APPENDIX DD SENATE RESOLUTION 221 AND RELATED DOCUMENT RESOLUTION Urging the President of the United States to take the leadership in seeking international cooperation in strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials. Whereas the Senate of the United States ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in recognition of the devastation associated with a nuclear war and of the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war; Whereas the parties to the treaty expressed a common belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war; Whereas the United States and other parties to the treaty pledged to accept specified safeguards regarding the transfer to nonnuclear-weapon states of special nuclear materials and facilities for the processing, use, or production of such materials; Whereas recent events, including the explosion of nuclear devices, the development of uranium enrichment facilities, and the proposed transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to nonnuclear-weapon states, emphasize the imperative need to increase the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be no further proliferation of nuclear weapons capability; Whereas the Senate of the United States is particularly concerned about the consequences of transactions without effective safeguards that could lead to the production of plutonium and other special nuclear materials by nonnuclearweapon states throughout the world; and Whereas the Senate is particularly concerned about the proliferation threat posed by the possibility of the development in the near future of a large number of independent national enrichment and reprocessing facilities and therefore believes that the United States should take the lead in securing agreement for the development of regional multinational, rather than national, centers to undertake enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to minimize the spread of technology which could be used to develop nuclear explosives: Now therefore, be it Resolved, That the President seek the immediate international consideration of strengthening the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and seek intensified cooperation with other nuclear suppliers to insure that the most stringent safeguard conditions are applied to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability; be it further Resolved, That the Senate of the United States strongly requests and urges the President to seek through the highest level of consultation in the United Nations and with the other leaders of the world community an intensive cooperative international effort to strengthen and improve both the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of the international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be a substantial and immediate reduction in the risk of diversion or theft of plutonium and other special nuclear materials to military or other uses that would jeopardize world peace and security; be it further Resolved, That the President seek, through consultation with suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology, their restraint in the transfer of nuclear technology and their cooperation in assuring that such equipment and technology only is transferred to other nations under the most rigorous, prudent, and safeguarded conditions designed to assure that the technology itself is not employed for the production of nuclear explosives; and be it further Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State. 43-785-79- -56 Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, REPORT [To accompany S. Res. 221] The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 221) calling on the President to take the leadership in seeking cooperation in strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolu tion do pass. PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION The purpose of Senate Resolution 221 is to convey the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States should seek: (1) the immediate international consideration of strengthening the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and seek intensified cooperation with other nuclear suppliers to insure that the most stringent safeguard conditions are applied to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability; (2) through the highest level of consultation in the United Nations and with the other leaders of the world community, an intensive cooperative international effort to strengthen and improve both the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of the international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be a substantial and immediate reduction in the risk of diversion of theft of plutonium and other special nuclear materials to military or other uses that would jeopardize world peace and security; and (3) through consultation with suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology, their restraint in the transfer of nuclear technology and their cooperation in assuring that such equipment and technology only is transferred to other nations under the most rigorous, prudent, and safeguarded conditions designed to assure that the technology itself is not employed for the production of nuclear explosives. BACKGROUND Senate Resolution 221 attempts to identify priorities to the executive branch in efforts to deal with the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation. The resolution addresses in particular the need to strengthen international atomie energy safeguards as well as safeguards required by suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology. The resolution recognizes that strengthening the scope, comprehension and effectiveness of safeguards will require intensive cooperation in the United Nations and in consultations with leaders of the world community. The resolution leaves it to the executive branch to develop proposals for the kinds of safeguards which can be applied bilaterally and multilaterally and allows the administration discretion in how best to seek the desired agreements. COMMITTEE ACTION On July 26, 1975, Senator John O. Pastore (for himself, Senator Mondale, Senator Inouye and Senator Montoya) introduced Senate Resolution 221, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements has held a number of hearings during the current session dealing with the subject matter of the resolution. On March 19, the Subcommittee heard Dean Adrian Fisher, Georgetown Law School, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor. International Research and Technology Corporation, and Dr. Mason Willrich, University of Virginia Law School. On July 18, 1975, the Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Dwight Porter, Director of International Government Affairs Division of Westinghouse Corporation and former permanent representation to the International Atomic Energy Agency. On July 22 the Subcommittee received testimony from George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, Mr. Myron B. Kratzer, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, and Mr. Abraham S. Friedman, Director, Division of International Programs, Energy Research and Development Administration. Finally, on October 24 the Subcommittee heard the Honorable Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In addition, the Subcommittee received detailed information on nuclear proliferation problems in executive session on July 19 from representatives of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. The executive branch provided its comments on Senate Resolution 221 in the following letter received November 4, 1975: Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., November 4, 1975, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of July 31, 1975, requesting coordinated Executive Branch comments on S. Res. 221, submitted by Senators Pastore, Mondale, Inouye and Montoya. This Resolution urges the President to take the leadership in seeking international cooperation in strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials. The Executive Branch fully supports the objective of the proposed Resolution and believes it would be supportive of U.S. efforts to abate the spread of nuclear weapons. As indicated by Secretary Kissinger in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly last September, we agree with the proposition that the U.S. should consult closely with other governments to assure that international safeguards are broadened in their application, made uniform and kept effective. We also agree that efforts should be undertaken with other suppliers to assure that adequate constraint is applied to the export of sensitive technologies. During the past year, we have initiated consultations aimed at meeting these objectives and ensuring that safeguards are removed as an element of commercial competition. While we believe that the existing IAEA system is admirably meeting its current responsibilities, we also agree that this system will require the strong collective support of the international community. A firm expression of support from the Congress that it shares the objective of strengthening the IAEA in its safeguards responsibilities would contribute to our non-proliferation efforts. The development of a common supplier approach in the field of nuclear export control has been an objective of U.S. policy for several years. Indeed, we encouraged and participated in the successful activity of the exporters group which developed an agreed "trigger list" for safeguarding nuclear exports. However, given the fact that a greater number of nations are now capable of providing such assistance and that nuclear power represents a significant source of energy throughout the world, we agree that strong Congressional endorsement of this goal, as part of our overall non-proliferation strategy, is more important than ever. The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely yours, ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Dean Fisher, who was the United States representative in the negotiations leading to the non-proliferation treaty told the Subcommittee that the United States should rely upon the structure of the treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard structure and continue to work to improve that structure. According to witnesses, the main dangers involving misuse of nuclear materials are mis-appropriation by the receiving nation and theft. While it is difficult to stop a nation determined to cheat, strengthened IAEA safeguards and agreement to restraint by the supplying nations can help to compound the problems facing a nation wishing to divert material to military programs. Mr. Porter told the Subcommittee that the safeguard system is not perfect but that it is being improved. He noted a belief that the technology problem of keeping track of nuclear materials can be solved. Dr. Taylor said that it is: My own sense of hope that this problem of protecting material from theft, at least if not from national proliferation, can be controlled is that it is so obviously in the best interests of every country in the world to see to it that these materials are protected from theft, I do not care if it is France, India, Russia, or the United States, or Cambodia, or whoever. In its preambuler clauses, Senate Resolution 221 notes: That the United States should take the lead in securing agreement for the development of regional multinational, rather than national, centers to undertake enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to minimize the spread of technology which could be used to develop nuclear explosives. This concept won widespread support from witnesses before the Subcommittee. Professor Willrich said: There is a strong economic argument against the construction of nuclear fuel cycle facilities-enrichment, fuel fabrication or chemical processing-in any country until it has a large nuclear power capacity. There is also a solid commercial basis for the co-location of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and their construction and operation under multinational forms of ownership. In the development of a worldwide nuclear power industry, therefore, economic and security interests appear complementary rather than conflicting. Dean Fisher said that the United States: Probably should also try to work in the development of, by and large, co-location of critical elements of the fuel cycle and try to discourage a whole series of little independent fuel cycles. Mr. Friedman indicated a view that could be "prudent and reasonable" to sell complete fuel cycles to other nations "if there were international participation, regional location, demonstration of the economic and technical need for such facilities. ... Mr. Porter said: I believe that the world must explore and do its best to achieve a regional reprocessing situation. Where you have plants scattered around the world which will reprocess spent fuel, these plants should have to be, I think, multinationally owned and perhaps operated. They have to have an international control mechanism built into them. It is that point of the fuel cycle which concerns me most and I say the IAEA is working on these proposals. It will need the help again of all supplier states to |