of the world, although peaceful, had been rather aggressive.23 It was now assumed that the acquisition of important

22 Dr. A. B. Hart, Harper's Mag., Feby., 1899.

23 See generally, Foster's American Diplomacy in the Orient (1903);

territory in the East would induce the United States to enter even more actively into the politics of that part of the world.

There was no apparent reason why the ownership of these islands should require the United States to accept invitations to conferences dealing with purely European affairs such as she had previously declined. But the world agreed in assuming that America was entering upon a new era of her history, and to a certain extent such was the fact. It was assumed that she was now full grown, and Dewey's battle in Manila Bay was regarded as a sort of national coming-out party. Henceforth Columbia was to be considered in society. While the conservatives shrank from the assumption of the new responsibilities which would result from the policy of expansion, such things had no terrors for the average uncloistered citizen who was, in fact, very willing to get down into the dust of the arena and battle for the world's prizes.

The importance of the economic factor in the policy of expansion must not be underestimated. Nations no less than individuals are interested in dollars. Statesmen could not be indifferent to the commercial possibilities of the situation, and they were disposed to give them due consideration. It was a time when trade expansion was much discussed at home. In an address as Chairman of the Republican National Convention which renominated President McKinley, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge said: “We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade expansion." There were also many who felt that some of the most revered of our political maxims had outlived their usefulness and that commercialism had become the directing and controlling force in international affairs.24

Soon after the Spanish fleet was destroyed measures were taken to ascertain the real and potential wealth of the Philip

Morse, Int. Rel. of the Chinese Empire (1910); Conant, The United States in the Orient, p. 156 et seq.; American Foreign Policy. By a Diplomat, Chap. 5.

24 See article by F. A. Vanderlip in Century Magazine, August, 1898, also in Senate Doc. 62, p. 563.

pines. An expert was detailed to report upon the financial and industrial conditions and a geologist, charged with the duty of investigating the mineral resources, accompanied the first expedition to Manila.25

Nevertheless, the altruistic factors of the situation were those which controlled. Had investigation shown that the islands were commercially and economically useless, it is improbable that the McKinley administration would have pursued any course other than that which was adopted. The president could not be made to believe that, after having destroyed the power of Spain and overthrown the existing government, the United States could, consistent with its obligations to foreign residents and the natives, withdraw the troops and leave the country to "stew in its own juice." It was largely on these grounds that the American people sustained the administration policy. They felt that, like the Cubans, the Filipinos were entitled to receive some benefit from the destruction of Spanish power. Just how it was to come about they were not then able to say, but they were certain that to abandon the natives to their own devices at that stage of the proceedings would be to inflict upon them an irreparable wrong. 26

It was not until after the treaty was ratified that the policy of expansion became a party issue. While many members of the Democratic party were affiliated with the so-called AntiImperialists, others, and those not the least influential, gave active as well as passive support to the administration measures. When the treaty was before the Senate party lines were loosely drawn. Senator Hoar, one of the old-time leaders of the Republican party, led the opposition to ratification, while Senator Gray, who as a member of the Peace Commission had opposed the

25 Senate Doc. 62, pp. 513-518.

26 One distinguished publicist, writing before the capture of Manila and when American dealings with the Filipinos had not extended beyond furnishing Aguinaldo and a few companions with free transportation from Hong Kong, giving him some arms, and putting him ashore with the advice to "get his army going," wrote, "We do not intend to hand the people of the Philippines back to the Spaniards, and our sense of decency and respect for the enlightened opinion of mankind will not permit us to abandon them." Rev. of Rev., July, 1898.

acquisition of the islands, spoke and voted in favor of ratification. But for the votes of democratic senators the treaty would have been defeated. It rested with Mr. W. J. Bryan, who had been the Democratic candidate for the presidency in the preceding election, to determine the issue. How his influence was exerted is thus told by Senator Hoar: "Mr. Bryan, in the height of the contest, came to Washington for the express purpose of urging upon his followers that it was best to support the treaty, end the war, and let the question of what should be done with our conquest be settled in the coming campaign. He urged upon them, as I was told by several Democrats at the time who did not take his advice, that the Democratic party could not hope to win a victory on the financial questions at stake, as they had been beaten on them in a time of adversity; and that they must have this issue for the coming campaign. He was besought by his wiser political associates to go away and leave the Senate to settle the matter. But he remained. After that it became impossible not only to defeat the treaty, but to defeat the policy which had inspired it."27

According to Senator Hoar, the Democratic party, at least in the early days of the controversy, were not earnestly and seriously opposed to the acquisition of the Philippines. They never wielded their party strength in opposition to it. The leaders supported the administration in enacting the legislation necessary to suppress the insurrection which followed the ratification of the treaty.28 "I do not mean to imply," says Senator Hoar, "that a large number of the Democratic party, both in public life and out of it, were not sincere and zealous in their objection to this wretched business. But next to a very few men who controlled the policy of the Republican party in this matter, Mr.

27 Autobiography, II, p. 322.

28 In the Washington Post of February 6, 1899, Sen. Bacon is quoted as saying: "I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be necessary to carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain that we could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate adopted my resolution or a similar resolution announcing our honest intentions with regard to the Philippines."