Rabbit Creek of September 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, conveying the
tract described to the Choctaw Indians in fee simple to them and
their descendants to inure to them while they should exist as a
nation and live thereon, was a grant to the Choctaw Nation, to
be administered by it as such; it did not create a trust for the
individuals then comprising the nation and their respective
descendants in whom as tenants in common the legal title would
merge with the equitable title on dissolution of the nation. Flem-
ing v. McCurtain, 56.

2. Allottee; jurisdiction of United States over.

Although an Indian may be made a citizen of the United States

and of the State in which the reservation for his tribe is located,
the United States may still retain jurisdiction over him for
offenses committed within the limits of the reservation; and
so held as to a crime committed by an Indian against another
Indian on the Tulalip Indian Reservation in Washington, not-
withstanding the Indians had received allotments under the
treaties with the Omahas of March 16, 1834, and of Point Elliott
of January 22, 1835. Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, distinguished,
the Indian in that case being an allottee under the general allot-
ment act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388. United States
v. Celestine, 278.

3. Jurisdiction of United States over-Interest of Indians considered in
construction of Federal statutes.

Legislation of Congress is to be construed in the interest of the Indians;
and, in the absence of a subjection in terms of the individual
Indian to state laws and denial of further jurisdiction over him
by the United States, a statute will not be construed as a re-
nunciation of jurisdiction by the United States of crimes com-
mitted by Indians against Indians on Indian reservations. Ib.
4. Citizenship; suggestion by Congress in act of May 8, 1906.
The act of May 8, 1906, c. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, extending the trust
period of allottees under the act of 1887, suggests that Congress
believed it had been hasty in its prior action in granting citizen-
ship to Indians. Ib.

5. Jurisdiction over offenses committed on reservations.
United States v. Celestine, ante, p. 278, followed, as to continuance
of jurisdiction of United States over offenses committed within
the limits of an Indian reservation. United States v. Sutton, 291.
6. Introduction of liquor in Indian country; power of Congress to pro-
hibit and punish.

The Indians, as wards of the Government, are the beneficiaries of

the prohibition against the introduction of liquor into Indian
country; and, under the Washington enabling act, jurisdiction
and control over Indian lands remains in the United States, and
Congress has power to prohibit and punish the introduction of
liquor therein. Ib.

7. Reservations; limits not affected by allotments in severalty.
The limits of an Indian reservation are not changed by allotments
in severalty during the trust period, and, where the lands allotted
are subject to restrictions against alienation and to defeasance,
the prohibition against liquor continues to be effective. Ib.

INJUNCTION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;

EQUITY, 1;

FRANCHISES.

INSOLVENCY.

See NATIONAL BANKS.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

Omission in statutory definition of duress held not reversible error.
Stating only part of a statutory definition of duress in the charge
to the jury held not reversible error, it not appearing that the
defendant was hurt thereby. Snyder v. Rosenbaum, 261.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

1. Order of Commission; setting aside; power to make and not wisdom
the test of validity.

In determining whether an order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission shall be suspended or set aside, power to make-and not
the wisdom of the order is the test and this court must con-
sider all relevant questions of constitutional power or right, all
pertinent questions as to whether the administrative order is
within the scope of the delegated authority under which it pur-

ports to be made, and also whether even if in form it is within
such delegated authority it is not so in substance because so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to render it invalid.

Com. Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 452.

2. Instruments of interstate commerce under control of.

Interstate

The equipment of an interstate railroad, including cars for trans-
portation of its own fuel are instruments of interstate commerce
and subject to control of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Ib.

3. Power to consider question of distribution of coal cars.
The act to regulate commerce has delegated to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission authority to consider, where complaint is
made on that subject, the question of distribution of coal cars,
including the carrier's own fuel cars, in times of car shortage,
as a means of prohibiting unjust preference or undue discrimina-
tion. Ib.

4. Power to make arrangements for distribution of coal cars to shippers.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,

ante, p. 452, followed as to power under the act to regulate com-
merce of the Commission to make reasonable arrangements for
the distribution of coal cars to shippers, including cars for trans-
portation of fuel purchased by the railroad company for its own
Interstate Com. Com. v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 479.

use.

5. Power to require railroad to take into account its own fuel cars in
making distribution.

It is not beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to require a railroad in distributing its coal cars to take into
account its own fuel cars in order not to create a preference of
the mine to which such cars are assigned over other mines.
Interstate Com. Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 452.

6. Power to deal with preferential and discriminatory regulations of
carriers.

Under § 15 of the act to regulate commerce as amended June 29, 1906,
c. 3591, 34 Stat. 585, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
power to deal with preferential and discriminatory regulations
of carriers as well as with rates. Ib.

7. Instrumentalities of commerce within control of.

Even if commerce in regard to the purchase of coal at a mine on a
railroad line by the railroad company which supplies its own

cars may end there, the power to use the equipment of the rail-
road to move the coal is subject to the control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in order to prevent discrimination against,
or undue preference of, other miners and shippers of coal. Ib.
See COURTS, 13-15;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3, 7.

INTERSTATE RENDITION.

See EXTRADITION, 1-4.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Presumption as to dealing in; effect of payment of Federal tax.
Quare, whether the payment to the United States of the special liquor
tax and taking a receipt therefor creates a prima facie presump-
tion that the person holding the receipt is engaged in the liquor
business. Flaherty v. Hanson, 515.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;

INDIANS, 6, 7.

INVENTION.

See PATENTS.

JOINDER OF PARTIES.

See REMOVAL of Causes, 1-4.

JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.

1. Efficacy of decree for conveyance of land situated outside of jurisdiction
of court.

While a court of equity acting upon the person of the defendant may

decree a conveyance of land in another jurisdiction and enforce
the execution of the decree by process against the defendant,
neither the decree, nor any conveyance under it except by the
party in whom title is vested, is of any efficacy beyond the juris-
diction of the court. (Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.) Fall v.

Eastin, 1.

2. Same.

A court not having jurisdiction of the res cannot affect it by its decree
nor by a deed made by a master in accordance with the de-
cree. Ib.

3. Application of local legislation as to effect of decree.

Local legislation of a State as to effect of a decree, or a conveyance
made by a master pursuant thereto, on the res does not apply
to the operation of the decree on property situated in another
State.

Ib.

4. Res judicata; extent of application of rule.

While the bar of a judgment in another action for the same claim or

demand between the same parties extends to not only what was,
but what might have been, pleaded or litigated in the first ac-
tion, if the second action is upon a different claim or demand the
bar of the first judgment is limited to that which was actually
litigated. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 252.

5. Decree; scope should be limited to necessities of case.

Where all that is necessary is to determine whether a right under a
state charter is now in existence, the decree should be confined
thereto, and should not attempt to determine the further dura-
tion of the charter under state statutes. Minneapolis v. Street
Railway Co., 417.

6. Privy to decree establishing right entitled to have right recognized in
subsequent suit involving same subject and defended by him for
another.

Where a decree to which he is privy has established the right of a

manufacturer to sell an article, there is force in the argument
that such right should be recognized in another suit against his
customer and defended by him. (Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U. S.
285.) Brill v. Washington Ry. & Electric Co., 527.

1. Under Criminal Appeals Act of 1907-Indictment for violation of
$5209, Rev. Stat.

Whether the person deceived by false entries is the person intended
by the statute, and whether the averments as to the deceit are
sufficient to sustain the indictment, are questions which involve
the construction of the statute on which an indictment for mak-
ing false entries in violation of § 5209, Rev. Stat., is based, and
this court has jurisdiction to review under the Criminal Appeals
Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. United States v.
Corbett, 233.

2. Under Criminal Appeals Act of 1907-Scope of review.

On writ of error taken by the United States under the Criminal Ap-