1798.]

zealous in resisting the arrogance of France, and they determined, if possible, to force on a war between that country and America. A council of their supporters, including Washington, Hamilton, and Pinckney, was accordingly summoned, and at this meeting a draft was prepared for the use of Adams in his opening speech.

The

The President arrived in Philadelphia from his country house about the end of November. Shortly afterwards he met the members of his Cabinet, and put to them the two questions contained in his letter of the 20th of October, to which no reply had yet been given. It was evident that Adams was disinclined to a declaration of war, and, although most members of the Government had formed a different view, it was resolved to omit the subject altogether from the speech to Congress at the approaching session. As regards the renewal of negotiations with France, Adams was willing to make such an attempt, though not without some manifestation by that Power of a sincere desire to re-establish the old friendly relations. For his opening speech he prepared a paragraph on the subject, which explicitly declared the President's disposition to send a Minister to Paris, or to receive one from the Directory, whenever assurances should be given that any representative of the United States would be met in a becoming manner. paragraph was not sanctioned by the Cabinet, who now brought forward the draft to which allusion has been made, and which in the main was accepted by the President. He demurred, however, to a clause so constructed as to shut him out from sending a mission to France, even should there be signs of a more pacific disposition on her part, unless she should in the first instance send an Envoy to America. The President had hitherto been over-matched by his Cabinet. They represented opinions more extreme than his own, and they had been enabled to force those opinions on their unwilling chief. But Adams now resolved to submit no longer to this dictation. Several members of the Government insisted with great warmth on the adoption of the passage; Adams as resolutely refused. He was determined to introduce some modification into the objectionable phrases; and in the end he succeeded. The paragraph, as it stands in the speech actually pronounced, ran as follows :—

"But, in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honour, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An official preparation for war can alone insure peace. It is peace that we have uniformly and perseveringly

549

cultivated; and harmony between us and France may be restored at her option. But to send another Minister without more determinate assurances that he would be received, would be an act of humiliation to which the United States ought not to submit. It must, therefore, be left to France, if she is indeed desirous of accommodation, to take the requisite steps. The United States will steadily observe the maxims by which they have hitherto been governed. They will respect the sacred rights of embassy. And, with a sincere disposition on the part of France to desist from hostility, to make reparation for the injuries heretofore inflicted on our commerce, and to do justice in future, there will be no obstacle to the restoration of a friendly intercourse. In making to you this declaration, I give a pledge to France and to the world that the executive authority of this country still adheres to the humane and pacific policy which has invariably governed its proceedings, in conformity with the wishes of the other branches of the Government, and of the people of the United States. But, considering the late manifestations of her policy towards foreign nations, I deem it a duty deliberately and solemnly to declare my opinion that, whether we negotiate with her or not, vigorous preparations for war will be alike indispensable. These alone will give us an equal treaty, and insure its observance."

The Speech was delivered in Congress on the 8th of December, in the presence of Generals Washington, Hamilton, and Pinckney, then assembled at Philadelphia for the organisation of the army. It recommended a large extension of the navy, so that the coasts might be watched, the national trade be protected, and the safe transportation of troops and stores be secured. The policy of the President, however, continued to meet with great resistance. An attempt was made by some members of Congress to bring on a declaration of war; but the attempt resulted in failure. At the commencement of 1799, the President and his Ministers were hopelessly at issue, and the latter omitted no opportunity of defeating or embarrassing the plans of the former. The feeling of the country, except in a few circles, was much in favour of war. France had as yet given but slight indications of a desire to adopt more conciliatory measures, and there was every probability that a collision would be precipitated, and all the evils of a disastrous struggle be forced on a country which had not yet recovered from the effect of former contests. The position of Adams suffered from the difficulties which naturally belong to

moderation. The President was not loved by either of the contending parties, since he held aloof from the exaggerations of both. He was disliked by the Democrats, because he would not be the servant of France; he was equally disliked by the Ultra-Federalists, because he declined to rush headlong into a wild crusade against the Directory and its principles. Nothing, however, was more conspicuous in Adams than strength of will. Although Congress was not heartily in his favour, and his own Ministers were very much against him, he persevered in his views-a course wherein he was greatly encouraged by a communication received from Mr. Murray, in Holland, the tendency of which was to show that the French had really become more pacific in their ideas. The Dutch had made an offer of mediation, and, on the 21st of January, the terms of the Directory's answer to this offer reached the American President. It was there stated that the French had already clearly intimated at Philadelphia their hearty desire for reconciliation, and the Government of the United States was charged with the consequences if it should persist in manifesting an implacable spirit.

Adams saw that the effect of these French statements, as soon as they became public, would be to increase the desire for peace on the part of the Democrats, and to give them the power of saying that it was America which held back from a friendly arrangement. Ten days later came a letter from Mr. Murray, containing particulars of his interviews with M. Pichon, the French Agent at the Hague, respecting the nature of the assurances required by the President in his message of the 21st of June, 1798. Talleyrand had addressed a despatch to M. Pichon, in which he reiterated the profession of a desire to come to a good understanding with America, and, adopting the very words used by the President on the 21st of June, had promised that a new Envoy, if sent, would be "received as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation." This gave a very decided turn to affairs in the direction of peace; yet Adams, knowing the warlike tendencies of his advisers, hesitated as to calling them together with a proposal for new attempts at negotiation. The course which he adopted was to send a communication to the Senate, nominating Mr. Murray, then Minister at the Hague, as Minister to France. In bringing forward his recommendation, he provided that no advance should be made beyond that appointment, until further assurances had been given by France, of such a nature as the dignity of the United States

required. The Senate was much agitated by this message. The Federalists feared that their opportunity for forcing a war had passed; the Democrats affected to think that the President had kept back Talleyrand's letter, in order to let the warmeasures go on. After two days' delay, the nomination of Mr. Murray was referred to a committee of five persons, all of them Federalists. The members of that committee determined to visit the President personally, and to obtain from him, if they could, such modifications of the proposed measure as would have been equivalent to its destruction. Adams, however, told them that he would neither withdraw nor alter the nomination. The committee, as extreme Federalists, and therefore desirous of a war with France, were of course disinclined to send any mission at all; but, finding that they could not induce the President to abandon his plan, they proceeded to make objec tions to the particular diplomatist who had been selected. Adams replied that, should the Senate think proper to decide against Mr. Murray, he might then propose to join with him two other individuals. On the following morning, he nominated Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Patrick Henry, of Virginia, as fellow-commissioners with Mr. Murray; thus anticipating any further action on the part of the Senate.

The news of these appointments was received, as might be supposed, with very opposite feelings by the two parties into which the country was divided. Jefferson, as the head of those who admired French institutions, declared that the nomination silenced all arguments against the sincerity of France, and rendered desperate every further effort towards war. To Mr. Hamilton and his friends, the act of Adams seemed nothing less than a dishonest desertion of the policy which they believed to be necessary to the honour and safety of the Federation. Men of more moderate and less factious habits, however, saw the wisdom of the President's course, and upheld him in his endeavours, at once to save the reputation of the country, and to avoid the dangers of war.

The carrying out of the proposed plan did not prove a very easy task. Patrick Henry, while agreeing in the advisability of sending Envoys, was unable to take his place in the Embassy, and Governor Davie, of North Carolina, was substituted for him. The Opposition adopted every means of delaying the preliminaries, in the hope that matters might yet assume a different complexion. In this they were aided by a piece of imprudence on the part of Adams. He left Philadelphia for the summer recess, after maturing with his Cabinet

1799.]

nates.

the points fixed upon as ultimata, in case the negotiations with France should be renewed, and after preparing certain papers necessary to the vindication of the direct tax recently imposed for defraying the additional expenses incurred by the preparations for war. It would have been wiser to remain at his post, since he well knew that he had unwilling subordiIn the absence of the President, every kind of procrastination ensued. On the 6th of March, Mr. Murray was informed that a distinct pledge must be obtained from the French Foreign Minister, that the Envoys should be received and treated with due respect; and that no indirect unofficial communication would be permitted, nor any variation of the designated policy be listened to, unless the Directory should themselves prefer to send a Minister to Philadelphia. These instructions did not reach Murray until May. Talleyrand repeated the assurances previously given, and complained of the delays which were now being unnecessarily made. The French Minister's note arrived in America on the 30th of July. Adams then urged upon the heads of Departments the propriety of completing all arrangements for the Commission with the utmost despatch. They acted, nevertheless, with elaborate slowness, in the manifest hope of defeating the attempt at peace. Indeed, the plot at length became so serious, that Mr. Stoddert, the Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Adams that his presence was absolutely necessary at Trenton, whither the public offices had been temporarily transferred, in consequence of an outbreak of yellow feverat Philadelphia. The Cabinet, it appeared, had been discussing the advisability of suspending the mission for some time. This idea was suggested by intelligence recently received from Paris, announcing that the rule of the Directory was at an end, that Talleyrand and many of the other Ministers had resigned, and that there were strong probabilities of the Jacobins being restored to power. The altered condition of affairs in France offered a valid excuse for re-considering the course which had been adopted so many months before; and the President himself saw that it would be reasonable to suspend the mission for awhile, until the result of the new revolution should be ascertained.

Adams arrived at Trenton on the 10th of October, and at once met the members of his Cabinet. Nothing was then decided; but the warparty soon obtained an accession of strength by the news of British and Russian successes over the French. It was thought by many that the French Republic would soon be at an end, and the Bourbons reinstated in power. The defeat of the contemplated mission was now regarded as almost

551

certain by the war-party; but they were in fact on the eve of a great reverse. On the evening of the 15th of October, Adams summoned his Cabinet to a meeting. When its members had assembled, the President laid before them the draft of instructions to the Commissioners which had been prepared by the Secretary of State. After a long discussion, this document met the unanimous approval of the Ministers. The Cabinet Council broke up about eleven o'clock at night, believing that the great struggle, as to whether the Commission should be sent at all, was only postponed until the next day. Very early on the following morning, however, two of their number received from the President a brief direction in writing, that the papers agreed upon for the use of the Commissioners should be forthwith made out, and that the frigate United States should be put in readiness to receive them, and set sail for France on or before the 1st of November.* On the 5th of that month the Commissioners started for Europe, and the ultimate result of their negotiations was to re-establish peace between the two countries.

But, almost before they could commence their duties, the head of the American army, and, taken altogether, the greatest character of that epoch and nation, had attained his final rest. A neglected cold had caused the death of Washington, on the 14th of December, 1799, after little more than a day's illness. He expired, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, in his beloved house at Mount Vernon, surrounded by that quiet and that domestic affection which he coveted above all things, and which came as a sacred solace and conclusion to a life of turmoil, danger, and contest. It may be said of him, as of many other great men, that his work was finished before he himself departed. Had he lived longer, he would perhaps have added nothing to his fame. He had helped to free his nation; he had lived to organise the political constitution of his country; he had added eight years of wise administration to eight of sterner service, and to a long career of preparation for the one great task. It would be difficult to imagine how anything more could have been placed upon the record, worthy of that which had already been accomplished. With men of special greatness, death is the completion and consecration of the full magnificence of their lives; and such, it may be said, was the case with Washington. The popular grief at

In this narrative of the events of Mr. Adams's Admistration, great use has been made of the Life of that statesman, by his grandson, Charles Francis Adams, which was published at Boston, U.S., in 1856, and which, as regards many matters, was based on information not previously given to the world.