went in person at unexpected times and seasons to inspect suspicious premises, and summoned witnesses freely, and the result was a great batch of indictments, a number of arrests and verdicts of guilty, a decided emigration of gamblers and prostitutes out of the city, and a general purification of the moral atmosphere. People who should know, told me that the following summer there was not an establishment left in the city where unlawful gaming was carried on. Some said this with pleasure, and others with long faces and prophetic head-shakings; for it is a theory to which many honest people hold, that a young city in a new country cannot possible thrive without the money and business that is brought into the place by these "social scavengers" as they call them. To drive them out was to drive the city to the dickens very quickly. But the facts accomplished by the mixed jury were questioned by nobody.

As may be well imagined, all this new state of things was not accepted quietly and peaceably by those whose interests it menaced, and questions were raised in the district court where the trials on these indictments were had, as to the ability of married women to serve as grand jurors. The court decided in favor of their ability to do so, and appeal was taken therefrom to the Supreme Court. The same question was raised and appeal taken from the decision in Tacoma, Pierce County, as well. It chanced that my business associations made it necessary for me to aid in looking up the law and preparing the brief that was used by the attorneys for the Appellants, so that while my sympathies were on one side of the question, my work was done on the other, as sometimes must happen. The points involved were very nice ones, turning principally on the construction of the word "householder" in the statute prescribing the qualifications of jurors, which reads as follows:

"All qualified electors shall be competent to serve as petit jurors, and all qualified electors and householders shall be competent to serve as grand jurors." (Chap. 152, §2078 of the Code.)

Could married women, living with their husbands, be considered "householders" in the sense required for the proper con

struction of this statute?

The system of community property between married people prevails, being adapted from the California Code, but with many broadening modifications in the more liberal Territory. A statute passed shortly before the law giving suffrage to women, expressly abolished all laws which imposed or recognized civil disabilities upon a wife which were not equally imposed upon or recognized concerning a husband. Also the rights and responsibilities of parents, in absence of misconduct, are equal in the Territory, and the mother as fully entitled to the custody, control and earnings of her minor children as the father; and in case of the father's death the mother comes into as full and complete control of the children and their estate as the father does in case of the mother's death.

These and other laws go to show that the intention, or the tendency of intention on the part of the legislators of the Territory had been to put husband and wife on an exactly identical legal footing; but the question remained whether they did,—and even whether they could-make both parties to the marital union householders. As I have said, the judges presiding over the district courts in the two counties of King and Pierce decided in the affirmative, while other counties looked on, regarding these as test cases. I heard the appeal argued before the Supreme Court at Olympia. There are four judges in the Territory, and on appeal, the three who have not already passed on the question, hear and decide it. Two of the four were known to be in favor of the right of married women. to serve as grand jurors. The third was thought to be shaky, and the fourth, a southern man who had just been appointed by President Arthur, was supposed to be unfavorable. So it proved, for Judge Turner gave a minority opinion contrary to that of the majority of the bench, which was favorable, the shaky third deciding to cast in his vote with those of two men of such acknowledged legal and judicial acumen as was possessed by the judges from Western Washington.

An appeal was taken from the decision to the United States Supreme Court, where I suppose it is still pending.

Meanwhile the question was locally settled, and women

continue to serve on juries in Western Washington, where the judges refuse to receive a list of names from the county commissioners of citizens eligible as jurors, if they consist entirely of males. In Eastern Washington women have served as jurors to some extent, but I think not to the same general degree as west of the mountains.

Recently I saw by a Seattle paper that the question is very seriously mooted whether or not the entire statute giving women the right of suffrage is void, unless specially ratified by Congress, on account of its being without title, other than "an Act to amend section 3050, chapter 238 of the Code of Washington;" whereas it is required that all statutes shall be given a descriptive title. It was stated that a test case would probably be made up soon and carried to the United States Supreme Court. It was shortly before the July municipal election in Seattle that the article was published, and it may have been only coined for political purposes. There is much threatening every now and again by one political party or another, that unless the women voters do thus and so (that is, obey the party lash) they will find themselves disfranchised again before they know it. But they go quietly on just the same, voting according to the dictates of their own sweet wills, scratching tickets fearfully, choosing their candidates rather for personal worth than party principles, secure in the fact that it is far easier to enfranchise than to disfranchise. The point just referred to may, or may not, be well founded. I have no opportunity at this time to look into the question, even for my own satisfaction, but it would certainly be very interesting to see what view the blackgowned justices at Washington would hold on the matter, and what action Congress would take.

Lelia J. Robinson.

THE OFFICE OF CHANCELLOR.

The office has existed from most remote antiquity. King Arthur, of almost fabulous fame, is said to have appointed a Chancellor.

In the early ages of the English government those who were wronged went to the King for redress, so that, as is reported in the Knights of the Round-Table," the cry of all the people for justice passed through the great hall "where Arthur sat."

But as population increased, and causes became numerous, the King called to his aid the wisest of his advisers and he became his secretary or assistant, listening to complaints and framing them into due form. In time, fixed forms were adopted for all similar cases, and a place was named to which all such suitors could resort to obtain justice. This was the officina justitia called chancery, and the officer who presided over it was called a Chancellor. The other great branch of the pristine duties of the Chancellor was the necessary aid required by the King for conferring grants of dignities, of offices and of lands. It was necessary that these grants should be duly framed and authenticated by an officer well versed in the laws and customs of the kingdom, and this man was the Chancellor.

Such writs and grants were in early time verified merely by signature. The art of writing being but little known, seals became common; and the King, according to the fashion of the age, adopted a seal, with which writs and grants were sealed. This was the Great Seal, and the custody of it was given to the Chancellor. "Keeper of the King's Conscience," was one of the appellations of the Chancellor. This was from the fact that after the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to Christianity by the preaching of St. Augustine, the King had always near his person a priest, to whom was intrusted the care of his chapel, and who was his confessor. This person was selected from the most learned men of his order, generally from among the hereditary barons. His functions were more political than judicial; he sometimes led armies to battle, and when the sovereign was beyond the sea, by virtue of his office, he, as regent, governed the realm.

A DEFINITION OF LAW.

We are all well acquainted with the definition of law, in its more comprehensive sense, as given by the illustrious English commentator-"a rule of action."

This definition is perhaps, sufficiently complete. There is however a sense still somewhat broader in which the word is sometimes used. It is employed to express a mere relation. Thus we say it is a law in mechanics that the power of a lever is proportional to the distance from the fulcrum; in general mathematics, that it is an invariable law that the whole is greater than any of the parts, and in geometry, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

In its more limited sense, taking the term to mean that which is administered in the courts or municipal law, as it is called, the definition of the same learned jurist is more ingenious than explicit.

Law, he says, is that which is prescribed by the supreme power of a state commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. Query. Is that which is thus commanded, and that which is prohibited wrong because it is prohibited, or is there another standard of right and wrong to which the prescribed enactment must conform in order to have the force of law? The author of the definition has not been as explicit in answering this question as we could wish, though it may upon the whole be said that he has answered it in the latter alternative. Thus also has it been answered many times since by the highest judicial authorities, not only in those countries