TABLE OF STATUTES CITED IN OPINIONS. 420, 421 1793, Feb. 12, 1 Stat. 302.. 1827, March 2, 4 Stat. 235. 1833, March 2, 4 Stat. 634, 90 719 1836, June 23, 5 Stat. 38.. 1849, March 2, 9 Stat. 352.. c. 57, (A.) STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. PAGE PAGE 1789, Aug. 7, 1 Stat. 54, c. 9..... 149 1884, July 4, 23 Stat. 73.....642, 643, 1789, Sept. 24, 1 Stat. 81, c. 20..70, 89 644, 645, 650, 651, 653, 657 1790, April 30, 1 Stat. 118, c. 9... 1885, March 3, 23 Stat. 437... 41 1888, Sept. 26, 25 Stat. 496, c. 1039, 262 1889, Feb. 9, 25 Stat. 658, c. 120, 446, 447, 448 1889, March 1, 25 Stat. 783, c. 333, 196 285, 286 1861, Aug. 6, 12 Stat. 320, c. 62.. 241 1863, March 3, 12 Stat. 713... 273 1864, June 30, 13 Stat. 223, c. 173, 277 1865, March 3, 13 Stat. 500, c. 86, 270, 271 1866, April 9, 14 Stat. 27, c. 31... 248 1866, July 13, 14 Stat. 140, c. 184, 277 1867, Feb. 5, 14 Stat. 385, c. 28... 72 1870, July 14, 16 Stat. 256....... 1871, Feb. 21, 16 Stat. 419, c. 62, 241 1872, May 8, 17 Stat. 69, c. 140, 277 272, 276, 277 scascascascos cascos cascascos cascascascascascosess 849. 283 § 983 283, 284 § 2139. 264, 265 § 2290. 487 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 1472. Argued March 4, 5, 1890.- Decided April 14, 1890. An appeal from the decision of a Circuit Court of the United States in a habeas corpus case, under Rev. Stat. § 764, as amended by the act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 437, c. 353, brings up the whole case, both law and facts, and imposes upon this court the duty of reëxamining it, upon the full record as it was heard in the inferior court. L-ed 137 158 135 L-ed 43f 664 135 L-ed 471 803 135 L-ed 144 294 48f 77 135 1 L-ed 55 160 241 64f 328 61f 350 135 1 A person who is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a By virtue of Rev. Stat. §§ 606, 610, the justices of the Supreme Court The docket title of this case is "Thomas Cunningham, Sheriff of the 135 County of San Joaquin, California, Appellant, v. David Neagle." 34 L-ed 55 s 10 SC 658 119 f 234 Syllabus. travelling from his residence to the Circuit Court which he is to attend, and from each place in that circuit where the court is held to the other places where it is held. Held, that, while a judge is thus travelling to or from those places, he is as much in discharge of his duty as when listening to and deciding cases in open court, and is as much entitled to protection in the one case as in the other. While there is no express statute authorizing the appointment of a deputy marshal, or any other officer to attend a judge of the Supreme Court when travelling in his circuit, and to protect him against assaults or other injury, the general obligation imposed upon the President of the United States by the Constitution to see that the laws be faithfully executed, and the means placed in his hands, both by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, to enable him to do this, impose upon the Executive department the duty of protecting a justice or judge of any of the courts of the United States, when there is just reason to believe that he will be in personal danger while executing the duties of his office. An assault upon a judge of a court of the United States, while in discharge of his official duties, is a breach of the peace of the United States, as distinguished from the peace of the State in which the assault takes place. Under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 788, it is the duty of marshals and their deputies in each State to exercise, in keeping the peace of the United States, the powers given to the sheriffs of the State for keeping the peace of the State; and a deputy marshal of the United States, specially charged with the duty of protecting and guarding a judge of a court of the United States, has imposed upon him the duty of doing whatever may be necessary for that purpose, even to the taking of human life. United States officers and other persons, held in custody by state authorities for doing acts which they were authorized or required to do by the Constitution and laws of the United States, are entitled to be released from such imprisonment; and the writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for that purpose. David Neagle, a deputy marshal of the United States for the District of California, was brought by writ of habeas corpus before the Circuit Court of that District, upon the allegation that he was held in imprisonment by the sheriff of San Joaquin County, California, on a charge of the murder of David S. Terry. He alleged that the killing of Terry by him was done in pursuance of his duty as such deputy marshal in defending the life of Mr. Justice Field, while in discharge of his duties as Circuit Judge of the ninth circuit. On the trial of this writ in the Circuit Court it entered an order discharging the prisoner, finding that he was in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and was imprisoned in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The case being brought up to the Supreme Court by appeal, this court, on examining the voluminous testimony, arrived at Statement of the Case. the conviction that there was a settled purpose on the part of Terry and his wife, amounting to a conspiracy, to murder Mr. Justice Field, on his official visit to California in the summer of 1889; that this arose from animosity against him on account of judicial decisions made in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California in a suit or suits to which they were parties; that the purpose which they had of doing Mr. Justice Field an injury became so well and so publicly known, that a correspondence ensued between the marshal and the District Attorney of that District and the Attorney General of the United States, the result of which was that Neagle was appointed a deputy marshal for the express purpose of guarding Mr. Justice Field against an attack by Terry and his wife which might result in his death; that such an attack did take place; that Neagle, being there for the said purpose of affording protection, had just reason to believe that the attack would result in the death of Mr. Justice Field unless he interfered; and that he did justifiably interfere by shooting Terry while in the act of assaulting Mr. Justice Field, whom he had already struck two or three times. Held, (1) That Neagle was justified in defending Mr. Justice Field in this manner; (2) That in so doing he acted in discharge of his duty as an officer of the United States; (3) That having so acted, in that capacity, he could not be guilty of murder under the laws of California, nor held to answer to its courts for an act for which he had the authority of the laws of the United States; (4) That the judgment of the Circuit Court, discharging him from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin County, must therefore be affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MILLER, on behalf of the court, stated the case as follows: This was an appeal by Cunningham, sheriff of the county of San Joaquin, in the State of California, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, discharging David Neagle from the custody of said sheriff, who held him a prisoner on a charge of murder. On the 16th day of August, 1889, there was presented to Judge Sawyer, the Circuit Judge of the United States for the Ninth Circuit, embracing the Northern District of California, a petition signed David Neagle, deputy United States marshal, by A. L. Farrish on his behalf. This petition represented that |