Statement of the Case. the payment of any tax mentioned in said section one, shall, on or before the first day of May in each year, make and file with the county treasurer in the county where it is proposed to carry on such business, a statement in writing and on oath, showing the name and residence of such person, the ward, village or township in which it is proposed to carry on such sale or manufacture, and the nature of the business which such person is engaged in, or is intending to engage in; and shall, on or before the first day of May in each year, pay to the said county treasurer, in advance, the taxes required by said section one for such business for the year commencing on said first day of May and ending on the thirtieth day of April next thereafter." "SEC. 7. If any person or persons shall engage or be engaged in any business requiring the payment of a tax under section one of this act without having paid in full the tax required by this act, and without having the receipt and notice for such tax posted up as required by this act, or without having made, executed and delivered the bond required by this act, or shall in any manner violate any of the provisions of this act, such person or persons shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, if there is no specific penalty provided therefor by this act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars and costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. And in case such fine and costs shall not have been paid at the time such imprisonment expires, the person serving out such sentence shall be further detained in jail until such fine and costs shall have been fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the whole term of imprisonment exceed six months. And any person or persons engaged in any business requiring the payment of a tax under section one of this act, who, after paying the tax so required, shall be convicted of the violation of any of the provisions of this act, shall thereby, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by this act, forfeit the tax so paid by him or them, and be precluded from con Opinion of the Court. tinuing such business for the remainder of the year or time for which said tax was paid, and be debarred from again engaging in any business requiring the payment of a tax under section one of this act, or from becoming a surety or sureties upon any bond required under section seven of this act, for the period of one year from the time of such conviction. Each violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be construed to constitute a separate and complete offence, and for each violation on the same day, or on different days, the person or persons offending shall be liable to the penalties and forfeitures herein provided, and be precluded and debarred from continuing or engaging in any business requiring the payment of a tax under this act as aforesaid. And it shall be the duty of sheriffs, marshals, constables and police officers to forthwith close all saloons and other places where the business of manufacturing, selling or keeping for sale any of the liquors mentioned in section one of this act is being conducted, upon which business the tax required by said section one has not been paid in full, and in which the receipt mentioned in section five of this act shall not be posted up and displayed." "SEC. 24. All persons engaged in the business of selling or keeping for sale any of the liquors mentioned in this act, whether as owner or as clerk, agent, or servant or employé, shall be equally liable as principals for any violation of any of the provisions of this act, and any person or principal shall be liable for the acts of his clerk, servant, agent or employé for any violation of the provisions of this act." Mr. Howard E. Thompson for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edward Cahill for defendant in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. Under the statute in question, which is entitled "An act to provide for the taxation and regulation of the business of manufacturing, selling, keeping for sale, furnishing, giving or delivering spirituous or intoxicating liquors and malt, brewed Opinion of the Court. or fermented liquors or vinous liquors in this State, and to repeal all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act," an annual tax is levied "upon the business of selling only brewed or malt liquors at wholesale or retail, or at wholesale and retail" of three hundred dollars, and "upon the business of manufacturing brewed or malt liquors for sale, sixty-five dollars per annum." The manufacturer of malt or brewed liquors made outside of the State of Michigan cannot introduce them into the hands of consumers or retail dealers in that State, without becoming subject to this wholesale dealer's tax of three hundred dollars per annum in every township, village or city where he attempts to do this. The manufacturer in the State need only pay the manufacturer's tax of sixty-five dollars, and is then exempt from paying the tax imposed on the wholesale dealer. We have repeatedly held that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648, and cases cited. In Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway, 125 U. S. 465, it was decided that a section of the Code of the State of Iowa, forbidding common carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into the State from any other State or Territory, without first being furnished with a certificate as prescribed, was essentially a regulation of commerce among the States, and not being sanctioned by the authority, express or implied, of Congress, was invalid because repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and in Leisy v. Hardin, ante, 100, the judgment in which has just been announced, that the right of importation of ardent spirits, distilled liquors, ale and beer from one State into another, includes, by necessary implication, the right of sale in the original packages at the place where the importation terminates; and that the power cannot be conceded to a State to exclude, directly or indirectly, the subjects of inter Syllabus. state commerce, or, by the imposition of burdens thereon, to regulate such commerce, without congressional permission. The same rule that applies to the sugar of Louisiana, the cotton of South Carolina, the wines of California, the hops of Washington, the tobacco of Maryland and Connecticut, or the products, natural or manufactured, of any State, applies to all commodities in which a right of traffic exists, recognized by the laws of Congress, the decisions of courts and the usages of the commercial world. It devolves on Congress to indicate such exceptions as in its judgment a wise discretion may demand under particular circumstances. Lyng was merely the representative of the importers, and his conviction cannot be sustained, in view of the conclusions at which we have arrived. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Michi gan is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. JUSTICES HARLAN, GRAY and BREWER dissented upon the grounds stated in their opinion in Leisy v. Hardin, ante, 100. MACKALL v. MACKALL. 135 167 L-ed 84 75f 493 751 507 135 167 L-ed 84 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 173 22 135 167 No. 159. Argued April 1, 2, 1890. Decided April 21, 1890. A bill in equity was filed to set aside a deed made to one of his sons by the grantor as made under undue influence, and to affirm the validity of a will executed by that grantor a short time before the making of the deed. A decree was entered, affirming the deed as to a part of the property conveyed by it as a confirmation of a previously acquired equitable title, and setting it aside as to the remainder. The plaintiffs appealed; the defendant took no appeal; Held, that, although the decree was apparently incongruous in supporting the deed as to a part and setting it aside as to the remainder on a bill charging undue influence, yet as no appeal had been taken by the defendant, the court would look into the merits, and that, whatever criticism might be made upon its form, the decree was substantially right. L-ed 84 83f 896 831 897 Opinion of the Court. When a husband and wife separate, and one son remains with the father. taking his part, sharing his confidence and affection, and assisting him in his affairs, and the other children go with the mother, taking her part in the family differences, and this state of things continues for years, until terminated by the death of the father, it is natural and reasonable that the father, in disposing of his estate, should desire to specially provide for the son who remained with him and took his part; and a deed made by him with this object, and under the natural influences springing from such relationship will be sustained, unless it be made further to appear that the son practised upon the father imposition, fraud, importunity, duress, or something of that nature, in order to secure its execution. The fact that a party who has received a parol gift of real estate has entered into possession and has expended money in improvements thereon, presents equitable considerations to uphold a decree establishing a subsequent conveyance as a confirmation of the equitable title. IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. S. S. Henkle (with whom was Mr. R. M. Newton on the brief) for appellants. Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson and Mr. J. S. C. Blackburn for Brooke Mackall, appellee. Mr. W. Willoughby filed a brief for same. Mr. Robert Christy and his wife, Mrs. Catharine Christy, appellees in person. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are these: On December 9, 1879, Brooke Mackall, Sr., made a will, whereby he gave to his children, other than Brooke Mackall, Jr., all his property, declaring as to said Brooke Mackall, Jr., that "by this my last will and testament I do not give, devise, or bequeath to my son, Brooke Mackall, Jr., any part, parcel or portion of my property whatever, as the said Brooke Mackall, Jr., heretofore received from me many and large advances, and as it would be unjust to my other children herein before named, but I direct Leonard to pay him one |