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of the Secretary of State.

On the other hand the proposal that the India Council should be composed of the elected representatives of India would be useless, unless the powers of the Council are increased, and its decisions by majority are made binding upon the Secretary of State on all matters without exception. In the absence of such provisions the Indian members will always have the mortification of being overruled by a man who knows nothing of the questions at issue. A frequent disregard of the wishes of the Council is sure to cause discontent in India if it ever comes to be known. Besides, if the powers of the Council are increased in this way, the real goal might be lost sight of. The effective powers of no authority in England, however constituted, should be increased at the cost of the authorities in India, if our ultimate goal is self-government in India.

In appraising all these suggestions it must be remembered that the Parliament of England can never interfere, with credit to itself and benefit to India, in the actual details of administration in India. What we want of that body, and what may justly be expected of it, if not as a price of our loyalty as a proof of her appreciation, is to abandon altogether the principles which have so far governed the Empire of India. Time was when the only champion of the Indian people was an independent, private Member of Parliament,-a Burke, a Wilberforce, a Bradlaugh. Time was when the Minister of State for India in England could well be regarded as the real and the only democratic check on the otherwise unlimited autocracy of the Indian Government, -a Canning, a Charles Wood, a Ripon. Time was when the average educated Englishman-of the type of the ordinary Civilian in India,-might be deemed more fit to govern in India than his fellow-subjects of Indian birth. His education was more liberal, his experience undoubtedly greater, his neutrality among the religion-divided peoples of India quite probable. But that day has now passed away. The English Parliament, busy with its own immediate problems, cannot play for ever the guardian of the welfare of the Indian people. It has confessed its inability to do so in the case of the colonies

planted by Englishmen, and where consequently the problems of Government could not be utterly dissimilar to the local problems of England. It cannot expect us to believe in its competency to go on being the guardian of India, when we are separated from her by thousands of miles, every one of which could give & reason for granting autonomy to India. For with the real problems of India, with our widowed virgins and our untouchable pariah, Parliament is utterly, fundamentally incompetent to deal. And perhaps that is why they never have been approached. The Secretary of State has ceased to be the democratic check that he was meant to be on the absolutism in India, and has ended by becoming the President of narrowest oligarchy, all the more incompetent to deal with the daily newer and more complex problems of India, because the men who compose it have had experience of India as it was 25 years ago. They will maintain themselves to be right with all the dogmatism of out-of-date experts. Even the young English Civilian, actually on the spot in India, and in daily touch with all the complex problems of Indian life, cannot now claim to be a better ruler than his Indian compeer. For his one great claim to superiority is gone or is fast going. As educated India learns the wisdom of religious toleration, his supposed impartiality admidst the warring creeds of India is useless. Education and experience are no longer his monopolies as they used to be. A trial of innate ability OWS no unquestioned superiority of the English over the Indian, while his sympathy with his surroundings can never equal that of his Indian colleague.

The myriad problems of India must be and can be solved only by the Indians in India. Strangers to Indian life and sentiment, animated with the nobler motives which have governed the best of Englishmen in India, may be efficient rulers, may even be good rulers-so long as the functions of the State are no more than those of a policeman. Change the ideal of the State, and no one people could govern another, especially those so utterly dissimilar in their habits and sentiments as the Indians and the English. Indians, when they come to rule in

India, may quite conceivably be no better policemen than the English perhaps no better engineers, financiers, diplomats, lawyers, or soldiers. But they are bound to be,-in spite of themselves, in spite of their history,-immeasurably superior in all those subtle, indescribable attributes, which go to make good government as against efficient government, which help to uplift an entire people.

CHAPTER II.

The Secretary of State.

2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Secretary of State has and performs all such or the like powers and duties relating to the Government, or revenues of India, and has all such or the like powers over all officers appointed or continued under this Act, as if the Government of India Act, 1858, had not been passed, might or should have been exercised or performed by the East India Company, or by the Court of Directors or Court of Proprietors of that Company, either alone or by the direction or with the sanction or approbation of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, in relation to that Government or those revenues and the officers and servants of that Company, and also all such powers as might have been exercised by the said Commissioners alone.

(2) In particular, the Secretary of State may, subject to the provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder, superintend, direct and control all acts, operations and concerns which relate to the Government or revenues of India, and all grants of salaries, gratuities and allowances, and all other payments and charges, out of or on the revenues of India.

(3) The salary of the Secretary of State shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament, and the salaries of his under-secretaries and any other expenses of his department may be paid out of the revenues of India, or out of moneys provided by Parliament.

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The Council of India.

3. (1) The Council of India shall consist of such number of members, not less than eight and not more than twelve, as the Secretary of State may determine provided that the Council as constituted at the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919, shall not be affected by this provision, but no fresh appointment or reappointment thereto shall be made in excess of the maximum prescribed for this provision.

(2) The right of filling any vacancy in the Council shall be vested in the Secretary of State.

(3) Unless at the time of an appointment to fill a vacancy in the Council one-half of the then existing members of the Council are persons who have served or resided in India for at least ten years, and have not last left India more than five years before the date of their appointment, the person appointed to fill the vacancy must be so qualified.

(4) Every member of the Council shall hold office except as by this -section provided; for a term of five years: provided that the tenure of office of any person who is a member of the Council at the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919, shall be the same as though that act had not been passed.

(5) The Secretary of State may, for special reasons of public advantage, reappoint for a further term of five years any member of the Council whose term of office has expired. In any such case the reasons for the reappointment shall be set forth in a minute signed by the Secretary of State and laid before both Houses of Parliament. Save as aforesaid, a member of the Council shall not be capable of reappointment.

(6) Any member of the Council may, by writing signed by him, resign his office. The instrument of resignation shall be recorded in the minutes of the Council.

(7) Any member of the Council may be removed by His Majesty from his office on an address of both Houses of Parliament.

(8) There shall be paid to each member of the Council of India the annual salary of twelve hundred pounds: Provided that any member of the Council who was at the time of his appointment domiciled in India shall receive, in addition to the salary hereby provided, an annual subsistence allowance of six hundred pounds.

Such salaries and allowances may be paid out of the revenues of India or out of moneys provided by Parliament.

(9) Notwithstanding anything in any act or rule, where any person in the service of the Crown in India is appointed a member of the Council before the completion of the period of such service required to entitle him to a pension or annuity, his service as such member shall, for the purpose of any pension or annuity which would have been payable to him on completion of such period, be reckoned as service under the Crown in India whilst resident in India.

4. No member of the Council of India shall be capable of sitting or voting in Parliament.

5. The Council of India shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, and subject to the provisions of this Act, conduct the business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the Government of India and the correspondence with India.

6. (1) All powers required to be exercised by the Secretary of State in Council, and all powers of the Council of India, shall be exercised at meetings of the Council at which such number of members are present as may be prescribed by general directions of the Secretary of State.

(2) The Council may act notwithstanding any vacancy in their number.

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