Pollard, 4 Deacon, 27, 40; Polson v. Stewart, 167 Massachusetts, 211. So I conceive that a Washington decree for the specific performance of such a contract would be entitled to full faith and credit as between the parties in Nebraska. But it does not matter to its constitutional effect what the ground of the decree may be, whether a contract or something else. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230. (In this case it may have been that the wife contributed equally to the accumulation of the property, and so had an equitable claim.) A personal decree is equally within the jurisdiction of a court having the person within its power, whatever its ground and whatever it orders the defendant to do. Therefore I think that this decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska.

But the Nebraska court carefully avoids saying that the decree would not be binding between the original parties had the husband been before the court. The ground on which it goes is that to allow the judgment to affect the conscience of purchasers would be giving it an effect in rem. It treats the case as standing on the same footing as that of an innocent purchaser. Now if the court saw fit to deny the effect of a judgment upon privies in title, or if it considered the defendant an innocent purchaser, I do not see what we have to do with its decision, however wrong. I do not see why it is not within the power of the State to do away with equity or with the equitable doctrine as to purchasers with notice if it sees fit. Still less do I see how a mistake as to notice could give us jurisdiction. If the judgment binds the defendant it is not by its own operation, even with the Constitution behind it, but by the obligation imposed by equity upon a purchaser with notice. The ground of decision below was that there was no such obligation. The decision, even if wrong, did not deny to the Washington decree its full effect. Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 212 U. S. 477, 480.

Argument for Appellant.

215 U.S.

REAVIS v. FIANZA.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS.

No. 16. Argued April 26, 27, 1909.-Decided November 1, 1909.

This court has jurisdiction of this case; for, even if the requisite amount is not involved, the meaning and effect of a provision of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stats. 691, is involved. The provision of § 45 of the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands relating to title to mines by prescription refers to conditions as they were before the United States came into power and had in view the natives of the islands and intention to do them liberal justice. Courts are justified in dealing liberally with natives of the Philippines in dealing with evidence of possession. Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449.

The limitation of size of mining claims in § 22 of the Philippine Organic Act applies only to claims located after the passage of that act. Under § 28 of the Philippine Organic Act a valid location could not

be made if the land was occupied by one who was already in possession before the United States came into power, and the claim of one locating under those conditions does not constitute an adverse claim under § 45 of that act.

A right to an instrument that will confer a title in a thing is a right to the thing itself, and a statutory right to apply for a patent to mining lands is a right that equity will specifically enforce.

Although, if seasonably taken, an objection to the form of remedy might be sustained, after trial on the merits it comes too late. 7 Philippine Rep. 610, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frederic R. Coudert and Mr. Howard Thayer Kingsbury, with whom Mr. Paul Fuller was on the brief, for appellant:

This court has jurisdiction both as the basis of the amount involved, and because the construction of a statute of the

United States (Act of July 1, 1902, § 45; 32 U. S. Stat. 703) is in question. The facts as well as the law are before the court for review. De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U. S. 309.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance was plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence. The Philippine Supreme Court should have decided according to the preponderance of the evidence. Act of Feb. 25, 1907, No. 1596, Acts of Phil. Com.

Plaintiffs had no title to the mines at the time of the cession and have acquired none since. Both under Spanish law and ours, mines can be acquired in private ownership only by compliance with governmental regulations. Translation of Mining Law and Regulations, War Dep't, July, 1900; Royal Decree of May 14, 1867; United States v. Castillero, 2 Black, 1, 166. After the cession the Spanish Mining Laws continued in force until further legislation by Congress. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 436. The act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 910, forbade for the time being any government grant of mining rights, and thus suspended recourse to former law. Unless plaintiffs have acquired some rights of property under the act of July 1, 1902, they have none now, and are mere trespassers.

Section 45 of the act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 703, is almost identical with § 2332, Rev. Stat. It confers no title, but merely prescribes what evidence shall entitle a claimant to a patent, upon compliance with requirements of § 37 and determination of any adverse claim under § 39. Plaintiffs at most have only a right to apply for a patent;—a jus ad rem, not a jus in re. The Young Mechanic, 2 Curt. 404; S. C., Fed. Cas. No. 18,180; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. 655, 666; 2 Lindley on Mines, § 688; In re Smith Brothers, 7 Copp's L. O. 4; Buffalo Zinc & Copper Co. v. Crump, 69 S. W. Rep. 572; Cleary v. Skiffich, 28 Colorado, 362; McCowan v. Maclay, 16 Montana, 234.

Rights founded on possession must yield to a "location" under the statutes. Horswell v. Ruiz, 67 Colorado, 111;

VOL. CCXV-2

Argument for Appellant.

215 U.S.

Kendall v. San Juan Mining Co., 144 U. S. 658. Reavis's peaceable adverse entry interrupted plaintiffs' possession and prevented them from acquiring title thereunder. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 287. Plaintiffs' possession was insufficient under the Philippine statute of limitations. Phil. Code of Proc., § 41; Hamilton v. South Nev. Gold & Silver Min. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 562. A "location" can only be made for a territory not exceeding 1,000 feet by 1,000 feet. 32 Stat. 697, § 22.

This case is to be distinguished from Cariño v. The Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449. There the boundaries were defined; the possession was definite and exclusive, and the lands were agricultural and hence prescriptible even against the Spanish Crown. Here the plaintiffs ask the court to declare that because a particular family of Iggorrots have habitually roamed over a whole mountain-side and taken out a little loose gold, they have acquired legal title to all the mineral wealth below the surface within whatever boundaries they now choose to assert. Such a ruling would prevent the development of the mineral resources of the Philippine Islands. The Iggorrots' conceptions of private property hardly included subterranean rights. The appellant asks the court to appreciate a peculiar colonial problem rather than to weigh conflicting claims as to mining boundaries.

Plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction. Their rights were doubtful and disputed. Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1; Gwillim v. Donellan, 115 U. S. 45; Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. v. Pacific Traction Co., 155 Fed. Rep. 259. They were out of possession when suit was brought. Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119; Whithead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146. They should have sued at law to recover possession. Bago v. Garcia, 5 Phil. Rep. 524; Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaran, 6 Phil. Rep. 286; Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. Rep. 41; Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349; Potts v. Hollen, 177 U. S. 365.

The judgment of the trial court should have been reversed for errors in the exclusion of material evidence. There is a

presumption of harm from such exclusion. Buckstaff v. Russell, 151 U. S. 626, 637; Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 203.

Mr. Henry E. Davis for appellees:

There is no force in the contention that plaintiffs had no title to the mines in controversy at the time of the cession of the Philippine Islands and have not since acquired any. The case comes under the temporary government act, especially $45 thereof, 32 Stat. 691, 703, which mutatis mutandis is, with very slight changes, identical with § 2332, Rev. Stat., taken from the act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91. The scheme of these acts was clearly to recognize in the inhabitants of territory newly acquired by the United States, rights equivalent to those of location and possession, and of themselves conferring a right to a patent for mining lands, independently of compliance with requirements of laws of the former sovereignty and local laws and customs inherited therefrom, or enacted or adopted in analogy to the institutions thereof.

Rev. Stat., § 2332, provides an additional mode of acquisition of mineral land from the Government, and, where possession has continued for the prescribed period before an adverse right exists, it is equivalent to a location under the laws of Congress. Anthony v. Jillson, 83 California, 296, 302; Altoona &c. Co. v. Integral &c. Co., 114 California, 100, 105; Min. Co. v. Bullion Min. Co., 3 Saw. 634, 657, 658; Harris v. Equator &c. Co., 8 Fed. Rep. 863; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 287; Lavignino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah, 125.

Upon completion of a location and until patent issues, the Government holds the title in trust for the locator; and a title so acquired will be quieted on a bill in equity even against the holder of a correct paper title. Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U. S. 348, 351; Min. Co. v. Bullion Min. Co., ubi supra.

In dealing with the Philippines, the United States meant to treat its inhabitants as it had treated those of our former Mexican territory, and, indeed, to put the former on an even