215 U.S. HARLAN, J., dissenting. the court said leaves no doubt as to what was intended to be decided. It said: "This suit, then, assuming it to be maintainable under the act of 1881, is one of which the courts of the United States have jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of the several States. The only existing act of Congress, which enables it to be brought in the Circuit Court of the United States, is the act of 1888. This suit comes within the terms of that act, both as arising under a law of the United States, and as being between citizens of different States. In either aspect, by the provisions of the same act, the defendant cannot be compelled to answer in a district of which neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is an inhabitant." Whatever general expressions are to be found in the opinions in the cases cited neither of those cases is an authority for the broad, unqualified statement that the United States Circuit Court, held in a State of which the plaintiff is a citizen, may not take cognizance of a suit brought by him in a Federal court against a corporation of another State, where such suit presents a controversy between citizens of different States and, in addition, discloses the fact that the plaintiff claims a Federal right which needs to be protected against the wrongful or illegal acts of the defendant corporation. This proposition is, of course, subject to the condition that the foreign corporation, by having an agency in Georgia or otherwise, can be reached by some process and brought into the Federal court sitting in Georgia. It is inconceivable, I think, that Congress intended to deprive the Federal court, sitting in the State of the plaintiff's residence of jurisdiction to protect his Federal right, simply because it appears from the record that the defendant and the alleged wrongdoer are citizens of different States. It necessarily follows from the opinion of the court in this case that where a citizen of another State is sued in a state court, and the suit involves a Federal right claimed by the plaintiff, the defendant cannot remove the case to the Federal court, but must remain in the state court of original jurisdiction, and there defend his asserted Federal right. The state court might well say, under VOL. CCXV-33 HARLAN, J., dissenting. 215 U. S. the opinion just delivered, that although the controversy between the parties involves Federal rights, and presents a controversy between citizens of different States, as well as one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is a suit of which the Federal court could not take cognizance by removal. We so say because such a case could not, under the court's present view of the act of 1888, have been originally brought in that court, and because, according to the settled doctrines of this court, no case can be removed from a state court to a Federal court which could not have been originally brought in the latter court. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454; Arkansas v. Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185; Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 340-1. I recognize the fact that the act of 1888 was not drawn with precision. But I am of opinion that as the act gives the Circuit Court original jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the several States, "of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States," the intention of Congress would be best effectuated by holding that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is not excluded, in a controversy between citizens of different States, simply because the plaintiff, who sued in the Federal court held in the State of his residence, asserts a Federal right and seeks to have it protected against the illegal acts of the defendant, a citizen of another State; provided, always, that the defendant, if a corporation of another State, may, through agents conducting its business in the State where the suit is brought, be reached by the process of the court and subjected to its authority. The presence in the case of a Federal right asserted by the plaintiff ought not prejudice him and does not, I think, alter the fact that the controversy is one of which a Circuit Court may take cognizance, because it is a controversy between citizens of different States. THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. FLAHERTY v. HANSON, SHERIFF OF GRAND FORKS COUNTY. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA. No. 47. Submitted November 29, 1909.-Decided January 17, 1910. A State cannot place a burden on a lawful taxing power of the United States; nor can it place a burden upon the person paying a tax to the United States solely because of such payment and without reference to the doing by such person of any act within the State and subject to its regulating authority. A State cannot so exert its police power as to directly hamper or destroy a lawful authority of the United States. A state statute requiring the holder of a Federal liquor license to perform duties in conflict with the requirement of the Federal statute is an exercise of power repugnant to the Constitution and cannot be enforced; and so held as to chap. 189, General Laws of North Dakota, 1907, requiring the holder of such a license to file and publish a copy thereof. Quare, whether the payment to the United States of the special liquor tax and taking a receipt therefor creates a prima facie presumption that the person holding the receipt is engaged in the liquor business. 16 N. Dak. 347, reversed. THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of North Dakota, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward Engerud, Mr. Daniel B. Holt, Mr. John S. Frame and Mr. George A. Bangs for plaintiff in error: The act complained of, chap. 189, Gen'l Laws, 1907, of North Dakota is not a regulation for sale of liquor and is not a proper exercise of the police power of the State. It relates only to the holders of Federal licenses. Even if such was the intent of the legislature, effect cannot be so given to it unless the language is plain and unambiguous. Courts cannot imagine an intent and twist the language so as to substitute what the court thinks the law should have been Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 215 U.S. instead of what it is. Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 395. The act does not regulate the liquor business in the State because it does not apply to all persons in the State. The act deprives the state court of the power to decide who are liquor dealers within the meaning of the state law. It affects only those dealers who obey the Federal law and post their receipts. The incriminating facts under the statute are the possession of a Federal tax receipt and failure to register and publish it. The statute is an attempt to exercise police power inherent in the State, but it cannot be enforced without resort to the Federal statutes. This situation is foreign to our form of government. Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, 111 U. S. 746; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; United States v. Tarble, 13 Wall. 397; Cooley, Const. Law, 399; Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vermont, 140. The act is an unlawful interference with Federal regulations. The fact that the state legislature intended by the law in question to make the enforcement of the prohibition laws of the State more easy and certain cannot save it if in truth it interferes in any manner with a subject over which the Federal Government has control. Bowman v. Chicago, &c., 125 U. S. 475; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. There can be no question made of the right of Congress to raise revenue for the maintenance of the Federal Government by taxing those who engage in the sale of liquors, and it is equally within the power of Congress to prescribe the conditions under which that tax shall be paid, and the notice which the person paying it shall give to the public of the fact of such payment. While the State is not prohibited from also taxing the persons who engage in that business because of the fact that Congress has seen fit to tax them it cannot lay upon those persons duties and obligations different from those imposed by Congress. The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority or is introduced by its permission, but does not extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 To the same effect also see Farmers' &c. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Commonwealth v. Petty, 29 S. W. Rep. 291; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Michigan, 309; Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Illinois, 109; Commonwealth v. Felton, 101 Massachusetts, 204; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minnesota, 24; People v. Kennedy, 38 California, 147; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83. Besides being an unwarranted usurpation of authority over transactions and relations between the Federal Government and its citizens, the act interferes with and impedes the operations of the Federal laws relating to internal revenue. There was no appearance or brief for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. By 18 of the act of February 8, 1875, ch. 36, 18 Stat. 307, as amended by $ 4 of the act of March 1, 1879, ch. 125, 20 Stat. 327, 333, a special tax of twenty-five dollars is imposed on retail dealers in liquors, as therein defined, and a tax of twenty dollars on a retail dealer in malt liquors. By Rev. Stat., §§ 3232 and 3233 a person is forbidden to engage in or carry on any trade or business made subject to a special tax until the tax has been paid, and it is made the duty of one engaging in a trade or business on which a special tax is imposed by law |