Hoffer is now speaking, is for a different kind of purpose, which he will explain.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may proceed, Colonel.

Col. HOFFER. In the procurement of this ammunition the manufacturers assembling the components into complete rounds will not in general manufacture all the components. This is especially true of the smokeless powder and high explosives. It becomes necessary, therefore, to provide storage facilities for the components in excess of those that the assembling companies can handle. In many cases it is impossible to regulate the output of a given plant to meet the actual needs from day to day. The quantities of material required. are so great that it is necessary to operate plants at the maximum: capacity which involves a storage for probably several months of a large portion of the components. For example, it is necessary to provide approximately four months' average storage for nearly 500,000,000 pounds of high explosives. These buildings must neces-sarily be small and placed at what are considered safe distances. To provide these storage facilities it is estimated that as much as $5,000,000 may be required.

The CHAIRMAN. That is largely a guess, I suppose, Colonel?

Col. HOFFER. Largely a guess. It is proposed to utilize wherever we can the storage capacity of the various plants manufacturing these components, and all contracts are being drawn up so as to utilize this capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the storage furnished at the Government establishments be of a permanent or temporary character?

Col. HOFFER. It will be of as temporary character as possible. No more expense will be incurred than necessary to secure reasonably safe storage of the components. It is estimated that there will bet required 160 powder storehouses and 900 explosive storehouses. Those buildings it is proposed to make of hollow tile with concrete floors, the cost of which will not be different materially from that of wooden buildings. For the storage of the metallic components the structures will be as simple and as inexpensive as they can be made, there being no great danger involved from fire risk. The distance that these storehouses will be separated, will, of course, necessitate that part of this money be used for proper means of communication between the storehouses so that the incoming and outgoing shipments can be properly and economically handled. We are allowing about three acres to a powder magazine and two acres to an explosive magazine, so that in case of the destruction of one, the others will not be destroyed.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR RIFLES ALSO COVERS THE MANUFACTURE OF PISTOLS.

The CHAIRMAN. General, it has been stated at different times that the War Department had an appropriation of $5,000,000 to provide rifles for the Army, but that, instead of providing rifles, they used the money for pistols, and that if they had used the money for rifles, as authorized, there would be an abundant supply of rifles now on hand. Will you state what you know about that situation? Gen. CROZIER. Mr. Chairman, the appropriation of $5,000,000 for rifles, which you are speaking of, must necessarily have been one

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which was made only last August, and toward the end of the month, because there has not been an appropriation for as much as $5,000,000, or anything like it, made for rifles in any other act since I have been chief of Ordnance. It ought to be perfectly apparent to anybody who knows enough about the subject to criticise that there could not possibly have been many rifles made out of that $5,000,000 since the time the appropriation was made, under any circumstances, or, at least, under our existing circumstances, with any kind of effort.

Now, at the time the appropriation was made the Springfield Armory was operating at less than one-fourth of its capacity, with a corresponding number of workmen. In order to increase the capacity it was, of course, necessary to increase the number of workmen, which, under the circumstances of the tremendous demand for workmen trained in the making of rifles existing because of the large number of rifles under manufacture in the country for our allies, and the condition of retardation of that manufacture, was extremely difficult. Those men were very hard to get, and our own men who had been laid off as our manufacture dropped away in previous months and years were all in the employ of these other people, and it was impossible to get them away. The other factory which the Government has is the one at the Rock Island Arsenal, and that one was shut down altogether and had been for some time because of the lack of funds, the appropriations for some time preceding the time that this appropriation of $5,000,000 was made having been very small. The one for the year before was only $250,000. The Rock Island Armory was reopened and men were collected as rapidly as could be under the circumstances, and the manufacture was resumed there and is now going on at about as good capacity as you could expect. I think they are making there now something like 200 rifles a day.

The full capacity on a double-shift basis of 10 hours each, and doing nothing but manufacture rifles would be about 500 per day. When I said that they are making 200 per day, I mean that is the number that they assemble and get through the final stages. They are increasing that capacity right along. At all events, the capacity has been increased as rapidly as it was possible to get the work done. At the Springfield Armory there were under manufacture a number of spare parts for rifles. We have to have spare parts in great numbers to keep our rifles in the hands of the troops. Anticipating a campaign, or anticipating the possibility of it, last autumn the department gave considerable orders for the manufacture of spare parts, which occupied the plant a good deal, and, of course, it interfered with an immediate increase in the output of rifles to a certain extent, but the great difficulties were in getting workmen.

Now, as far as the utilization of that money for the manufacture of pistols instead of the manufacture of rifles is concerned, the extent to which that was done was more than justified, because, although we are short of both rifles and pistols, the shortage is greater in the case of pistols than in the case of rifles. That is to say, we are more put to it for a proper number of pistols than for a proper number of rifles, with less opportunity for providing increase in the manufacture.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent was the money used for the manufacture of pistols?

Gen. CROZIER. I have not the figures now before be, but I can tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you put that in the record?

Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I can put that in the record, if you like.

During the period from August, 1916, until the date of the entry of the United States into the war the Ordnance Department placed orders for 93,600 automatic pistols at a cost of $1,303,200, which figure does not include the cost of extra magazines and spare parts.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those pistols manufactured in the armories? Gen. CROZIER. They were manufactured in the armories at that time, and we have been up to quite recently manufacturing them in the Springfield armory. Now, in order that the output of rifles and pistols together may be increased, I am devoting the whole Rock Island plant to the manufacture of rifles, giving the pistols over to private manufacturers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those of your latest model?

Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. We are getting some pistols which are not of the latest adopted model-but they are good pistols-because we have to get them so fast. We have to get them faster than we can get them of the latest adopted model with all that we can do. Of course they use the same ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the diversion of this money for pistols interfere with the output of rifles, or has it done so up to the present time, or could you have utilized that money in view of the facts that you have stated?

Gen. CROZIER. If so, it would have been to a very limited extent, and, even had it been so, I would not have done it. If I had been able to increase the output of rifles by putting less money in pistols I would not have done it, because it would not have been a wise thing to do. It would not have been sensible to take money and divert it from things of which you were short and put it in things of which you were not short. We are shorter of pistols than we are of rifles. Now, under those circumstances, what intelligence would there be in using money which might be used either for rifles instead of pistols?

The CHAIRMAN. This money was available for both?

Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; for both. It was appropriated for the manufacture of small arms.

The CHAIRMAN. The impression created is that it was available for rifles exclusively.

Gen. CROZIER. That is so erroneous that I did not understand that it was even the impression.

The CHAIRMAN. And the statement was made to me that that had been done. I said that I did not believe it was possible, because if the money was available only for rifles you could not use it for pistols.

Gen. CROZIER. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. So that under the wording of the appropriation it was available for pistols and rifles?

Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and it has been so available, under the wording of that same or a similar appropriation, for the last 20 years and more.

The CHAIRMAN. In utilizing it, then, you utilized it to get things. that were required to equip this army?

Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and things that were perfectly covered by the appropriation.

CONTRACT FOR MANUFACTURE OF HOWITZERS.

Mr. SISSON. General, will you please prepare a concise statement giving us the details of this peculiar contract that has been made for the manufacture of howitzers, or, if more convenient to you, you might set out the contract in the record?

Gen. CROZIER. I will do so.

Mr. SISSON. And also please prepare for the record a concise statement of the other contract made by the department for the manufacture of cannon.

Gen. CROZIER. The contracts to which you refer are for field artillery matériel, including guns, gun carriages, limbers, and caissons, and they provide that a fixed price shall be paid for each of these guns or vehicles, with the proviso that if the profit made by the contractor exceeds 20 per cent of the cost the difference between the profit and the 20 per cent of the cost shall not be paid. It further provides that if the profit is less than 10 per cent of the cost the amount required to make the 10 per cent shall be paid the contractor by the Government. It is further provided that an extra profit, amounting to approximately 10 per cent of the cost of all the material ordered, shall be paid the contractor for the purpose of creating additional facilities for manufacture of the articles to be delivered, but that if this 10 per cent does not equal 45 per cent of the cost of facilities the Government shall pay an additional amount suflicient to make it equal 45 per cent, and that if the 10 per cent exceeds 55 per cent of the cost of facilities the difference shall not be paid. The object of the above agreement was to insure, in the face of the very uncertain material and labor markets, that the contractor should get between 10 and 20 per cent profit on his work, and that the Government should pay for approximately 50 per cent of the increased facilities required for the production. I may add that this contract. has not been executed, but is still under discussion with the contractor, although the work is well under way.

ALTERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE ARTILLERY.

The CHAIRMAN. The next item is "For alteration and maintenance of the mobile artillery, including the purchase and manufacture of machinery, tools, and materials necessary for the work and the expenses of the mechanics engaged thereon, $206,600,000." The appropriations thus far have been $26,000,000.

Gen. CROZIER. That is intended for keeping in repair and replacing, if destroyed, during the year all of the field artillery, including that heretofore provided for and that for which the estimates are now being made. Taking into consideration the $26,000,000 which has already been appropriated this spring, it contemplates the work of maintaining this artillery in repair and the work of manufacturing such parts in advance as are necessary for maintaining it in repair. Manufacturing in advance means, in some cases, the manufacture in

this fiscal year of parts which will be intended to replace damaged parts in the next fiscal year, supposing the war to go on for the next fiscal year as well as this one.

The items are divided-a part of them-into two rather general classes, one for the repair and maintenance of the artillery and the other the manufacture of parts to be used in repair, maintenance, and replacement. The estimates for the repair and maintenance have been made at about 20 per cent of the cost of the artillery to be repaired and maintained, and the cost of the spare parts and replacing parts-which, of course, are spare parts-has been estimated at about 15 per cent of the artillery which they are intended for. There has been a still further division into classes because the percentages are somewhat different-that is to say, we have divided the artillery into classes in which the vehicles are drawn by horses and those in which they are drawn by motor vehicles. For the repair and maintenance of the horse-drawn artillery, with the exception of the guns themselves, the actual guns, just the pieces themselves, which is expected to be on hand by June 30, 1918, the sum estimated is $11.250,000; for the repair and maintenance of the artillery, again excepting the guns themselves, which will be on hand at that date and which it is expected will be motorized instead of horse-drawn, the sum estimated is $7,515,200, with the addition of 50 per cent of the cost of the motor vehicles themselves, as distinct from the vehicles which the motors draw, which amounts to $21,096,800.

The repair parts for the artillery, except the cannon, which is horse drawn and not motor drawn, for the first army of 1,000,000 men, are estimated at $8,027,400, and for the repair parts, with the same exception, for the artillery that is to be motorized, and being for the first million men, the estimate is $30,574,740. In addition to that, there is 25 per cent added to the total estimated cost of the motor equipment itself which amounts to $31,754,600. So far all of these sums have related to the artillery, with the exception of the cannon they refer to, carriages, limbers caissons, ammunition wagons, and so on, always excepting the cannon; for the maintenance of the cannon, including labor and materials, up to June 30, 1918, for the first million men, the estimated amount is $6,500,000. For the second million men there is estimated only the cost of the repair parts and not the cost of repairing and maintaining, because these second million men are only supposed to go into the war at about the end of this fiscal year, and repair parts will have to be provided to make good the breakages, etc., which will be suffered the following fiscal year, but the expense of repairing and maintaining will only commence at the beginning of the following year, so for the repair parts, again excepting the cannon-that is, the pieces themselves-for the nonmotorized artillery of the second million men the estimated sum is $15,133,800. The same thing for the motorized vehicles will be that for the artillery vehicles themselves as distinct from the motor vehicles, $36,211,140, and for the motor vehicles themselves, the motor equipment, $44,259,600.

Coming to the cannon-which I have just excepted-for these people, the material for the maintenance of the cannon of the first and second million men, during the following fiscal year, ending June 30, 1919-which material will have to be gotten during the fiscal year 1918-the estimate is $19,250,000. These figures include the whole of