ORIGIN of EVIL. By DR. WILLIAM KING, late Lord Tranflated from the Latin, with large Notes; tending To which is prefix'd A DISSERTATION Concerning the Fundamental Principle and immediate Criterion of Virtue. A S ALSO, The Obligation to, and Approbation of it. With fome account of The Origin of the Paffions and Affections. LONDON: Printed for W. Thurlbourn Bookfeller in Cambridge; and fold by 12-27-30 deg THE. Tranflator's Preface. Have always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, as one of the nobleft and most important Subjects in Natural Theology: It leads us into the most exalted Speculations concerning the Existence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. It firft difcovers the true Intent of the Deity in creating any Beings at all, and then purfues that Intent thro' the feveral Works of his Creation: it fhews how this is fully anfwer'd by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how it might and should be and why, and in what refpect it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Oeconomy in the Government of the Univerfe, fearches into the various Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compafs of Nature. Neither is its Usefulness inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to act upon any ferious Views here, or to entertain any folid Hopes of Futurity. a 2 Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in fome degree, is abfolutely neceffary in order to the fettling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him; in order to the due Apprehenfion of his Design in creating, preferving, and directing us, and to the regular Conduct of our Lives, and Enjoyment of ourselves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Pleafure can we take in knowing any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am; I'm told that an abfolutely perfect Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpose to communicate fome Part of his Happiness to me, and to make me, in fome measure, like himself.This End is not obtain'd; -the direct contrary appears; I find myself furrounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Misery; by whofe fault I know not, How to better myself I cannot tell. -What Notions of God and Goodness can this afford me?- What Ideas of Religion? -What Hopes of a future State? God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown; if it be neither his Glory, (as fome will have it) which my present State is far from advancing;-nor mine own Good, which the fame is equally inconfiftent with; how know I what I'm to do here, and in what manner I must endeavour to please him? or why fhould I endeavour it at all? For, if I must be miferable in this World, what Security have I that I fhall not be fo in another too; (if there be one) fince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I fee) have been happy in both? -Such Thoughts as For, if these must needs disturb a Person that has any Concern for his Maker's Honour, or his own Happiness; that defires to pay him a reasonable Service, and answer the End of his Creation: in fhort, that happens either to think at all upon these things, or to think for himfelf. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of fome of thefe Perplexities, cannot fure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one of thefe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind, which can never be unseasonable. But the Usefulness, as well as Antiquity, of the prefent Debate; and the Abfurdity of the Manichean Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need not not here be infifted on: all that ever feem'd wanting to an entire Conqueft over thefe Hereticks, and their abfurd Hypothefis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear before I have done. There are two general ways of Reafoning, called Arguments a Priori, and a Pofteriori; or, according to what Logicians commonly ftile the Synthetical and Analytical Method: The former lays down fome evident Principles, and then deduces the feveral Confequences neceffarily refulting from them: The latter begins with the Phonemena themfelves, and traces 'em up to their Original, and from the known Properties of thefe Phænomena arrives at the Nature of their Caufe. Now the former of thefe is evidently preferable, where it can be had, (and I think it may be had almoft every where, but in the firft Caufe) fince the latter muft depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole Argument, and quite fpoils a Demonftration. "It is very true (fays Dr. J. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 79.) that this is not a strict Demonftration of the general Conclufion, because that "can be had no other way than by trying all the Experiments. "that can poffibly be made every where, which is infinite and "endlefs; but it is the beft that the Nature of the thing is capa"ble of." Now, if the Thing before us will admit of the former Method, then I think it is capable of a much better; and an Attempt to fhew that it is fo, must be very defirable: And this our Author feems to have done, without any precarious System, or ill-grounded Hypothefis whatsoever. His fuperior Excellence (as I apprehend) confifts in having laid down, and previously eftablish'd fuch folid fubftantial Principles as may be drawn out in infinitum, and easily apply'd to all the Difficulties that attend the prefent Question. He first of all enquires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Design. in the Creation; fettles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines whether any could be perfect; and if not, whether all should have been |