PREFACE. OBSERVATION and experience have convinced me of the narrowing and misleading effects upon the mind of an incomplete conception of what is meant by the term "Nature." It is too generally taken as denoting the assemblage of phenomena external to and apart from the human mind, which none the less is one of the most important objects which presents itself to our perception. Hence arises a necessary imperfection. But a worse evil follows. "Nature," taken in this limited sense, is often made use of to explain that which has been tacitly excluded from it. Thus it is that the facts and processes of Reason are apt to be first ignored in order that they may be afterwards treated as if the mere phenomena of irrational nature were sufficient to explain them. Impressed with this conviction it has been my endeavour to point out in the following chapters (in however imperfect and fragmentary a manner) what I deem the most important lessons to be derived from "Nature," in the broad sense of that word as a great whole of which the mind of man forms part. For us indeed the facts of mind form the inevitable starting-point from which we must set out in order to study, logically, the phenomena of irrational nature, and to investigate, if we may, their cause and purpose. There is no doubt, in thus proceeding, a danger of Anthropomorphism— of attributing to the First Cause merely human characteristics, and projecting as it were our personality, as in the Brocken shadow, far beyond its proper limits; but the danger of Antanthropomorphism is at present much greater -the danger, that is, of allowing the facts of reason to be obscured and overshadowed by an analogously enlarged distortion of the world of sense, which ever so clamorously reiterates its claims on our attention and regard. The following chapters are mainly reprints from articles which have from time to time appeared in the 'Quarterly,' 'Dublin,' 'Contemporary,' and 'Fortnightly' Reviews between June 1871 and November 1875. These various articles, however, were originally written with the intention that they should be augmented, re-arranged and republished in an assemblage of consecutive chapters as they now appear. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE STARTING-POINT. "Our own continued existence is a primary truth known to us with supreme Reasons why the contemplation of nature has become a passion-Specula- pp. 1-28 "Knowledge must be based on the study of mental facts, and on undemon- strable truths which declare their own absolute certainty, and are seen by the mind to be positively and necessarily true." Self-knowledge shows we can have absolute certainty without proof- Reasons why we should begin with a study of mind before studying external nature--And endeavour to harmonize our thoughts and feelings -Some differences between these-Thought, not feeling, the test of truth-Balmes and Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the necessity of starting with undemonstrable truths-Mr. Spencer's test of ultimate truths, false because merely negative-Two distinct classes of unimaginable propositions-A fallacy of Professor Helmholtz-Mr. Spencer's example of absolute inconceivability-Our perception of necessary truth not limited by experience-Propositions positively seen to be necessarily true-Summary of the propositions here arrived at-Mr. Bain's ulti- mate criterion of truth—The principle of contradiction denied by Mr. Spencer, and the highest faculties of the human mind ignored-As also by Mr. Lewes-The validity of our reasoning faculty-Mr. Lewes con- founds reasoning with sensible association-Summary and conclusion. "The real existence of an external world made up of objects possessing qualities such as our faculties declare to us they do possess, cannot be logically denied and may rationally be affirmed." A justification of our belief in the external world here logically required -Prevalent scepticism on this subject amongst modern philosophers, and its cause-Mr. John Stuart Mill-Mr. Spencer's Transfigured Realism -His justification of it-Outcome of it-His reply to criticism-Its insufficiency-His proof-case as to sound-The truth of his affirmation:: denied Mr. Spencer's reply to the charge of fundamental incoherence -Rejoinder to such reply-Need of a more detailed survey of his positions-His observations on the relativity of our feelings-The impossibility of logically denying the objective validity of our perceptions as to even the secondary qualities of objects-Mr. Spencer on the rela- tivity of our relations between feelings-On the effects of structure, |