by the state courts which control Federal courts. Nor does it establish any rule of property. This is an action of trespass on the case for tort. None of the cases cited by defendant apply.

Decisions of the state court even when decided upon a statute or upon the principle of an established rule of property, do not preclude the Federal court from passing on questions of contract out of which the cause of action accrued before the decision of the state court. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Griffin v. Overman Wheel Co., 9 C. C. A. 584; Rowan v. Runnels, 10 How. 134; Lawrence v. Wickware, Fed. Cas. No. 8,148; S. C., 4 McLean, 56; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 599; Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 119; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; Detroit v. Railroad Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 569; King v. Investment Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 33; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 497; Sims v. Hunsley, 6 How. 1.

The Federal courts are not bound in cases involving validity of municipal bonds by decisions of state courts made after the bonds are issued. Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439.

The Federal courts are not bound by decisions of the state court where private rights are to be determined by application of common-law rules alone, Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Hill v. Hite, 29 C. C. A. 55; or contract rights depending on a state statute or provision of the Constitution if the decision of state court is made after the contract. Central Trust Co. v. Street Railway Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 1; Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed. Rep. 296; Jones v. Hotel Co., 79 Fed. Rep. 447.

As to provisions in a deed that are merely contractual and do not affect the title the Federal courts are not bound by state court decisions. Fire Ins. Co. v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 904; Bartholomew v. City of Austin, 85 Fed. Rep. 359; Jones v. Hotel Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 370; and see also Speer v. Commissioners, 88 Fed. Rep. 749; Clapp v. Otoe County, 104 Fed. Rep. 473.

215 U. S.

Argument for Fairmont Coal Co.

Nor should the decision of the state court be followed to such an extent as to sacrifice truth, justice or law. Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 416; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 462; Foxcraft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Loan Co. v. Harris, 113 Fed. Rep. 36.

Mr. Z. Taylor Vinson and Mr. Edward A. Brannon for Fairmont Coal Company:

It is the duty of the Federal courts to follow the decisions of the highest court of a State in cases pending in the former where the decision of the state court construes a state statute or local law or interprets deeds or grants to real estate and determines rights pertaining thereto, wherein no Federal question is involved; nor is this duty affected by the fact that the decision is made by the state court after the contract rights involved in the case in the Federal court had accrued. ford Ins. Co. v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 91, 108; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 139; Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 How. 1; Fairfield v. Gallatin County, 100 U. S. 47, 52; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 35; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 653; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 311; Sioux City R. R. v. Trust Co. of N. A., 173 U. S. 99.

Hart

In determining what are the laws of the several States, we are bound to look not only at their constitutions and statutes but also at the decisions of their highest courts. Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 499; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555; Jackson v. Chew, 6 Pet. 648; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139.

The construction of deeds for the transfer of land between private parties, given by the highest court of the State in which the land lies, will be adopted and followed by the Federal courts whenever the same question is presented to them. East Central Eureka Co. v. Central Eureka Co., 204 U. S. 266,

Argument for Fairmont Coal Co.

215 U.S.

272; citing Brine v. Hartford Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, 636; DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566; and see also United States v. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat. 577; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23; Olcott v. Bynum, 17 Wall. 44; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236; Clark v. Clark, 178 U. S. 186; Oliver v. Clarke, 106 Fed. Rep. 402; Berry v. Bank, 93 Fed. Rep. 44.

The Federal courts will lean toward an agreement of views with the state courts if the question seems balanced with doubt. Waterworks v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 244; Mead v. Portland, 200 U. S. 163; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 412; Bienville Water Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S. 212, 220; Chicago Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 622, 674.

The construction given by the state court to the similar deeds in the Griffin case, announced no new rules of interpretation of deeds; but, on the contrary, followed strictly a line of decisions of the state courts of West Virginia and Virginia made long prior to the date of the deed involved in this case. No rule of law previously established has been changed but the decision is in perfect accord with the English decisions. McSwinney on Mines, see 59 W. Va. 507; Hurst v. Hurst, 7 W. Va. 339; Snodgrass v. Wolf, 11 W. Va. 158; Barber v. F. & M. Ins. Co., 16 W. Va. 658; O'Brien v. Brice, 21 W. Va. 704; Gibney v. Fitzsimmons, 45 W. Va. 334; Long v. Perrine, 41 W. Va. 158; McDougall v. Musgrave, 46 W. Va. 509; 2 Minor's Inst. pp. 996, 1066; Carrington v. Goddin, 13 Gratt. 587; Wilson v. Langhorne, 102 Virginia, 631; King v. Norfolk & Western, 99 Virginia, 625.

The court will not write new covenants into a deed. See Gavinzel v. Crump, 22 Wall. 308; Baltzer v. Air Line Co., 115 U. S. 634; D. & H. Canal Co. v. Penna. Coal Co., 8 Wall. 276, 290. The laws of the State in which land is situated control exclusively its descent, alienation and transfer, and the effect and construction of instruments intended to convey it. Cases supra and Abraham v. Casey, 179 U. S. 210; Claiborne Co. v.

Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; Williams v. Kutland, 13 Wall. 306; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291, 296.

The rules of property covered by this principle include those governing transfer, descent, title and possession. Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484; 11 Cyc. 903; Buford v. Kerr, 90 Fed. Rep. 513; Foster v. Oil & Gas Co., 90 Fed. Rep. 178.

This court has at times overruled its own decisions so as to conform to the decisions of the state court, affecting titles to real estate. Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U. S. 367; Lowndes v. Huntington, 153 U. S. 1; Moores v. Bank, 104 U. S. 625; Forsythe v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 518; Board v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is here on a question propounded under the authority of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, relating to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, §6. The facts out of which the question arises are substantially as will be now stated.

On the twenty-first day of November, 1889, the plaintiff Kuhn, a citizen of Ohio, sold and conveyed to Camden all the coal underlying a certain tract of land in West Virginia of which he, Kuhn, was the owner in fee. The deed contained these clauses: "The parties of the first part do grant unto the said Johnson N. Camden all the coal and mining privileges necessary and convenient for the removal of the same, in, upon and under a certain tract or parcel of land situated in the county of Marion, on the waters of the West Fork River, bounded and described as follows, to wit: . Together with the right to enter upon and under said land and to mine, excavate and remove all of said coal, and to remove upon and under the said lands the coal from and under adjacent, coterminous and neighboring lands, and also the right to enter upon and under the tract of land herein before described VOL. CCXV-23

and make all necessary structures, roads, ways, excavations, airshafts, drains, drainways and openings necessary or convenient for the mining and removal of said coal and the coal from coterminous and neighboring lands to market.”

The present action of trespass on the case was brought January 18th, 1906. The declaration alleged that the coal covered by the above deed passed to the defendant, the Fairmont Coal Company, a West Virginia corporation, on the of January, 1906; that the plaintiff Kuhn was entitled of right to have all his surface and other strata overlying the coal supported in its natural state either by pillars or blocks of coal or by artificial support; that on the day named the defendant company mined and removed coal from under the land, leaving, however, large blocks or pillars of coal as a means of supporting the overlying surface; that the coal company, disregarding the plaintiff's rights, did knowingly, willfully and negligently, without making any compensation therefor, or for the damages arising therefrom, mine and remove all of said blocks and pillars of coal so left, by reason whereof and because of the failure to provide any proper or sufficient artificial or other support for the overlying surface, the plaintiff's surface land, or a large portion thereof, was caused to fall; and that it was cracked, broken and rent, causing large holes and fissures to appear upon the surface and destroying the water and water courses.

The contract under which the title to the coal originally passed was executed in West Virginia and the plaintiff's cause of action arose in that State.

A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the Circuit Court, an elaborate opinion being delivered by Judge Dayton, Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 152 Fed. Rep. 1013. The case was then taken upon writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

It appears from the statement of the case made by the Circuit Court of Appeals that in the year 1902, after Kuhn's deed to Camden, one Griffin brought, in a court of West