virtues of his private life. As a citizen it can be said that he always did his duty.

He was publie spirited, and manifested it not alone by his words, but also by his acts. He did not-as so many do-live for himself, or for his family, or for his immediate circle, but he was one of those who recognized and fulfilled all his obligations and duties as a member of the society in which he lived.

But few men have ever been so sincerely esteemed and generally beloved, and their loss so mourned by an entire community as Judge Rogers.

As a lawyer he stood in the very front rank of his profession. While he made the practice of his profession a means of livelihood, yet the money was always a secondary consideration. He was thoroughly imbued with a love of the law as the noblest and grandest of all professions, He knew and benefited by its elevating influence. The sharp practices and trickery which bring discredit upon the practice of the law he absolutely abhorred.

He believed that no man could be a true lawyer, who did not become, by the practice of his profession, not only a wiser and broader minded man, but also a purer and nobler character. He was a cautious and prudent counselor as well as a zealous advocate.

In his intercourse with his brother attorneys he was always courteous, frank and honorable, and his word was as good as his written stipulation.

After a long and highly successful career as an a attorney, ripe in experience, he was called to the bench of the Circuit Court of this county. It has been said that some men are born to be judges. He appeared to fall into the position as naturally and easily as any man I ever knew.

The natural impartiality and equanimity of his disposition, and his great kindness and urbanity of manner seemed to fit him for the bench, and enable him to preside with great ease and dignity. He always drew a sharp line of distinction between true dignity and austerity of manner.

While no attorney ever felt embarrassed in his presence, none ever forgot that he was in the presence of the court. He

was fairly worshiped by the younger members of the profession. He had for the young attorney always a kind manner and words of encouragement.

I remember one young attorney who had met with many discouragements in his endeavor to get "a foothold at the bar," who, upon meeting him one day, and asking how he was succeeding, replied, while his eye brightened, "I think now I shall succeed. I tried a rather difficult case the other day before Judge Rogers, and after the trial was over and while the jury was out, he called me up to the bench and said privately to me, 'Young man, you tried that case very well indeed, and I hope I shall often see you in my court.'

Every young lawyer went before him with confidence, that if his cause was just, if the law was on his side, he was bound to be successful, no matter how old or experienced his opponent might be.

In addition to his other admirable qualities for the position, he was a profound judge of human nature, and appeared to know by intuition the hidden and secret springs of human action. His success appeared to be assured almost from the day he ascended the bench in the year 1870. He soon acquired such a reputation for absolute impartiality and ability that there was no attorney, or suitor, but was pleased to have his case come before so able and upright a judge.

He feared no man's face, and no person, suitor or attorney, ever had any special favor in his court. He saw no nam s upon his docket except, as indicating who was the plaintiff and who the defendant. He was possessed of and practiced great patience, and remembered the advice of Lord Bacon, not to be guilty of "an impatient and catching hearing of the counsellors at the bar," "nor of an impertinent flying out to show learning."

He always gave the closest attention in the trial of a case. He appreciated the truth, that inattention in a judge is a crime against justice, a crime not punishable by any statute law, yet nevertheless a malfeasance in office; because no judge can know the law unless he knows all the facts of the case. There is no truer maxim than "that out of the facts the law ariseth."

In a city of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, with its extensive commerce and great and varied interests, it was inevitable that cases involving questions of great importance

should come before him.

(Judge Tuley here detailed and commented upon a number of the decisions of Judge Rogers, and proceeded as follows:) After my elevation to the bench, in 1879, I was drawn into still closer and more intimate relations with Judge Rogers. Judges Rogers, McAllister, Moran, Barnum and myself were elected after a very heated and exciting contest.

We were thrown much together by reason of our frequent consultations in matters connected with the public interest, and we found in Judge Rogers, at all times, a most able and judicious adviser. While never assuming to control, for he was as modest as he was able, his always clear insight as to the point in issue led us to prompt and correct conclusions.

Utmost good feeling and harmony prevailed. No doubt, no distrust, no envy, no jealousy, had any place in our midst. We gloried in each others successes, and the reputation acquired by one seemed to be, as it were, the joint property of all.

We found Judge Rogers to be a man of strong friendship and great affections. He gave us both, and what he gave us we returned as best we could. We became very much attached to him, and when the dread news, one day in January last, spread like wild-fire through the corridors and court rooms of the court, that Judge Rogers had fallen dead in Gossage's store, the news struck a pang to the hearts of his brother judges, second only to that which struck the hearts of the loved ones at home.

He has passed away from among us, leaving only the influence of his great and noble life. Who can estimate the farreaching and beneficial influence of such a life? I shall not attempt to state it as it needs a more eloquent tongue than mine.

I can only say in conclusion that his judicial career gives us a model that any judge might be proud to follow, and that his professional life, as an attorney, is worthy of all imitation by the members of the legal profession.

POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMAN

IN NEW YORK AND AT COMMON LAW.

The profession and the country have been surprised by the news that a woman voted at the last New York general election, and that efforts in both Federal and State courts to punish her therefor-to make, as was boasted, a "test case" that should keep other women from voting-have wholly failed. The Federal authorities dropped the case on the ground that a woman's vote is no violation of Federal statute. The District Attorney of Alleghany County declined to frame an indictment against Mrs. BARBER, of Alfred Center, and the grand jury dismissed the complaint against her, because no State law could be found which she had infringed. These results, which two years since scarce any one thought possible, attract much attention.

Space will permit only to set forth a few basic facts which underlie these weighty events, and to ask for them the earnest attention of the legal profession, the law writers and the bench, as well as of the many millions of others whose rights it concerns, throughout the English speaking world.

In 1880, the Legislature of New York passed, by an overwhelming vote, a bill repealing the statute prohibiting women from voting at school elections. Afterward, in compliance with the request of the committee on the Judiciary, who had desired to be informed of the exact extent to which the legislature could go to protect the women of the State in the exer

cise of the right which had been declared, the writer had occasion to investigate thoroughly the whole question, as it stood both at common law, and under the constitutions and statutes of this country.

It then became manifest that, to secure woman her political rights, it was not necessary to get 700,000 men's affirmative votes for a constitutional amendment, but that the votes of 65 assemblymen and 17 senators for a repealing statute, would be sufficient. The next year, to the amazement of nearly all, a majority in the Assembly voted favorably—a thing formerly deemed impossible.

From 1880 to 1885, there was an annual effort to secure woman suffrage. It was objected that the section of the Constitution which guaranties suffrage to specified male persons, abrogates utterly the Legislature's immemorial power to regulate suffrage, and by forbidding it to disfranchise such male persons, prevents it from guarantying suffrage to any others.

This extraordinary assumption, that mere omission disfranchises a million and a half of citizens, arose from ignorance of the facts in the case; especially that in 1842-the first time in this State, women were by statute forbidden under penalties to vote at general elections.

The Constitution, in the same article which guaranties specified persons, specifies whom it debars. These sections read thus:

"SEC. 1. Every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a citizen for ten days and an inhabitant of this State one year next preceding an election, and for the last four months a resident of the county, and for the last thirty days a resident of the election district in which he may offer his vote, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the election district of which he shall at the time be a resident, and not elsewhere, for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions which may be submitted to the vote of the people.

"SEC. 2. No person who shall receive, expect or offer to receive, or pay, or offer or promise to pay, contribute, offer or promise to contribute to another, to be paid or used, any money or other valuable thing as a compensation or reward for the giving or withholding a vote at an election, or who shall make any promise to influence the giving or withholding any such vote or who shall make or become directly or indirectly interested in any bet or