towards religious systems-Christianity asserts creation-The Genesis of Species-And Professor Huxley-A misapprehension-His astonish- ment-Another misapprehension-An explanation-Suarez-The fact of creation-Another misapprehension-Want of acquaintance with theology-Authorities-An utter mistake-Solvitur ambulando-Chris- tianity and reason-Mode of controversy-Restatement of issue-A LESSONS FROM NATURE. CHAPTER I. THE STARTING-POINT. "Our own continued existence is a primary truth naturally made known to us with supreme certainty, and this certainty cannot be denied without involving the destruction of all knowledge whatever." the contem become a THE philosophic contemplation of nature may be said to be a passion of the age in which we live. Nor is Reasons why the reason why, far to seek. Every physical science, plation of when once its study is fairly begun, never fails nature has to excite much interest, and in our day a certain passion. knowledge of physical science has become widely diffused. Most popular sciences, zoology, botany, and geology, &c., can be followed with ease by all commonly gifted minds, and the beauty, variety, and inexhaustible multitude of the facts and relations they disclose are such as may well make that interest become intense and absorbing. But when it is recollected that to the attraction these sciences possess in themselves there is now added the interest called forth by the generally diffused belief (whether rightly or wrongly entertained) that by these much light may be thrown upon the deepest problems and the most important questions which can occupy men's minds, it becomes easy to understand why a very large part of our popular lectures and of our periodical literature should be devoted to subjects of natural history, so treated as to bear, directly or by implication, upon questions of origin and agency and purpose; devoted, in short, to physical philosophy. The problem of the true relation subsisting between irrational and rational nature is the problem of the day. An endeavour then will here be made to elucidate what are the lessons taught us by a combined study of nature in its two aspects, rational and irrational. activity of our age. It is probable that the last quarter of a century has, in Speculative England, seen a more quickly growing and more wide-spread crop of speculative questioning than any former period of like duration. More than this, it is doubtful whether any period of the world's past history has witnessed a more general uncertainty, not only respecting the solution of particular problems, but as to the possibility of satisfactorily and certainly answering any one of them. Thus it has come about that from increased speculative activity, and the inability of physical science to satisfy the questions raised, men devoted to physical science have been forced into philosophy. "Metaphysics," which had become (especially in this country) a byword of reproach, are again avowedly pursued. A reaction has set in, and the importance of philosophy, indeed its absolute necessity as a basis for science, is made manifest by the most popular teachers of physical knowledge. On the Continent, Buchner, Vogt, Hartmann, and Strauss have powerfully aided in directing popular attention to philosophical problems. In England, in spite of the oft-repeated assertions of the unprogressiveness of metaphysics, and the comparisons drawn between the efforts of metaphysicians and those of Sisyphus, our bookshelves teem with evidence that devotion to philosophy is on the increase amongst us, and physicists such as Carpenter, Bence Jones, Bastian, Huxley, Tyndall, Darwin, Wallace, with many more, have all, in various degrees, wandered beyond the domain which is specially their own into the metaphysical region. Even that annual national congress, which was instituted expressly for the promotion of physical science, had its session of 1872 inaugurated by an address on "the mental processes by which are formed those fundamental conceptions of matter and force, of cause and effect, of law and order, which form the basis of all reasoning;" while, at Belfast, in 1874 it was opened by what may be fitly termed a sermon advocating the deliberate substitution of a religion. of emotion for one of reason. Professor Huxley, some years ago,* bore witness to the needfulness of attending "to those philosophical questions which underlie all physical science;" and he has again and again availed himself of his well-earned popularity to press upon his hearers metaphysical considerations, and to endeavour to make plain to them that the questions of really supreme importance are such as are philosophical. starting cannot be In entering upon an inquiry which professes, as does this, to take nothing for granted unnecessarily Our need of a or without criticism, we must be careful that our point which starting-point, in our investigation of nature, shall gainsaid. be thoroughly satisfactory-containing truth which is absolutely unquestionable. Such a starting-point is supplied us by our passing mental states-the facts of consciousness itself. It is conceivable that the whole external world, and all existences external to ourselves, might be delusions, but everybody can see that while we actually have a feeling we must have it, and that no supernatural being could cause us to be thinking that which we at the same time do not think, or not to think anything while we are actually continuing to think it. Here, then, in consciousness itself we have a perfectly satisfactory starting-point, a firm rock which may serve as the corner-stone of a future edifice. Such an edifice we may find it possible to raise by inquiring into the activity of our own mind, by finding what it declares to be ultimate and certain truths (if it declares any to be such), by criticising the tests given as to such truths being certain and ultimate, and by examining the grounds on which we are, if at all, to accept such declarations as true, having, at the same time, seen what truth itself really is. *Contemporary Review,' November 1871, pp. 443, 444. perimental science. 66 This task may appear a difficult and tedious one, but after The study of all it is one which comes strictly within the field of mind an ex- the experimental sciences, and is actually the most certain science of them all. Its inductions repose upon the most direct of observations, and its deductions are tested by experiments of the most decisive kind. Whether metaphysics" be or be not a cloud-land, this particular inquiry is at least to be made on firm ground, under a clear sky, and in bright sunlight. Before, however, entering upon the first inquiry, a preliminary caution may not be out of place. A widely extended discussion of philosophical quesThe two dan- tions such as that which now obtains is manifestly gers of popu- open to two dangers, the one, a "hasty dogmatism," sions. the other, an "irrational scepticism." It is common enough to find writers (such, e.g., as Professor Clifford) speaking in so dogmatic a tone that the unwary are in danger of mistaking confident assertion for proof, while the many, ever prone jurare in verba magistri, are but too apt to adopt themselves the dogmatic style merely on the authority of their chosen masters. For such, a judicious scepticism is the necessary remedy. lar discus Authority More common, however, is the danger of "irrational scepticism." And here a word of explanation may be addressed to those who may be offended by this phrase, fancying (in spite of the concluding phrase of the last paragraph) that I may deem "scepticism" to be generally "irrational.” But it is manifest that in philosophy, reason, and reason only, is and must be the supreme and ultimate arbiter. has no place For all those who are convinced that truth is necessarily good, it is even wrong to accept anything whatever as true which has not been made evident to the intellect. For such, no authority, however venerable, no consequences, however calamitous, as long as they do not involve a contradiction, can or ought to stand in the be cured by way of pitiless logic in following out to their final results the processes of reason. As a consequence, in philoso phy. Doubt only to investiga tion. when any man has become a victim to doubt, he has no |