government, which had, however, admitted a certain degree of decentralisation. But the devolution was the result not of any concession to strong local sentiment but purely for administerative convenience. It was true this convenience had crystallised into such a hard fact that the resumption of complete authority by the central government was next to impossible, it is also true that the reviving political consciousness of the people of India made them see in the expansion of the powers delegated to the provincial governments the surest means of securing their own increasing association in the task of government. The government, therefore, fell in with a growing current of Indian public opinion when it announced as its settled policy the increasing association of the people of India, and directed attention to the possibilities of provincial autonomy as the only means to accomplish that end.

But because for once government convenience has coincided with popular ambitions, it does not necessarily follow that the ideal is either feasible, or acceptable. The provinces and states of India are units without any unity. They are the creations of political expediency, without a link that could serve for permanent cohesion. The provinces might foster a sense of local patriotism, and thestates a feeling of personal loyalty, which will, if tolerated at all, result in the most disastrous seeds of internal rivalries and jealousies, ending, as sure as fate, in the rapid undermining of national solidarity. The Reforms para from which we have quoted above goes on to observe:

"Over this congeries of states would preside a central government, increasingly representative of and responsible to the people of all of them; dealing with matters both internal and external of common interest to the whole of India; acting as arbiter of interstate relations, and representing the interests of all India on equal terms with the self-governing units of the British Empire."

This picture is necessarily over-coloured, The Central Government will appear in the light of either a meddlesome

interferer, or else a parasite which it will be no one's interest to support. It will be, maintained into power by alien authority, under pretext of extra Indian responsibility. It aims at representing all India on equal terms with the self-governing members of the British Empire; but will, if allowed to weaken by the growth of provincial autonomy and local patriotism, end by becoming the instrument of foreign tyranny. The present financial arrangements make it appear in the light of a provincial pensioner, busy with all the wasteful and extravagant departments of public activity. Even assuming these arrangements to be temporary, the bad odour created by such an arrangement cannot altogether be destroyed.

The public opinion of India, led by men who desired to progress on the lines of least resistance has been betrayed into a gigantic political error. The true self-government in India can never be established so long as the central authority remains irresponsible. The reservation of powers provided for in the Act of 1919 is sufficient proof of this remark. India has ever aimed at being one, no matter the accidents of our history. For the Indian people, at a stage in their political development, deliberately to abandon or weaken the principle of national solidarity and Indian unity is, to say the least, politically suicidal. And hence we cannot accept the goal indicated in the above quotation, as much because, it would render this country an easy prey for designing outsiders, as because it would increase and intensify internal jealousies, and prevent the consummation of our political ambitions, the establishment of a strong, national, democratic government in India.

CHAPTER V.

The Indian Legislature.

63. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Indian legislature shall consist of the Governor-General and two chambers, namely, the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly.

Except, as otherwise provided by or under this Act, a Bill shall not be deemed to have been passed by the Indian legislature unless it has been agreed to by both chambers, either without amendment or with such amendments only as may be agreed to by both chambers.

63 A. (1) The Council of State shall consist of not more than sixty members nominated or elected in accordance with rules made under this Act, of whom not more than twenty shall be official members.

(2) The Governor-General shall have power to appoint, from among the members of the Council of State, a president and other persons to preside in such circumstances as he may direct.

(3) The Governor-General shall have the right of addressing the Council of State, and may for that purpose require the attendance of its members.

63 B. (1) The Legislative Assembly shall consist of nomitnated or elected in accordance with rules made under this Act.

members

(2) The total number of members of the Legislative Assembly shall be one hundred and forty. The number of non-elected members shall be forty, of whom twenty-six shall be official members. The number of elected members shall be one hundred:

Provided that rules made under this Act may provide for increasing the number of members of the Legislative Assembly as fixed by this section, and may vary the proportion which the classes of members bear one to another, so, however, that at least five-sevenths of the members of the Legislative Assembly shall be elected members, and at least one-third of the other members shall be non-official members.

(3) The Governor-General shall have the right of addressing the Legislative Assembly, and may for that purpose require the attendance of its members.

63 C. (1) There shall be a president of the Legislative Assembly, who shall, until the expiration of four years from the first meeting thereof, be a person appointed by the Governor-General, and shall thereafter be a member of the Assembly elected by the Assembly and approved by the Governor-General:

Provided that, if at the expiration of such period of four years the Assembly is in session, the president then in office shall continue in office until the end of the current session, and the first election of a president shall take place at the commencement of the ensuing session.

(2) There shall be a deputy-president of the Legislative Assembly, who shall preside at meetings of the Assembly in the absence of the president, and who shall be a member of the Assembly elected by the Assembly and approved by the Governor-General.

(3) The appointed president shall hold office until the date of the election of a president under this section, but he may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor-General, or may be removed from office by order of the Governor-General, and any vacancy occurring before the expiration of his term of office shall be filled by a similar appointment for the remainder of such term.

(4) An elected president and a deputy-president shall cease to hold office if they cease to be members of the Assembly. They may resign office by writing under their hands addressed to the Governor-General, and may be removed from office by a vote of the Assembly with the concurrence of the Governor-General.

(5) A president and deputy-president shall receive such salaries as may be determined, in the case of an appointed president by the Governor-General, and in the case of an elected president and a deputy-president by Act of the Indian legislature.

63 D. (1) Every Council of State shall continue for five years, and every Legislative Assembly for three years from its first meeting:

Provided that

(a) either chamber of the legislature may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General; and

(b) any such period may be extended by the Governor-General if in special circumstances he so thinks fit; and

(c) after the dissolution of either chamber the Governor-General shall appoint a date not more than six months, or with the sanction of the Secretary of State not more than nine months, after the date of dissolution for the next session of that chamber.

(2) The Governor-General may appoint such times and places for holding the sessions of either chamber of the Indian legislature as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by notification or otherwise, prorogue such sessions.

(3) Any meeting of either chamber of the Indian legislature may be adjourned by the person presiding.

(4) All questions in either chamber shall be determined by a majority of votes of members present other than the presiding member, who shall' however, have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes.

(5) The powers of either chamber of the Indian legislature may be exercised notwithstanding any vacancy in the chamber.

63 E. (1) An official shall not be qualified for election as a member of either chamber of the Indian legislature, and if any non-official member of either chamber accepts office in the service of the Crown of India, his seat in that chamber shall become vacant.

(2) If an elected member of either chamber of the Indian legislature becomes a member of the other chamber, his seat in such first-mentioned chamber shall thereupon become vacant.

(3) If any person is elected a member of both chambers of the Indian legislature, he shall, before he takes his seat in either chamber, signify in writing the chamber of which he desires to be a member, and thereupon his seat in the other chamber shall become vacant.

(4) Every member of the Governor-General's Executive Council shall be nominated as a member of one chamber of the Indian legislature, and shall have the right of attending in and addressing the other chamber, but shall not be a member of both chambers.

64. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, provision may be made by rules under this Act as to

(a) the term of office of nominated members of the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly, and the manner of filling casual vacancies occurring by reason of absence of members from India, inability to attend to duty, death, acceptance of office, or resignation duly accepted, or otherwise; and

(b) the conditions under which and manner in which persons may be nominated as members of the Council of State or the Legislative Assembly; and

(c) the qualification of electors, the constitution of constituencies, and the method of election for the Council of State and the Legislative