dit of the account of the administrator, di-ceive or consider the account unless the same
rect him to pay the balance of personalty on is duly verified.
account of the mortgage debt.
—DONAHUE'S ESTATE, 92
Decedent's estate-Collateral inheri-
tance tax-Real estate-Direction to sell
land in another state with consent of life-
tenant-Liability of proceeds to tax.
Where a testator devises to his wife a life-
estate and the remainder to his executors in
trust to sell, and in a subsequent clause em-
powers his executors to sell both the life-
estate and remainder, subject to the consent
of his wife, and the executors sell the re-
mainder and the life-estate with the con-
sent of the wife, the proceeds are not liable
to collateral inheritance tax. The physical
status of the property at the time of testa-
tor's death determines the question of lia-
bility.
-CROZER'S ESTATE, 116
Decedent's estate--Widow's exemption
-Right of widow who had no common
household with her husband Insolvent
estate-Preference-Laches.
-ESTATE OF MARIE REED, DECEASED, 170
Decedents' estates - Accounts
opening and revising adjudication-Act
7 June, 1917, P. L. 514, Sec. 48—Or-
phans' court practice.
Under Section 48 of the Act 7 June, 1917,
P. L. 514, the Orphans' Court may revise and
correct a former adjudication where it ap-
pears that such adjudication contained a
mistake by the parties and the rights of
third parties have not intervened.
The Orphans' Court is not bound by the
rules of practice which prevail in a court of
Chancery.
Orphans' Court-Practice-Sale of de-
cedent's real estate to pay debts-Notice
of application for order to sell real estate
to pay debts-Lien of debts of decedent
on his real estate.
--GIBBS' ESTATE, 29
Orphans' Court-Jurisdiction-Exec-
A widow who never established a common utor's disputed claim of personal prop-
household wih her husband is nevertheless crty.
entitled to her widow's exemption of $500,-MARSTELLER'S ESTATE, 74
where she did not desert him, and there was
no severance of the marital relation by her
voluntary act.
Orphans' Court - Jurisdiction-Con-
tract of executors-Specific performance.
DESERTION.
Desertion-Jurisdiction.
An executor who pays other debts than -ESTATE OF JOHN SCARLETT, DECEASED, 96
administration expenses with knowledge of
the existence of a widow, will be surcharged
if the estate is insolvent, although a peti-
tion for the allowance of the exemption was
not filed for more than fifteen months after
decedent's death and eleven months after
letters were granted.
-SCULL'S ESTATE, 165
Where a husband and father deserts his
wife and children outside of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, and a complaint is
brought against him, under the Act of April
12, 1867, P. L. 78, for desertion and non-
Decedent's estate-Account, method of maintenance, the courts of Pennsylvania do
stating-Purpose of an account-Verifi-rot acquire jurisdiction in the case by the
wife and children, after the desertion, taking
A properly stated account should in the
up their residence in Pennsylvania, and the
first instance contain the principal debit it-bringing of the defendant, after his arrest
ems, followed immediately by the discharges outside of the state, into Pennsylvania, and
claimed and if another account is embraced his remaining there, under compulsory pro-
within the paper, it should be separately
cess, awaiting the trial.
-COMMONWEALTH V. SPRENKEL, 66
stated in a like manner. Any other method
of stating accounts should not be approved.
Mingling of administration and distribution
in an account is in violation of our well-es-
tablished practice.
Divorce-Master's recommendation—
Duty of court to examine and consider
the evidence-Cruel and barbarous treat-
ment.
The filing of an account by a fiduciary is
in the nature of a petition to a court of rec-
ord alleging matters of fact; its ultimate
purpose being to secure the approval of the The court can not grant a decree in di-
court of its contents by setting out in detail vorce on a master's report, unless up n a
the acts of the fiduciary performed in his of- full examination of the record and of the
ficial capacity; and the court should not re-evidence, it shall be convinced that the lat-
ter is sufficient to justify such a decree; and
Divorce-Permanent alimony-Act of
the rule of law that the master's conclusion June 25, 1895, P. L. 308-Discretion of
should not be adopted by the court without court-Conduct of respondent.
a full perusal and personal examination of
the testimony in each case is so imperative
that to make a decree of divorce without
The Act of June 25, 1895, P. L., 308 allows
the court in its discretion to grant or refuse
permanent alimony to the wife when the
having done so, would be an evasion of the husband is granted a divorce on the grounds
court's judicial duty.
of cruel and barbarous treatment or indig-
nities to the person which rendered his con-
dition intolerable or life burdensome.
The discretion of the court should be gov-
Although a single act of cruelty may be so
atrocious, and attended with such distressing
physical results as to endanger life and
health, and justify a divorce it is well set-erned and directed by the circumstances in
tled, that no single act of mere indignity to each case as they appear from the evidence
the person, however annoying or humiliating and one of the controlling, elements is the
is a sufficient ground for divorce. The law conduct of the respondent.
in such cases requires proofs of such repeat--MCCLELLAND V. McCLELLAND, 105
tinued course of malicious conduct which
ed acts of ill treatment, as constitute a con- Divorce Desertion-Leading ques-
renders the libellant's life burdensome and tions-Evidence as to period of absence
Returning case to
her condition intolerable.
The testimony failing to show in detail
the circumstances attending the separation
of the parties, or that it followed as the di-
rect result of threats, or personal injury to
the libellant, and the weight of the whole of
the evidence indicating that said separation
was really caused by the respondent's refus.l
to work or support his wife, a divorce on
the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment
In a divorce proceeding, the fact of deser-
tion cannot be established by asking the li-
bellant leading questions which are mere
conclusions and having them answered in
To support a decree in divorce, there must
be affirmative evidence that the desertion
complained of continued for the required
statutory period. The mere statement that
must be refused for want of sufficient evi-respondent "went out" from his home on a
Divorce Affidavit
-Amendment to record.
A divorce was refused with leave to amerd
the record where the affidavit was simply
captioned: Allegheny County, ss. The court
could not infer that it had been made in the
County of Allegheny and State of Pennsyl-
vania.
particular day without proof that his ab-
sence continued for the required period or
in fact any period is insufficient.
Where it was apparent that the libellant
could testify to a state of facts which would
probably entitle her to a decree the court
sent the case back to the master so that li-
bellant may have an opportunity to en-
lighten the court as to the real facts of the
case.
-BRUCKMILLER V. BRUCKMILLER, 132
Divorce-Practice-Sufficience of libel
The affidavit to a divorce libel must be Amendment of libel.
made in the county in which the case Was
entered.
-ALEXANDER V. ALEXANDER, 208
A libel in divorce by a wife against her
husband, under the Act of 1815, which
charges specific acts of indignities to her
person, rendering her condition intolerable
and life burdensome, and also with cruel
and barbarous treatment, endangering her
cause it does not allege that she was forced
to withdraw from the respondent's home.
A libel in divorce may be amended to
remedy a technical defect, after the appoint-
ment of a master to take testimony.
-STREET V. STREET, 133
A wife is not justified in leaving her hus-life and health, is not vitally defective be-
band on the ground that a home furnished
by him was small and in some respects in-
convenient, lacking modern improvements,
that his poverty at times imposed privations
upon the family, and that he permitted her to
pack her things the night before the separa-
tion without remonstrating, it not appearing
that his interference would have been of any
use. In such a case the husband is entitled
to a divorce on the ground of desertion.
-FREES V. FREES, 95
Divorce-Cruel and barbarous treat-
Bad temper, jealousy, indefinite threats
without any move to carry out same and ab-
sence of any offer of physical violence of any
sort does not constitute legal cruelty to en-
title libellant to a decree of divorce.
-CASSARA V. CASSARA, 157
and disinterested witnesses to the material
facts within the jurisdiction of the court who
were not called, as suggested by the master.
-MOORE V. MOORE, 177
Divorce Allowance for payment of
Divorce-Master's report-Improper counsel for wife.
conduct of master-Desertion-Change
In an action for divorce, it is undoubtedly
of domicile by husband-Duty of wife-the duty of the court to make a proper al-
Cruel and barbarous treatment-Indig- lowance for the wife, if she is not herself
nities to person.
of sufficient ability, to enable her to main-
Where the libellant in a divorce proceeding | tain or defend her suit, having regard to the
pays to the master his fee while the case is ability of her husband.
pending before him, the master's recom-
mendation favorable to the libellant will not
be considered in finally determining the case.
In such case, if no application is made for
the appointment of another master, the
court will read and consider the evidence,
and decide the case without considering the
master's conclusions.
A husband may lawfully change his place
of abode, consulting merely his business
comfort and convenience, and it is the mar-
ital duty of the wife to accompany him.
On a petition for an order for the payment
of counsel for the wife, in an action by the
husband for divorce, where it appeared that,
the parties had been married and lived to-
gether for about thirty-one years, reared a
family, accumulated property, separated and
on complaint of the wife the husband was
ordered to pay ten dollars per week for her
maintenance; that at the time he was or-
dered to pay for the maintenance of his wife
he had fourteen thousand dollars in cash and
bonds, of which he had improvidently lost
a considerable part before the hearing of
said petition; and that his wife was without
property or money, except the payments by
the husband under the order for mainte-
In such case the burden is upon the hus-
nance; the court ordered the payment of two
band to show that the wife's refusal to ac-hundred and fifty dollars for counsel fees.
company him was without reasonable cause.
Cruel and barbarous treatment, to entitle
one to a divorce, is limited to cases in which
life or health is involved.
If in such case the wife, without reason-
able cause, refuses to accompany him, she
commits such desertion as entitles the hus-
band to a divorce.
Indignities to the person need not be such
as to endanger life or health, but they must
be such as to render the condition intoler-
able and life burdensome, and such indigni-
ties must be of a serious character and long
continued, and so calculated to destroy the
peace of mind as to make the condition un-
bearable.
Dover charge, discharge of land from
by court.
Where, on a petition under Sec. 27, (b), of
he Fiduciaries Act of 1917, P. L. 447, for the
discharge of land from a dower fund, the
weight of the evidence showed that the fund
in question was paid to the parties thereto
entitled more than twenty-eight years be-
Where a wife alleges such cruel and bar-
fore the hearing of the case, and in the opin-
barous treatment and indignities to her per-ion of the court was sufficient to establish
son as to endanger her life and to render her this fact, a decree discharging the land from
condition intolerable and life burdensome, the fund was entered.
but testifies that during the time she acted |—HARBOLD'S ESTATE, 149
the part of a detective, followed her hus-
band's movements and kept a diary day by
day of all her husband did or said, such con-
duct is inconsistent with either a prostration
Elections-Polling place-Acts of Ap-
of health or an intolerable condition of life.ril 14, 1903, P. L. 187; July 8, 1919, P. L.
Divorce-Sufficiency of testimony.
A divorce will be granted on the testimony
of the libellant and her step-mother, where
they testify to all the requisite facts to sup-
port the allegations of the libel and to sus-
tain a decree of divorce, and their testimony
is not impeached or contradicted, although
their testimony shows that there are other
769; May 18, 1893, P. L. 106; April 17,
1866, and June 13, 1883, Purdon. 1318.
The act of April 11, 1903 P. L. 187, auth-
orizes the county commissioners to change
a polling piace and the act of July 8, 1919,
P. L. 769, requires them to give the occupant
or owner of the polling place notice before
the change is made.
The act of May 18, 1893, P. L. 106, is re-
pealed by the act of July 8, 1919, P. L. 769.
The acts of April 17, 1866, and June 13, 1883 EQUITY.
2 Purdon, 1318, provide for a change by the
court when an exigency exists.
-IN RE CHANGE OF POLLING PLACE, 13
Equity Jurisdiction Fraudulent
lease-Cancellation-Restitution and ac-
counting-Remedy at law.
A bill in equity for cancellation of a lease
Correction of plaintiff's land on ground of fraud will not
be certified to the law side of the court
of lists by order of court-Personal ap-
plication for registration — Insufficient merely because it incidentally prays for res-
application for registration.
titution of the land together with an ac-
counting. The incidental questions of res
toration and acounting, although proper mat
ters for suit in ejectment, come within the
jurisdiction of equity as incidental to the
main question of specific relief by cancella-
tion of the lease, as to which the remedy at
Section 1 of the Act of May 16, 1915, P. L.
75, authorizes the court of common pleas, at
any time before the election, to call before
it electors whose names have been omitted
from the registry list, and the assessor of the
district, and after hearing the parties to dis-law is inadequate.
pose of the subject in a summary way as to
law and justice shall belong and if need be
to order the assessor to correct the registry
list accordingly.
Equity-Trustee-Bailment.
One of two assignees of property under
into money, pay the assigner's debts, pay
the assigner a fixed annuity for ten years,
and a certain sum thereafter, and pay the
assigner or his heirs a sum sufficient to ac-
quire certain specified property, and make
certain other payments, and that the assig-
nees shall retain for their own use "all the
proceeds and property remaining after these
Under the provisions of that act, the e'ee-stipulations that they shall convert the same
tors have the right to be assessed and have
their names placed on the registry list, at
any time, on personal application to the as-
sessor for that purpose, if duly qualified. If
their assessment is thereupon neglected or
refused, the court may at any time, before
election, correct the registry list by ordering
such names to be added thereto by the as-
sessor. But where there has been no previ-provisions have been complied with", deliv-
ous application to the assessor for assess-
ercd certain of the property assigned as
ment there is no breach of duty by him, or aforesaid to a bank as security for the pay-
error in the registry list, calling for correc-ment of an alleged liability by him to the
tion.
An unsigned partly written and partly
printed paper, with a blank designation of
the party who was authorized to have a vo-
ter's name placed on the assessment books,
is not sufficient authority for the assessment
of a voter or for the correction of the registry
list by the court ordering the addition of the
v ter's name to the list.
The court ordered the correction of the
registery lists of a borough where the names
of voters who had applied personally to the
assessors for registration had been omitted
from the lists by errors.
-IN RE REGISTRY LISTS OF RED LION BOR-
OUGH, 85
Election laws--Invalid nominating pe-
bank, if the liability should be established,
and if not established, then to be returned
to him. The action by the bank against the
assignee, or his alleged liability, was decided
in favor of the assignee, who then demanded
the return to him of the pledged property,
which demand was refused by the bank.
The assignee brought a bill in equity, not as
trustee, but in his individual right, against
the bank to compel the redelivery of the
property. The court found that the bank still
held an unsatisfied claim against the as-
signor; that the assignee was a trustee of
the property pledged; and that he had im-
properly used it as his own; and Held: that
the bill must be dismissed, and that the
property in controversy must remain in the
custody of the bank until further order of
the court.
-DELLONE V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 49
Equity-Equitable relief—Sale of real
estate-Fire insurance Cancellation of
contract-Specific performance.
A nominating petition which does not have
the requisite number of signatures of qua'-
ified electors is in effect no petition, and it
carnot be amended, since permission to
amend would amount to permission to ale
after the last day for filing as fixed by law.cerning the legal effect of a transaction in
—EMERICK'S PETITION, 94
Equitable relief will be granted when ig-
norance or misapprehension of a party con-
which he is engaged, or concerning his own
legal rights which are to be affected, is in-
duced, procured, aided or accompanied by
any inequitable conduct of the other party.
A court of equity will not permit one party
to take advantage and enjoy the benefit of
an ignorance or mistake of law by the other,
which he knew and did not correct.
If the evidence shows that in addition
there would be great hardship in enforcing
the contract, made in ignorance of the law,
equity may afford relief.
A contract for the sale of land provided
for the possession of the land by the pur-
chaser, the payment of fixed monthly in-
stallments on account of the purchase price,
the payment by the purchaser of the cost
of fire insurance written in the name of the
redress by action of the stockholders of the
corporation or by any corp ate action what-
ever.
A stockholder's bill against the officers and
certain directors of a corporation was held
insufficient where plaintiff failed to aver that
she had sought redress by the officers and
lirectors without result. This general rule
can only be avoided in exceptional cases and
it must clearly appear that such action would
be useless. Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing
Company, 259 Pa. 510, distinguished.
-WILSON V. BROWN ET AL., 104
Sales-Vendor and vendee Machine
vendor, and for the delivery of the deed sold to be "satisfactory"-Time when
vendee to be satisfied-Evidence.
after the remainder of the purchase price
has been reduced by the monthly payments
to a certain sum. After a number of in-
stallments had been paid, but before the re-
mainder of the purchase price had been re-
duced to the sum stipulated, fire destroyed
a building and machinery on the land. The
vendor received the insurance money and
part of the proceeds of the sale of iron re-
maining after the fire. The purchaser's at-
torney, who was also the advisor of the ven-
dor, advised the purchaser that the vendor
could not be compelled to allow him any-
thing on account of the insurance received.
The vendor told the purchaser he will treat
him fair, showed him a computation of the
purchase money remaining unpaid, and pre-
vailed upon him to meet him at their at-
torney's office. Only part of the proceeds of
the insurance was credited in the computa
tion to the purchaser. The latter demurred.
but finally was induced to sign another con-
tract for the purchase of the same land, by
which he agreed to pay the amount shown
by the computation mentioned to be payable
on the first contract. On bill in equity filed
by the purchaser, it was HELD, that the pur-
chaser is entitled to credit on account of
the purchase price for the proceeds of the
iron sold and of the insurance received by
the vendor, and to cancellation of the second
contract and specific performance of the
original contract.
-WALTERMYER V. KING, 77
---BURKHOLDER V. HESS, 17
Criminal law-Bankruptcy-Disposing
of goods to defraud creditors-Evidence.
-COMMONWEALTH V. LEVENTHAL, 20
Pleadings-Evidence not pertinent to
the issue-Practice.
-ATLANTIC REFINING CO. V. LEVY, 26
Criminal laze-New trial-Evidence of
complaint of rape-Evidence admissible
on one count but not on another-Repu-
tation, value of evidence of-Charge on
reputation.
-COMMONWEALTH V. KELLER, 185
New trial-Evidence.
-BERKSTRESSER V. LURIA RAG CO., 87
New trial Evidence - Striking out
testimony-Municipal lien for paving-
Former improvement.
-CITY OF YORK V. DECKER, 101
Division fence-Rebuilding of - Pro-
ceedings under Act of April 14, 1905–
When void--Notice.
A report of borough auditors as to the re-
building of a partition fence under the Act
of April 14, 1905, P. L. 162, and proceedings
thereon are void where there was no notice
given to and no personal attendance by the
Bill by stock-party charged with the costs of repairs, and
Issuing new shares-Pleading judgment for defendant should be entered
on appeal from the judgment of a magis-
prior demand-General rule-Demurrer. trate founded on said report.
A demurrer to a stockholder's bill against A visit of the auditors to the defendant
the officers and five directors of a corpora- after they had gone over the ground and
tion to declare illegal and void an issue of viewed it and partially made up their de-
certain shares of stock to themselves was cision, cannot be construed as a voluntary
sustained and the bill dismissed where plain- attendance and participation in the proceed-
tiff did not aver prior demand for redressings by him.
the directors or an attempt to secure -CARPENTER V. WOLF, 9
|